Perception and practice: Participation, evaluation and aid harmonisation in Ethiopia by Williamson, Virginia
        
University of Bath
PHD








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. May. 2019
 
 
Perception and Practice: Participation, 









A thesis submitted for the degree of 




University of Bath 
Department of Social and Policy Sciences 











Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author. A 
copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and they must 
not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent 




This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may 

























1. INTRODUCTION 14 
 
1.1 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 14 
 
1.2 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 16 
 
 1.3 RESEARCH BOUNDARIES  18 
 
 1.4 NARRATIVE AND STRUCTURE 19 
 
 1.4.1 Narrative 19 
 1.4.2 Structure 22 
 
 
2. AID AND ITS MANAGEMENT 25 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 25 
 
2.2 AID AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT: CONGRUENT 
AND COMPETING DISCOURSES 25 
 
2.2.1  Development Management as Normative Project 26 
2.2.2 Historical Analysis 29 
2.2.3 Development Management as Public Administration 31 
2.2.4 Ethnographic Studies of Development Management 33 
2.2.5 Critical Management Studies 34 
2.2.6 Positioning Within Development Management 
Discourse 35 
 
2.3 THE NEW AID ARCHITECTURE 38 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 38 
2.3.2 Development of the New Aid Architecture 38 
2.3.3 The NAA and the Global Political Economy 43 
 
 2 
2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION 44 
 
2.4.1 Monitoring and Evaluation within the NAA 44 
2.4.2 Historical Development of Aid Evaluation 45 
2.4.3 The Purposes of Evaluation 46 
2.4.4 Critical Approaches to the Concept of Evaluation 49 
2.4.5 Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation 50 
 
2.5 CHANGING NORMS OF PARTICIPATION 51 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 51 
2.5.2 The Role of Participation in the NAA 52 
2.5.3 Indigenous Forms of Participation 54 
2.5.4 The ‘Professional’ in Participation Discourse 56 
2.5.5 Participatory Space, Transaction and Power 61 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 64 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 64 
 
3.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH AND ITS 
ORIENTATION 65 
 
3.2.1 Research Objective 65 
3.2.2 Research Question 67 
3.2.3  Formative Experience Influencing the Research 
Methodology 68 
 
3.3 SOCIAL ACTOR ORIENTATION: SOCIAL AND KNOWLEDGE 
INTERFACES 70 
 
3.3.1 The Social Actor 70 
3.3.2 Applying a Social Actor Perspective to Complimentary 
  Literatures 76 
 
3.4 TRANSACTION, MOTIVATION AND INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE 78 
 
3.4.1  Information Asymmetry in Explaining Aid Relationships 78 
3.4.2 Analysing Trust and Motivation in Aid Relationships 79 
3.4.3 Geopolitics, Information Asymmetry and Polity 80 
3.4.4 Shared Mental Models 82 
 
3.5 CULTURAL ANALYSIS AND MENTAL MODELS 86 
 
3.5.1 Cross-Cultural Research, Epistemology and 
Ontological Discussion 86 
3.5.2 Selected Foci in Cross-Cultural Research 91 
 
3.6 RESEARCH METHODS AND FIELDWORK  95 
 
3.6.1 Ethnography of Aid 96 
3.6.2 Research Methods 98 
3.6.3 Ethics 100 
 3 
3.6.4 Country Selection 102 
3.6.5 Research Relationship with Addis Ababa University 102 
3.6.6 Selection of Donors 103 
3.6.7 Negotiating Access 103 
3.6.8 Logistical Constraints 106 
3.6.9 Pattern of Fieldwork: numerical data on interviews 107 
 
 
4. ETHIOPIA: HISTORY, GEOPOLITICS AND AID RELATIONS 109 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 109 
 
4.2 THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND GEOPOLITICS 110 
 
4.2.1 Ethiopian History and Identity 110 
4.2.2 Religion, Socio-Economy, Ethnicity  113 
4.2.3 Political Systems 118 
4.2.4 Geopolitical Context within the Horn of Africa 123 
 
4.3 AID RELATIONS 126 
 
4.3.1 History and Pattern of Foreign Aid 126 
4.3.2 Donors: Canada 129 
4.3.3 Donors: Ireland 133 
4.3.4 Donors: Sweden 136 
4.3.5 The Framework for NAA Adoption 141 
4.3.6 The 2005 General Election and Aid Relations 145 
4.3.7 Key Issues for Aid Relations 146 
 
 
5. ETHIOPIA: CULTURE AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS 148 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 148 
 
5.2 KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
DISCOURSE 149 
 
5.2.1 Synthesising National and International Literatures 149 
5.2.2 Recurring Themes: Dualism, Continuity, Synchronicity 151 
 
5.3 RELIGION 153 
 
5.3.1 Orthodox Religious Practice 153 
5.3.2 Religious Syncretism 154 
 
5.4 CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP AND COMPETITION 155 
 
5.4.1 Traditional Conceptions of Leadership 155 
5.4.2 Continuity of Governance Patterns 157 
5.4.3 Opposition, Legitimacy and Conflict Resolution 157 
 
 4 
5.5 COMMUNICATION AND ORAL SKILLS 159 
 
5.5.1 Oratory 159 
5.5.2 Reticence 161 
5.5.3 Discussion in Decision-Making 162 
 
5.6 GOVERNMENT-COMMUNITY STRUCTURES 163 
 
5.6.1 State-Civil Society Relations: National NGOs 163 
5.6.2 State-Civil Society Relations: Community-Level 
  Mechanisms 165 
5.6.3 Mobilisation for Participation 167 
 
5.7 COMMUNITY STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS 167 
 
5.7.1 Reciprocal Labour-Sharing 168 
5.7.2 Religious Associations 168 
5.7.3 Non-Religious Associations 169 
5.7.4 External Perceptions of Ethiopian Associational 
Structures 170 
 
5.8 MORES OF PARTICIPATION 171 
 
5.8.1 Individualism and Collectivism 171 
5.8.2 Mutuality, Reciprocity and Trust 173 
 
5.9 EVALUATIVE MECHANISMS  174 
 
5.9.1 Informal Evaluative Mechanisms 174 
5.9.2 Formal Evaluative Mechanisms 175 
 
5.10 LOCAL v. INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS OF PARTICIATION 
AND EVALUATION 176 
 
 
6. PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION IN GOVERNMENT-COMMUNITY 
RELATIONS IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA 179 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 179 
 
6.2 RESPONDENTS 180 
 
6.2.1 The Government/Community Nexus 180 
6.2.2 Female Heads of Household 182 
6.2.3 Priests 183 
6.2.4 Farmers 184 
6.2.5 Local Leaders 185 
6.2.6 Young Professionals  187 
6.2.7 Older Government Officials 190 
 
6.3 PERCEPTION AND PRACTICE OF PARTICIPATION 192 
 
6.3.1 Introduction 192 
6.3.2 Participation as “Contribution of Labour” 193 
 5 
6.3.3 Participation as “Involvement in Community Meetings” 199 
6.3.4 Bridging Conceptions of Participation 207 
 
6.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION 210 
 
6.4.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Data Collection 210 
6.4.2 Evaluation in Rural Development 214 
6.4.3 Reflection on Ethiopian and Donor Concepts of 
Evaluation 220 
 
6.5 CONGRUENCE, AMBIGUITY AND DISJUNCTURE: 
RECIPIENT CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON 221 
 
6.5.1 Introduction 221 
6.5.2 Comparative Analysis: Ethiopia, Tanzania and 
Vietnam 221 




7. PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION IN DONORS’ 
EXPERIENCE IN ETHIOPIA 229 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 229 
 
7.2 DEVELOPMENT VALUES, PARTICIPATION AND 
EVALUATION: DOCUMENTARY REVIEW 230 
 
7.2.1  Development Values 230 
7.2.2  Concepts of Participation and Agency 234 
7.2.3  Approaches to Monitoring and Evaluation 239 
7.2.4  Indications for Harmonisation and Alignment 241 
 
7.3 FINDINGS FROM DONOR INTERVIEWS 242 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 242 
7.3.2 Aid, Politics and Development 243 
7.3.3 Understanding the Local Context 248 
7.3.4 Participation 254 
7.3.5 Evaluation 262 
 
7.4 SHARED MENTAL MODELS 273 
 
7.4.1 Actors’ Agency 273 
7.4.2 The Arena for Sharing Mental Models 275 
7.4.3 Polity, Information and Mental Models 276 
7.4.4 Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity 279 
 
 
8. REFLECTION ON THE ROLE OF MENTAL MODELS IN 
DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 289 
 
8.1 OVERVIEW 289 
 
8.2 ‘LESSONS LEARNT’ FROM THE RESEARCH 293 
 6 
8.2.1 Consensus, Heterogeneity and Confusion 293 
 
8.3 AGENCY AND INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMULATION 297 
 
8.3.1 Agency in Development Agencies 297 
8.3.2 Knowledge from ‘The Field’ 301 
8.3.3  Shift From Technical to Political Imperatives 304 
 
8.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 305 
 
8.4.1 Development Management Discourse 305 
8.4.2 Development Management and Ideology 307 
8.4.3 Development Management and Cross-Cultural 
  Discourse 309 











A. Summary of WIDE Analysis 313 
  
B. Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 322 
 










Figure 1.1 Diagrammatic Illustration of the Literature Review 23 
Figure 2.1 Discourses in Development Management 26 
Figure 3.1 Linked Literatures 65 
Figure 3.2 Consensus, Information and Polity, adapted from 
Waterman and Meier (1998: 188). 81 
Figure 4.1 ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005 127 
Figure 4.2 ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005 
 disaggregated by donor 128 
Figure 4.3 Canadian ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 129 
Figure 4.4 Irish ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 133 
Figure 4.5 Swedish ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 137 
Figure 6.1 Formal and Information Administrative Structure 181 
Figure 6.2 Local Evaluation Framework 217 
Figure 7.1 The ‘Dialogue Architecture’ 247 
Figure 7.2 Conception of Congruence and Disjuncture in Identities 
 within the local aid chain 261 
Figure 7.3 Principal-Agent expansion to Consider Polity 278 
Figure 8.1 Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity in Mental Models 302 






Table 2.1 Simplified Conceptual Model of Post WWII Aid Orthodoxies 30 
Table 3.1 Number of Interviews Held 108 
Table 6.1 Comparative Overview: Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam 222 
Table 6.2 Emerging Themes from the Ethiopian Data 228 








I acknowledge with great appreciation the funding support I received from the 
University of Bath, in the form of a University Research Studentship, and thank 
the staff of the Department for their support and advice. My supervisor, Dr. 
James Copestake, has been unfailingly supportive and encouraging, and 
accepting of the breadth of literature and concepts that the cross-cultural nature 
of the thesis has included. He has provided feedback promptly, his advice has 
been consistently constructive and stimulating. I owe him an enormous debt of 
gratitude.  
 
My thanks, too, to Dr. Philippa Bevan for providing access to her team’s primary 
data to set me on my way, and for our challenging conversations on the terrace 
at the Ras Amba. I am also grateful to Dr. Alula Pankhurst for his insights and 
help in setting up the research. As a result of this, I also received logistical 
support from the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University 
of Addis Ababa. My research assistants, former students from that department, 
were knowledgeable, helpful and tolerant, making the research process so much 
easier for both me and my respondents. My thanks go to Kibrom Fisseha, 
Solomon Debebe and Agazi Tiumlissan, and also to Yisak Tefere and Feleke 
Tadele for their friendly advice. Ann and Frank Rispin and Judith Altshul gave 
me warm hospitality in Addis Ababa. I am particularly grateful to my family and 
friends for their support throughout, despite my absence, either literally or 
metaphorically, in a place from where communication links were poor. Above all, 
I am grateful to my respondents, both habesha and ferengi, who gave me their 




This thesis explores the role which culture and belief systems play in influencing 
perceptions and practice of participation in evaluation in aid-funded 
development. The research followed the programmes of three bilateral donors in 
Ethiopia, a pilot country for aid harmonisation, which has a Revolutionary 
Democratic government. The New Aid Architecture (NAA) assumes that 
recipient countries will adopt liberal democracy and New Public Management, 
recognising them as superior to their own ideology and institutions. Donors’ 
assumptions, and the implied consensualism of the NAA, were fractured when 
the government demonstrated it had not accepted democratic pluralism and 
donors withdrew budget support, designing a new modality with greater controls 
in response.  
 
The two ideological approaches share a consensual rhetoric in which citizens 
are expected to participate - voluntarily/individually in liberal democracy, and 
obligatorily/collectively in revolutionary democracy. The meaning and purpose of 
participation and evaluation were strongly shared in northern Ethiopia, where 
government-community interaction synthesises with customary practices of 
participation and evaluation. In contrast, donors’ understanding of participation 
and evaluation was partial and uncertain, differentiated most clearly by 
professional background and nationality. By employing Denzau and North’s 
‘shared mental models’ as an analytical tool within an underlying social actor 
perspective, it was possible to trace elements of culture and belief systems, from 
which mental models are formed, through to the development values and 
practice of all four countries (Ethiopia and the three donors). 
 
The research proposes a normative approach to development management 
which engages constructively with policy formulation and management practice, 
recognising the role that culture and belief (religion and/or ideology) play in 
countries’ differential development values, objectives and practice. This requires 
greater interrogation of the political systems which underpin development policy 
formulation, and a more comparative approach, involving greater reflexivity, to 
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1.1 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
International development is a normative project, and current aid orthodoxy for 
poverty reduction centres on good governance as the vehicle to achieve this. 
Discourses about the form and quality of participation and about aid 
effectiveness reflect this approach. International donors’ focus on participation 
and evaluation as ways of improving and measuring aid effectiveness shifted 
during the 1990s with the move from project to programme modality. Current aid 
orthodoxy, the New Aid Architecture (NAA), is based on the premise that donors 
and recipient governments (and governments and their citizens) reach 
consensus about developmental goals and strive to achieve them by working in 
‘partnership’. It assumes that recipient countries will adopt liberal democracy 
and New Public Management, with expectations that civil society will monitor 
government performance and the electorate will hold the government to account 
via multiparty elections. The NAA was introduced as a guidance document for 
donors, Shaping the 21st Century (OECD, 1996). King describes this as “one of 
the clearest expressions of a set of donor-driven and donor-selected policies, 
strategies and targets that have been agreed by the OECD members states on 
behalf of the developing world” (King, 2004: 15). 
 
The terms ‘participation’ and ‘evaluation’ are linked in discourse (see 2.4 and 
2.5) in arguments for improved aid effectiveness. The rationale for the research 
was to explore how participation, particularly in evaluation, was conceptualised 
within donors’ aid chains, and in donor-government relations, and to investigate 
what factors facilitate or constrain stakeholders’ participation in evaluation of aid-
funded development interventions. The research adds to this literature by 
exploring how participation and evaluation were perceived and practised within 
one cultural and political country context (Ethiopia) during a period of two years 
(2004-2005), when the new instruments were introduced and then tested by 
political events.  
 
The research employed an ethnographic approach to the aid chains of three 
bilateral donor programmes, from the setting of development objectives by 
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donor governments through to participation and evaluation in development 
activities at community level. Based on a social actor epistemology, the 
fieldwork sought to understand the cultural and institutional factors which 
constrained or enabled participatory practice (focusing on issues of power, 
agency, role and culture) and to explore the extent to which these were country-
specific.  
 
The thesis confirms the necessity of taking a ‘long view’ of the development 
process to take account of the culturally-embedded nature of mental models, of 
both developers and those they hope ‘to develop’ through the allocation of aid. 
The central argument of the thesis is the importance of recognising firstly, that 
‘development’ is a transactional, cross-cultural arena in which actors’ strategies 
and receptivity to change are guided by their own mental models and their 
conception of others’; and, secondly, that mental models reflect underlying 
power relations and culturally rooted political beliefs. The contribution of this 
thesis is to add to the development management literature by arguing the 
potential value of these factors in informing development policy and practice. A 
concomitant argument is made, that development policy which assumes the 
superiority of Western models of participation and of accountability may lack 
relevance and legitimacy in the local context and may also fail to meet local, 
sometimes more exacting, standards. Being alert to these inconsistencies 
encourages comparison with the increasing democratic deficit and declining 
trust in systems of governance, for example in the United Kingdom.  
 
The rationale for the research places it within the development management 
subset of development studies. I regard development management as a 
normative endeavour, requiring purposeful engagement with policy and practice. 
Resulting from my own experience and ontological reflection, my approach to 
development management is to engage with discourses from other disciplines to 
inform and appropriately contextualise policy, planning and evaluation. The 
thesis therefore draws on literatures and concepts from a number of different 
disciplines - cultural anthropology, sociology, history, political science, cross-
cultural studies and institutional economics - in order to understand the multi-
faceted nature of donor-government and government-community relations. 
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1.2 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
 
International development is a normative project, and current aid orthodoxy for 
poverty reduction centres on good governance as the vehicle to achieve this. 
Discourses about the form and quality of participation and about aid 
effectiveness reflect this approach. The New Aid Architecture is concerned with 
attitudinal change, and tends to assume that liberal democracy and public 
management reforms will be adopted by recipient countries because their 
existing ideologies and administrative institutions are inadequate. This thesis 
explores the cultural and institutional factors which affect (constrain or enable) 
forms of participation in aid evaluation, drawing upon data from three bilateral 
donors’ programmes in Ethiopia -  a pilot country for aid harmonisation. By 
focusing on governance, the NAA effectively pitched one meta-narrative, liberal 
democracy, against the narrative of ‘Ethiopia’, which was particularly strong. 
 
The principle goal of this thesis is to address an issue for development 
management: what accounts for the differences in the practice of participation, 
particularly in aid evaluation? The conceptual framework is grounded in Norman 
Long’s social actor approach but includes concepts from transactions analysis to 
explore issues of motivation and trust, referencing these against cross-cultural 
research into social identity and individualism-collectivism. The analytical focus 
draws on Denzau and North’s concept of ‘shared mental models’. This argues 
that mental models originate in culture and belief systems (including religion and 
ideology) and facilitate decision-making under uncertainty. They suggest that 
learning takes place gradually through sharing information and discussion of 
values, with plasticity of language assisting assimilation. Significant shifts in 
mental models only occur when belief systems are found to be inadequate to 
explain experience. 
 
The research confirms that actors’ differential understanding of participation and 
evaluation is rooted in their own culture and belief systems. Despite the 
existence of specific areas of contestation, there was greater homogeneity and 
clarity of conceptualisation and practice of participation and evaluation within the 
hierarchy of Ethiopian government-citizen relations than amongst the donors. 
Ethiopian government systems firmly structure the practice of participation and 
evaluation, constraining individual agency in Western liberal democratic terms. 
In contrast, some donor staff found donor structures and practice often 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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conflicted sharply with their own value systems and mental models. This was 
most apparent for those who had joined donor agencies as technical specialists 
and found that political skills were in greater demand than technical expertise. 
Disjunctures were also accentuated by differences between central and regional 
offices of the donors, and increased use of national staff  
 
Although all three donors supported the harmonisation agenda, the range of 
modalities they used provided them with different opportunities to find out about 
local forms of participation and evaluation. Not all chose to access these 
opportunities, and length of engagement alone was not sufficient to achieve 
discursive congruence. Greater congruence was found in the meanings and 
values expressed within agency interviews and policy documentation than 
between donors. Links could be traced between each country’s patterns of 
communication, attitudes to giving and forms of civic engagement (including 
Ethiopia’s), and its political, cultural and religious roots. 
 
The ‘up-stream’ modalities of the New Aid Architecture reduce the level of 
interaction between in-country donor staff and local government and their 
citizens while, at the same time, harmonisation increases the interaction 
between donors, creating a second cross-cultural arena based on the premise of 
shared values and political beliefs. In both arenas, lack of clarity about terms 
such as participation and evaluation, and ambiguity in their use, masks 
uncertainty and hides differences. While the research demonstrates some sharp 
disconnects between donor and Ethiopian understanding and practice of 
participation, accountability and evaluation, some rhetorical positions were found 
to be shared: these include the role of exhortation and communication skills, and 
the importance of civic ‘duty’.  
 
The coherence and consistency of Ethiopian descriptions of participation and 
evaluation, and the strength of national narrative, including the role of 
development, demonstrated the relative strength and validity of structures and 
institutions which accorded with local notions of entitlement and purpose. The 
thesis calls for greater reflexivity on the part of donors and researchers, to 
recognise that national identity and the longevity of customary practice can be 
empowering, and that international practice may be less effective and less 
equitable than the practices which donors expect to see replaced. 
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The shared mental models concept helps to consider disjunctures as well as 
congruence, and the research identified areas of congruence, disjuncture and 
ambiguity which offer discursive ‘room for manoeuvre’. Denzau and North 
suggest that, when mental models are shared, single words can be used to 
communicate complex ideas and that plasticity of language assists congruence. 
In Ethiopia, where oratorical skill is particularly admired, participation and 
evaluation had relatively specific meanings and purpose, compared to their 
fluidity and uncertainty among donors. Denzau and North also argue that 
learning is a gradual process of sharing cultures and belief systems, unless a 
conceptual crisis forces re-evaluation of the mental model. The EPRDF, a 
Revolutionary Democratic party, had been in power in Ethiopia since 1991 and, 
while some donors had adopted federal budget support, others were more 
equivocal. Post-election violence in 2005 caused harmonising donors to 
suspend budget support or reduce their programmes and to design a new 
modality (“Protection of Basic Services”) which gave them a more interventionist 
role.  
 
Donors failed to effect the attitudinal change in Ethiopia that it assumed would 
effect the adoption of liberal democracy. The use of a framework such as 
Denzau and North’s may help indicate to development managers the relative 
strengths of different polities, the extent to which objectives and meanings are 
shared and the relevance of alternative modalities. The thesis concludes by 
arguing that development management discourse should interrogate the role 
which culture, belief systems and information, the mediating factor in shared 
mental models, play in the formulation of development policy and practice.  
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH BOUNDARIES 
 
The research focused on cultural and institutional factors affecting participation 
in evaluation. It did not directly evaluate or explore the effectiveness of donors’ 
programmes, but does draw on secondary literature such as OECD-DAC peer 
reviews, academic texts and evaluation reports. It did not compare the efficacy 
of different evaluation methods, whether participation results in increased aid 
effectiveness, or whether participation results in improved evaluation. The 
evaluation systems of donor, such as multilateral agencies or international Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), are not discussed except in relation to their 
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interaction with the three bilateral donors. .The interview questions were limited 
to exploration of the perception and practices with regard to participation and 
evaluation within the aid chain of the three donors’ programmes. 
 
There were a number of factors which restricted the fieldwork. A limited number 
of donors were interested in taking part, but it was helpful that those who did 
were all actively engaged in the new aid modalities. However, sensitivity about 
their relationship with Ethiopian central government departments meant that 
they did not facilitate access to federal ministry officials for me and an attempt at 
informal access failed. However, because the three donors had regional 
programmes, I concentrated instead on regional government and its sub-levels 
with no insuperable difficulties, although poor infrastructure restricted my access 
to more remote villages. Access to a donor-government monitoring and 
evaluation forum was vetoed by one bilateral donor who had declined to take 
part in my research, but a few multilateral agency staff agreed to key informant 
interviews and gave me relevant documents. The fieldwork coincided with 
parliamentary elections, and the political events which included unexpectedly 
high level of violence delayed fieldwork. It did not cause me to reduce it except 
in one administrative area near the border area with Eritrea. 
 
 




The initial research idea originated from reflection on my experience working in 
a project management role for a development consulting company and 
observing the development management process. Because I was tracking the 
‘project cycle’, I was aware of the genesis of many of the projects and the 
degree to which they were based on evidence. Sometimes the project cycle was 
so extended that the premises on which the project was originally designed were 
no longer current. The intended beneficiaries were rarely consulted and, if they 
were, their views were rarely taken into account, usually because their 
preferences did not coincide with those of the donor or the government. 
Although involvement of government counterparts and national consultants was 
required by projects’ terms of reference, working relationships between donor, 
government and project staff were often tense, with poor or missed 
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communication, conflicting personal goals and project goals open to mis- or re-
interpretation by the different stakeholders. These occurred even when actors 
believed they were able to communicate well, or when they were motivated to 
communicate well but failed. In other situations, failures in communication were 
either not noticed, or not referred to and masked by culturally-based norms of 
polite behaviour. As an example, I was surprised to find that an international 
consultant could, despite his fluency in the local language and claims for special 
insights into local structures, political and cultural norms gained over many 
years’ residence, be unreceptive to information and ideas provided by national 
staff and local leaders; it seemed that ingrained perceptions prevented him from 
doing so.  
 
In this thesis, I have used an analytical concept from Denzau and North, ‘shared 
mental models’, in which ‘mental models’ are derived from culture and belief 
systems. Writing the thesis, during which I drew on discourses from a number of 
disciplines, I struggled to get the right balance between my interpretations, 
mediated by my own mental model, and discourse which might be written by 
others with similar or very different mental models. I had to work out the extent 
to which I should adjust my interpretation to the ‘narratives’ within these 
discourses. 
 
Gould suggests that social scientists’ approach to knowledge is differentiated by 
their interest in “the contingent nature of knowledge and a desire to problematize 
the social mechanisms by which ‘facts’ become constituted as knowledge and, 
hence, the basis for action” (Gould, 2007: 288). As the use of parenthesis 
indicates, the word ‘fact’ is loaded with certainty and implied power; superior 
levels of ‘knowledge’ are required to turn information into ‘fact’. Interpret ivist 
social science recognise that ‘facts’ are usually a matter of interpretation. By the 
the end of the thesis, I had concluded that it was important to distinguish clearly 
between information, the catalyst for sharing mental models (cf. Denzau and 
North), and ‘knowledge’. Taking up Gould’s point, I visualise problematising as 
part of a process of knowledge production, but, because of my mental model 
which has led me to regard development management as a normative 
endeavour, I am wary that too much emphasis on problematising crowds out the 
purposeful value of ‘information’. I therefore argue in Chapter 8 that discourse, 
being a matter of interpretation, must consider the author(s)’ menta l model; in 
other words, I argue for greater reflexivity. This is clearly an acceptance of the 
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“contingent nature of knowledge”, but a mental models approach requires 
recognition of the role which culture, religion and ideology play in the 
construction of mental models.  
 
In development, the term ‘Western’ applied to knowledge construction, values 
and political structures is used to denote a worldview developed largely as the 
result of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. This research found that donor 
staff from three different countries which are normally included under the 
‘Western’ umbrella had different values and practices, and each country had a 
dominant value which was observable in their development objectives: 
geopolitical stability, empathy and solidarity+knowledge. Using them as an 
example, and endorsing Craig and Porter’s identification of the New Aid 
Architecture with the ‘Third Way’ form of liberal democracy, I provide a schema 
(in Chapter 8) for normative development management to engage with culture 
and ideology to order to understand the mental models behind policy 
formulation. The ‘shared’ component of Denzau and North’s approach is the 
extent to which mental models rely on inductive reasoning or respond to 
information provided by another (mental model). The schema suggests that 
normative development management requires study of empathy, knowledge and 
belief systems but this needs to be grounded in ‘information’. Making the 
information explicit permits the analysis. 
 
This chapter and Chapter 8 ‘top and tail’ the thesis by setting the broader 
context of the research, indicating the implications for a normative development 
management and thus for development policy. The chapters which follow 
gradually focus down to two chapters (6 and 7) containing the results of 
interviews with Ethiopian and donor respondents, before expanding again as the 
analysis deepens. I have included rather more ‘information’ in these two 
chapters than another author might have done. This was for three reasons. 
Firstly, I undertook the research and its analysis using a social actor perspective 
(Long, 2001), acknowledging individuals’ agency and strategies. The degree of 
heterogeneity and fluidity of the knowledge interface, from Long’s approach, is a 
key part of the analysis. Furthermore, my mental model leads me to value the 
role of the individual within society. Secondly, since the analysis was directed by 
my own mental model, and because my social science research training instilled 
the principle of validity, it was important to retain sufficient data to allow others’ 
to critique the analysis. The third reason is the role which the data has played in 
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developing the reflexivity which I learnt through engaging with the concept of 
‘community’.  
 
Back home in the UK writing the thesis, I engaged with my local ‘community’ in a 
way I had not really done since I was a child. I had interviewed over one 
hundred people in Ethiopia and the interviews have played like a videotape at 
the back of my mind as I have experienced Third Wayism at work, observing the 
dynamics of government-community interaction, the participatory space that it 
provides and the differing levels of agency which allow people to speak out as 
individuals or through their associational life, or not at all. I therefore owe a debt 
of gratitude to my Ethiopian respondents, and wanted to retain their input, rather 
than edit it out. It allowed me to realise that Third Wayism is being imposed on 
developing countries under the current orthodoxy, even though - in the UK at 
least - we, as citizens, are still working out the extent and implications for 
ourselves. With the donor respondents, too, I heard the difficulty that most of 
them had in equating their own value systems and sense of agency with the 
development policies formulated not just back at their agency headquarters but 
in the centres which devise and globalise development orthodoxies. 
 
1.4.2 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explores current discourses about 
aid, participation and evaluation. The discussion of aid is presented in two parts: 
first, a review of development management as a field of study addressed by 
differing disciplinary discourses; and second, an exploration of the current aid 
orthodoxy, the NAA. A second strand of literature review (in Chapter 3) involves 
the identification of the key concepts which inform the analysis: a review of 
discourses about trust and motivation, leading to the selection of ‘shared mental 
models’ as the focus of the analytical framework. This leads on to a reflective 
review, as a non-anthropologist, of cultural analysis. Chapter 3 then discusses 
other influences on my own ontological perspective and my epistemology, and 
concludes by describing the research methods used and the logistics of 
fieldwork. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide the contextual background to the research in 
Ethiopia. Chapter 4 is a review of the historical, anthropological and political 
science literature, includes a discussion of Ethiopia’s geopolitical importance 
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and provides a history of aid and donor-government relations, tracking the three 
donors’ aid trajectories. Chapter 5 provides information about Ethiopian 
institutions and explores the literature on customary practices of participation 
and evaluation. These two chapters provide the contextual background against 
which the findings of the fieldwork with Ethiopian government staff, local leaders 
and farmers, written up in Chapter 6, can be read. Subsection 1.4.1 reflected on 
the importance of the interview data in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 7 starts with 
documentary analysis of the donors’ development values, and concepts of 
participation and evaluation, and goes on to present and analyse the interviews 
with national and international donor staff. 
 
The literature review therefore covers several chapters. The logic of this is 
demonstrated in the range of intersects between the different domains of the 
research, illustrated in  Figure 1.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1.1:  Diagrammatic Illustration of the Literature Review 
 
 
Analysis of the interview data in Chapters 6 and 7 is carried out alongside the 
findings, and assesses the actors’ agency, cultural repertoires and opportunities 
and mechanisms for acting strategically at the development interface. The two 
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chapters are linked around the themes of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity 
as arenas for dialogue.  
 
Included in Chapter 6 is a brief comparison of the development values, 
associational life and customary forms of evaluation of Ethiopia, Tanzania and 
Vietnam. This indicates that, despite the particularity of Ethiopia, of which it is 
proud, the forms of participation and evaluation found there are also apparent, to 
a greater or lesser extent, in the other two countries, particularly in Vietnam. 
Chapter 8 draws conclusions about the usefulness policy makers and to 
development management of taking a mental models approach, which uses 
culture and its institutions, and belief systems (religion and/or ideology) and its 
institutions, to anticipate learning options and outcomes. It advocates greater 
use of donor as well as recipient country comparison in assessing the 
trajectories of differential aid policies and development practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 





This chapter reviews three sets of literature providing the discourse relevant to 
explore the role of participation in monitoring and evaluation within the 
complexity of the aid chain. The first section, 2.2, explores current discourses in 
development management, identifying its changing patterns and suggesting four 
main approaches to its study. Section 2.3 discusses the current aid orthodoxy, 
the ‘New Aid Architecture’, tracking its development and relating it to the global 
political economy. Discourses on evaluation and concepts of participation within 
monitoring and evaluation are discussed in 2.4; and changing norms of 
participation in aid discourse are reviewed in section 2.5.  
 
 
2.2 AID AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT: CONGRUENT AND 
COMPETING DISCOURSES 
 
Review of development management literature identifies overlapping discourses 
which come from different disciplinary traditions. This section starts (2.2.1) with 
a discursive exploration of the distinctive qualities claimed for development 
management, based on the conception of development as a ‘normative project’, 
The first of four ‘disciplinary’ discourses, the historical analysis of aid 
management (2.2.2), is a clearly defined field, closely related to patterns of aid 
funding, aid policy and their trajectories. The second discourse is development 
management as a subset of public sector management (2.2.3). The next two 
discourses share normative concerns about development management’s 
‘managerialism’ but each claims a particular epistemological view. These are 
ethnographic studies of development management (2.2.4) and the application of 
Critical Management Studies to development management (2.2.5). The section 
ends with reflection on my own position within the discourse (2.2.6). 
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2.2.1 Development Management as a Normative Project 
 
Development management discourse displays anxiety about its values and its 
role in management, hence discussion of its normative quality. Thomas 
describes development management as a contested field “with inherent 
ambiguities” (Thomas, 2007: 384) and some of these ambiguities are explored 
below. While there are various, evolving subsets of the development studies 
literature called ‘development management’, the subject is also an interest 
broadly shared by most individuals in the ‘aid industry’. The literature is 
fragmented by technical specialisms, each claiming a disciplinary-privileged 
perspective, so that, despite widespread cross-industry engagement with the 
management of development, “the international development community 
remains relatively stovepiped, and analysts and practitioners within one 
specialization tend not to talk much to those outside their area of expertise” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2008: 995).  
 
Figure 2.1 below conceptualises this diagrammatically, indicating that there is a 
general, normative interest within the development ‘industry’ in development 
management, occupied by several fields of discourse varying by the space 
which they occupy in the literature, and the level of their engagement with 
development management praxis. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Discourses in Development Management 
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Aid is distinguished from other types of government funding by being raised and 
macro-managed in one country and disbursed and meso- and micro-managed1 
in another. The ‘aid chain’ is complex, running vertically from taxpayer in the 
donor country to intended beneficiary in the recipient country, and horizontally 
between donor governments, between donors and recipient governments and 
between recipient country structures, its institutions and citizens and their ‘expert 
advisers’. Ideological, political, cultural, socio-economic and demographic 
differences influence how transactions take place in cross-cultural encounters 
requiring “identification of anomalies, surprises and counter-intuitive 
observations that challenge received theory of ways of looking at the world” 
(Hood, 2005: 22), and the need to accept uncertainty, paradox and disjuncture 
(Uphoff, 1996: xii). Brinkerhoff claims that development management is 
inherently reflexive, with the result that “Development specialists have a history 
of disillusionment and self-criticism” (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 356). 
Certainly, “[i]ntegral to the structure and performance of the industry is 
uncertainty about the nature and causes of underdevelopment, and the 
mechanisms by which development progresses” (Copestake, 2005: 55). As the 
industry constantly tries to ‘improve’ development practice and management, the 
issue is whether policies are - or should be - evidence-based, as donor rhetoric 
suggests, or are contingent on wider political and cultural processes. Lewis and 
Mosse suggest that policy follows practice, rather than forming it, therefore 
policy is an interpretation of practice (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 4). Watson, on 
the other hand, suggests that there are structural reasons why donors present 
development plans as ‘idealized’ and ‘optimistic’ rather than confront reasons for 
failure of the previous approach, particularly where there were political 
dimensions associated with the failure (Watson, 2003: 307).  
 
For those who see development as an ‘inherent good’ (Crewe and Harrison, 
1998: 15), its management should be more value-driven than other forms of 
public administration. However, Thomas regards development management as 
“an ideal rather than a description of what takes place” (Thomas, 2000, quoted 
in Cooke, 2004: 612), implying that development management is not such an 
applied discipline as Brinkerhoff suggests. Some of the literature is provided by 
disheartened former senior employees of donor agencies, and from 
                                               
1
  Meso-managed via PRSPs and decentralisation; micro-managed by local government 
officials. 
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“academic/activist-consultants who have emerged from a pragmatic 
engagement with aid/development with more questions than answers” (Gould, 
2004: 268).  
 
From within ‘normative development’ discourse, Wilson reclaims professional 
‘technocracy’ from its “pejorative label in contemporary development discourse” 
which is critical of ‘experts’ on the grounds that they lack local knowledge and 
are unreceptive to different worldviews (Wilson, 2006: 509). Drawing attention to 
the extent of expertise and empirical experience, Wilson notes that, rather than 
being “part of the problem” (ibid: 513), these experts offer the opportunity for 
‘learning with’ in a “non-strategic, dialogic relationship between actors” for the 
purpose of joint knowledge creation rather than focusing on “strategic self-
interests” (ibid: 517) as their critics imply.2 
 
Alan Thomas’s three conceptions of development management are widely cited 
in the literature on values in development management. In the first, 
management in development related to management’s task of “long-term 
historical change”. Development as “deliberate efforts at progress” he called 
management of development. He subsequently took a different approach, 
defining development as progressive change which was the result of an 
orientation rather than a task. This orientation should “guide all activities of 
development organisations, not just specific development interventions”, acting 
as a form of both motivation and organisational compliance and making 
development management distinct from ‘conventional’ management, thus 
management for development (Thomas, 1999). 
 
Latterly (2007), Thomas’s approach became more congruent with that of 
Brinkerhoff, discussing development management in terms of ‘values’. While 
Thomas’s three approaches to defining development management have 
provided a useful point of reference, his recent engagement with Brinkerhoff’s 
more deliberate focus on the political nature of development management 
appears to have led Thomas to a more ‘applied’ perspective, by reflecting on the 
legitimacy of value selection, in other words ‘whose values?’, on accountability 
(the efficacy of one’s own values and the values of others) and on the tension 
associated with conflicting values (Thomas, 2007: 386). He concludes that 
                                               
2
  Discourse on the role of the professional is discussed in 2.5.4 
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values, being deeply-held, cannot be imposed on others, and that exchange of 
ideas, “influencing, steering, negotiation, looking for common ground, and so on, 
are of more importance than trying to force agreement for the implementation of 
a rationally defined programme of action” (ibid: 387). 
 
The current aid orthodoxy is based on liberal democratic values, including 
citizen participation via civil society structures and multiparty democracy (see 
2.3 and 2.5.2). It places considerable emphasis on the normative role of ‘good 
governance’ but, as Brinkerhoff points out, good governance “is strongly 
mediated by the realities of interest group politics, patronage and conflict” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2008: 988). McCourt agrees that development management must 
therefore engage with politics, despite its traditional separation (McCourt, 2001: 
221), but this entails confronting values embedded in Western ideological 
positions and a willingness to consider alternative models including those drawn 
from indigenous management systems (ibid: 226).  
 
2.2.2 Historical Analysis 
 
Development management responds to changes in international public 
administration methods as well as aid ‘fashions’ (Hirschmann, 1999: 289). Each 
orthodoxy becomes obsolescent as changing political agendas and the 
discovery of new ‘scientific’ paradigms redefine ‘development’ (Quarles van 
Ufford et al., 2003: 15) in a “perpetual change for the better” for which there is 
often weak empirical evidence (Easterly, 2002: 234; Killick, 2004: 5).  
 
Historical analysis of development management is the longest-running discourse 
and its review is necessarily abbreviated here. Historical analysis tends to divide 
aid funding into ‘epochs’ characterised by both forms of aid and objectives for 
aid. These can loosely be called aid orthodoxies, because of their presentation 
by international finance institutions (IFIs) and their leading proponents as being 
both universally applicable. The following summary draws on Turner and Hulme, 
1997; Copestake, 2005; and Brinkerhoff, 2008,  and Table 2.1 overleaf, 
summarised from Copestake (2005), conceptualises the orthodoxies in the form 
of a typology. 
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Table 2.1 - Simplified Conceptual Model of Post WWII Aid Orthodoxies 
 








Modernisation Economic growth, 
aid as cold war 
patronage and 
ideological tool 

















Fiscal weakness of 
the state inhibits 
growth 




Aid as contested 









Adapted from Copestake, 2005: 71-73. 
 
 
Comprehensive planning, based on modernisation theory and technical transfer, 
was expected to counteract the influence of the Soviet Union. During the 
1950s/60s, the state was seen as the “primary development actor”, and donors 
paid little attention to corruption, in part because of the Cold War (Brinkerhoff, 
2008: 986). Failure of confidence in the state’s ability to achieve modernisation 
resulted in a shift to decentralised, donor-funded projects providing technical 
assistance via expert ‘change agents’ to effect knowledge transfer. Criticism of 
this methodology centred on weak long-term sustainability of project 
interventions, and the imposition of external forms of knowledge, undermining 
indigenous forms. A growing faith in the market under the developing neo-liberal 
agenda resulted in the next development ‘paradigm’3 , structural adjustment, 
which further reduced the role of the state in development, and included donor 
demands for (mainly fiscal) policy reform reinforced by financial conditionality. 
This shift marked the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. What McCourt 
calls the Washington model of public management was “a cost-driven model of 
reform” (McCourt, 2001: 232). In the fourth and current ‘paradigm’, policy 
management, the state was rehabilitated as part of ‘the solution’, providing 
                                               
3
  I use the term ‘paradigm’ in its secondary meaning, a ‘sorting device’ (Hunt, 1989: 2). 
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sound economic policies, providing basic services and public goods in response 
to democratic accountability, hence ‘good governance’ (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 987). 
The move to policy management, concurrently with the rise of post-modernism, 
has attracted a much broader disciplinary discourse than the previous 
development strategies, which had been dominated by economists. The change 
in development focus from socio-economic improvement to ‘good governance’ 
through the imposition of policy reform and attitudinal change (through civil 
service reform and capacity building) suggested a universal order which hides 
the paradoxes and disjunctures in development practice.  
 
This shifting of aid orthodoxies should compel development studies, and 
therefore development management, to be “a historical exercise” which takes 
into account contextual factors which dictate the path of development (Brett, 
2000: 799). A purely historical review of aid’s orthodoxies is unable to supply 
this level of analysis, without including the antecedents of each orthodoxy and 
its application in different country contexts. The historical approach does, 
however, employ a degree of political analysis of donors’ ideological positions. 
 
2.2.3 Development Management as Public Administration 
 
Aid is managed as part of wider donor government administration, described by 
Brinkerhoff and Coston as development management’s ‘parent discipline’ 
(Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 348). Development administration history closely 
reflect the evolution of development paradigms: during the period 1945-1979, it 
focused on restructuring and leading developing country public sector 
bureaucracies to undertake central planning, infrastructure, and economic 
management (Brinkeroff, 2008: 989), but during the 1980s and 1990s (the “state 
as problem” period), the emphasis shifted to policy management. The 
concurrent introduction of private sector management techniques into the public 
sector led to the re-labelling of development administration as ‘development 
management’ (ibid: 989). In the post-Cold War period and with the introduction 
of ‘third way’ politics in  the West, development management expanded again to 
encompass the promotion of free and fair elections, third sector development 
and local accountability through community empowerment (Craig and Porter, 
2004). 
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The introduction of private sector thinking to public sector management evolved 
into New Public Management (NPM)4. NPM is based on liberal-democratic 
principles of the reduction of the state and democratic accountability. Its “infinite 
reprogrammability” provides “an ‘apolitical’ framework within which many 
different values could be pursued effectively”, but which was susceptible to 
political interest groups (Hood, 1991: 3-8).5 Discourse tends to focus on the 
transfer of NPM to the South, but it should be noted that in Europe NPM is 
regarded as an Anglo-American formulation, which European countries have 
adopted selectively and which they interpret and implement differently.6 
 
Applied in development management, NPM permitted “a coming together of two 
seemingly irreconcilable positions. The view of the Right concerning the need to 
break down the power of powerful interest groups … have found their 
counterpart .. in the softer more socially responsive traditions associated with 
the championing of poverty-focused international aid.” (Brown, 1998: 133). It 
resonated with donors’ agendas for increased participation and with donors’ 
move from project to programme modality. NPM’s components (accountability, 
performance measurement, management by results) are observable in current 
development practice, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (PRS) and their performance indicators; decentralisation; 
and community-funded welfare services. The incorporation of NPM into aid 
orthodoxy is clearly a challenge for development management, because it has 
narrowed the range of ‘acceptable’ aid modalities and limited the tools of 
assessing effectiveness of poverty reduction strategies (donors’ and 
governments’) to the use of aggregated data.  
 
Despite donors’ emphasis on policy and civil service reform, “the analytical 
framework of the MDGs resembled a simplistic machine model that largely 
ignored institutional factors and governance” (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009: 2). 
When acting independently of each other, donors acknowledge that social 
groups in developing countries have differing expectations of the benefits of aid 
and different levels of power required to implement them, and may well reject 
                                               
4
 NPM was first instituted in the UK and New Zealand but subsequently adopted by 
many OECD countries (Hood, 1991: 3) 
5
 NPM is described as “the one-size-fits all managerial solution” (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 
1999: 351) 
6
 See Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Noordhoek and Saner, 2004; Barzelay and 
Füchtner, 2003; Politt et al., 2007. 
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new management and governance systems because they conflict with their own 
“values, systems and knowledge of their own society” (Brett, 2000: 799). 
Increasing acknowledgement of such contextual factors among the donor 
community has resulted, at agency level, in the (limited) development and use of 
analytical techniques such as the Drivers of Change (DOC) approach but DOC 
analysis has had limited application because it assumes that change is 
incremental, requiring an extended time-frame, thus conflicting with donors’ 
rhetoric on aid (and consequent short time-frame) and threatens disbursement 
priorities (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009: 5-6).  
 
Facing a dilemma between their own accountability and ceding control to 
recipients, donors ostensibly adopted process management which, theoretically, 
binds together policy and “iterative cycles of analysis and practice” (Brinkerhoff 
and Coston, 1999: 357). This ‘evidence-based’ concept of process conflicts with 
the political nature of aid and political influences on its management, where the 
move to a “politically infused, multisectoral, multiorganizational model” requires 
“the integration of politics and culture into management improvement” (ibid: 348-
349). Of the authors currently engaged in development management discourse, 
it appears to be those authors who approach development management from a 
public sector management perspective, such as McCourt and Brinkerhoff, who 
explicitly track ideological influences on development management practice. 
 
McCourt argues that the MDGs’ renewed emphasis on improved public services 
led to increased interest among sector specialists in development management 
(McCourt, 2008: 472). The next subsection looks as the role of anthropologists 
in development management discourse. 
 
2.2.4 Ethnographic Studies of Development Management 
 
Anthropologists claim two characteristics of their approach to ethnography of 
development management. The first is that their critique is grounded in practice, 
conceiving development “as daily rout and relationships which cope with 
disjunctures” (Quarles van Ufford et al., 2003: 19), “setting aside self-
representations of bureaucratic rationality in order to uncover more of the inner 
workings of development agencies” (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 3). The second 
characteristic claimed is a strong normative thread: “ethnographic enquiry is 
informed by moral issues embedded in practice as well as broader frames of 
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moral reflection” (Quarles van Ufford et al., 2003: 19). For Gould, 
anthropologists are better placed to assess development practice, firstly 
because they “often identify with the marginalized and disenfranchised”, and 
secondly because they “will often have a better understanding of the recipient’s 
social context than the development practitioner” (Gould, 2004: 276). 
 
While a few anthropologists have drawn on the mainstream management 
literature,7 anthropologists’ main contribution has been the application of 
ethnographic methods to the study of development management. Labelled 
“aidnography” by Gould (Gould, 2004), these have focussed largely on the 
practices of the staff of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, in which 
anthropologists have been engaged as staff (see Eyben, ) or as sub-contractors 
(see Mosse and Lewis, 2004; Grammig, 2002).  
 
A further thread within the ethnographic approach claims that disjuncture 
between policy and practice is necessary to sustain active discourse, thus 
anthropologists position themselves as “antagonistic observers”, “characterized 
by critical distance and a basic hostility towards the ideas of development and 
the motives of those who seek to promote it.” (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 50, 6). 
As their critique is grounded in praxis, some anthropologists are concerned that, 
as “reluctant participants they are complicit in the management project” (ibid: 6). 
They share this concern with authors from Critical Management Studies (CMS)8. 
 
2.2.5 Critical Management Studies  
 
The engagement of anthropologists with ideas from mainstream management is 
soundly criticised by authors from critical management studies. Unlike 
“aidnography”, Critical Management Studies (CMS) is not grounded in practice 
but is “primarily, an academic phenomenon” which says “that there is something 
wrong with management, as a practice and as a body of knowledge” (Fournier 
and Grey, 2000: 12, 16). Its assumption of a ‘critical position’ means “CMS 
research is a relatively closed system” unable to engage with other management 
points of view (Schuurman, 2000: 11-12). Instead, reflexivity is conceptualised 
                                               
7
 Lewis et al. used organisational culture as a way of understanding how development 
organisations (inter)act (Lewis et al., 2003) 
8
  Aid ethnographers and CMS critique the ‘managerialisation’ of current aid orthodoxy. 
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within CMS as “perpetual critique” of own philosophy and methodology (ibid: 
19).  
 
In common with the ethnographical approaches to development management, 
the application of CMS to development management responded to the 
perceived managerialisation of aid orthodoxy during the 1990s. Dar and Cooke 
“believe there is something intrinsically wrong with the very idea of management 
and its applications in international development”, in particular the “amoral, 
virally pernicious, globalizing managerialism” of the current aid orthodoxy, 
centred on the PRSP process and policy reform, orchestrated by the World 
Bank (Dar and Cooke, 2008: 1, 5). 
 
CMS rejects management’s assumption of performative intent, that is “inscribing 
knowledge within means-end calculation” (Fournier and Grey, 2000; Clegg et al., 
2006: 19), and it mistrusts texts (Fournier and Grey, 2000: 19) so that 
“permanent critique, including a critique of any promesse de bonheur, is all we 
can do in the face of postmodernism, however painful this limitation may be.” 
(ibid:21). The paradox of this situation, where permanent critique “effaces or 
appropriates the voices of those in the name of whom they claim to speak”, led 
to a debate whether CMS should engage constructively with applied 
management or whether this would lead to CMS becoming “just another ‘tool kit’ 
for managers” who would use it to increase their own legitimacy and domination 
(ibid: 24). 
 
By engaging with ‘critical development studies’, Dar and Cooke claim that CMS 
can become “The New Development Management” (Dar and Cooke, 2008). 
Although they invoke Thomas’s ‘management for development’, their rejection 
on behalf of CMS of constructive engagement with management appears at 
odds with its normative intent. 
 
2.2.6 Positioning within Development Management Discourse 
 
‘Management’ and ‘Managerialism’ 
 
The preceding sections have noted both overlap and distinction between 
different disciplines. Although Brinkerhoff (2008: 991) commends the “theoretical 
eclecticism” of development management for its ability to “accommodate a large 
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variety of analytic occupants”, the problematic lack of a discrete domain for 
research which he identifies is exemplified by disjunctures in the vocabulary of 
development management.  
 
The ethnographers and the CMS authors tend to conflate managerialism with 
management.9  McCourt describes this conflation as a ‘real problem’: he defines 
managerialism as “the belief that every political problem has a management 
solution, so that the means of management substitute for the ends of policy”, 
hence the uncritical adoption of some private sector management models into 
development orthodoxy (McCourt, 2001: 222). The emphasis on indicators 
under the current orthodoxy “allows efficiency to become an end in itself” and 
thus ‘managerialist’ (ibid: 238). 
 
Another aspect of the discourse on managerialism is the confusion apparent 
between the use of ‘political’ and ‘technorational’ as descriptors of development 
management. Brinkerhoff sees development management as shifting away from 
bureaucratic ‘technorational’ management to a “politically-infused, multisectoral, 
multiorganisational model” (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 348), while Lewis, 
following Craig and Porter (2003), regards the same process as a shift from a 
focus on poverty reduction (therefore, political) to a technorational model based 
on the MDGs, PRSPs and budget support (Lewis, 2008: 53). I have used 
Brinkerhoff’s descriptors in this thesis. 
 
Reflection on development management discourse 
 
The brief review of the four current discourses in development management 
raises several issues. Apart from arguing NPM is part of a neoliberal agenda, 
the literatures tend to avoid engagement with the role of different bilateral donor 
governments in its formulation or its alternatives. By focusing on specific 
organisations, either particular bilateral donor agencies or more frequently the 
World Bank, attention is deflected from the donor government’s political 
objectives and policies. Another concern is the tension between the ‘uncertainty’ 
of development practice and the disciplinary ‘moral high ground’ found within the 
literature, “generat[ing] endless and competing versions of virtuous prescriptions 
for social betterment” (Gould, 2007: 271), where degree of normative-ness, 
                                               
9
 Mosse goes further, by describing “a new managerialism in international development” 
as the conceptual tool of “the ‘new institutional economics’” (Mosse, 2005b: 5). 
Chapter 2: Aid and Its Management 
 37 
critical-ness or emic-ness affords the holder an apparently privileged grasp of 
the problem, though not necessarily the solution. Development management 
has to contend with a (post-development) critique which “is an anti-authoritarian 
sensibility, an aversion to control” where “there is critique but no construction” 
(Pieterse, 1998: 366). 
 
There are, however, an increasing number of calls for greater reflexivity. Among 
these, Pieterse suggests that development management’s ‘uncertainty’ is both 
an expression of, and an opportunity for, reflexivity “in a social and political 
sense, as a participatory, popular reflexivity, which can take the form of broad 
social debates and fora on development goals and methods” (ibid: 369, italics in 
the original). Craig and Porter advise those working in development “to be frank 
and blunt about the limited political and economic outcomes of their own 
institutionalized doctrine and practice” and consequent accountabilities (Craig 
and Porter, 2006: 274). In the afterword to The New Development Management, 
Escobar draws in the ethnographic and critical studies approaches to support 
Gibson-Graham’s call for an “ethical and political development”, one which 
would meet, for example, “local needs more directly, using the surplus to 
strengthen communities; recognizing consumption as a viable route for 
development; … and acknowledging the interdependence of people, nature, 
things and knowledge” (Escobar, 2008: 202). Bebbington also calls for a more 
constructive approach10 to development studies by re-grounding discourse in 
development practice. He singles out Cornwall’s “refreshing humanist edge” 
(Bebbington, 2004: 281) which provides a reminder (to donors and to ‘brokers’) 
that citizens “shape their own conditions of engagement and find and use their 
own voice” outside the participatory spaces created for them (Cornwall, 2004: 
85). 
 
The discourse which identifies development management as a sub-set of public 
sector management, thereby acknowledging the political drivers of both 
management techniques and development policy, has the greatest resonance 
with my own experience. Its starting point, that development management is an 
applied discipline orientated by values, is far more ontologically rewarding than 
the CMS approach which eschews constructive engagement with management. 
I concur with Brinkerhoff that development management is “an applied discipline 
                                               
10
  Recalling an admonition that “you do what you can” (Bebbington, 2004: 278) 
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with permeable boundaries, [which] draws on a mix of analytic intellectual and 
practical tools” (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 990). Normative development management is 
therefore a constructive (purposeful) endeavour - management for development. 
The ethnographic approach offers the opportunity to study, from within, the 
transactions of those engaged in the aid chain, as donors, recipients or 








Section 2.2.2 provided a list of aid orthodoxies which have been applied by the 
international community since the 1950s. This section explores discourse on the 
current orthodoxy, known as the New Aid Architecture (Farrington and Lomax, 
2001: 533), locating it within the current global political economy. 
 
2.3.2 Development of the NAA 
 
The development of the NAA arose, as its predecessors had done, from 
disillusionment about the previous model, structural adjustment linked to 
economic conditionality. In 1996, the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD published a document ‘Shaping the 21st Century’, setting out the agenda 
for the new orthodoxy, which it introduces under a heading ‘Values and 
Interests’. Labelling the document in millennial terms, it takes a multilateralist 
approach and identifies the ‘international community’s’ concerns as creating 
opportunities for poor nations to participate in the global economy, and reducing 
conflict and bad governance. The document then sets out the targets for 
international development, which became the MDGs. The language used does 
not reflect a particularly strong moral argument for reducing poverty, although 
humanitarian need is mentioned as one of three motives, along with [donors’] 
enlightened self-interest, and solidarity to take global issues (at this stage, 1996, 
the list of global issues does not contain ‘security’). The document speaks about 
a ‘vision of progress’ in which poor countries could have “profound influence in 
shaping the 21st century” (OECD-DAC, 1996: 3, 5). This included ‘A Stronger 
Compact for Effective Partnerships’ where “each developing country and its 
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people are ultimately responsible for their own development” (OECD-DAC, 
1996: 5). 
 
The principles of the New Aid Architecture 
 
The main components of the NAA are: debt relief, the formulation of a 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) from which a PRSP is 
formulated in consultation with civil society and donors; and civil service reform. 
This is translated into donor practice as harmonisation of donor programmes, 
alignment of donors’ financial management systems with government systems, 
and conceptualising the relationship between donor and recipient as one of 
‘partnership’, and thence ‘ownership’.  
 
Funding structures and aid modalities 
 
The first stage in developing the structure was the World Bank’s concept of the 
CDF, a “single, overarching development strategy for a given Third World 
country, to which individual first World nation development agencies contribute” 
(Cooke, 2004: 613). The next step for a country to obtain loans from the World 
Bank and IMF is to prepare a “satisfactory” PRSP, in consultation with civil 
society, NGOs, and other donors and creditors” (Easterly, 2002: 223).  
 
The PRSP is based on the idea of policy reform, ostensibly to meet agreed 
MDG targets, but assumptions are made about the link between administrative 
and fiscal reforms including reform and poverty reduction, because: “policy 
conditionality is intended to improve the policy environment and hence aid 
effectiveness” (Killick, 2004: 21). Although Shaping the 21st Century and the 
OECD-DAC documents on harmonisation and aid effectiveness do not preclude 
other lending modalities, direct budget support (DBS) and programme aid is 
described as ‘the way forward’ (OECD-DAC 1996, OECD, 2005e: 13). Thus, the 
NAA allowed donors to continue changing their dominant funding modality from 
projects to programmes. Killick notes that although the move to programme aid 
was justified on grounds which included “stronger influence on the policy 
environment, superior ownership properties, greater overall coherence”, the root 
reason was the belief that programme aid had lower transaction costs than 
project aid (Killick, 2004: 18). This reason, however, is usually hidden behind 
claims for increased ownership. Where it is expressed, as in the Rome 
Declaration on Harmonization (2003), it is in terms of lower transaction costs for 
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recipient governments’ management and financial systems. However, as Killick 
points out, “the concept of transaction costs is being used to justify really large 
changes in the modalities of aid” (ibid, 2004: 21). 
 
Ownership, alignment and harmonisation 
 
Ownership, alignment and harmonisation are specified both as the route to aid 
effectiveness, and as the way by which effectiveness could be monitored. The 
OECD-DAC says very little about the meaning of ‘ownership’, other than to use 
the number of countries with PRSPs as an indicator of its progress. Shaping the 
21st Century talks more about ‘responsibility’ as being the basis for partnership 
(OECD, 1996: 14), sharpened in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(OECD, 2005g) to a commitment from recipient governments to ‘exercise 
effective leadership’ of their development strategies. 
 
Academic commentators tend to argue that ‘ownership’ is necessarily rhetorical, 
firstly, because imbalance of resources (and therefore power) between donor 
and recipient country makes it difficult for donors to cede ownership, even if it 
was in their interests to do so; and secondly, because demands for 
accountability from donors’ domestic principals limits ownership unless donor 
and recipient share congruent values and balanced incentives. The logic of the 
NAA requires donors to use the PRSP as a planning and control document for 
their own aid strategy. Similar rhetoric surrounds partnership, “an aspiration, not 
a fact” (Booth et al., 2005: 4). Concepts of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ are built 
around Western concepts, “rules, ways of working and attitudes which reflect 
donor convenience and donor power” (Hubbard, 2005: 367). Thus, "PRSPs 
remain steadfastly part of the neo-liberal agenda and are simply a new 'technical 
framework’; which does not address uneven power relations within countries 
and between them and donors." (Hickey and Mohan, 2004a: 161). 
 
The Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003) included a greater role for the 
OECD-DAC and the European Union, coordination with regional bodies such as 
the World Bank’s Strategic Partnership for Africa as well as country-level 
coordination mechanisms (OECD, 2005e: 37). Harmonisation therefore takes 
place between donors at international, regional and country level, encouraging 
‘collusion’ between donors and potentially reducing a recipient government’s 
room for manoeuvre (Easterly, 2002). On the other hand, donors have different 
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objectives so that “the more astute [recipients] may be able to manoeuvre 
between different donors, wholly satisfying none” (Burnell, 1997a: 119). 
 
Although the NAA’s main justification was the reduction of recipient’s transaction 
costs, donors anticipated that programme aid would lower their own transaction 
costs. However, dialogue with government and other donors increased staff 
inputs. Transaction costs included loss of contextual knowledge through 
reduced contact with ministries and local level engagement (Killick, 2004: 
21-22), the need to resolve conflicting values and norms, and negotiate 




Although the NAA exerts pressure on donors to work as a single community 
(through ‘harmonisation’) and to create a “single design solution”11, seeing the 
NAA as a tidy centripetal system in which donors act ‘as one’ ignores the 
multiple centrifugal forces of national politics, institutions, culture and values. 
These forces also affect donors’ approaches to participation and to monitoring 
and evaluation, in their own strategies and in their engagement with recipient 
governments. The OECD-DAC aid effectiveness guidelines include “managing 
for, not by, results” (OECD, 2005e: 114). As both donors and recipients were to 
use Results Based Management (RBM), it implied they could ‘learn together’ 
(Eyben, 2006: 12).  
 
The concept of ‘ownership’ placed the responsibility for the effectiveness of the 
donors’ change of practice on the recipient government, rather than on the 
donor (Hubbard, 2005: 369). Government performance on poverty reduction 
was to be monitored via a policy matrix attached to the PRSP, an Annual 
Progress Review (APR) and Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs). It was 
also to be monitored by citizens, directly through civil society involvement in the 
PRSP process, and indirectly through the ballot box. Consultation has been key 
component of donor rhetoric around ownership and partnership (Gould, 2006: 
82), and thus participation could be ‘scaled-up’ to national policy making (Booth, 
2005: 4). The use of civil society to monitor government performance against the 
PRSP is supposed “to elicit greater commitment to equitable and efficient 
                                               
11
  World Bank (2004), Public Sector Capacity Building Programme, Ethiopia - PID 
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development policy by obliging governments to debate their policies openly with 
other actors in their countries” (ibid: 1).  
 
The OECD-DAC uses five aspects of the NAA as performance indicators to 
judge donors’ aid effectiveness and monitor the MDGs: the extent of ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability 
(‘mutual assessments of progress’) (OECD, 2005f: 2). The percentage of 
programme aid was to be an indicator of the use of common procedures, and 
the percentage of joint field missions and diagnostic reviews as an indicator of 
shared analysis (ibid). Although “aid alignment is not an end in itself but a 
means to an end” (Booth et al., 2005: 1), the effectiveness of the NAA was to be 
assessed by the extent of its components, not their impact. 
 
Although the NAA was adopted without ensuring in advance that the recipient 
government had the requisite skills and capacity (Hubbard, 2005: 365, 369), 
weak capacity could also be found among donor staff. High turnover, lack of 
country knowledge and perverse incentives such as disbursement pressure and 
“constant pressure for change” contribute to a lack of organisational learning 
and dearth of donor staff with broad-based experience (Conyers and Mellors, 
2005: 87).  
 
Other critiques of the NAA note donors’ disregard for implementation constraints 
of PRSPs12, whether financial, infrastructural, skills, corruption or political 
interference (Farrington and Lomax, 2001: 541); unrealistic assumptions about 
the link between administrative and fiscal reform and poverty reduction (Killick, 
2004: 21); the NAA is a “one size fits all” orthodoxy, a “hegemonic vision of the 
world” (Eyben, 2006: 15). Donors’ political interference in policy formulation 
damages the ability of local people to hold government to account. Rather than 
improving coordination and accountability between government and citizens, 
there are “vast tracts of the nominal state apparatus and of the political rea lm in 
general that remain relatively disconnected from this configuration of powers” 
(Gould, 2006: 92). 
 
Craig and Porter, who characterise the current orthodoxy as neo-liberal 
institutionalism, comment that the international community has “not been able to 
                                               
12
   PRSPs are “worth a try” (Booth et al., 2005: 2). 
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apply institutional discipline effectively either to its own processes, or to those of 
many governments it engages”, nor to withstand the appropriation of its new 
institutional arrangements by “ensconced territorial interests”. (Craig and Porter, 
2006: 13-14). This appropriation means that good governance is “mediated by 
the realities of interest group politics, patronage and conflict” (Brinkerhoff, 2008: 
988), and its institutions have increased, rather than diminished, the power of 
governments which the West would classify as authoritarian (Craig and Porter, 
2006: 249, 251).  
 
2.3.3 The NAA and the Global Political Economy 
 
Section 2.2 discussed briefly the historic influence of the global political 
economy on donors’ aid strategies. The key document in the formulation of the 
New Aid Architecture, Shaping the 21st Century, did not include ‘security’ as one 
of the objectives of aid.13  For some time, the international community has paid 
particular attention to conflict in developing countries, identifying various 
categories such as ‘fragile states’, and ‘low income countries, unstable states’. 
Because of their geopolitical strategic importance or previous colonial links, 
some low and medium income countries in Africa receive higher levels of 
funding than those with “limited strategic, security and commercial interest” 
(OPM: 21-22).  
 
The events of 11th September 2001, and the consequent conflicts now referred 
to as ‘the war on terror’ have been reflected in increased levels of donor funding 
for security reform in recipient countries, in addition to increased military 
spending; with security at the forefront of the international agenda, some 
regimes in Africa were able to ‘downplay issues of governance’, shift dialogue 
away from ‘soft’ security (welfare), to ‘hard’ security. Cold-war partnerships with 
dictatorial regimes were revived; and local opposition groups were suppressed 
as ‘terrorists’ (OECD, 2005f: 63).  
 
The NAA is both a product of the global political economy, and a contributor to it. 
Maxwell notes that the UN’s Millennium Declaration, from which the MDGs 
proceeded, included a “commitment to peace, security and the rule of law” 
(Maxwell, 2005: 3). While this said “there is more to poverty than lack of 
                                               
13
 Others included trade, humanitarian concern, and mitigation of “external threats”, 
including migration, terrorism and HIV/AIDS. 
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income”, it was also an acknowledgement that “security concerns may swamp 
development and humanitarian concerns, especially in the EU and the US” 
(ibid: 4). Abrahamsen argues that, behind the presentation of development as a 




2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 
2.4.1 Monitoring and Evaluation within the NAA 
 
The NAA challenges monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in a number of ways. 
Firstly, it requires donors to undertake joint evaluations, although donors have 
different objectives. The logic of harmonisation precludes independence, and 
the need for compromise will necessitate some donors lowering their evaluation 
standards. Secondly, the NAA includes ‘products’ such as ‘governance’, which 
are difficult to measure, not least because of imprecision and shifts in meaning 
and purpose (Cracknell, 2000: 270). NPM tools such as performance targets, 
which are included in the PRSP policy matrix, “specify what organizations are to 
produce without detailing how they are to do it” and are too ‘rudimentary’ to 
measure the qualitative nature of, for example, participation (Brodkin, 2008: 323-
324). Thirdly, PRSP monitoring systems are confused and imprecise, due in part 
to donors’ desire to ‘demonstrate’ that their policies worked, rather than to 
establish chains of causality (Lucas et al., 2004: 31).  
 
PRSP monitoring aggregates data, but “there is general agreement that 
disaggregation is in principle intrinsically beneficial” (ibid, 2004: 31). Donors 
intended PRSP monitoring to provide feedback to citizens as well as satisfying 
donors’ own aid management requirements. However, as well as failing to 
provide disaggregated, and therefore contextual, data, this form of monitoring 
may have no validity as far as indigenous concepts of accountability are 
concerned, let alone be a practical means of holding government to account.  
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2.4.2 Historical Development of Aid Evaluation 
 
Uncertainty about aid itself is mirrored in critiques of evaluation practice14. These 
include concern about its quality: “widespread unease about the uneven quality 
of evaluation products and the limited use of evaluation” (Picciotto, 2003a: 1); 
and its purpose: “the link between policy evaluation and policy action is often 
quite weak or entirely missing” (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 305). 
 
As with aid orthodoxy, aid evaluation has an epochal quality, although the 
epochs are not concurrent. Rebien and Cracknell both present a four-phase, 
semi-chronological typology. Phase One (1960s and 1970s) was positivist and 
instrumentalist in approach, and it was assumed that evaluation results fed into 
policy (Rebien, 1996: 19-22); the OECD DAC became a leading force in the 
development of aid evaluation (Cracknell, 2000: 43). In Phase Two (mid 1970s 
to mid-1980s), responding to aid reduction following the 1973 oil crisis, 
emphasis shifted from rate of disbursement to effectiveness, with increased 
resources being made available for evaluation (ibid: 44). Phase Three (from 
mid-1980s to the end of the decade) was characterised by concern about the 
effectiveness of aid and the apparent lack of evaluation to contribute to ‘better’ 
development. Evaluation methods ceased to be prescriptive, and became 
context-sensitive and pragmatic as regards time, cost and purpose (Rebien, 
1996: 34). The logical framework, and similar, formalised methods of evaluation, 
received critical appraisal, and PRA was introduced into evaluation practice. 
Rebien and Cracknell’s Phase Four (‘Evaluation at the Crossroads’, 1988 to the 
present15) notes that, in addition to increasing demand for (or rhetoric about) the 
use of participatory methods, changes in development practice further blurred 
the uncertainties surrounding the practice and purpose of evaluation, specifically 
the relationship between participation and accountability (Cracknell, 2000: 48). 
The tenets of NAA sever the direct relationship between individual donors and 
intended beneficiaries and, while there is an emerging literature on NAA 
monitoring, there is as yet no literature on its effect on evaluation; instead, there 
is comment on the lack of evaluation (Booth and Lucas, 2002: v; Holvoet and 
Renard, 2007: 77).  
 
                                               
14
  Critics of evaluation practice notably include former heads of donor evaluation units, 
such as Picciotto (World Bank) and Cracknell (DFID). 
15
  The ‘present’ being the date of Cracknell’s publication, 2000. 
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2.4.3 The Purposes of Evaluation 
 
The two most frequently stated purposes of evaluation are accountability 
(‘whether aid is successful’) and lesson learning (‘why aid is successful’), though 
some authors suggest that these objectives are broadly incompatible (Cracknell, 




Accountability concerns not only accepting responsibility for spending taxpayers’ 
money, but ‘accounting for’ aid effectiveness (Davies, 2003: 3). However, this 
rhetorical link is hard to identify in practice. Donor staff are thought to avoid 
commissioning evaluations, due either to disbursement pressure (Carlsson, 
1994: 177), or to the difficulties of project management (Cracknell, 2000: 184).  
The amounts that agencies invest in evaluation “do not correspond to the 
importance and emphasis that agencies assign to evaluation at a rhetorical 
level” (ibid: 88). Rather, the determining factor for investment in evaluation is the 
agency’s organisational culture (ibid: 181). Whereas accountability used to be 
interpreted as ‘regularity’, in both attendance and compliance with set working 
patterns (Turner and Hulme, 1997: 122-123), NPM links accountability to the 
idea of performance management16. The shift to policy and programme aid has 
made monitoring more difficult, because of the greater intangibility of the 
objectives (Martens, 2002a: 17, 28). The NAA further distances individual donor 
staff, and the agency itself, from the (in)effectiveness of their performance, 





Despite donors’ rhetoric about the importance of organisational learning, the 
literature suggests that it is limited in practice. While performance management 
should directly influence objectives and policy (Roberts, 2003: 1), Picciotto 
suggests that it is the lack of information that allows adoption of aid ‘fashions’, 
the antidote to which would be improved information flows (Picciotto, 2003b: 
                                               
16
  Performance management consists of, inter alia, assessment of past results relative 
to targets, identification of areas of under-performance, diagnosis of the causes of poor 
performance and either remedial measures and/or the amendment of targets (Roberts, 
2003: 5)  
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231). Evaluation reports make no contribution to policy formulation (Cracknell, 
2000: 188), so the challenge for effective monitoring and evaluation systems is 
“not only the supply of information .. but more importantly the [policy makers’] 
demand for lessons learnt about the effect of earlier policies.” (Gordillo and 
Anderssen, 2004: 305).17  
 
Carlsson suggests that aid strategies are usually decided “not by reference to 
sophisticated analysis, but through the use of experience and knowledge.” 
(Carlsson, 1994: 180), but high staff turnover and dynamic change in 
orthodoxies reduce this likelihood. According to Cracknell, evaluations have little 
impact on policy because they emphasise technical objectives and fail to take 




Given that development interventions have multiple objectives, it is not 
surprising that its actors seek a variety of different outcomes from evaluation. 
Evaluation is intrinsically political because it explores questions of legitimacy 
and questions the quality of both policy and strategy (Carlsson, 1994: 176). The 
political will to amend policy depends on the incentives for politicians, and 
policy-makers and politicians are unlikely to utilise evaluations unless institutions 
are present which protect them from negative conclusions (Gordillo and 
Anderssen, 2004: 305, 311). 
 
For donor agencies, evaluation has a range of internal political purposes. In 
addition to being  “an instrument of transparency and control, accountability, … 
and institutional learning”, evaluations have a legitimizing or ‘marketing’ 
purpose, “meant to ‘prove’ the aid organization’s successful work to the general 
public.” (Michaelowa and Borrmann, 2006: 313). The agency may also be 
competing for funding and political position within government, and use 
evaluations for this purpose (Cracknell, 2000: 184). 
 
Under the NAA, aid is believed to be more effective if donors harmonise and 
align their objectives and procedures with those of the recipient government. If 
“achieving shared objectives among group members is a prerequisite for 
                                               
17
 This discourse is the opposite of that provided by Mosse and Lewis (2006: 4), who 
suggest that policy follows practice, rather than forming it. 
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effective collective action” (Picciotto, 2003a: 5), disagreements over the 
objectives or results of evaluations must require a degree of compromise over 
evaluation criteria, for harmonisation to be achieved. Fear of being accused of 
ingratitude or of jeopardising future aid flows may deter (potentially aligned) 
governments from evaluating donors’ “gifts” of aid (Carlsson, 1994: 184). 
Because development is only one objective of aid, other strategic considerations 
“may introduce a race to the bottom as donors lower their standards for foreign 
policy reasons” (Sida, 2002b: 17). 
 
Participation in Evaluation as an Empowering Process 
 
Although the process of evaluation can be an exercise in ‘power’ where “[t]he 
culture of accountability and attribution breeds fear of retribution” (Earle, 2002: 
11), there is also a literature, often closely linked with that on participatory 
monitoring and evaluation (see 2.4.5), linking evaluation with empowerment in 
two ways. It was seen as a right, for example the assertion that “all stakeholders 
put at risk in an evaluation have the right to place their claims, concerns and 
issues on the table for consideration, irrespective of the value system to which 
they adhere” (Carlsson, 1999: 16). It was also regarded as a tool for 
effectiveness: “a way of building ownership, since it puts local stakeholders in 
charge, helps develop skills, and demonstrates that their views count” 
(Blackburn et al., 1999: 17). However, participatory approaches shift 
responsibility for international development strategies away from donors to ‘the 
participants’ (Henkel and Stirrat, 2001: 183). When donors are prepared to insist 
on and respond to community evaluation, power asymmetries often preclude 
this ideal. The stronger the power of local elites, the weaker the incentive to 
institute M&E, and in “political regimes where such positive incentives [to share 
information] are weak, M&E information is often used as a mechanism to exert 
top-down control, monitor and restrain their agents.” Such power asymmetries 
require more than “[t]he mere creation or modification of the rules” to change 
patterns of behaviour (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 310, 308). Donors’ 
attempts to use civil society organisations (CSOs) as proxies have not yet 
addressed these questions of power and legitimacy (Lucas et al., 2004: 14-15). 
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2.4.4 Critical Approaches to the Concept of Evaluation 
 
Technical criticisms of monitoring and evaluation have claimed that it: (i) is 
costly and ineffective, (ii) does not involve or benefit intended beneficiaries, (iii) 
is increasingly specialised and controlled by outsiders, (iv) is used as a tool of 
control, and that (v) quantitative data is used, rather than qualitative data which 
would be more sensitive for measuring change (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 
15). These criticisms have not led to refinement of those methods, but have 
been sidestepped by a shift in preferred modality towards programme aid and 
demands for policy change in recipient countries.  
 
Another key methodological question surrounding evaluation has been the 
extent to which evaluation could, or should, be ‘independent’. Cracknell 
advocated mixed teams of internal and external evaluators, so that reports are 
“geared closely to the agency’s operational needs” while retaining ‘scope’ for 
impartiality (Cracknell, 2000: 80-81). However, the use of consultant evaluators 
does not guarantee independence (Picciotto, 2003b: 233) and risks principal-
agent problems. Other questions of independence arise in evaluation: it is a 
social process, in which team members negotiate the construction of ‘the truth’, 
the evaluation report (Wood, 1998: 61-62), and an organisational tool which 
donors use to “confirm self-fulfilling prophecies about viability” (Mosse, 2005: 
3-4). 
 
The rise of social development and participatory approaches in the 1980s 
resulted in the increased use of qualitative methods and debate about the 
requirement for, let alone the possibility of, ‘objectivity’ within evaluation. 
Economists have historically dominated aid evaluation with use of quantitative 
methods. Their claims for objectivity, independence and ‘methodological rigour’ 
faced increasing criticism of conventional monitoring methods centred around 
their lack of responsiveness to real life contexts (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 
16).  
 
A further area of concern has been ‘mechanistic’ monitoring. Logical framework 
analysis (LFA), setting out purpose, indicators, intended outcome, risks and 
assumptions relating to each goal, was originally devised as a planning tool 
(Earle, 2002: 1). Although it should be used adaptively, critics of LFA argue that 
its ‘inherent’ inflexibility precludes responsiveness to unforeseen events and 
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socio-cultural factors (ibid: 6-7). Despite variations in its use, donors retain the 
LFA to evaluate projects and programmes and its format has been adapted for 
use as the policy matrix attached to PRSPs and in RBM (Gasper, 2003: 9).  
 
2.4.5 Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
The adoption of participatory monitoring reflected the intention that development 
intervention should be an iterative process, adaptable to “socio-cultural, 
economic, political and institutional contexts”, where evaluation is perceived as 
“a social process for negotiating between people’s different needs, expectations, 
and world-views” (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 26, 24). The ‘purist’ view of 
participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) is one where “stakeholders are 
involved in the design, data collection, analysis and use of phases of the 
evaluation” (Rebien, 1996: 5), but Estrella and Gaventa found no documented 
incidence of PM&E “occurring solely at the village or community level” in the 
literature. In their view, the extent to which an evaluation could be described as 
‘participatory’ should be judged by identifying who initiates and conducts it, and 
“whose perspectives are particularly emphasised” (Estrella and Gaventa, 1998: 
21, 17). Rebien believes “evaluator and evaluatee are locked together and 
influence each other in a way which implies that they construct or create 
evaluation findings together.” (Rebien, 1996: 66). This accords with Guba and 
Lincoln’s “fourth generation” evaluation, in which constructions (not facts) are 
“the realities of the case”, and where “everything is value-laden and evaluators 
cannot avoid having to take different value positions into account.” (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989, quoted in Cracknell, 2000: 332).  
 
The question of who legitimately facilitates PM&E highlights the potential 
dilemma between partnership, ownership and forms of contract (Blackburn et 
al., 1999: 6-7, 9). PM&E presumes that information is publicly available and 
could compromise the power of ruling elites (Gordillo and Anderssen, 2004: 
309). Donors currently depend to a large extent on CSOs to monitor the PRSP 
on behalf of the wider public, to triangulate government data. Although the 
reason presented is increased democratic legitimacy, “in many African countries 
[CSOs’] social base is narrow and often urban, cosmopolitan and professional” 
and their role in monitoring the PRSP process ignores “a lack of clarity about the 
nature of their engagement …[which] is too often viewed as consensual and 
apolitical” (Lucas et al., 2004: 18, 13-14).  
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Writing in 2000 and noting a large gap between rhetoric and reality in donors’ 
practice of participatory evaluation, Cracknell observed a recent backlash 
against the participatory approach, suggesting it was related to critiques of 
Chambers’ work which regarded “the participatory approach as a new kind of 
tyranny” (Cracknell, 2000: 178)18. The PM&E literature declined from the early 
2000s, as participation in monitoring and evaluation was reworked in donor 
policy as civil society monitoring of the PRSP and recipient governments were 
pressured to include local citizens in planning, implementation and evaluation of 
programme aid funded development activities. Concurrently, the increasing 
tendency by donors to channel project-type aid through international NGOs19 
necessitated the NGOs changing their own monitoring structures, aligning them 
to donors’ systems. 
 
 




Discourse on participation is wide-ranging, multidisciplinary and contested. No 
conclusive definition of ‘participation’ can be offered, because its meaning has 
been reworked so often by authors from different epistemological and political 
standpoints. Its ambiguity allows it to be used to conform to changing vogues in 
development practice (White, 1996: 7-8). Eyben and Ladbury use World Bank's 
Popular Participation Learning Group (1991) definition of participation: "a 
process whereby those with legitimate interests in a project influence decisions 
which affect them." (Eyben and Ladbury, 1995: 192); and Hickey and Mohan 
offer: “Participation essentially concerns the exercise of popular agency in 
relation to development” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004b: 3). Academic discourse 
therefore tends towards a normative conception of participation as the exercise 
of individual agency. The NAA, in contrast, conceives participation as a 
collective exercise; the individual exercises agency through multi-party 
democracy, but cedes authority to CSOs when civil society acts as a proxy for 
the wider public, as in the PRSP process.  
 
                                               
18
 A reference to discourse generated by Cooke and Kothari (2001). 
19
  Non-government organisations (NGO); international NGO (INGO) 
Chapter 2: Aid and Its Management 
 52 
This section starts by focusing on participation from a starting point of its 
intended role under the NAA (2.5.2), via PRSPs, governance and the role of civil 
society. Discussion of NGOs’ legitimacy as the voice of rural communities 
bridges ‘civil society’ to 2.5.3, which discusses local forms of participation, 
including African forms of participation. In 2.5.4, discussion of the role of 
professionals includes reference to the debate emanating from Chambers’ work 
and on the role of professionals as facilitators and brokers. This broadens into 
discussion of the role of voice, agency and ‘transformation’. Finally, in 2.5.5, I 
discuss participation as ‘transaction’ and introduce Cornwall’s participatory 
“space” as a means for conceptualising participation in the aid chain. 
 
2.5.2 The Role of Participation within the NAA 
 
Donor interest in civil society, and its incorporation into the NAA, stems from “the 
global dominance of neo-liberal ideologies” (Lewis, 2002: 571). Participation is 
structured into the NAA as ‘good governance’, meaning - under this agenda20 - 
holding government to account through two routes: by the adoption of liberal 
democracy and through civil society assessment of government policy and 
performance. Under the NAA, participation “is not primarily a way of using local 
knowledge, but of using aid to transfer external values and systems to people 
who would not otherwise have adopted them of their own accord” (Brett, 2003: 
15). 
 
By the time Shaping the 21st Century was published (1996), the adoption of 
liberal democracy was no longer regarded by donors as merely an outcome of 
development, but “a necessary condition of development”, which “can be 
inserted and instituted at almost any stage in the developmental process of any 
society”, irrespective of social structures or economic and political conditions 
(Leftwich, 1996: 4, 17). This “naïve” assumption also ignores evidence that 
“successful development” is more likely to depend, inter alia, on economic 
markets, on competent, relatively incorrupt administration; and “on a critical 
minimum degree of consensus between groups and regions about the 
objectives of growth and the rules of the game for achieving it”, rather than 
whether the regime is democratic (ibid: 19-20).  
 
                                               
20
  Under some donors’ agendas, ‘good governance’ can refer to legislative reform, 
financial management. CIDA is an example. 
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Introduced concurrently with the NAA, decentralisation was envisaged by donors 
as an arena for political education leading to improved democracy, an 
expectation shaped by experience in their own countries (Lister and Betley, 
1999: 16). Review of developing country decentralisation experience indicated 
that the expected democratic benefits were contingent on the local context. 
Where there was a well-developed civil society, decentralisation did indeed 
invigorate public engagement (Kulipossa, 2004: 468-469) but, where civil society 
was weak and central government was strong, decentralisation permitted ruling 
parties to increase central power. In Tanzania under African socialism in the 
1960s/70s, this was achieved by central government officials and party leaders 
moving to regions (Mamdani, 1996: 175). Where central government was weak, 
as in Benin, rather than improving local democracy, decentralisation increased 
local rent-seeking; by extending both opportunity and adding administrative 
levels, decentralisation reinforced the pre-existing political mechanisms, thus 
consolidating the power of the dominant party (Bierschenk, 2006: 568).  
 
The incorporation of ‘participation’ “is one of the crucial dimensions 
differentiating the PRSP from previous generations of aid instruments” (Brown, 
2004: 238) but the instrumental use of ‘civil society’ to hold government to 
account “effectively short-circuit[s] the establishment of more participatory forms 
of governance” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004a: 160), with depoliticising effect 
(Harriss et al., 2004: 7-8). Although citizens’ access to information to monitor 
compliance, and their ability to use it, is limited, and “users may well prefer to 
‘hand over their participatory rights to professions; thereby saving themselves 
time, energy and, in some instances, conflict” (Brett, 2003: 13-14), discourse 
also recognises that CSOs may not be able (or willing) to represent the interests 
of rural communities, “since they too are bureaucratised, politicised and staffed 
by indigenous elites” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 254). 
 
Under the ‘social liberalism’ of the NAA (Craig and Porter, 2004), the term ‘civil 
society’ has greater use for donors’ conception of state relations than it has any 
meaning for poor people (Eyben and Ferguson, 2004: 168). For them, ‘civil 
society’ is effectively “associational life outside the state” (Johnson and Wilson, 
2000: 1891; Lewis, 2002: 570). The term implies homogeneity, whereas different 
groups have “different interests, values and concerns, and potentially different 
stocks of social capital” (Johnson and Wilson, 2000: 1893). Under the NAA, 
CSOs are given the role of “brokers for the poor” (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001: 63) 
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because they are assumed to be ‘more efficient’ and ‘apolitical’ (Waddington 
and Mohan, 2004: 228). Critics of this approach suggest that CSOs are 
“bureaucratic, politicised and staffed by indigenous elites” (Mohan and Stokke, 
2000: 254), tend to be urban-based and “may lack a democratic mandate” 
(Goetz and Gaventa, 2001: 63) for the role which donors expect them to play.  
 
Donors’ intervention in civil society tends to focus on funding NGOs involved in 
advocacy and raising awareness of democratic processes. In Western liberal 
democracies, focus is placed on the individual as an ‘active’ citizen who may 
chose to join an interest group, political party or community organisation, thus 
seeking “to fulfil themselves as free individuals” (Rose, 1999: 166). Whereas 
‘community’ has been a widely used, if often undifferentiated, term in 
international development to describe local rural populations, its use as a social 
term in the US and UK was reworked in the 1990s as a political product of ‘third 
way’ government, with its concept of citizen as consumer exercising power 
through ‘civil society’, and as a third form of service provision between public 
and private sectors (ibid: 169). Under this agenda, ‘community’ became 
synonymous with “notions of voluntarism, of charitable works, of self-organised 
care” (ibid: 169). The terms ‘civil society’ and ‘community’ are thus widely used 
in policy in both the donor and recipient country contexts, but with distinctly 
contextual meanings.  
 
In order to pose a contrast to current ideological conceptions of participation in 
the West, and to provide background to discourse on Ethiopian concepts of 
participation and community, the next sub-section focuses on indigenous African 
forms of participation. 
 
2.5.3 Indigenous Forms of Participation 
 
The emergence of local NGOs in Africa should not be regarded as “the flowering 
of civil society” but as a response to the international agenda, which derives 
from “wishful thinking or ideological bias than from a careful analysis of present 
conditions” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 18). CSO proxies at the PRSP negotiation 
table may lack representative legitimacy, even when citizens’ delegate 
participation to NGOs because transaction costs are high (Eyben and Ladbury, 
1995: 197) or when “citizens are insufficiently informed or organised ... to take 
advantage” of new participatory spaces (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001: 60). 
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Remarking on the conceptual disjuncture about the meaning and practice of 
participation in Western and African NGOs, Crewe suggested that “ideological 
and philosophical orientations are the products of complex historical forces 
within their own countries” which the other party cannot fully understand (Crewe, 
1997: 59). The introduction of new institutional mechanisms of participation may 
obscure existing, effective channels of participation (Cleaver, 2001: 42).  
 
Discourse on the role of participation in African societies provides alternative 
viewpoints. Traditional mechanisms of discussion involving the participation of 
the whole community, with the aim of consensus “without factional divisions” 
(Nursey-Bray, 1983: 100), allows the individual to enjoy “personal freedom, 
independence, and respect for his property rights”, but these “individual rights 
are subservient to those of the community as a whole” (Ayittey, 2006: 65). 
These mechanisms, in which self-interest tends “to take a backseat to group 
loyalty and the need to … belong” (Dia, 1996: 54) conflict with Western notions 
of active citizenship which do not allow for African mores of participation, such 
as showing respect and avoiding open conflict (Cleaver, 2004: 272). Traditional 
forms of association, which may include labour-sharing and community self-help 
mechanisms, are based on reciprocity rather than altruism. Apparently 
solidaristic, such associations use negative sanctions to maintain conformity. 
Participation is therefore transactional, with individual strategies being based on 
non-material self-interest, as well as material, and on the local cultural and 
political context (Brett, 1996: 9-11). Ayittey points out that, although “individual 
rights are subservient to those of the community as a whole”, “an African can be 
totally free, liberated from the moral obligations imposed by society if s/he 
chooses to live outside the community and fend for him/herself” (Ayittey, 2006: 
43, 65). In pursuing independence (in Western terms), the individual loses 
access to support (social or resources) from the community. 
 
African socialism drew on traditional mechanisms of consensus, which meant - 
in the case of Tanzania - that Nyerere regarded alternative views as “selfish and 
mischievous factional interests” and one-party government “identified with the 
nation as a whole” made democracy “firmer” (Nursey-Bray, 1983: 104-105). 
Under African socialism, political leaders were presented as ‘moral agents’ of a 
strong state. Their citizens were expected to contribute to the development of 
the nation, in a concept of civic engagement still apparent, for example, in 
contemporary conceptions of participation in Tanzania (Marsland, 2006: 65). 
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Donors’ current role for civil society “as not only separate from the state but also 
as opposed to it” (Dessalegn, 1999: 1) stems from Landell-Mills’ call, on behalf 
of the World Bank, for donors to support African civil society as a counterweight 
to the continent’s “kleptocratic sycophants” (Landell-Mills, 1992: 548)21. 
Abrahamsen claims that “constructing African countries as undemocratic and 
lacking in good governance reconfirms the continual right of the democratic 
countries of the North to intervene (Abrahamsen, 2004: 40). However, Landell-
Mills’ central argument had been that, just as concepts of democratic 
participation and accountability in the UK had developed over centuries based 
on underlying religious belief, governance institutions in Africa should also be 
built “in tune with the traditions, beliefs, and structures of its component 
societies”, citing Ayittey’s assertion that “indigenous pre-colonial African 
institutions were generally democratic, with strong inbuilt systems of 
accountability and popular participation” (Landell-Mills, 1992: 545, 550-551). 
 
Rather than regarding citizens of developing countries as disempowered, in 
suspended animation until provided with liberal democracy as a result of donor 
influence, some traditional African forms of participation and accountability have 
provided more immediate, culturally coherent and inclusive mechanisms, than 
those offered by the NAA. While local power relations may account for 
unwillingness to express conflicting interests (White, 1996: 13), Masaki warns 
against overemphasizing “the oppressive nature of power” without grounding its 
conceptualisation in the local context (Masaki, 2004: 136).  
 
2.5.4 The ‘Professional’ in Participation Discourse 
 
The extensive literature relating to poor people’s experience of opportunity and 
exclusion in participation has been swelled by discourse on the roles taken by 
those working in development, as academics and practitioners. These fall into 
four broad themes: facilitating empowerment, power related to assumed 
expertise, power related to roles of interpretation or brokerage, and, fourthly, 
facilitating ‘transformation’. 
 
                                               
21
  See Moore, 1996: 143; Abrahamsen, 2000: 17. 
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Participation as ‘empowerment’, proposed by Robert Chambers in ‘Putting the 
Last First’ (1983), centres around the use of qualitative methods for data 
collection designed for use with and by local communities, with ‘facilitation’ by 
development workers trained in those particular techniques. The methods, 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), almost became a synonym for 
‘participation’ in the ensuing discourse. Critiques of PRA as a route to 
empowerment focus on its legitimacy: on the use of Western methods which 
"override existing and potentially legitimate forms of decision-making” 
(Waddington and Mohan, 2004: 221), and on the assumption that people in the 
community are currently disempowered and that they “are not already engaged 
actively as subjects in their own development" (Brett, 2003: 15). Projecting local 
people as having 'a problem' stigmatises them as weak and powerless, 
legitimizing outside intervention (Waddington and Mohan, 2004: 220).  
 
Chambers defines PRA as “a mindset, a philosophy, and a repertoire of 
methods. The essence of PRA is changes and reversals - of role, behaviour, 
relationship and learning." (Chambers, 1998: xiv). His “philosophy of 
participation” is therefore about “personal change in attitudes and behaviour on 
the part of development professionals (the mindset), and 'empowerment' of poor 
people they were working with (the philosophy)” (Bevan, 2000: 752).  
 
The debate about the role of the professional which arose from critiques of 
Chambers’ work, most notably that of Cooke and Kothari (2001), focused on the 
potential abuse of power conferred by the ‘expertise’ of the professional. Gould 
suggested this was partly an expression of uncertainty about the role of 
development, which the development worker was engaged in implementing but 
might conflict with their sense of ‘vocation’ (Gould, 2004: 278). Chambers 
advises professionals (in relation to PRA) to “Use your own best judgement at all 
times” (Chambers, 1997: 1751). Crewe warns that conceiving development 
workers as homogenous is “as misleading as generalizing about ‘locals’” 
(Crewe, 1997: 77). As the NAA exemplifies, policy on ‘participation’ is formulated 
at the upper end of the aid chain. As policy filters down through aid agencies, 
“individual actors manage the dissonance between normative claims and 
reality”, often having to run old and new policies in parallel (Gould, 2004: 282), 
while having values, experience and conceptual frameworks that may differ from 
their immediate colleagues (Kaufman, 1997).  
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Bierschenk found that the weakness of the state in decentralised Benin provided 
opportunities for ‘brokers’ to operate opportunistically (Bierschenk, 2006: 36). 
The concept of ‘broker’ as entrepreneur was introduced by anthropologists 
working in the French APAD tradition22: Olivier de Sardan describes brokers as 
operating within “the entangled social logic” that exists at the “intersection of 
development ‘universes’ of donor and recipients”. He equates the entangled 
social logic approach with Long’s social actor approach, claiming that it 
elucidates the complexity of development and its actors, including intermediaries 
and brokers (Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 11-12, 16). Brokerage is mediated in the 
space between local and central government or market structures, where 
“development aid flows can be interpreted as rent”. Brokers are therefore part of 
patronage networks, which can include bidding for funds for local communities, 
using marketing tools such as the ‘correct’ language of development. Potential 
brokers may include local leaders and NGOs, as well as strategically placed 
individuals, and Olivier de Sardan reflected on their possible motivation: 
altruism, activism, material reward or power and influence (ibid: 173-175). 
External development workers or researchers, acting as ‘translators’ (see below, 
and Chapter 3) may be “driven by social and political interests” which serve to 
control ‘beneficiaries’ rather than to empower them (Wright Mills, 1953, cited in 
Long, 2001: 257). 
 
Olivier de Sardan cites the example of development agents, noting that the 
literature tends to treat them as ‘transparent’ entities, as ‘transmission belts’, but 
they mediate between different types of knowledge, between the technical and 
the popular. Their interaction with their clients requires them to negotiate various 
logics and tactics but, while doing so, they have to “defend their own personal 
interests; defend the interests of their institution; [and] mediate between various 
actors’ interests and those of local factions” (Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 172). 
Scaling this up to the mediation of knowledge between social scientists and 
developers, Olivier de Sardan suggests five possible areas of disjuncture. 
Firstly, they operate using different forms of knowledge: academic versus 
management procedures. Secondly, their time-frames for change differ, with 
pressure on developers to produce short-term results rather than taking the long 
view. Thirdly, social scientists look for ‘difference’, whereas developers look for 
similarity. Fourthly, developers assume technical specialists to be allies, they do 
                                               
22
  Association Euro-Africaine pour l’Anthropologie du Changement Social et du 
Développement. Key proponents are Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk. 
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not expect them to be critical. Fifthly, they have different systems for 
professional accountability (ibid: 200). Remarking that speaking for the poor 
“may be a rewarding business”, de Herdt and Bastiaensen also note that 
“interface experts have an interest in maintaining the social boundaries of the 
world-views between which they mediate” (de Herdt and Bastiaensen, 2004: 
880-881). 
 
The contribution to the brokerage literature which Mosse and Lewis (2006) 
provide is the concept of ‘translation’, utilising the term from Latour’s ‘actor 
network theory’, which posited that different kinds of entities, material and 
semiotic, interact to form a single network. ‘Translation’ was used to mean the 
output from a process of joint creation across the network (Strathern, 2000: 15). 
Mosse and Lewis use ‘translation’ to describe the joint creation of description of 
an aid intervention, which may be used for policy formation, by a “mutual 
enrolment and the interlocking of interest to produce project realities” (Mosse 
and Lewis, 2006: 13).23 To date, there has been little critique or expansion of 
Mosse and Lewis’ use of the term ‘broker’ in relation to ‘translation’. They assert 
that the process of translation “invariably” results in “all actors defer[ring] to 
dominant or official narratives of agency and history that work to reinstate policy 
ambitions and to conceal divergent and contradictory logics of practice” (ibid, 
2006: 16). Campbell’s experience in Kenya did not substantiate this, finding 
differences in ‘the narrative’ within the aid agency, and between government and 
various NGOs, noting that “a diversity of positions with regard to donor 
development discourse is possible”. Based on his finding of inter and intra 
agency divergence, he concluded that “it is important not to over-emphasize the 
power of bilateral and multilateral agencies” (Campbell, 2008: 263). Mosse and 
Lewis’ co-authors in Development Brokers and Translators (2006) also show 
that actors operate strategically, presenting different facets to different 
‘principals’ (Rossi, 2006), negotiating between the religious and the political in 
“messy power struggles” (Doolittle, 2006: 70), and demonstrating how meaning 
can be both naturally and artificially manipulated by different actors so that a 
“common discursive ground” was not possible (Salemink, 2006: 122). Desai, 
analysing the role of development agents, argues that their “individual 
                                               
23
 Woolcock suggests that international development students should be taught three 
roles: ‘detective’ (to collect data), ‘translator’, in order to “refram[e] given ideas for 
diverse groups”, and ‘diplomat’ to mediate ideas between different groups (Woolcock, 
2007: 55, 67). Such ‘job titles’ for development workers are, of course, value-laden, cf. 
Stirrat’s ‘mercenaries, missionaries and misfits’ (Stirrat, 2008). 
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relationships and development practice shape policy in a way that makes an 
isolated analysis of strategic and policy changes in national and local contexts 
inadequate” (Desai, 2006: 188). 
 
Olivier de Sardan’s use of ‘broker’ to describe the role of development agents is 
a reminder that junior government officials and professional workers have also 
been described as ‘street level bureaucrats’. Lipsky (1980) identified street level 
bureaucrats as those who implement government policy at the interface, and in 
doing so reinterpret policy to make it functional in the local context. In this 
concept of translation, which is in opposition to that of Mosse and Lewis, the 
street level bureaucrat has the agency to change policy in a way which makes it 
contextually applicable. Different modes of implementation may include 
‘authority’, ‘transaction’ and ‘persuasion’ or, respectively, ‘enforcement’, 
‘performance’ and ‘co-production’ (Hupe and Hill, 2007: 296). The degree of 
autonomy possible in street level bureaucracy has provoked a number of studies 
looking at accountability and principal-agent problems (discussed in 3.4). This 
literature acknowledges both the multiplicity of interactions and the differing 
political contexts in which street level bureaucracy is involved. Long, who puts 
social interaction at the core of his ‘social actor’ approach, describes brokers as 
‘gatekeepers’ (Long, 2001: 180). 
 
The most recent development in the Chambers/Cooke and Kothari debate about 
the role of participation, arguing that participation must be transformative, is 
based on a model from Latin America (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 162). In this 
post-development perspective, local knowledge and forms of agency (“the 
localist fallacy”) should be replaced by ‘universal’ “multi-scaled strategies” to 
attain ‘modernity’ (ibid: 61). Critiques of transformatory participation argue that 
its empirical base is context-specific: the disability-rights movement and others 
in the US; the ‘case’ of Brazil (conscientisation); and Europe (Habermas’ 
deliberative democracy). Its proponents assume that transformatory participation 
can be instituted irrespective of local cultural norms of power and 
communication (Harriss et al., 2004: 1, 11-13). It thus falls prey, as does 
‘democratic participation’, to accusations of being externally-driven and being 
based on Western political concepts and values. This suggests that 
‘participation’, whether transformatory or aiming at democratic development, is 
“rarely a response to demands from local people who may well be locked into 
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hierarchical and deferential structures, but rather promoted in response to 
western values imported by donors” (Brett, 2003: 14-15). 
 
Grounding concepts of participation to people’s daily lives, Cleaver argues that 
“'empowerment' and 'transformation' require not just the opening up of 
participatory spaces to transparently debate citizenship, to hold the state to 
account and so on, but also the more prosaic transformation of everyday life" 
dominated by fetching water, hard labour, poor health, and dependence on 
patrons. "Transforming the notion of participation into one of a radicalized and 
political citizenship, reliant on the open and transparent negotiation of rights, 
doesn't suddenly do away with the costs of participation. .. In the short term, the 
disadvantages to them of confronting unequal relations on which they depend, 
may simply outweigh the costs of acquiescence." (Cleaver, 2004: 275). 
 
2.5.5 Participatory Space, Transaction and Power 
 
This section has explored current conceptions of participation, which assume 
citizens’ desire to participate and to hold government to account, under the 
opportunities made available to them by the NAA, or assume that citizens’ 
participation has to be facilitated (the empowerment discourse) or that citizens 
must be encouraged to claim participation (‘transformation’). In each of these 
conceptions, actors external to the community define the arena in which 
participation should take place. Whereas the NAA creates fora for participation 
between donors, between donors and government, and between government 
and civil society, ‘up-stream’ modalities restrict the level of participation at which 
donors themselves engage with aid recipients. Rhetorically, there are multiple 
spaces in which actors can potentially demand, accept, avoid or be denied 
participation. Exploring the concept of participatory space, Cornwall describes 
participation as circumscribed by “political, social, cultural and historical 
particularities” which more powerfully determine the nature of the space than 
“idealised notions of democratic practice” (Cornwall, 2000: 51). Hickey and 
Mohan view participatory space more positively, as “allow[ing] a form of political 
learning where experiences from one space are transported and transformed 
consciously or unconsciously in different and new spaces.” (Hickey and Mohan, 
2004b: 18). More critical readings see ‘space’ as an arena for the use of power. 
Thinking spatially allows questions to be asked about how power, voice and 
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agency are exercised within that space or ‘bounded yet permeable arena’ 
(ibid: 75).  
 
Outsider intervention introduces the idea of distortion of the natural dynamics of 
participation, so that “the act of soliciting the ‘voices of the poor’ can all too 
easily end up as an act of ventriloquism as ‘public transcripts’ are traded in open 
view” (Cornwall, 2004b: 82). Another way that outsiders intervene is to ascribe 
labels (beneficiaries, clients, citizens) which dictate the way that local people are 
viewed, and view themselves; this “influences what they say, and how and 
whether they are heard” (ibid: 84). Current aid orthodoxy assumes that citizens 
will either claim participation by voting in elections, or take on the responsibility 
of participation as civic ‘duty’. The literature reviewed suggested that issues of 
power, culture and ideology structured how citizens would respond.  
 
White proposes a four-part typology of forms of participation: normative, 
instrumental, representative and transformative (White, 1996: 8). One of the 
characteristics of normative participation is ‘display’, by both the ‘facilitator’ and 
the participant. Even if such participation is purely tokenary, participants may 
gain positive benefit through a sense of inclusion. Labour-sharing was cited as 
an example of instrumental participation, and it may be extractive both in 
political and in practical terms. Labour-sharing may, however, be regarded 
locally as positive, through increased effort or social bonding (Brett, 1996: 12). 
Representative participation (improved leverage through voice and agency) 
leads, in donor rhetoric and some development discourse, via empowerment to 
‘transformation’; participation is thus seen as “a means to empowerment and an 
end in itself” (White, 1996: 9). The actors in the participation agenda are 
motivated by different interests. While donors focus on the rhetorically inter-
related factors of legitimation, sustainability, empowerment and efficiency, 
citizens, particularly the poor, are interested in inclusion, empowerment, 
leverage and transaction costs (ibid: 10). 
 
The transaction costs of participation may include conflict (particularly where 
power is challenged), opportunity costs, and managing self-seeking behaviour 
against group interests (Brett, 1996: 14). Brett argues that, while participation 
discourse tends to be bifurcated between participation as rational choice and 
concepts of trust and fairness, participation at community level is more likely to 
be seen as ‘team’ production, individual input being subject to the needs of the 
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group (ibid: 8). Participation is therefore regarded as a common-pool resource, 
based on strict reciprocity and controlled by negative sanctions and by non-
material incentives.  
 
This research explores the perceptions of actors throughout the aid chain who 
possess different levels of power and opportunity to exercise it at different 
development interfaces. Accepting that social actors’ strategies are 
transactional, the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 is built on 
conceptions of motivation, trust, individualism-collectivism and information 
asymmetry in differing and cross-cultural and political contexts within the 
development nexus. 








Discussion of aid’s changing orthodoxies and the discourses on participation 
and evaluation in Chapter 2 made reference to differing objectives, values and 
strategies within the complexity of the aid chain. These influence transactions in 
cross-cultural contexts and are further complicated by different ideological 
positions. Holding this range of complexity in mind, I explain below my 
methodological framework, from concepts, via fieldwork, to analysis.  
 
As Chapter 1 explained, this thesis is a contribution to the development 
management literature. From the different disciplinary approaches to 
development management (see 2.2), I identified the public sector management 
perspective as the one which has most resonance with my own experience and 
ontological position. As a result, I might have been expected to take a ‘rational’ 
approach to the research, drawing on management theory, or using a 
conventional principal-agent model. While I do consider the problem of 
information asymmetry, the nature of my own management experience led me 
to a social actor research orientation. 
 
I start by restating the objectives of the research and setting out the research 
questions (3.2). As a social actor1 in a qualitative research project, I make 
explicit the genesis of the research, my own experience in development, and 
other influences affecting my world-view. Section 3.3 explains my overall 
research orientation: this is adopted from Long’s social actor approach, chosen 
in order to understand the lifeworlds of actors interacting at the development 
interface. A comparative link is made from ‘lifeworlds’ to the concept of ‘mental 
models’ (later expanded in 3.4.3). I then explain my use of (elements from) two 
different but, I argue, overlapping literatures. This logic is set out in Figure 3.1 
overleaf. Themes of uncertainty, access to knowledge and decision-making are 
linked across all three literatures. The cross-cutting analytical theme, ‘shared 
mental models’, although identified from the institutional economics literature, 
                                               
1
  Long’s concept of the social actor is explored in 3.1.1. 
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builds on aspects of the social actor approach and also led me to the cross-
cultural literature.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 : Linked Literatures 
 
From the institutional economics literature (3.4), I review concepts of trust, 
motivation, decision-making and uncertainty, leading me to the selection of 
Denzau and North’s ‘shared mental models’ as the core analytical tool. In 3.5, I 
explore selected elements from the cross-cultural literature which the analysis of 
earlier, primary data from Ethiopia2 indicated would be useful for analysing 
participation and evaluation in Ethiopia. Having set out my ontological and 
epistemological framework and the literatures employed, I turn (in 3.7) to the 
detail of research methods used, and a description of the fieldwork, including 
country selection, respondent selection, logistics, methods and constraints. 
 
 
3.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH AND ITS ORIENTATION 
 
3.2.1 Research Objective 
 
The NAA’s use of consensual strategies such as harmonisation, alignment and 
partnership, implies that donors share the same values, priorities and practices, 
and that aid recipients will adopt those same values and practice because they 
will recognise them as superior to - or at least compatible with - their own. It also 
assumes that, provided with an enabling environment, implicitly as the result of 
                                               
2
 This refers to the Wellbeing and Illbeing in Development, Ethiopia (WIDE) study - see 
paragraph 3.5.2. 
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donor influence, citizens will take advantage of the structures offered and 
participate in evaluation of government performance in poverty reduction, 
holding them to account via democratic processes, namely multiparty elections. 
 
Discourse reviewed in Chapter 2 indicated that the role of both participation and 
evaluation in donor practice are contested and that, despite rhetorical calls for 
learning lessons from evaluation, these were not taken up. The nature of the 
NAA alters the role of participation in evaluation in donor policy and praxis, by 
transferring responsibility for evaluating donors’ policies on to their intended 
beneficiaries. This replaced an earlier rhetoric where participation in donor 
evaluation increased aid’s effectiveness and legitimacy. This research aimed to 
address these issues by studying participation, particularly in evaluation, within 
the complexity of the aid chain of three bilateral donors’ programmes in one 
country context (Ethiopia). By investigating participation in evaluation both 
vertically (by working with donors, central government, local government staff 
and their agents, and community members) and horizontally (through an 
exploration of three donors’ approaches, and donor-government interaction), the 
research sought a richer understanding of how different actors participate in 
evaluation, both formally and informally, how these link with claims which donors 
make for participation and for accountability, both as policy and as practice. The 
underlying objective was to elucidate the mechanisms which constrain or enable 
participation in evaluation, and thereby enhance knowledge transfer, with the 
goal of improved aid delivery. 
 
Responding to another aspect of NPM, the research also looked at ways in 
which donors and governments use M&E data as a performance management 
tool and as organisational learning tool. When the research was formulated 
(2003), donors expressed interest in the role of incentives in performance 
management3. I had anticipated (incorrectly, it turned out) that this topic would 
be relevant to donors but less so to the Ethiopian government. As 2.4.3 made 
clear, donors’ claims for learning lessons from evaluations are not uphe ld in the 
literature. 
 
It is important to make clear what the research did not include. The research did 
not include evaluation of M&E procedures, or an evaluation of donors’ or 
                                               
3
  For example, Sida, 2002a. 
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governments’ development programmes; nor was it a ranking exercise or a case 
study comparison of donors’ M&E systems.  
 
3.2.2 Research Question 
 
The genesis of the research was my own experience of working in donor-funded 
project management (see 3.2.3). Despite a rhetoric which presented M&E as an 
integral part of the project cycle, into which participation could logically be 
inserted to provide more contextualised data and to respond to the agendas for 
participation and improved effectiveness, the system for project design, 
implementation and evaluation did not include mechanisms for this. Although the 
research took place in a different country context and a different aid modality, 
partnership and other tenets of the NAA are equally open to the same critique of 
relevance. Because the NAA reduces opportunities for donors to collect 
contextualised primary data, the research questions were thus just as, if not 
more, relevant under the NAA than under project modality. 
 
The constituent parts of the enquiry were, firstly, to identify what role, if any, 
participation in M&E plays in donors’ formulation of strategies and development 
planning. Secondly, I wanted to identify donors use participation in M&E as a 
tool for performance management and organisational learning and, if so, how. 
From my own previous experience (see below) Thirdly, I was interested to 
explore the cultural and institutional factors that affect participation – by donors, 
by federal and local government, by local populations. 
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These lines of enquiry were intended to answer the underlying question: 
 
What accounts for the variation in forms of participation in evaluation 
of donor-funded aid programmes? 
 
3.2.3 Formative Experience Influencing the Research Methodology 
 
Qualitative researchers acknowledge that their research is moderated by their 
own background, value systems and experience. Reflexivity is advocated “in 
order to situate the researcher and the field in wider hierarchical systems” and to 
deconstruct the research process, through choice, selection, fieldwork, writing 
up and dissemination (Wright and Nelson, 1995: 48). From a social actor 
perspective, “the researcher is also considered an active agent influencing 
specific events and the construction of both the social and ethnographic text.” 
(Long and Long, 1992: 6). Acknowledging this, the ‘writing-up’ process 
challenges the interpretive researcher, who must constantly reflect on how the 
research process, the respondents and any data relating to them are being 
represented. The development of the research idea stemmed from my own 
background and experience; these and my own value system affected the way 
that I identified research objectives, approached the research and analysed the 
results.  
 
The influence of previous experience on the research process 
 
Three key areas of my previous experience have, I believed, influenced my 
approach to this research. 
 
Public Sector Experience.  During the 1970s and 1980s, I worked in teaching 
hospitals in the UK and experienced a series of reorganisations, each of which 
was presented as an advance, ‘the most radical shake-up of the health service 
since it was established’. Ways had to be found of coping with frequent 
directives from central government which often seemed irrelevant, and worse, 
disruptive and wasteful of resources. Coming from a medical family, I identified 
myself as a ‘coal-face worker’, not a bureaucrat, but the reorganisations finally 
exhausted my enthusiasm for working in a sector which was so frequently used 
as a ‘political football’. I learnt that public sector management, so often 
presented politically in a technocratic way, is about managing conflicting goals, 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 69 
pursued by competing groups with different coping strategies, interests and 
values. I developed the approach that, as well as being a ‘constructive’ 
endeavour (see discussion in 2.2.6), effective management involves 
understanding these different actors’ interests, strategies and values - and how 
they interact. 
 
History. Studying history as an undergraduate may have led me to take a 
broader than usual perspective on the research. Historical analysis, the 
interpretation of events, texts and myths, seemed to be a useful preparation for 
qualitative research, which also explores perceptions, meanings and identities. 
Historiography was also a useful tool. While epistemology and hermeneutics in 
social science research teaching cover some of the same ground, there is no 
exact equivalent in the social sciences. It seemed to me that historiography puts 
politics and ideology at the front of hermeneutics, while social science study 
privileges epistemology. History also involves a complex understanding of time 
and its relationship with change; it does not assume that change is sequential, 
or that events occur irrespective of context. Development has in the past often 
been presented as a linear process, though more recent discourse has focussed 
on its non-linear trajectory.  
 
Development Project Management. The experience of working for a consulting 
company provided an insight into the way that donor organisations work and 
how donors and other expatriates interact with government, other national staff 
and contractors. It also afforded an understanding of the ways in which internal 
processes affect the external intervention. Because I was tracking the ‘project 
cycle’, I was aware of the genesis of many of the projects and the degree to 
which they were based on evidence. 
 
The initial research idea originated from reflection on my experience of the 
development management process. Sometimes the project cycle was so 
extended that the premises on which the project was originally designed were 
no longer current. The intended beneficiaries were rarely consulted and, if they 
were, their views were not taken into account, usually because their preferences 
did not coincide with those of the donor or the government. Although the 
involvement of government counterparts and national consultants was ‘required’ 
contractually, working relationships between donors, government and project 
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staff were often tense, with poor or missed communication, conflicting personal 
goals and project goals open to reinterpretation by the different stakeholders.  
 
Normative Conception of Development 
 
Crewe and Harrison point out that “development is clearly .. an ideal, an 
objective towards which institutions and individuals claim to strive. This aim is 
seen as inherently good” (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 15) and is thus “value 
relative” (Gasper, 2004: 14). My normative stance on development before 
joining the industry was limited to some vague idea that everyone was entitled to 
sufficient material and psycho-social resources to enable them to maintain a 
degree of security and independence. The experience of working in project 
management refined my ideas about the value and ethics of the development 
industry, but the basic stance around ‘equality of opportunity’ remains.  
 
At various points in this thesis, when discussing my approach to management4, I 
have referred to the importance of understanding the interests, values and 
strategies of the different actors involved. While I can argue this on grounds of 
effectiveness, I recognise that there is also an underlying ‘political’ stance which 
is liberal, in the sense of willingness to respect values and opinions different 
from one's own5. 
 
 
3.3 SOCIAL ACTOR ORIENTATION: SOCIAL AND KNOWLEDGE 
INTERFACES 
 
3.3.1 The Social Actor 
 
Long describes his ‘social actor’ approach as an expansion of the actor-oriented 
approach, which rejects social constructionism’s tendency towards rational 
choice as an explication of individual action. An actor becomes a social actor in 
interaction with others (Long and Long, 1992: 21, 25), but retains individual 
agency, so that communities or organisations “are better depicted in terms of 
‘coalition of actors’” (Long, 2001: 241). Social actors can be individuals or 
collectivities (op.cit.) so this approach is appropriate to research which explores 
                                               
4
  In 2.2.6 and 3.2.3. 
5
 The Oxford Dictionary of English (revised edition). Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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perception and practice by individuals within collectivities (communities, 
governments and donor agencies). 
 
Rather than a dichotomy between structure and agency, Long’s social actor 
approach “emphasizes the interplay and mutual determination of ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ factors and relationships, which provide accounts of the lifeworlds, 
strategies, and rationalities of actors in different social arenas.” (Long and Long, 
1992: 4-5). He regards structure as part of the overall explanation for the 
construction of a social actor’s lifeworld, but not the determining factor. Critical 
discussion of Long’s work has centred on the relative weight given to structure, 
arguing that the social actor approach overplays relative levels of agency 
(Mosse and Lewis, 2006: 10). A further critique is that Long has not developed 
the concept further, but that it remains “narrow and repetitive”, restricted to a 
particular empirical field (Olivier de Sardan 2005: 13). However, its longevity is 
reflected in its continued wide use - Long’s social actor approach “remains a 
touchstone in the anthropology of development” (ibid: 13). It may be that the 
notion of the social actor’s agency is important to our own individualist culture, 





Social actors’ frames of reference for decision-making are derived from their 
individual, taken-for-granted, social ‘lifeworld’. Lifeworlds incorporate actions and 
meanings influenced by repeated interaction with others. Long stresses that 
lifeworlds are not “‘cultural backcloths’ which frame how individuals act, but … 
the product of an individual’s own constant self-assembling and re-evaluating of 
relationships and experiences” (Long, 2001: 241). However, he also states that 
a lifeworld “entails practical action shaped by a background of intentionality and 
values and is therefore essentially experienced as some kind of ordered reality, 
shared with others” (ibid: 54), which implies that lifeworlds entail transaction. 
Social actors have agency “in that they possess the knowledgeability and 
capability to assess problematic situations and organise ‘appropriate 
responses’” (Long, 2001: 241). While this initially appears consistent with a 
‘Chambersian’ understanding of indigenous knowledge6, insecurity may mean 
                                               
6
  Referring to the work of Robert Chambers. 
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that the ‘appropriate response’ could be to maintain the status quo, because the 
outcome is more familiar and therefore predictable (cf. Wood, 2003).  
 
While bridging the interface (see below) involves mediation between the 
different lifeworlds of, for example, a government officer and a poor farmer, a 
government official born in a rural village may have to reconcile him/herself to 
both worldviews (Long, 2001: 213). Alternatively, both actors may draw on an 
imagined or historical past of government-community relations, which guide their 




Long argues that a actor-oriented perspective is useful for bridging the 
‘dichotomy’ between Western and ‘local’ knowledge (ibid: 170). Such an 
approach examines how actors involved “manage critical knowledge interfaces 
that constitute the points of intersection between their diverse lifeworlds” (ibid: 
170). Interface studies provide “insights into the processes by which policy is 
transformed, how room for manoeuvre and empowerment are created by both 
intervenors and ‘clients’ and … [how] ideologies shape the contests that take 
place over competing paradigms and strategies of development” (ibid: 172). For 
this research, the concept of ‘interface’ is clearly useful for considering the 
interactions of actors within the aid chain. Interface is not applied solely to binary 
interaction, but reflects the multiple interactions in which the social actor is 
engaged. This is a counterweight to the linearity implied by the phrase ‘aid 
chain’, and Long is particularly critical of the linearity of purpose and outcome 
assumed in donors’ use of the term ‘intervention’, arguing that the interfaces of 
development are emergent, contingent and ‘messy’. The concept of social and 
knowledge interfaces provides an orientation for exploring perceptions and 
practice at the cross-cultural interstices which occur in bilateral aid chains. 
Interface can describe the ‘middle ground’ negotiated in the work-place, in 
government-citizen relations or in social forms of associational life (ibid: 69). 
However, ‘discontinuity’ is central to Long’s definition of social interface, which 
focuses on discrepancies in values, interests and knowledge (ibid: 243) and the 
interface is more likely to be the site of contention and potential conflict. For 
Long, therefore, interface studies “are essentially concerned with the analysis of 
discontinuities in social life” (ibid: 177). 
 




A tension for me in working with Long’s social actor approach centred on his 
approach to the concept of transaction. He explicitly rejects rational choice 
(Long and Long, 1992: 21) but accepts that actors have multiple rationalities 
which are locally constructed (ibid: 15). Although he uses the term ‘transaction’ 
infrequently, it is clear that he recognises interaction as a transactional process, 
with decision-making being based on the social actor’s lifeworld. When stressing 
heterogeneity and struggles with discontinuity at the social interface, what Long 
describes is not dissimilar to a transactions approach from institutional 
economics which regards “social life is a series of contracts” (Waterman and 
Meier, 1998: 174). 
 
Long insists that the ‘local context’ dictates the form which discrepancies take, 
which reduces the spectrum of the interface to ‘the local’. In this research, I look 
at a spectrum of sequential interfaces within aid delivery. In the cross-cultural 
arena of the aid chain, multiple social and knowledge interfaces occur across a 
range of lifeworlds, national and international. In critiquing “the local”, Mohan 
and Stokke argue that spaces in which local interfaces take place “are 
constituted by economic, social, cultural and political relations and flows of 
commodities, information and people that extend far beyond a given locality” 
(Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 264).  
 
Review of the discourse on the role of the professional as ‘participant’ (2.5.4) 
included discussion of the notion of ‘broker. Long recognises that those who 
work at the interface have to “respond to the demands of their own groups as 
well as to the expectations of those with whom they must negotiate”; describing 
these as ‘brokers’ (Long, 2001: 70), reflecting the ‘APAD’ use of broker as 
‘entrepreneur’ (see 2.5.4). The other meaning of broker used by Long, ‘mediator’ 
(cf. Mosse and Lewis)7 “entails the interplay or confrontation of ‘expert’ versus 
‘lay’ forms of knowledge, beliefs and values, and struggles over their 
legitimation, segregation and communication” (Long, 2001: 71).  
 
                                               
7
  Mosse and Lewis revised the term ‘brokerage’ to include mediation towards a 
dominant ‘translation’ of a development project to justify, retrospectively, donors’ 
intervention (Mosse and Lewis, 2006). See 2.5.4. 
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It is important therefore, in ethnographic research of aid and its delivery, to 
conceive donor staff and government officials, as well as those in the ‘local’ 
context, as social actors. Donor staff also adopt strategic resistance or 
enrolment (see Eyben, 2005) and consultants have to strategise between their 
commercial, academic and normative interests in a complex pattern of 




Social scientists are concerned with “the contingent nature of knowledge and a 
desire to problematize the social mechanisms by which ‘facts’ become 
constituted as knowledge and, hence, the basis for action” (Gould, 2007: 288). 
The discourse on the ‘professional’ (2.5.4) raises the question of whose logic 
prevails in the formation of knowledge. In Long’s typology of knowledge 
construction, under a ‘systems model’, the ‘implementing’ actor is faced with the 
challenge of reconciling top-down planning with the interests and constraints of 
those with whom s/he interacts, re-interpreting the planned intervention in line 
with strategic relationships at the knowledge interface (Long, 2001: 174)8. 
Knowledge “is essentially a joint product of [social interaction] and fusion of 
horizons” and powerful actors will try and enrol others to accept their own 
interpretations and viewpoints (Long and Long, 1992: 27). Long suggests that 
such enrolment may result in ‘delegated’ power, but other discourses suggest 
that such delegation can result either from trust or from unacceptably high 
transaction costs. Long also describes circumstances in which knowledge 
enrolment is resisted in development interventions: by subverting resources to 
locals’ alternative preferences, and by internalising ‘external factors’ by deviating 
their meaning (ibid: 27, 33-35).  
 
Long uses the term ‘knowledge interface’ to encapsulate this dynamic where 
knowledge is constructed by “everyday contingencies and struggles that 
constitute social life” (ibid: 170). He assumes that “the repertoire of ‘sense-
making’ filters” will vary considerably in the local context, while accepting that 
they “are to a degree framed by ‘shared’ cultural perceptions (ibid: 51). 
However, he argues that it is unlikely that farmers will share “the same priorities 
and parameters of knowledge”, so that it is important to understanding the 
                                               
8
  This has parallels with ‘street level bureaucrats’. 
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dissonance as well as the consonance of ideas and beliefs (ibid: 176). Being 
characterised by discontinuity rather than linkage; and by transformation rather 
than transfer, knowledge is therefore the product of dialogue and negotiation 
(ibid: 243). When interpretation is a group endeavour, actors have to work 
towards an accommodation of different view points, retaining the possibility for 
dissent (ibid: 50). For Long, knowledge construction is therefore a process of 
continuous contention, in which knowledge can be ‘transformed’ at critical points 
of confrontation. In contrast to the fluidity of knowledge practice in Long’s 
approach, Mosse and Lewis argue that knowledge is ‘captured’ by dominant 
narratives through a process of translation (Mosse and Lewis, 2006: 16). Half-
way between the two approach, Gould sees knowledge as a series of elements 
consolidated into a “socio-epistemic assemblage”, which is not fixed but a 
continual process.  
 
There are similarities between this trajectory and the one argued in the mental 
models literature (see 3.4.3), though the emphasis is greater there on 
accommodation rather than on contention. Wilson calls for ‘communities of 
practice’9 of reflexive, multidisciplinary teams “driven by collective knowledge 
requirements for improving practice in relation to a defined problem domain” 
(Wilson, 2006: 515). In order to move beyond “simply extracting from each other 
to meet the strategic self-interests of different actors”, actors with different 
histories and assumptions within a community of practice need to feel motivated 
and empowered to challenge each others’ ideas and “to embrace disagreement 
where necessary”, by building trust through sharing values, assumptions and 
motives through an iterative process of joint engagement (ibid: 518).  
 
Heterogeneity, Disjunctures and ‘Accommodations’ 
 
Long’s emphasis on discontinuity and conflict within heterogeneity appeared to 
sit uneasily with the ‘normative’ impulse in development management. Although 
he acknowledged that dense social networks may be valued strategically, his 
approach appeared to preclude cooperative action10 or shared multiple-period 
games in collectivities where homogeneity is valued. One of the criticisms of 
Long’s work is that it is restricted to experience in Latin America (Olivier de 
Sardan 2005: 13) where cultural norms differ to those in Africa (see 2.5.3). It 
                                               
9
  Etienne Wenger quoted in Wilson, 2006: 515. 
10
  Except in the work-place. 
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may be that there is a danger of reification of heterogeneity11, whereas in the 
local narrative ‘difference’ may represent a threat to community cohesion and a 
risk to social and economic insecurity.12 Emphasis on discontinuity implies that 
commonality of lifeworlds, security of shared practice and shared belief systems 
are not valued by social actors. Rather than discontinuities at the interface, 
agency also allows actors to avoid conflict by adapting and thus assimilating 
dissonant views within their own rationality.  
 
However, in the intervening years between Battlefields of Knowledge (1992) and 
Development Sociology: Actors’ Perspectives (2001), Long appears to have 
reduced the ‘oppositional’ element in ‘interface’. He recognises that cultural 
repertoires allow people to “improvise and experiment with ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
elements and experiences, and react situationally and imaginatively, consciously 
or otherwise, to the circumstances they encounter” (Long, 2001: 3). He also 
refers to ‘enabling’ as well as ‘constraining’ elements, in interfaces which occur 
in “arenas in which interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, 
accommodating, segregating or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive 
standpoints” (ibid: 65).  
 
Long regards donor interventions as social processes which are “more likely to 
reflect and exacerbate cultural differences and conflicts between social groups 
than they are to lead to the establishment of common perceptions and shared 
values”, and thus “it becomes unrealistic and foolhardy to imagine that 
facilitators can gently nudge or induce people and organisations towards more 
‘participatory’ and equitable modes of integration and coordination” (ibid: 88). 
Applied to the NAA, this clearly poses a challenge to the rhetoric of the NAA and 
the shift in attitudes it requires. 
 
3.3.2 Applying a Social Actor Perspective to Complementary Literatures 
 
In working out an analytical framework for analysing the Ethiopian donor-
recipient context, I wanted to work within a social actor orientation to consider 
congruence and disjuncture at the knowledge interface. The challenge has been 
                                               
11  Emphasis on agency, heterogeneity and discontinuity may represent a viewpoint 
grounded in Western individualism, so that, in development, “the individual agent has 
become the key political site” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 253). 
12
  Strategies may include “seek[ing] accommodation within the state apparatus rather 
than creating new political spaces outside it” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 260). 
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to find a way of analysing relationships in the aid chain which are influenced by 
a mixture of politics and normative values.  
 
Commentaries on aid relationships are found in several disciplines. A commonly 
used approach is institutional economics, often in terms of information 
asymmetry and incentives. A smaller, anthropological, literature discusses how 
knowledge is constructed, brokered and valued in development policy (see 2.2.4 
and 2.5.4). The development sociology literature tells us how resources, 
including knowledge, are constructed, brokered and valued by poor people, in 
an attempt to reduce the uncertainty which dominates their lives. Thinking about 
how knowledge and transactions are treated, it became apparent to me that 
there was considerable synergy between the different literatures in 
understanding the role of, and interrelationship between information, trust and 
motivation. Having spent time working in East Asia and South East Asia before 
researching in Ethiopia, I was also aware that different cultural patterns 
governed interactions between international and national staff, and between 
national staff of different social, political and geographical status.13  
 
Intending to combine these approaches with the specificity of Ethiopia and within 
the nature of the aid chain, I sought a model which permitted analysis of the 
interaction between culture, polity and information exchange, particularly in 
cross-cultural transactions. The underlying precepts of Denzau and North’s 
shared mental models (SMM) are that decision-making is governed by 
uncertainty rather than risk and that our mental models are formed from culture 
and belief systems (religion and/or ideology), and that sustained sharing of 
information permits mutual understanding and thus learning, though significant 
shifts in belief only occur in unusual circumstances (this brief outline is 
expanded fully in 3.4.4). 
 
Although SMM comes from the institutional economics literature, a social actor 
approach recognises the formation of mental models and the sustaining of belief 
systems through repeated interaction with others. Rather than assuming, as 
donor discourse does, that Western concepts can be universally shared, and 
that values and norms are common to other country contexts, the cross-cultural 
literature addresses issues of comparative norms of participation and 
                                               
13
 See Grammig (2002). 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 78 
accountability intra-nationally. In the next section, 3.4, I provide an overview of 
the institutional economics literature relating to trust, motivation and access to 
information, concluding with discussion of the shared mental models framework, 




3.4 TRANSACTIONS, MOTIVATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
 
3.4.1 Information Asymmetry in Explaining Aid Relationships 
 
There has been a reluctance to analyse aid relationships because “it makes 
people in the business nervous. That’s because it deals with messy stuff - 
behaviours, cultural norms, skills, motivations, and judgement calls” (Pomerantz, 
2004: 10). The institutional economics literature on accountability in aid-funded 
development tends to argue that there is a principal-agent problem affecting 
policy formulation, performance and aid effectiveness. If a purely institutional 
economics approach is taken, “the aid industry emerges as a complex of 
principal-agent, collective action and game theory problems” (Copestake, 2002: 
3). However, conventional principal-agent problems fail to provide an adequate 
explanation when faced with the complexity of aid, which can sometimes invert 
the principal-agent relationship, and the different objectives of its multiple actors.  
 
The aid chain is distinguished from other forms of publicly-funded service 
because it is funded by taxpayers in one country for service provision to the 
inhabitants of another - where donors are “spending others’ money on others” 
(Copestake, 2005: 63). Because of the length of the chain and its conflicting 
objectives, “it appears hardly possible that voters in donor countries at the end 
of the pipe and without any direct contact with the final beneficiaries, are 
supplied with realistic information on aid effectiveness.” (Michaelowa and 
Borrmann, 2006: 314). In practice, information asymmetry is tolerated (in 
contrast with donor rhetoric about monitoring aid effectiveness and lesson 
learning), with the consequence that aid objectives are weakly formulated 
(Martens, 2002b: 176), the length of the aid chain providing a level of protection 
to both donor politicians and their agents (Easterly, 2002: 244). 
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A further peculiarity of aid is that all donors and all levels of the chain claim to 
have the same objective, that is the interest of the ultimate beneficiaries 
(Seabright, 2002: 42). The NAA in particular implies that donors and recipient 
governments have broadly similar goals, and that donors will abandon self-
interest in the name of harmonisation. In theory, country ownership implies that 
the recipient government becomes the principal in the process, but the degree of 
ownership and its implications are far from clear: “[t]he responsibility and 
accountability that an owner has, in the conventional meaning of the word, is 
transformed to nearly unrecognisable forms by the system of development 
assistance” (Ostrom, 2002a: 243).  
 
3.4.2 Analysing Trust and Motivation in Aid Relationships 
 
Orthodox economics assumes an individual will respond to control by financial 
incentives, but studies have shown that use of such extrinsic control 
mechanisms “can be potentially counterproductive, because it undermines the 
pro-organizational behaviour of the steward, by lowering his or her motivation” 
(Davis et al., 1997: 25; cf. also Kunz and Pfaff, 2002: 275-6), ‘crowding out’ the 
individual’s sense of community in a shared purpose (Osterloh, 2001: 89).  
 
Unlike other bureaucrats, development staff have the task of implementing 
development policy in different political and cultural environments, either 
interacting across a geographical divide supplemented by intermittent missions 
to the ‘field’ or, with increasing decentralisation of development cooperation 
offices, through interaction with the recipient government’s political and 
bureaucratic staff. In their roles as interpreters of international development 
policy, donor staff are guided by their own ‘mental models’ when interacting with 
others. Crewe and Harrison suggest that, rather than looking at one group of 
development actors in isolation, “it is more useful to look at the relationships 
surrounding intervention practices as they actually take place.” (Crewe and 
Harrison, 1998: 19); in other words, regarding them as social actors at the 
development interface. 
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When donor staff undertake operational work, they are moved between posts 
every thee years or so to avoid moral hazard14, resulting in a loss of institutional 
memory. Knowledge of past performance is a vital resource for insecure, poor 
citizens. To reduce uncertainty, they opt for the security of predictable 
institutions and relationships, sacrificing their long term interest in a ‘Faustian 
bargain’ which entails “a tradeoff between the freedom to act independently in 
the pursuit of improved livelihoods and the necessity of dependent security” 
(Wood, 2003: 455). Repeated transactions, or multiple period games, therefore 
reduce uncertainty by offering a degree of predictability on the basis of ‘past 
performance’.  
 
3.4.3 Geopolitics, Information Asymmetry and Polity 
 
Aid can be regarded as a “useful, if sometimes unreliable, service to the conduct 
of international politics and diplomacy”, but conditionality is rarely imposed 
because its costs to the principal include the risk of jeopardising an existing 
relationship which might be important for strategic reasons (Burnell, 1997: 121). 
Additionally, conditionality imposes a moral cost, “because more is at stake: the 
country’s entire aid programme is on the line” (Thomas, 2004: 490). As a result, 
“governments often see that they have little to fear if they do not keep their side 
of the policy-for-money bargain” (Killick, 1997: 493).15   
 
Under the NAA logic, donors rely on information provided by the government to 
monitor the policy matrix attached to the PRSP, but in practice are faced with a 
decision about whether to trust government information. Even though liberal 
democracy is a central plank of the NAA, there is little focus in the literature on 
the role of ideology in relation to development. Waterman and Meier’s 
adaptation of the principal-agent model links polity with information asymmetry 
(Figure 3.2 overleaf). This offers a way of analysing the polity of donor-
government and government-community relations in circumstances such as 
those which occurred in Ethiopia in 2005 when, contrary to donors’ expectations, 
the government did not adopt multiparty pluralism. 
                                               
14
  These rotations are designed to deter donor staff from ‘going native’ (Pomerantz, 
2005). It assumes that staff will be effective as soon as they arrive in post, and wherever 
they are posted. 
15
  After many years working in Africa, Pomerantz concludes that African countries know 
that donors have much to lose by cutting aid, and this, together with resentment at being 
told what to do, gives African governments a degree of power in the aid relationship 
(Pomerantz, 2004: 20-21). 




Figure 3.2 Consensus, Information and Polity, adapted from 
Waterman and Meier (1998: 188) 
 
 
The model suggests that, where both principal and agent have access to 
information, policies are likely to be evidence-based, regardless of whether or 
not principal and agent have shared objectives. Where there is goal conflict, a 
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situation where both principal and agent are well-informed will result in 
‘advocacy coalitions’, built by combining ideas and information, leading to well-
argued policies. Where there is goal consensus and both principal and agent 
have information, an evidenced-based “classic policy subsystem” will result. 
Although formulated to address information asymmetry between politicians and 
bureaucrats, Waterman and Meiers’ model offers a useful tool for discussing the 
relationship between different ideological positions within the aid interface.  
 
3.4.4 Shared Mental Models 
 
Denzau and North define mental models as “the internal representations that 
individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment” (Denzau and 
North, 1994: 4). The concept of shared mental models (SMM) was introduced 
briefly in 3.3.2. Retaining a social actor perspective, I was interested to identify 
an transactional analytical model to help analyse actors’ perceptions of the 
process of participation and evaluation of aid, itself made up of inter-national 
and intra-national economic, social, cultural and political transactions. The 
refinement of the concept of mental models which North developed with 
Denzau, ‘shared mental models’16, provides such an analytical framework. 
Rejecting “substantive rationality in which agents know what is in their self-
interest and act accordingly” they argue that “uncertainty, not risk, characterizes 
choice-making” (ibid: 27, 3). The cruces of their argument are (i) that uncertainty 
is reduced when actors’ mental models are, if not shared, at least familiar to one 
another; and (ii) that mental models are derived from culture and belief systems. 
The model’s components are set out below. 
 
Uncertainty is reduced when mental models are familiar or shared 
 
North argues that uncertainty in decision-making forces actors to rely on past 
experience and on values which form their mental models. These are embedded 
in institutions, so that knowledge and belief are resistant to rapid change (North, 
1995: 25). If individuals share a common cultural background and similar 
experiences, they are likely to share similar mental models (Denzau and North, 
1994: 3). Denzau and North do not suggest that mental models are uniform, or 
that conflict, power asymmetries or divergent interests do not exist. Both 
                                               
16
 Denzau, A. T. and North, D. C. (1994). ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and 
Institutions’. Kyklos, 47 (1), pp. 3-31. 
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Hofstede, who uses a similar approach (mental programming)17, and Denzau 
and North conceptualise mental models or programmes in interaction with an 
individual’s environment, with which the person has both a reactive and a 
proactive relationship (Hofstede, 2001: 2). This conveys the agency of Long’s 
social actor, particularly when engaged in ‘bridging’ the interface (Long, 2001: 
65). 
 
When faced with complex problems in the absence of information, “we must be 
employing some form of induction, enabling us to learn from the outcomes of our 
previous choices” (Denzau and North, 1994: 11). Not only do we rely on mental 
models for inductive processing, but our mental models determine what we 
learn. “The very spaces for actions, outcomes and reasonable strategies, as well 
as the mappings between them, may be objects of ignorance on the part of the 
individual.” (ibid: 11). Contrasted with Long’s argument, that social actors 
“possess the knowledgeability and capability to assess problematic situations 
and organise ‘appropriate’ responses” (Long, 2001: 241), ‘knowledgeability’ 
appears to equate with ‘inductive processing’. 
 
Although ‘mental model’ and ‘worldview’ are sometimes used interchangeably, 
‘worldview’ (Weltanschauung)18 has philosophical applications which are absent 
from North’s concept of mental models. It is the comparison between different 
mental models and the interactions within the intervening space that 
distinguishes ‘shared mental models’ from ‘worldview’, and also from ‘bounded 
rationality’ and ‘constrained preferences’, because Denzau and North are 
interested in analysing the pace of change.  
 
Denzau and North suggest that classical economics tends to view learning as a 
regular, incremental process (Denzau and North, 1994: 22). They propose an 
alternative approach which considers learning as “slow, gradual change 
punctuated by relatively short periods of dramatic changes” (ibid: 23). Dramatic 
changes19 are often induced by “the failures of a mental model to predict in 
situations when the individual is highly motivated, i.e., when the issue is one 
very important to the learner” (ibid: 17, fn8]. During these periods of change, 
“new meanings [are absorbed] from related mental models” (ibid: 25).  
                                               
17
  Hofstede links “collective programming of the mind” to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus 
(Hofstede, 2001: 4). 
18
  There are other similar terms: for example, mentalité collective (Bauman, 1999: 92). 
19
  Denzau and North call these changes “Episodes of representational redescription” 
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This raises an interesting paradox about the ‘familiarity’ of meanings. On the one 
hand, congruent mental models permit verbal ‘shorthand’ through tacit 
knowledge and understanding of the conceptual background to the idea 
expressed verbally, allowing “single terms to stand for substantial pieces of 
implicit analysis embodied” in the mental model (ibid: 20). The widespread use 
of proverbs in Ethiopia would be an example of this. On the other hand, a 
common language can be interpreted differently if mental models are not 
shared, because “[t]he reception of a message and its interpretation by the 
listener are strongly influenced by the categories and beliefs that the listener 
already has about the world” (ibid: 20). Denzau and North suggest that 
meanings will converge the more that they are discussed and used and that 
“[m]ental models are shared by communication, and communication allows the 
creation of ideologies and institutions in a co-evolutionary process” (ibid: 20).  
 
Mental models are derived from culture and belief systems 
 
Denzau and North maintain that any moderately sophisticated belief system, 
whether a religion or an ideology, is likely to contain a number of paradoxes, or 
logical inconsistencies (ibid: 26), and that, if these paradoxes become 
contentious, “the ideological entrepreneur could utilize this in order to help 
reinterpret the ideology in ways more suitable to the entrepreneur’s goals” (ibid: 
26)20. For these authors, ideologies are defined as “the shared framework of 
mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an 
interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment 
should be structured.” This approach is shared by the anthropologist, Geertz, for 
whom “the importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve, for an individual or 
for a group, as a source of general, yet distinctive conceptions of the world, the 
self, and the relations between them, on the one hand … and of rooted, no less 
distinctive ‘mental dispositions’ … on the other (Geertz, 1966: 40). Geertz 
argues that one function of religion is to reduce a person’s uncertainty, because 
“even the remotest indication that they [religious symbols and systems] may 
prove unable to cope with one or other aspect of experience raises within him 
the gravest sort of anxiety” that his “creatural viability” may be threatened (ibid: 
13). 
                                               
20
  This is another arena for brokerage. 
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Hofstede defines culture as “collective programming of the mind”, manifested in 
values, symbols, heroes and rituals (Hofstede, 2001: 1), passing on through 
inter-generational transfer “with an obstinacy that is often underestimated” 
(ibid: 3). For Hofstede, the “key constructs … for describing mental software are 
values and culture. Values are held by individuals as well as by collectivities; 
culture presupposes a collectivity.” (ibid: 5)21. Because, like culture (or perhaps 
as part of culture), “values are programmed early in our lives, they are 
nonrational (although we may subjectively feel our own to be perfectly rational!).” 
(ibid: 6). Denzau and North have very little to say about culture, as distinct from 
religion and other belief systems (particularly ideology), other than to say that 
culture “encapsulat[es] the experiences of past generations of any particular 
cultural group”, experiences which are transferred through a process of cultural 
learning which starts at birth (Denzau and North, 1994: 15). This captures the 
inter-generational transfer characteristic of culture, but using the umbrella 
phrase ‘shared mental model’ downplays the role which power asymmetries play 
in the manifestation and perpetuation of culture. However, such asymmetries 
would be an intrinsic part of their mental models, and their familiarity would 
reduce uncertainty. 
 
Shared Mental Models - subsequent discourse 
 
Reviewing subsequent interest in their paper on SMM twelve years after its 
publication, Denzau et al. re-emphasise the link between the evolution of SMMs 
and belief systems, but note that ideologies - they use neoliberalism as their 
example - are adopted differently depending on each country’s social, political, 
economic and institutional context (Denzau et al., 2006: 14, 21). Although the 
Kyklos paper has been cited in over 130 publications across a number of 
disciplines, it has been most usefully explored, as far as this research is 
concerned, in the comparative politics literature where there has been “renewed 
interest in the role of collectively held ideas and beliefs in politics” (Legro, 2000: 
419).  
 
Two relevant papers offer an adaption of SMM’s explanation of 
ideological/ideational change. Rothstein discusses the creation of ‘collective 
                                               
21
   Uphoff reminds us that ‘mental constructs’ are also constraining (Uphoff, 1996: vii). 
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memory’ as a tool used by political strategists/entrepreneurs (Rothstein, 2000). 
The other paper takes up Denzau and North’s patterns of learning; Legro is 
interested in why citizens’ mental models are sometimes resistant to ‘exogenous 
shocks’22, suggesting that there are “powerful tendencies toward continuity”. He 
sees ‘ideational’ change as a two-stage process: disillusion with existing 
collective ideas, and subsequent identification of an alternative, preferable set of 
ideas. In the absence of these conditions, Legro suggests that the status quo 
will be maintained because the security of adhering to the existing, dominant 
orthodoxy is preferable to the risks associated with change (Legro, 2000).23. 
 
Denzau and North note that one key issue in the Kyklos paper that had not been 
adequately addressed in subsequent research, namely “the interaction of 
learning with the pre-existing shared mental models in a person’s head, and in 
the heads of the people of a society” (Denzau et al., 2006: 14). My research is 
concerned with the extent of congruence and disjuncture (and ambiguity) in the 
SMMs not only of Ethiopian actors, but all actors within the prevailing aid chain. 
Given that aid-funded development is currently aimed at sustainable institutional 
change, SMMs seem to be a useful way of exploring the dynamics of that 
change process. Hofstede’s advice below endorses a strategy of increased 
understanding of donors’ partners’ mental models:  
 
“In these postcolonial days, foreigners who want to change something in another 
society will have to negotiate their interventions. Negotiation again is more likely 
to succeed when the parties concerned understand the reasons for the 
differences in view-points.” (Hofstede, 2001: 15). 
 
 
3.5 CULTURAL ANALYSIS AND MENTAL MODELS 
 
3.5.1 Cross-Cultural Research, Epistemology and Ontological Discussion 
 
The purpose of this section is to explore issues in cross-cultural research, 
prompted by the Ethiopian context and the selection of SMMs as my core 
analytical focus. The exploration is done in two parts. In 3.5.1, I explore some 
                                               
22
  Legro’s use of ‘shocks’ mirrors Denzau and North’s ‘crisis’. 
23
  This provides an example of SMM from political science which resonates with the 
concept of the ‘Faustian bargain’ made by poor villagers in the face of insecurity Wood, 
2003. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 87 
ontological and epistemological issues arising out of my concern to avoid 
ethnocentricity in researching culture, particularly in cross-cultural settings, 
being wary of “the indecency of speaking for others” (Escobar, 1995: 152). In 
3.5.2, my focus shifts to discourses on topics identified as being of particular 
relevance to participation and evaluation in Ethiopia24. 
 
Researching the ‘Other’ 
 
Aid and development orthodoxies arise from Western normative, geopolitical 
and economic priorities, and there is a danger of donors assuming that 
‘participation’ and ‘monitoring and evaluation’ are Western concepts which have 
to be ‘taught’ to the governments and citizens of developing countries. In 
exploring how these terms are conceptualised and practiced in cross-cultural 
situations, a potential ethical problem was how to discuss cultural norms and 
attitudes in relation to intrinsic motivation, trust and communication. The fact that 
I was doing research and using interpretive methods which are not culturally 
appropriate in the context of rural Ethiopia (‘inappropriate’ in that I was not an 
Ethiopian, but a European woman, accompanied by an interpreter, asking open-
ended questions of a range of individuals), demonstrated a degree of 
ethnocentrism: I was engaged in a ‘Western project’ (Hofstede, 2001: 16). I was 
concerned to explore the implications of including cultural analysis in my 
conceptual framework.  
 
Ethiopia has always fulfilled a role of ‘the other’ in Westerner’s perceptions (see 
section 4.2.4), including the representation of ‘famine’ to a global audience (a 
continuing representation which Ethiopians find humiliating). Notions of ‘Africa’ 
play a particular role for the West, as in Tony Blair’s 2001 description of Africa 




The two meanings ascribed to cultural relativism in the Dictionary of 
Anthropology, one methodological, “while the anthropologist is in the field, he or 
she temporarily suspends … their own esthetic and moral judgements”, the 
other moral and political, to “respect other cultures and treat them as ‘as good 
                                               
24
  This refers to the analysis of the WIDE research data (Annex A). See 3.5.2. 
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as’ one’s own”,25 gloss over earlier discourse which viewed cultural relativism’s 
suspension of judgement as nihilist. More recently, “corrupt and corrupting 
appropriations of cultural relativism” have “inspire[d] critics from all points along 
the political spectrum” (Perusek, 2007: 827, 821). In rejecting “a [Talcot] 
Parsonian dichotomy between tradition and modernity”, researchers tended to 
avoid discussing ‘cultural themes’ during the 1980s/90s (Hanson, 2003: 355). 
Despite a renewed interest in issues of culture, particularly in comparative 
politics, there remains a danger that “the well-known methodological pathologies 
of cultural theory, reification, ethnocentrism, teleology and conceptual fuzziness 
will be resurrected as well” (ibid: 356). 
 
From the cultural capital literature, Rao and Walton describe “culture is part of a 
set of capabilities that people have … There is no presumption that these 
processes are inherently “good”, or inherently “bad”.” (Rao and Walton, 2004: 4). 
From the cross-cultural psychology literature, Hofstede advocates 
‘intersubjectivity’, that is, taking different viewpoints into account (Hofstede, 
2001: 2) without being judgemental. Uphoff, a sociologist, describes such a non-
judgemental cross-cultural encounter as maintaining a “’binocular’ perspective 
… [which] keeps apparently opposite objects or values in view and in focus, 
drawing insight and benefit from their different qualities and apparent 
contradictions”, and thus accepting the epistemological role of paradox (Uphoff, 
1996: xii). For Gasper, legitimate cultural relativism does allow judgements 
provided that they are based on contextual knowledge and self-reflexivity 
(Gasper, 2004: 211). Long locates the renewed interest in culture to a post-
globalisation shift from focus on the nation state to national (or ethnic) identity 
which celebrates a cultural distinctiveness linked with a (sometimes imagined) 
historical past (Long, 2001: 222). 
 
Some of the literature on Ethiopia reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5 contains 
reference to traits and behavioural norms which move close to discussion of 
‘national character’. I was concerned that discussing the lifeworlds of 
respondents whose national identity is strongly linked to an historical past (see 
Chapter 4) risked essentialising customary norms and practice. My concern was 
mitigated by Hofstede, a cross-cultural psychologist, writing that ‘national 
character’ was formed by ‘learning from the past’ and through interaction with 
each other, even in heterogeneous societies (Hofstede, 2001: 13).  
                                               
25
 Dictionary of Anthropology, WWW. 
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Gasper, who describes psychologist Hofstede’s concept of shared mental 
programming as ‘influential’, quotes anthropologists Crewe and Harrison’s 
description (1998: 152-3) of Hofstede’s 148 country study for IBM as a 
“management-studies simplification” one which ignores power relations (Gasper, 
2004: 197). I argue this is a misreading of Hofstede, whose four analytical 
factors are all connected with power: one explicitly (high-low power distance), 
and three implicitly (individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity and 
uncertainty avoidance). Crewe and Harrison do accept the role of ‘mental 
models’: “Culture may be a ‘mental’ process, but it consists of active, creative 
rather than passive programming” (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 152)26.  
 
Cross-cultural analysis and methodological rigour 
 
Discussing the need for methodological rigour to avoid reducing the findings to 
discussion of ‘stereotypes’, Hofstede specifies that analysis must be descriptive 
rather than judgemental. He emphasises “the impossibility of escaping value 
judgements”, there being “no way out of this dilemma but to (1) expose oneself 
and one’s work to the work of others with different value systems and (2) try to 
be as explicit as possible about one’s own value system” (Hofstede, 2001: 14-
15).27 
 
Hofstede distinguishes between “a phenomenological study of values (which is 
the area of social science) and a deontological approach (which belongs to 
ethics, ideology, or theology)” (ibid: 15). I suggest that this dichotomy is 
problematic for researchers in international development, because they are 
normally exposed to both ontological approaches: trained (usually) in social 
science research methods, their choice of career and their field experience are 
likely to be normative in origin. Given that ethics, ideology and, in some 
instances, religious belief are endemic to development as practiced by both 
donors and recipients, a deontological exploration of the values of development 
actors, as well as the researcher, is justified.  
 
                                               
26
 Wood uses the term “cognitive mapping” in peasants’ institutional landscape (Wood, 
2003: 468). 
27
  My own normative framework is discussed in 3.2.3. 




Discussion of ‘values’ currently dominates the political agenda, domestically and 
internationally. The fieldwork for this research took place between 2004 and 
2006, throughout which ‘Western values’ were juxtaposed with an ‘other’ which 
was simplified as fundamentalist Islam (Perusek, 2007: 826). This feeds into the 
idea of development as a ‘moral’ project underpinned by fear (Abrahamsen, 
2000: 17). 
 
In the NAA’s involvement of ‘civil society‘ (a concept rarely precisely defined by 
donors), Abrahamsen detects a romanticised, unproblematised conception of 
civil society organisations within liberal democratic discourse (Abrahamsen, 
2000: 53, 54). In the UK writing up my thesis, I looked afresh at how the familiar 
vocabulary of ‘participation’ (voice, empowerment, exclusion, partnership, 
ownership) was employed in my local district. Feedback from local associations, 
of which I was a member, local media and affected individuals identified  
concerns similar to those raised in development discourse, and, through contact 
with the local government services, I found that democratic representation was 
often sidelined by a managerialist view of civil society.  
 
Politics and Culture 
 
Recent literature demonstrates an upsurge in interest in culture among political 
scientists. Chabol and Daloz have developed “a cultural approach to 
comparative politics” (Chabal and Daloz, 2006: 198), adopting qualitative 
research methods. They state that “Rather than risk ‘false consciousness’ 
(misinterpretation), a cultural approach to politics uses how those involved 
account for their own lives” (ibid: 207-208). However, they describe analysis of 
values as ethnocentric, whereas they contend that the analysis of meaning 
avoids this pitfall; meanings can be shared even when values are not (ibid: 22, 
86).  
 
The relationship between politics and culture has been a two-way interest, as 
anthropologists have engaged with politics in ‘political anthropology’. Politics, 
together with history, had previously been treated as ‘context’ (Poluha and 
Rosendahl, 2002: 7), not as an integral part of the analysis. Using Bourdieu’s 
concept of doxa, the “taken-for-granted and thus never discussed or 
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questioned”, and the heterodoxa, the ‘never questioned’ in relation to dominant 
ideology, Poluha and Rosendahl warn against assumptions of doxa in non-
Western societies, with assumptions about the degree of political agency 
embedded in Western society (ibid: 9-10).  
 
3.5.2 Selected Foci in Cross-Cultural Research 
 
As part of the grounding for the research, I analysed primary data from Ethiopia 
collected in 2003 by Dr. Philippa Bevan, Dr. Alula Pankhurst and their Ethiopian 
research team in a series of village studies titled Wellbeing and Illbeing in 
Development, Ethiopia (WIDE). The analysis suggested that cultural values 
relating to identity, individualism, collectivism and religion, would be important 
for understanding cultural influences on participation and evaluation in Ethiopia. 
Discourse on these topics from the cross-cultural literature are reviewed below.  
 
While there is broad congruence between sociology’s and anthropology’s 
definition of culture as “the repertoire of learned ideas, values, knowledge, 
aesthetic preferences, rules and customs shared by a particular collectivity of 
social actors” (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000: 376), the term ‘culture’ is highly 
contested within anthropology. This is because it is closely linked with 
“disciplinary identity” and is associated with anthropologists’ perception that “the 
concerns of the non-anthropological world keep leaking into our own private 
disciplinary disputes, despite all our best attempts to establish boundaries 
around what we see as our intellectual property” (Barnard and Spencer, 2000: 
136). 
 
The working definition of culture for this thesis has been: 
 
“culture is the set of ideas, values, norms and communicative means that a 
group shares, has received from the previous generation and tries to convey to 
the next generation, transformed in varying degrees by internal innovation and 
cultural contact with other groups.” (Klausen, quoted in Jerman (1998)) 
 
This definition includes the idea that culture is a dynamic process and, although 
susceptible to change (“a set of contested attributes, constantly in flux” (Rao and 
Walton, 2004: 4)), it is deeply embedded in individuals’ interactions from an 
early stage in their lives.  
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 92 
 
The particularity of the development context is that transactions and interactions 
take place in a cross-cultural ‘space’. Pomerantz, writing about donor behaviour 
and cross-cultural confusion arising from the (dis)juncture between Western and 
‘African’ cultures, echoes the SMM approach by suggesting that building trust, 
“the fundamental ingredient in relationships that lead to mutual influence” is 
done through shared purpose, reliability, familiarity, and open communication” 
(Pomerantz, 2004: 12). She notes that cross-cultural disconnects occur not only 
between international and national personnel but between metropolitan and rural 
Africans, and between donor staff who ‘go native’ and those who do the 
opposite because of the “minor irritants of everyday life” (ibid: 35, 37). For the 
most part, it is assumed that those in the development industry can work 
anywhere and be effective in short-term deployment and thus that the 
development industry is culturally neutral, although the industry has its own 





Triandis (1989: 507) argued that there are “three kinds of self-conceptions … 
private selves are the aspect of self conceptions that are shown and known to 
oneself; public selves are those aspects that are presented to others; and 
collective selves represent the self as members of various groups.” (Kashima, 
2002: 213). In collectivist societies (see below), where deviation from social 
norms risks severe penalties, “the private and public selves are often different” 
(Triandis, 1989: 514). This suggests that there are nested layers of self-identity 
depending on whom one is interacting with. These identities may be conflicting 
and result in social tension, as in Crewe and Harrison’s example of national 
project staff who were both ‘developers’ and ‘locals’ (Crewe and Harrison, 1998: 
173). Our private selves construct the identity we want to present to others; 
others impose their own interpretation based on their own mental models.  
 
In Grint’s view, group identity requires individuals to take a “leap of faith and 
imagination” to feel that they share the same ideas and values as other 
members of their group, and different values to members of other groups28 
                                               
28
  Relevant to the discussion of in-group/out-group below. 
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(Grint, 1996: 181). This accords with the conventional approach to identity within 
development studies, which is to engage with Anderson’s notion of national 
identity. Putting aside his supposition of its Eurocentric origins29, which do not 
apply in the Ethiopian context, one can accept his definition of national identity 
as an ‘imagined political community’ (Anderson, 1991: 6). Given that “the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members” (ibid: 6) and therefore their mental models of national identity are not 
built up through repeated interaction, the importance of culture and ideology, 
both of which are influenced by history, becomes apparent. If, as Woodward 
suggests, “identities are forged through the cultural practices and symbols 
through which meanings are made”, interaction with out-group others “may 
result in a complete failure to share meanings” (Woodward, 2002: 74, 76).   
 
Individualism and Collectivism  
 
The cross-cultural literature on individualism-collectivism tends to present a 
bifurcated world, one half being ‘Western culture’ and the other usually ‘Eastern 
culture’, or ‘Asia and Africa’, indicating that there is clearly a geopolitical 
dimension to this. Using ‘East’ and ‘West’ as alternative labels for ‘collectivistic’ 
and ‘individualistic’ cultures, Triandis suggests that freedom is often seen as an 
unqualified good in individualistic cultures yet it is associated with “chaos” in 
vertical collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1999).  
 
Individualists “define the self as autonomous and independent” (Chen et al., 
2002: 571; also Triandis, 1999). Individualist societies “sample mostly personal, 
internal attributes of persons” such as “personality, ability, attitude” (Triandis, 
1999); all are assumed to be entitled to equal rights and equitable treatment 
(Moemeka, 1998: 122-123). Because “In individualist societies, it is permissible 
for individuals to put self-interest ahead of group interest” (Chen et al., 2002: 
572), “individualists’ contractual control preference may orient them toward 
proactively laying down specific legal protections characteristic of what 
collectivists consider a trustful ingroup relationship” (ibid: 579).  
 
In collectivist communities, “joint effort is perceived as the only feasible way to 
bring about change. The corollary of this is that “in collectivistic cultures, the 
                                               
29
 Anderson identifies the Enlightenment, print media and the rejection of religious 
thought as the origins of national identity (1991: 4-7). 
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entire group may be held responsible for the actions of its individual members. 
Therefore, no one is allowed to make decisions alone without the approval of the 
entire group.” (Sagie and Aycan, 2003: 457); whereas “in individualistic cultures 
it is believed that individuals have the potential and power to change things.” 
(ibid: 457). Strict standards about social actions and forms of communication 
control ‘performance’: “Noncompliance provokes strict social, and often 
economic and psychological, sanctions”. Thus, “the community requires each of 
its members to be his or her neighbor’s keeper”, and proverbs or adages, 
reinforced by sanctions, are used to ensure “honesty and trust in interpersonal 
and group relationships” (ibid: 130-131). Fear of exclusion acts as a deterrent 
because “an individual expelled from the group does not have an identity” 
(Velayutham and Perera, 1996: 69). Triandis suggests that such exclusion is 
“emotionally draining” for in-group members, hence the rigid requirement for 
conforming to group norms (Triandis, 1989: 511).30  
 
In “culturally-evolved” communities, where there is no choice but to belong 
(Moemeka, 1998: 122), “[n]othing done, no matter how important and useful it is 
to the individual, is considered good unless it has relevance for the community. 
No misfortune, no matter how distinctly personal, is left for the individual to bear 
alone. The community laughs together and also cries together.”31 (ibid: 124). 
Discussion of African ‘participation’ in 2.5.3 noted the importance ascribed to the 
unity of the community. “Collectivists define the self as interconnected and 
interdependent” (Chen et al., 2002: 571). Another way of saying this would be 
the African adage: ‘I am because we are’ (Mbiti, 1969, quoted in Moemeka, 
1998).  
 
Whereas "individualist societies prescribe a universalistic norm of dealing with 
all others with ethical consistency”, so that “strangers are simply individuals that 
the self does not know rather than representatives of any outgroup”, “collectivist 
societies … are more likely to prescribe particularistic norms and standards for 
treating people differently depending on whether they are ingroup or outgroup” 
(Chen et al., 2002: 573). The concept of in-group/out-group may have relevance 
to cross-cultural ‘partnership’, as “the collectivist self may have “negative 
                                               
30
 Weaker versions of in-group-out-group dynamics also occur in individualistic societies: 
second-guessing what the rest of the group want can cause anxiety as failure risks 
being made a scapegoat or being branded as a non-team player (Cooke, 2001: 109-
110). 
31
  This expression was often found in the Ethiopian data reported in Annex A. 
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expectations of cooperation from anyone other than one’s ingroups” (Chen et 
al., 2002: 579, 574). The identification of an oppositional ‘other(s)’ helps form the 
‘collective memory’ of national identity (Rothstein, 2000), and the state becomes 





This section has explored some cultural variables which had been identified as 
relevant to the country context following analysis of the WIDE data and reading 
the literature in Chapters 4 and 5. Building on the social actor approach, I 
introduced Denzau and North’s SMMs; both argue that culture determines the 
way individuals interpret the world around them, their patterns of interaction, 
motivation and knowledge acquisition. Given the complexity of relationships 
occurring in the cross-cultural context of aid, and the introduction of new forms 
of relationship such as ‘harmonisation’ and ‘partnership’, there are clearly a 
myriad junctures where mental models might be shared, obscured or fractured. 
Because of the political nature of current aid orthodoxy and because a political 
crisis in 2005 challenged donors’ assumptions and induced them to alter their 
Ethiopian aid programmes, I also included a model analysing the relationship 
between information exchange and polity. Combining these forms of analysis 
permitted exploration of the ways different perceptions of participation and 
evaluation were formed and the extent to which the (rate of) attitudinal change, 
assumed under the NAA, had taken place. 
 
 
3.6 RESEARCH METHODS AND FIELDWORK 
 
This section provides detail about the organisation of the research. It starts with 
an overview (3.6.1) of examples of ethnography of aid which influenced my 
selection of the aid chain as a ‘unit of analysis’, and a description of the 
qualitative methods used (3.6.2). This is followed by a section on ethics (3.6.3), 
an explanation of the choice of Ethiopia as the country context (3.6.4), and a 
linked account of the support provided by the Department of Sociology and 
Social Anthropology at Addis Ababa University (3.6.5). Turning to the 
organisation of the field work, I describe how donors willing to take part in the 
research were identified (3.6.6) and how access to their programmes and to 
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respondents within those programmes was negotiated (3.6.7). Logistical 
constraints are described in 3.6.8 and, finally, I give details of the timing of the 
fieldwork, its locations and the numbers of those interviewed, in 3.6.9. 
 
3.6.1 Ethnography of Aid 
 
Although my research proposal indicated an ethnographic study of participation 
in M&E as a system, I kept coming up against the challenge of what 
‘ethnography’ entailed, and whether it was possible to do an ethnography of 
such a wide ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, quoted in Marsden, 2003: 5), 
comprising different donors, different levels of government and villagers from 
different sites. The danger might be that, by doing “quick and dirty ethnography” 
rather than ‘deep’ ethnography in the Malinowski mould, my research would be 
insufficiently emic to draw out the multitude of factors involved.  
 
In the period prior to the research, it seemed that there was an increasing 
interest in how development organisations work. This resulted in a number of 
ethnographical studies of development which provided useful insights into how 
such processes and the actors involved can be studied. Because development 
agencies regulate both policy and practice, a number of authors have used a 
similar combination of research methods and analytical techniques: a social-
actor-approach combining participant observation, textual analysis, and 
organisational cultural analysis. 
 
Examples of ethnography of development which I found particularly useful were: 
 
Heginbotham’s anthropological study of a development intervention in India in 
which four different layers of management ‘model’ had to be negotiated by 
project staff and other actors from the community. His observation of encounters 
between the different historical and cultural cognitive models of organisation and 
how people responded to the conjunctures and disjunctures, led him to suggest 
“three major sources of cognitive models” which could be used to understand 
organisations - (i) cultural norms and institutions, (ii) historical experience, and 
(iii) ideologies (Heginbotham, 1975:10-11). This approach clearly has resonance 
with mental models. 
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Gould has sought to “establish aidnography as a specific kind of intellectual-
political enterprise defined by specific tensions of a discursive and 
methodological nature”. This should include “how specific definitions compete in 
everyday social transactions - in speech and in texts, in ritual and performative 
settings.” He proposes two analytical strategies: firstly, “aid rhetoric can be and 
is studied for its ‘narrative’ structures” and, secondly, “the analysis of social 
relations; of encounters of patrons, brokers and clients; or bureaucratic roles 
and procedures” (Gould, 2004: 263, 269).  
 
Wedel’s recommended method for aidnography was ‘studying through’ 
(following Shore and Wright (1995: 49), which enabled aidnography to be linked 
to policy, and thence to “institutions, ideology, power, rhetoric, and discourse, 
the global and the local”. Wedel recommends talking with “many people in 
different positions, to assess their moves, the influences upon them, and 
networks connecting them - and to return to them repeatedly.” (Wedel, 2004: 
150, 160, 170). 
 
Gasper provided methodological insights to investigate “concepts and 
arguments and for reflecting on moral and political assumptions”  (Gasper, 
2003: 1) and “to demystify the common discourse in development cooperation 
and international relations, through probing the meanings of ‘development’, 
‘freedom’, ‘efficiency’, and so on.” (ibid: 225). Looking for “consensus or 
compromise across widely different perspectives and interest groups, trying to 
bridge ideals, interests and action”, Gasper recommends supplementing 
ethnography with deconstruction of logframes and policy/performance matrices, 
textual analysis and participant observation from within the aid community (ibid: 
3, 24). 
 
I was concerned that breaking the fieldwork up into periods would preclude 
sustaining research relationships. Fortunately, there were no changes of staff 
among donors or government respondents once fieldwork started. It also 
permitted a more longitudinal view in which delays and disjunctures became 
evident. Fetterman describes ethnography as frequently an iterative, episodic 
process, where contextual knowledge is built up over time, allowing for major 
themes to be elicited and for periods of reflection in between field visits, enabling 
him “to see patterns of behaviour over time” (Fetterman, 1998: 9). Ethnography 
permits an historical perspective to be taken, mapping how different 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 98 
organisations were perceived and conducted and changed over time; and the 
interplay between culture, values, language and practice in power relationships 
in the development context (Lewis, (undated): 7). 
 
3.6.2 Research Methods 
 
The anthropological literature and my analysis of the WIDE data had shown that 
most activities at village level were communal and that there was some tension 
around the idea of individualism in Ethiopian culture. This might suggest Focus 
Group Discussion as the most suitable qualitative method, but there were three 
reasons why I chose not to use this technique. First, the emphasis on group 
cohesion and the hierarchical nature of group activities suggested that the 
desire for conformity to the ‘group view’ might inhibit expression of individual 
viewpoints. Second, I knew from the literature and from my initial visit to the 
field, that oratorical skills were much admired and that those displaying 
leadership would want to display those skills, at the expense of those who were 
less articulate and those afraid of expressing minority views. Third, and more 
practically, focus groups (needing instantaneous translation) seemed an 
unwieldy vehicle for drawing out the nuances of individual perception and 
practice. 
 
For these reasons, I chose to use semi-structured interviews as the primary 
research method. In order to be able to compare the views of donors, 
government and community, similar questions were asked of each category of 
respondent. The questions were based on reading the development literature, 
the anthropological literature and the WIDE analysis, and were sufficiently open 
that different issues could be raised by/with the respondents. The original list 
had nineteen questions, but these were condensed and rewritten to be less 
abstract, more experiential, for community respondents, in order to reduce the 
risks of incorrect interpretation during the interview and re-interpretation during 
analysis. (Both sets of questions are attached in Annex B.) 
 
Detailed notes were taken during the interviews. The interviews were not tape-
recorded, because I anticipated that respondents would feel apprehensive about 
expressing views that were critical if their voices were recorded. I needed 
instantaneous translation in order to follow up unusual points or explore 
inconsistencies. (This point is pursued in 3.6.3.) 
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I also carried out a non-verbal exercise with respondents where it seemed 
appropriate. This involved respondents ordering, in terms of importance, of 
different factors (to do with government, religion, associational and family life) 
which affected, for good or bad, their ability to make a ‘success’ (whatever 
‘success’ meant for them) of their lives. This exercise was designed to elicit 
perceptions of autonomy and agency within the structures and institutions which 
framed their daily lives. Because it was based on the anthropological literature 
and the WIDE analysis, it was most appropriate with community respondents, 
though it was tried with some woreda staff and a few European respondents. It 
used ‘flash cards’, with verbal help for non- or less literate from the 
translator/research assistant. Where it was not possible to do the full exercise 
(where the ground was too rough, or too windy - literally, in the field - or there 
was insufficient time), respondents were asked to rank four factors verbally:  
God, Government, Community, Self, factors identified from the historical and 
anthropological literature as being particularly influential. 
 
The third research method employed was textual analysis. Gasper states “The 
aid world is heavy too on formal declarations and documents .. The abundant 
speeches and documents are legitimate foci” for textual analysis (Gasper, 2003: 
3). Rather than following Gasper’s recommendation to put forward “possible 
reformulations” of the text to make its meaning explicit, the intention here was 
solely to identify statements of intent and values, and to explore any disconnects 
or inconsistencies. This method was primarily used with documents issued by 
donor headquarters or by donor groups in Ethiopia. These were analysed for 
‘corporate’ meanings around participation, monitoring and evaluation, and 
participatory monitoring and evaluation, and for internal logic. They were also 
used for comparison with individual staff’s perceptions and opinions about these 
issues. 
 
It had seemed, at the planning stage, as though there would be opportunities for 
participant observation but this was not the case. Early possibilities of 
attending donors’ meetings with government were opposed by donors as being 
politically sensitive. During the fieldwork, none of the three donors undertook 
evaluations of the aid programmes being followed. I attended one project 
meeting between international and national consultants, and was later told that 
my presence had had an inhibiting effect. A white, female foreigner’s presence, 
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even in administrative centres let alone rural villages, was sufficiently disruptive 
that it would have been fruitless to expect my attendance would not have altered 
the dynamics of evaluations or meetings at village level. Although that could 
have provoked an ‘event’ for analysis, I would have regarded that as extractive. I 
hoped to be able to ‘tread lightly’. 
 
Observation therefore had to be much more oblique, but could prove revealing 
nonetheless. During the course of interviews, attitudes to privacy, to 
transparency/opacity, ways to maintain distance or to pose a challenge, 
mechanisms for avoiding engagement, could be juxtaposed against verbal 




Language - Translation 
 
In Ethiopia, a multi-ethnic country with approximately 80 indigenous languages, 
language is particularly political in nature. Amharic is the language of 
government and a legacy of Amhara domination.  English is the language of aid, 
of external influence and indicative of being educated (to 10th grade and above). 
 
As all donors, key informants and most senior government officials were fluent in 
English, the majority of the fieldwork above the local government (woreda 
administrative level) was undertaken without translation. At woreda level, 
officials were offered the choice of speaking English or either Amharic or 
Tigrigna (the languages in the two regions in which the research took place). I 
was assisted by interpreter-research assistants from both regions who were 
graduates in sociology and social anthropology from the University of Addis 
Ababa (see 3.6.5). Both Amharic and Tigrigna, the language of the Tigray 
region, are rich in allegory and elaborate linguistic devices which preclude all but 
the very fluent foreigner from understanding the nuances and subtleties being 
conveyed. 
 
Using a translator, I was open to criticism of being ‘complicit with wider political 
inequalities’ (Watson, 2004: 60). However, Grint provides an alternative 
perspective: even though “we need to construct a series of empathetic 
competencies”, and although cultural boundaries can be seen as “protection 
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from the ‘other’”, Grint suggests that we need to accept “not passing as a local” 
(Grint, 1995: 172). Quite apart from the practical difficulties of cost, time and 
degree of linguistic complexity, I argue that the nature of the research itself 
justified the use of translation. As part of the aid process, government officials 
and national staff working for donor agencies are involved in frequent 
transliteration between Amharic or Tigrigna and English. The ‘political 
inequalities’ were already there. Equally, the process of M&E includes field visits 
by international and national staff who rely on English as a common language 
and who often rely on local staff to translate. As a researcher, I therefore 
experienced some of the same constraints of participation in M&E process 
which I was studying. Although English is favoured in Ethiopia, as being 
technocratic and precise, the ambiguities inherent in any language (ibid: 9), 
result in conflicting interpretations. Finally, the actual ‘language’ being studied is 
that of ‘participation’, one of Gasper’s ‘languages of aid’, an essential 




Health service experience had instilled in me the medical ethics’ principles of 
‘duty of care’, confidentiality and voluntarism, enshrined in medical research as 
‘informed consent’. In the social science context ‘duty of care’ raises questions 
of power, the type, length and effect of the encounter; and the risk of confusion 
over the purpose, limitations and potential outcomes of the research. The 
researcher should take steps to minimise these risks as far as possible, without 
putting any responsibility for the ethical process on the research subject. The 
ESRC warns that social science research is most clearly shaped by social 
processes when the research involves different national cultures. The emphasis 
on the individual, enshrined in the concept of ‘informed consent’ “can seem 
inappropriate or meaningless” in more collectivist societies in developing 
countries (ESRC, 2005: 28, 24).  
 
In a regime where party influence is manifest at sub-hamlet level, there was a 
possibility of putting the research subject at risk if attempting to seek them out 
without official permission. In a situation where there is very little privacy, either 
socially or administratively, conventional ethical standards promise little. In 
practice, each respondent was given written as well as verbal information about 
the research and asked to sign a consent form, or to give verbal assent if 
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illiterate. Talking through the consent form structured the translators’ verbal 
explanation, ensuring that the essential points were covered. The consent 
process may have done far more to sooth my normative concerns than to allay 
the practical concerns of the respondents, but some individuals opted not to take 
part. The WIDE data indicated that confidentiality was a contentious issue and, 
in practice, I found that an explicit guarantee of confidentiality was considered 
important by a number of government officials.  
 
3.6.4 Country Selection 
 
The original proposal was not formulated in relation to a specific developing 
country. The political and cultural context is fundamental to the research thesis, 
but the research was not predicated on the ‘peculiarity’ of Ethiopia. Rather, it 
was an exploration of a sub-system of aid (participation in evaluation) where 
donors interact within a single political and cultural context. The eventual country 
selection was based on two criteria: (i) the existence of strong research links 
with the country concerned, and (ii) the presence of significant donor-funding. 
The Department of Economics and International Development, University of 
Bath, which was funding my Studentship, had strong research networks with 
four countries participating in the Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) 
research programme. Of these, Ethiopia was the most aid-dependent. 
 
3.6.5 Research Relationship with Addis Ababa University 
 
At the start of my fieldwork, the University of Bath had an on-going research 
relationship with the SoSA at Addis Ababa University32. In the time, the country 
coordinator for Ethiopia for the WeD research project was based in SoSA. In 
order to formalise research support from SoSA, I applied for Affiliate Research 
status. Vitally importantly, they assisted me with the identification of experienced 
and very able research assistants.  
 
                                               
32
 This was an extension of work by Dr. Philippa Bevan, undertaken at the Centre for 
African Studies, Oxford, in conjunction with Addis Ababa University (Ethiopian Village 
Studies, 1994-1996). The extensions were WIDE (2003), and WeD (2003-2007; 
www.wed-ethiopia.org). 
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3.6.6 Selection of Donors 
 
I had originally intended to select one multilateral agency, one bilateral and one 
international NGO. Given the emerging complexity of the context, I decided to 
simplify the ‘variables’ and focus on three bilateral donors. As a preliminary step, 
I visited most of the donors with large programmes in Ethiopia. Some declined 
straight away. One (Ireland) expressed interest immediately, but with other 
donors it was a process of negotiation. As I was also relying on textual analysis 
as one of my research methods, it was important that I could access documents 
in English.  
 
3.6.7 Negotiating Access 
 
I assumed that, as a researcher, I would be able to gain access to donor staff 
easily but the process of negotiating access to their programmes took longer 
than I anticipated. In retrospect, the process with each agency involved many of 
the characteristics I later found in the research data, both in their documentation 
and their interview responses, reflecting the agency’s organisational culture. I 
describe below how access to their programmes was negotiated and, through 




Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI) 33 
 
DCI showed immediate interest in the research because they were developing 
an M&E framework with the Tigray Regional Government for their recently 
established regional budget support programme. After an initial meeting with a 
senior specialist, I was asked to submit a research description to be discussed 
by the development cooperation team at the embassy. The negotiation was 
concluded with a verbal agreement that my research should not be ‘extractive’. 
This stemmed from previous research which had not provided DCI with any 
feedback. It was agreed that I should offer conceptual support around 
participation in monitoring and evaluation to embassy and local staff, who were 
being encouraged to undertake qualitative monitoring to support DCI’s 
                                               
33
  Ireland Aid was renamed ‘Development Cooperation Ireland’ just before the research 
period. Its name then changed again in 2006, to Irish Aid. 
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programme in Tigray. The embassy arranged for me to visit the programme, 
during which staff introduced me to woreda officials. 
 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
 
Just as DCI professed lack of experience in monitoring and evaluation at 
regional level and lack of an integrated system between the field and 
headquarters, CIDA claimed to have a coherent RBM system. Negotiation took 
place during a period when there were several changes of staff. One individual 
took the initiative to get colleagues’ agreement to take part in the research. 
CIDA differed from the other two donors because it had created a structure 
within the embassy with responsibility for M&E, with a focal person at the apex, 
an adviser and two senior embassy staff responsible for overseeing M&E in 
different sectors. None of these staff had any formal training in M&E apart from 
an introduction to RBM. 
 
Unlike the other two donors, CIDA did not have regional offices. Although its 
preferred modality was federal DBS, it had two technical assistance projects 
managed from CIDA headquarters. Access to both projects was arranged via 
the embassy. Attempts to interview headquarters staff, either by telephone or on 
missions to Ethiopia, were unsuccessful. 
  
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) 
 
Access to SIDA was initiated through an informal contact and it took me some 
time to work out how to get formal access. Eventually, I realised that the 
formality I was anticipating was not required and, in retrospect, this probably 
reflected Sida’s more equalitarian organisational culture. Embassy staff 
arranged an introduction to Sida’s programme in Amhara. Staff at SIDA 
headquarters were open to direct contact and the interviews were easily set up. 




Contact with Regional government staff, in each case, was made through the 
donors’ embassy or regional staff. The choice of senior government staff 
interviewed were determined by the individual donor’s aid modality. Access to 
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district (woreda) staff was negotiated either through the donor’s local staff or via 
the project or programme director, and thence via the chairman of the woreda. 
Because of the difficulty of arranging appointments, selection of woreda 
respondents was opportunistic but nevertheless provided respondents from the 
different bureaux: finance and economic development, capacity building (health 
and education) and natural resources (agriculture). The Development Agents 
(DAs) work at kebele level, but organisationally they fall under the woreda 
Bureaux of Agriculture. I therefore categorised DAs as part of the government 
structure. Typically, the agriculture sector head would allocate DAs to 
accompany us to the villages.  
 
The de facto administrative structure in Ethiopia extends beyond that of the 
formal administration and it is difficult to establish the boundary between 
government and community. For the purposes of writing up this research, I have 
categorised the formal administrative structure as ‘government’ and the 
administrative network below this as ‘local leaders’.  
 
A simple representation of the multi-tiered structure of government is:  
 






Leader of 30 households 
Leader of 5 households. 
 




As government administration reaches down into the community, a central 
ethical question was the feasibility of obtaining direct, unsupervised contact with 
individual members of rural communities, to get their voluntary cooperation 
without putting them under some form of duress.  
 
My first fieldwork visits were to Tigray. The strength of support for the 
government from the Tigreans I met, combined with the impressions that I had 
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formed of the widespread control exercised by the federal government, led me 
to assume that my itinerary and the identities of my respondents would be 
known. For ethical reasons I would, in any case, be explicit about the nature 
(and limitations) of the research but, with the growing realisation of government 
influence and the insights which I had gained from analysing the WIDE data, I 
concluded that I should use the existing structures in order to approach 
community members. Not to do so, might have caused community respondents 
unnecessary anxiety. DAs would be known to the majority of the local 
population, worked closely with both local officials and with local leaders, were 
part of the woreda structure, and therefore made appropriate ‘gatekeepers’.  
 
In practice, there were regional differences. In Tigray, the interpreter and I went 
with the DA out into the fields or walked through villages where we were allowed 
to identify possible respondents apparently independently. The practice in 
Amhara was for the DAs to collect a group of potential respondents, from whom 
I could select individuals. Tigrean community respondents were mostly 
interviewed in the field where they were working. In Amhara, respondents were 
interviewed either in their own homes or in the DAs’ office (without the DAs 
being present).  
 
3.6.8 Logistical Constraints 
 
I was unprepared in a number of ways; firstly, for the poor communication and 
transport infrastructure and secondary for the local political economy, and the 
pervasiveness of government influence. I had assumed that the conditions 
described in the anthropology and history literature which I had read in the UK, 
most of which were written before the current regime came to power, would no 
longer be current. This proved to be incorrect, and caused me to modifiy my 
ambitions for the fieldwork.  
 
Because some of the woreda towns and nearly all the kebeles had no electricity 
or telephone connection, it was difficult to arrange appointments in advance with 
government staff. To visit communities in Amhara, our practice, agreed with 
government officers, was to visit the site and try and make appointments for the 
following day. In Tigray, visits were more spontaneous. However, the lack of 
rural roads, the roughness of the terrain (and for me, the altitude), meant that 
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the choice of sites was further limited to those on or reasonably close to a rural 
road.  
 
The second ‘logistical’ problem related to delays incurred by the government’s 
response to political unrest following the disputed elections of May 2005. 
Research with donors in June 2005 was briefly curtailed by the violent 
suppression of demonstrations. The start of the community-level research, 
which had already been delayed for logistical reasons, was further delayed in 
November 2005 (4.3.6). Community fieldwork in one of the research sites had to 
be cancelled because of concurrent tension on the Eritrean border. 
 
3.6.9 Pattern of Fieldwork: numerical data on interviews 
 
I undertook the fieldwork in separate blocks. Six visits to Ethiopia were made in 
total, three in 2004 (total five months), three in 2005 (total six months) and a 
short visit in 2006 to present the findings to the donors. These periodic visits 
enabled me, while back in the UK, to keep abreast of the fast-changing aid 
dialogue and agendas of the international donor community, to reflect on the 
research process and the findings to date and to expand my reading as a result.  
 
Key informants included multilateral agency staff, academics and NGOs. At the 
embassies, the key contact - a senior specialist in each case - was interviewed 
on every field visit. National staff were interviewed only once, unless they were 
responsible for M&E.  In Tigray and Amhara, the pattern was to interview one or 
two key individuals at Regional level, and then to interview program staff at 
regional and (if applicable) at sub-regional level. After the initial visit to all four 
sentinel woredas in Tigray, research was undertaken in the three woredas in the 
north and west. The last piece of Tigray fieldwork coincided with a build-up of 
troops on the Eritrean border, and was therefore limited to just two woredas. In 
Amhara, two visits were made to the regional capital, where the SIDA area 
based programme’s PCU is based, and two visits to programme woredas in the 
East Gojjam zone.  
 
Interviews were held with senior programme staff and with up to three sector 
heads at woreda level. Community interviews were held in five kebele in Tigray 
(two in one woreda, three in another), and in nine kebele (three in three different 
woreda in Amhara. The plan was to interview one or two formal (kebele, got) 
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leaders, one or two informal leaders, with a female household head and two to 
three farmers in each kebele, usually within one got.  
 
Table 3.1: Number of Interviews Held 
 
 Type No. of respondents  
 Donors (and their employees) 22  
 Government (incl. DAs) 37  
 Community (incl. sub-kebele leaders) 46  
 Other key informants 11  
 Total: 116  
 
 
Maps, showing the regions’ locations within Ethiopia, are provided in Annex C. 
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CHAPTER 4 





This is the first of two chapters which provide background information about 
Ethiopia, supplemented by commentary from the literature which identifies issues 
within Ethiopia’s history, political economy and communal life which have relevance 
for understanding relations within the aid chain, between donors and government, 
and between layers of government and communities. Chapter 4 outlines the 
national and international context behind Ethiopia’s aid relations, and Chapter 5 
describes inter-community relationships and structures in rural Ethiopia. 
 
Chapter 4 comprises two parts. The first, 4.2, provides an overview of the 
geopolitical and historical context of Ethiopia, necessary to understand the 
formation of national identity and policy, Ethiopia’s international significance in the 
Horn of Africa and the pattern of aid which it has attracted. Having set out the 
political arena for Ethiopia’s relations with the ‘international community’, the second 
part, 4.3, includes an historical overview of aid relations, before focusing in on the 
aid programmes of the three bilateral donors who took part in this research. The 
organisational frameworks underpinning these programmes are assessed via 
documentary analysis. (Their normative frameworks are explored in Chapter 7, 
together with the findings and subsequent analysis.)  This is followed by a 
description of the structure of donor-government relations current at the time of 
fieldwork, 2004-2005, when Ethiopia had been identified as a pilot country for 
harmonisation under the NAA, and a brief account of events surrounding the 
general election of 2005 which provoked some donors’ to change their aid modality. 
The section concludes by drawing out some issues from the chapter which appear 
to challenge some donor assumptions about aid relations with Ethiopia. 
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4.2 THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND GEOPOLITICS 
 
4.2.1 Ethiopian History and Identity 
 
Ethiopia’s prehistory and its Christian narrative have importance both for its 
peoples’ sense of national identity and its international relations. Palaeontological 
excavations, in particular the discovery in 1974 of human remains dating back 4-6 
million years and man-made artefacts such as the stelae at Axum (10th century 
BC), are sources of national pride. More influentially, the Solomonic foundation 
myth, written down in the fourteenth century as the Kebre Negast (“The Glory of the 
Kings”), “defines the secular and religious foundation of Ethiopian nationhood” 
(Mulatu and Yohannis, 1988: 1), and links Ethiopia with the world of the Old 
Testament. The legend claims that Menelik, the son of the Queen of Sheba (here 
an Ethiopian) and the Biblical King Solomon of Israel, returned to Ethiopia with the 
Ark of the Covenant (Bahru, 1971: 7). While these legends are formative for 
Ethiopian internal identity, its external identity was being constructed by the West as 
a mythical realm at the boundaries of Christendom (Levine, 1974: 89). The earliest 
of the Western Christian accounts, dating from the 12th century (Mulatu and 
Yohannis, 1988: 1) echoed descriptions from Ancient Greece that Ethiopia was a 
land of piety, rich in natural resources1.  
 
Historically, Christianity arrived in northern Ethiopia (‘Abyssinia’, widely assumed to 
be equivalent to the current Amhara and Tigray regions2) in the 4th century. With 
the exceptions of the Zagwe dynasty (10th-13th centuries) and a period of 
warlordism (the Era of the Princes, 1769-1855), their shared Solomonic heritage 
allowed both Tigreans3 or Amharas to hold the throne until 1974. Succession was 
never hereditary and rulers gained power most frequently by military conquest. In 
the nineteenth century, Menelik II (1889-1913) repelled the Italians at the Battle of 
Adwa in 1896, and incorporated territories to the south west, approximating to 
___________________________ 
1
  In Homer’s Iliad, Ethiopia was visited by Zeus and other gods (Levine, 1974: 3-4). 
2
  ‘Abyssinia’ is a derivation of ‘Habesh’, which originally described people with a common 
linguistic heritage, living in an area equivalent to modern day Eritrea and Tigray. ‘Habesha’ 
is in current usage, mainly in Amhara and Tigray, as a local term for ‘Ethiopian’. 
3
  Its spelling may be Tigrean or Tigrayan. 
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present day national boundaries, within which Amhara culture (essentially, the 
adoption of Amhara ‘behaviour’) was broadly assimilated (Clapham, 1988: 24)4.  
 
Haile Selassie, installed initially as Regent from 1913, and then as Emperor from 
1930, employed absolutism to ‘modernise’ Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991: 140). Ethnically 
Amhara, he achieved a level of national unity which his predecessors had been 
unable to do, limiting the power of the nobility by appointing ministers and senior 
officials ostensibly on the basis of merit. In compensation, the nobility were “granted 
hereditary rights over tributary land”5 (ibid: 140). The Constitution of 1931 reinforced 
Haile Selassie’s power, allowing him to appoint, or control selection of, 
representatives to the two parliamentary chambers, one of several measures 
intended to impress the international community with Ethiopia’s political modernity 
(ibid: 141). Despite Haile Selassie’s growing international prestige, Britain and 
France initially took no action when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935. Bahru6 suggests 
that resistance to the Italian occupation was hampered by antagonism between the 
Ethiopian military leaders and indecision by Haile Selassie (ibid: 154-157, 174). 
Although it was the British who expelled the Italians in 1941, following Mussolini’s 
alliance with Hitler, Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian occupation for the second time 
(cf. 1896) helped consolidate its pride as an African country which has never been 
colonised. 
 
Haile Selassie’s personal authority grew until he acquired an “almost supernatural 
aura” and (interestingly for this research) instituted a mechanism whereby “The 
humblest of his subjects could appeal to him, incriminating the highest … the 
emperor could pose as an impartial arbiter between the wrongdoer and the 
wronged.” (ibid, 1991: 201-202). Despite a revised constitution of 1955 introducing 
universal suffrage and an elected second chamber (ibid: 207), opposition to the 
emperor’s absolute power increased and an attempted coup in 1960 marked the 
___________________________ 
4
  Clapham’s critics argue that adoption of the Amharic language and norms of behaviour 
was strategic, in order to access resources. Lewis refers to the absorption of these ethnic 
groups as “this expanding African 'Hapsburg empire' … with literacy in the mother tongue of 
the Amhara elite being the final signature of full citizenship." (Lewis, 2004: 70 - 71) 
5
  Historians are divided as to whether imperial Ethiopian society was ‘feudal’. Bahru 
suggests that 19th century feudalism was weakened by ‘modernisation’ under Haile 
Selassie’s reign (Bahru, 1991: 159). 
6
  Much historiography of modern Ethiopia is influenced by ideological positioning in relation 
to Ethiopia’s transition from the Derg to post-Derg political economy.  
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beginning of an alliance between radicalized soldiers and young intellectuals 
(Teshale, 2008: 346). The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM), formed in 1950s, 
became increasingly active in opposing the imperial regime (Bahru: 222-223). 
Teshale describes the ESM, which drew together students from both impoverished 
rural areas as well as urban elites, as “one of the most radical in the world”, and the 
source of Marxist radicalisation within the military (Teshale, 2008: 347).  
 
Weakened by opposition from within the military establishment and widespread 
accusations of covering up the famines of 1972-1974, Haile Selassie was deposed 
in September 1974 by the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee (‘the committee’ 
or Derg in Amharic). The Derg proclaimed itself the nation's ruling body, introduced 
a programme of sovietisation and sent students out into the countryside to 
implement land nationalization and villagisation. In 1977, internal power struggles7 
within the Derg culminated with Mengistu Haile Mariam, by then Chairman of the 
Derg and Head of State, conducting a ‘Red Terror’ campaign against opponents of 
the Derg, in which thousands were killed8. 
 
Many of the leaders of resistance movements which developed in the 1980s against 
the Derg had been students in the 1960s. These ethnic, regionally-based opposition 
groups, led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), formed the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989, which eventually ousted Mengistu in 1991. The 
EPRDF, which led the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 1991-1995, has 
continued in power through subsequent elections in 1995, 2000 and 2005 under the 
leadership of Meles Zenawi of the TPLF. Although the EPRDF arose from a Marxist 
movement “and its Marxist core, the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray”, it 
downplayed its public adherence to Marxism in 1991 in “its eagerness to be 
embraced by the West” (Teshale, 2008: 346).   
 
Toggia comments that “Ethiopia’s history has always been a totalizing narrative” in 
which historians have written selectively in favour of dominant groups, in which 
___________________________ 
7
  Teshale Tibebu  describes these as being “merciless campaigns of mutual defamation, 
recrimination and dehumanization” (Teshale, 2008: 349) 
8
  Estimates vary from 2,000 to 250,000. 
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periods of non-Solomonic hegemony such as the ‘Era of the Princes’ are glossed 
over (Toggia, 2008: 322). However, the ‘totalising narrative’ continues to be 
politically relevant, exemplified by the federal Constitution, Tigrean domination of 
the current regime, its structure and institutions: “Ethiopia survived because 
throughout its history the national ideology was stronger than ethnic sentiments” 
(Messay, 1999: 258). This is reinforced by the term habesha, a derivation of 
‘Abyssinia’ (see 4.2.1), to denote anyone or anything Ethiopian, in apposition to 
ferengi, a derivation of ‘French’, or foreign). Poluha describes habesha as a strong 
sense of allegiance to ‘Ethiopia’, not clearly defined except as in opposition to 
European countries (Poluha, 2004: 189). 
 




An overview of religion is inserted here, between sections on history and 
geopolitics, because it is a major linking factor between the two topics. In both, 
Ethiopia is presented as a predominantly Christian nation. There is a regional 
element, with EOC predominant in Amhara and Tigray. In the first part of the 20th 
century, the EOC forbid Protestant missionaries from working in these northern 
regions. Nationally, estimates of current religious adherence suggest that Orthodox 
Christians account for approximately 40-45%, Muslims 40-45%, evangelical 
protestants (‘Pente’) 10% (and increasing, according to recent estimates), 
traditional believers 5%9. Conversion to evangelical Protestantism is a greater 
threat to the Orthodox church than Islam, despite a rapid increase in mosque, and 




 Estimates in the rural areas differ: the Participatory Poverty Assessment 2005 gave the 
distribution as 30%EOC, 40% Muslim, 25% other Christian denominations (PPA 2005: xvi) 
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The Ethiopian Orthodox Church  
 
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), established in the 4th century AD, ceded 
from the rest of the Christian church at the Council of Chalcedon in AD 451 
because of its adherence to monophysitism, the refusal to accept that Christ had 
two ‘natures’, human and divine. The EOC has a primarily monastic tradition, with 
strong, in some cases extreme, elements of asceticism. Doctrinal dispute ‘ended’ in 
1855, when the Patriarch decreed the current (Tewahedo) doctrine as the sole 
doctrine. Those who failed to accept it were punished and theological disputation 
gradually died out; the EOC (“the institution incarnating Ethiopian personality”, 
(Messay, 1999: 219)) retains its doctrinal orthodoxy. As a result, “Ethiopia has 
never known a period of religious purification and reform” (ibid: 255). Aspen notes 
that there is no preaching and “only a minimal importance is attached to an 
intellectualization of the Holy Word in the EOC” (Aspen, 2001: 78). Under EOC 
doctrine, the individual has no direct relationship with God. Divine intervention will 
only occur through the intercession of one’s patron saint on one’s behalf (Hoben, 
1970: 196).  
 
The EOC obtained independence (‘autocephaly’) from the patriarchate of 
Alexandria in 1959. In the early years of the Derg, church property was 
nationalised, the Patriarch was executed and clergy imprisoned (Chaillot, 2002: 37-
39). The Derg’s campaign against the EOC was deeply unpopular with rural 
Orthodox communities and was subsequently relaxed10. The EOC re-established 
dialogue with the other Orthodox churches in 1989, and it retains close links with 
the current government, for whom it remains an additional channel of 




Islam arrived in Ethiopia in the 7th Century (Abbink, 1998: 113). Mohammed 
reportedly advised his followers that Abyssinia was “a land of righteousness where 
___________________________ 
10
  Braukamper suggests that, with the exception of the confiscation of church land, the Derg 
“did not threaten the strong position of the Orthodox Christian Church, because it was an 
outstanding guarantor of Habasa (Ethiopian) national superiority” (Braukamper, 2003: 5). 
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God will give you relief from what you are suffering” (Erlich, 1994: 6). Arabic 
literature extols the ‘tolerance’ of the Ethiopians. Islam and the Ethiopian form of 
Orthodox Christianity have shared certain characteristics, such as seclusion and 
self-sufficiency, which may account for the extent of tolerance, albeit as a 
secondary religion (Abbink, 1998: 112-113). Islam was proscribed for a period 
during the second half of the 19th century, with little effect, and was subsequently 
tolerated provided that Orthodox Christianity enjoyed political and cultural 
dominance (ibid: 115). The Italians supported Muslims in preference to Orthodox 
Christians during the 1936-41 occupation (ibid: 117). Muslims have only been able 
to hold official posts since the deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, even 
though the constitution of 1931 allowed them to do so (Trimingham, 1952: 136).The 
current regime has a policy of religious ‘co-existence and cooperation” (Abbink, 
1998: 117) but Orthodox Christianity is dominant in political terms, not least 
because of TPLF domination of the EPRDF11. Ahmed argues that this narrative of 
harmonious relations is overplayed, and that there has been an undercurrent of 
tension over religious practice and mosque-building (Ahmed, 2006). 
 
There were other, secular, reasons which enabled toleration of Islam. First, being a 
universal religion rather than a national one, unlike the EOC, Islam is not bound up 
with - or threatening to - national identity. Second, Muslim groups were widely 
scattered and had little intergroup communication or institutions (Markakis, 1974, 
quoted in Messay, 1999: 104). Third, traditionally Muslims were engaged in trade, 
an occupation which was thought inferior to agriculture, and therefore there was no 
socio-economic rivalry attached to religion (Pankhurst12, quoted in Messay, 1999: 
146).  
 
International interest in Islam in Ethiopia increased in the 1960s because of the 
Iranian revolution “and the subsequent breakthrough of what is generally called 
Islamic fundamentalism” (Braukamper, 2003: 1). Although Ethiopia is portrayed 
(and portrayed itself to the superpowers, Makinda, 1987: 32) as a “Christian island 
___________________________ 
11
  Abuna Paulos, patriarch at the time of the research, comes from the same area of Tigray 
as Meles Zenawi, and is widely regarded as closely connected with the TPLF. 
12
  Pankhurst, R. (1992). A Social History of Ethiopia. p.207. 
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in a sea of pagans” (Clapham, 1988: 25), in practice there has been relatively little 




Eighty-five per cent of Ethiopia’s population (estimated at 75 million13) depend on 
subsistence agriculture, mainly grains and livestock. In 2006, Ethiopia’s per capita 
GDP of US$130 was “only about a fifth of the Sub-Sahara African average”14. Life 
expectancy is 42.5 years15 and 8.6 million people are estimated to be chronically 
food insecure16.  
 
Socio-economic indicators vary across the regions, partly for topographical and 
therefore geographic reasons. Rain-fed cereal-culture is practiced in the northern 
highland regions of Amhara and Tigray. The private sector in Ethiopia is relatively 
small: private investment comes from a small base, often with links overseas. 
Small-scale private enterprises are predominantly concerned with petty trading: 
craft-workers are traditionally despised in Ethiopian culture (Korten and Korten, 
1972: 67). The government’s vehicle for economic growth is Agricultural 
Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI), which, “pursued since the mid 1990s has 
had poor results” (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004b: 9). ADLI is rolled out via DAs 
under Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES), 
‘informing’ the most innovative farmers to adopt (uniform) extension packages, and 
then ‘persuade’ the remainder to follow (Kassa and Abebaw, 2004: 143). 
 
Ethiopia has had repeated famine, the worst being 1888-92, which killed 50% of the 
population (Pankhurst, R., ?1985). The 1984 famine, which received worldwide 
attention, resulted in increased numbers of aid interventions, particularly from 
NGOs, but also from Western governments which had previously been ‘unable’ to 
provide aid to a Marxist country. Commentators (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 96, 
___________________________ 
13
  Source: DFID, 2006. Population statistics were being calculated by the Central Statistical 
Authority at 2.9% p.a. increase since the last census in 1994. The 2007 census figure was 
76m. 
14
  [http://web.worldbank.org/; accessed dated June 2006] 
15
  Source; DFID, 2006, from World Development Indicators Database April 2006. 
16
  Source: DFID, 2006, from EC Diagnostic Survey 2006. 
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102-103; Hoben, 1995: 1013-1016) suggest that a form of “Malthusian narrative” for 
Ethiopia, which includes population growth, traditional farming practices and 
environmental degradation, informs government environmental policy (soil and 
water conservation through food for work). Ethiopia’s topography thus synthesised 





Nineteenth century expansion to the south (4.2.1) incorporated the Oromia, 
Gambella and Beneshangul regions and what has now become the Southern 
Nations National Peoples (SNNP) region. Ethiopia has more than 85 ethnic groups, 
speaking approximately 82 languages. Regional topographies has resulted in 
distinct livelihood systems based around different forms of agriculture: pastoralism, 
cereals and ensete (false banana), and livestock. Religious lines do not coincide 
with ethnic ones; for example, an Oromo can be either Christian or Muslim. 
(Clapham, 1988: 25-26).  
 
Modern views of ethnicity at the supra-regional level, particularly in the political 
system, are contested. Bahru ascribes Ethiopia’s apparently successful multi-ethnic 
society to a large extent due to “long-distance trade between them [south and north, 
which] tempered … political and cultural heterogeneity” (Bahru, 1971: 21). A more 
influential argument suggests that the “plasticity” of Amhara culture17 permits its 
incorporation by other ethnic groups (Clapham, 1988: 24; Messay, 1999: 107). At 
the regional level, there are diverse liberation movements within the larger regions 
of the south, but in SNNP it is widely accepted that ethnic federalism allows them a 
degree of influence in central government which would not otherwise be available. 





  Amhara culture, transmitted administratively through the Amhara representatives sent to 
the new territories by Menelik to collect taxes - and culturally by the church - was sufficiently 
flexible and tolerant of alternative religious expression to allow it to be easily absorbed by 
the new members of the empire. 
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Ethiopia’s adoption of national federalism arose from ultra-leftist or Stalinist ideas 
(Young, 1998: 193; Aregawi Berhe, 2004: 592). The EPRDF “holds that 
ethnonationalism cannot be restricted to the cultural sphere, and that ethnic 
federalism was the only way of avoiding secessionism” (Young, 1997a: 214). A 
pivot between two dyads occurs here; ethnicity as threat and ethnicity as cultural 
harmony. Under the current Ethiopian Constitution, every nationality [ethnic group] 
has the right to secede. Those that disagreed with this ethno-nationalist approach 
were accused of “undermining the already initiated democratic process through 
espousing chauvinism and war mongering” (Kassahun, 2003: 120), and were 
subject to arbitrary arrest and coercion during elections (Berhanu and Vogel, 2006: 
211).18 As a result, “the basis of participation for all the other [political] groups was 
founded in their adherence to the EPRDF’s sacrosanct principal of national self-
determination” (Kassahun, 2003: 119).  
 
4.2.3 Political Systems 
 
‘Abyssinian’ Political Skills 
 
Section 4.2.1 noted that Amhara and Tigray shared a religious, political and 
hegemonic history. Bridging the gap between discussion of ethnicity and of the 
Ethiopian political system, this subsection sets out the relative “indigenous” political 
skills which are prized in Amhara and Tigray.  
 
There is a suggestion that Tigray is both more ‘modern’ and a truer inheritor of the 
Ethiopian form of authority than Amhara: “The Amhara and Tigrayans are closely 
related peoples ethnically, linguistically, and culturally. However, according to 
Markakis, Tigray alone represented purity and continuity in the Ethiopian culture” 
(Young, 1997a: 46). Writing before the revolution, Korten notes that Tigreans pride 
themselves on being “more direct and, thereby, more ‘honest’ in their speech” 
(Korten and Korten, 1972: 64). Others attribute Tigrean confidence to the revolution 
itself: Tigray has “a certain self-confidence” combined with the “political space” to 
undertake regionally-determined initiatives, both due to the pride of the Tigrean role 
___________________________ 
18
 Meles Zenawi used the same argument to justify imprisoning 100 leaders of the 
opposition coalition following the 2005 elections. 
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in the liberation from the Derg, and to the continued primacy of Tigreans in the 
ruling party (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 113).  
 
These skills are interwoven with political practice. Under the current regime, Tigrean 
officials’ understanding of the participatory approach “does not take a liberal, 
populist form; there are greater resonances with the early Maoist ‘mass line’ 
approach, a connection which dates back to the ideological beginnings of the TPLF 
in the 1970s. … Informants describe such a participatory model as a process 
whereby the government listens through the baito19 system, ‘takes a consensus’, 
makes a decision and then conscientises and mobilises the people around the 
issue.” (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 115). The TPLF worked with traditional norms 
around religion and oral culture to gain peasants’ loyalty, synthesising these with 
more ‘modern’ techniques such as meetings, majority voting, public debates, 
elections at local levels and public evaluations (Young, 1997a: 173-192).  
 
The Current Political Economy and its System of Government 
 
The EPRDF, the coalition of ethnically-based liberation groups led by the TPLF 
which overthrew the Derg, has remained in power since 1991. Bahru describes the 
origins of the TPLF as a movement “leading a predominantly peasant guerrilla 
army”, being so influenced by Maoism that it had the reputation of being “more 
Albanian than the Albanians themselves, who in turn had the distinction of being 
more Chinese than the Chinese themselves” (Bahru, 2003: 9). Ideological drift 
between Meles Zenawi’s leadership of the TPLF in Addis and its core constituency 
in Tigray led to a split in the party in 2001, from which Meles emerged dominant 
having purged his rivals (Medhane and Young, 2003).  
 
Although the EPRDF ostensibly rejected Marxism in 1991 in order to appeal to the 
international community, commentators agree that it retains strong Marxist-Leninist 
characteristics. These include the party acting as “vanguard political force”, 
mobilising the peasantry as “an undifferentiated class” and, somewhat 
paradoxically, self-determination of nationalities (Gilkes, 1999: 37; Abbink, 2006: 
___________________________ 
19
  The baito was an administrative level, now replaced by kebele (see below, in Amharic, 
and tabia in Tigrignia). 
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195, Vaughan, 2004: 16). Relatively little academic attention has been paid outside 
Ethiopia to analysis of revolutionary democracy ideology. The EPRDF produced a 
700 page document on party ideology in 2001, which few Westerners have read20. 
Vaughan’s work, Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia (2003), describes the form of 
‘revolutionary democracy’ embraced by the EPRDF as seeking “to exploit the 
performative power of the unified and mobilised participation and will of the 
community - of the ethnic group.” (Vaughan, 2003: 182). Party doctrine is based on 
Marxist-Leninist understanding of democracy which has two, contradictory 
perspectives: the first is that communities can be mobilised and engaged through 
using its (national) language, cultural traditions and knowledge systems; the second 
is that “a vanguard party may legitimately grant self-determination to a community 
from the outside” (ibid: 170). In Vaughan’s analysis, revolutionary democracy “is 
based on communal collective participation, and representation based on 
consensus, indicating that the party’s “perception of democracy is shaped partly by 
ideological conditioning, and partly by historical experience, fusing class theory with 
ethnicity” (ibid: 171). 
 
EPRDF influence reaches down into rural communities, where it is indistinguishable 
from local administration (Pausewang et al., 2002a: 38; Kassahun, 2003: 144), with 
the passivity of peasants attributed to fear of retribution (Pausewang et al. 2002a: 
39). As a result, “beneath democratic institutions, the TPLF has established an 
administration and a power structure that perpetuates its rule” (Pausewang et al., 
2002b: 242). The number of meetings organised within government and by 
government for local communities is a continuation of practice developed by the 
TPLF during resistance to the Derg, when political instruction was delivered through 
“an enormous number of seminars, meetings, discussion forums and the like in all 
government institutions”, although “the degree of ideological penetration achieved 
by hours of conscious political education appear[ed] to be slight” (Clapham, 1988: 




  Its title, translated from Amharic, is ‘Revolutionary Democracy: Directions and Strategies 
for Development’, but the document does not contain a definition of revolutionary democracy 
(Notes of a talk by Tekalign Gedamu, Addis Ababa, 2001) 
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Despite the primacy given to nationalities in revolutionary democracy ideology, the 
regional state governments have no representation in the Federal government and, 
despite decentralisation (started in 1996), the federal government maintains close 
control over policies and systems of implementation. The formal regional structure 
comprises:  the regional government, districts (woredas), villages (kebeles), and 
sub-villages (gots).21 Under decentralisation, woredas became centres for planning 
and spending, though in practice, planning remains top-down and party officials are 
active down to the smallest administrative units. While the formal government 
structure stops at kebele level, below kebele administration which is “the lowest 
official level of the government hierarchy, a network of mengistawi buden … 
operates below this”22 (Harrison, 2002: 600). 
 
Conception of ‘government’ under both the imperial and Derg regimes is described 
as “the embodiment of the national will, the overseer of the destiny of the people”, in 
which the individual is a subject with duties rather than a citizen, characterised by 
ignorance and laziness (Amare Tekle, 1990: 36-38). With its long history of strong, 
centralised rule, “Government in Ethiopia is a matter for experts who know what to 
do; the ignorant peasant, by contrast, is there to be … governed”. (Clapham, 1991: 
260, 263). 
 
While essentially critical, Young’s view is that the form of rural administration which 
the TPLF23 established through a combination of two apparently contradictory 
initiatives (mobilisation and allowing peasants’ participation in decision-making) 
“may well prove to be the movement’s most enduring accomplishment” (Young, 
1997b: 195). This presents another dyad: the EPRDF’s assertion that the peasantry 
are the driving force behind Revolutionary Democracy (“it is not a question of 
magnanimity … the peasants … can choose based on an understanding of the 
facts” (Chairman of the EPRDF, quoted in Vaughan, 2003: 185) and its conception 
of the peasantry as “illiterate, uneducated”, needing to be ‘taught’ (Abbink, 1991, 
quoted in Vaughan, 2003: 202). Rural people participate in local government 
___________________________ 
21
  The equivalent terms in Tigrigna are tabia (for kebele) and kushet (for got). A diagram of 
the structure is provided in Chapter 5 (Findings). 
22
  Mengistawi buden is the Amharic term (‘government team’) used for ‘Development 
Group’ for 30 households. 
23
  Initially during the Derg regime, but continued under the EPRDF. 
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meetings for a variety of reasons: to get information, to receive propaganda, to be 
subject to mobilisation, to receive benefits (or to avoid being denied benefits), to be 
involved in communal work (Aalen, 2002: 91). “The party rhetoric reaches all the 
way down to the grassroots, and peasants in the countryside who do not read 
newspapers or listen to the radio are well versed in the political vocabulary of the 
national political leadership”, so that party influence is “a naturalised part of 
everyday life” (ibid: 92).  
 
By the late 1990s, “Ethiopia ha[d] acquired virtually all the forms of democracy but 
little of its substance”; and that this ‘façade’ of democracy masked “an essentially 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regime dependent upon the EPRDF’s superior military 
muscle” (Harbeson, 1998: 63, 66). Most Western governments approved the 1995 
elections as free and fair, even though the EPRDF won more than 95% of the vote 
(Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 112). Despite the EPRDF’s hegemony, the persistence 
of other dissident factions in Ethiopia “gave Western governments hope that the 
democratisation could develop” (Pausewang et al., 2002a: 26). Vaughan describes 
the “dominant view within the EPRDF …that disagreements in policy and 
perspective should generate political competition rather than dialogue. This has 
contributed to polarized political landscape, in which the ruling party has benefited 
little from the constructive criticism of outsiders” (Vaughan, 2004: 16; also Gilkes, 
1999: 38)24. This implies that multiparty elections per se are not unacceptable to the 
EPRDF, but challenge - let alone defeat - is regarded as intolerable. Commentary 
on the 2005 elections and subsequent violence (see 4.3.6) suggest this was the 
case; the EPRDF appeared to welcome the elections, probably as “a means to 
sustain the incumbent regime’s own power” (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 112), or, as 
in previous elections, “as referenda to validate its policies and reaffirm consensus” 
(Vaughan, 2004: 20), but the party reacted aggressively when the opposition 
coalition appeared to be gaining widespread support (Abbink, 2006: 184; Aalen and 
Tronvoll, 2008: 112). In contrast to the state’s monolithic structure, opposition 
groups have historically been weakened by fissuring of coalitions, attributed to 
traditional traits of inability to compromise, intolerance of diverging views, mistrust 
and hostility (Kassahun, 2003: 122, 141).  
___________________________ 
24
  The purge of rivals to the TPLF leadership in 2001 would appear to conform to this 
concept of political competition in which ‘winner takes all’. 
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Ethiopia shares a recent political history of ‘African socialism’ with ex-colonies such 
as Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola. Common features include: revolutionary 
enthusiasm for persuasion disintegrating into coercion (physical, psychological, 
financial); the use of quasi-government community organisations (farmers, women’s 
and youth associations) as an additional vehicle for implementing government 
policy; enforced labour; the use of decentralisation to extend the power of central 
government, and ethnicity used instrumentally in the name of national unity 
(Mamdani, 1996: 173-178, 187). However, Clapham suggests that Ethiopia cannot 
be regarded as typical of Africa, as its polities cannot be replicated elsewhere 
(Clapham, 1988: 243). Ethiopia’s long history of leadership from the top is fertile 
ground for the establishment of an instrumental state. Dessalegn argues that, in 
contrast to the rest of Africa where the state is ‘in retreat’, the Ethiopian state has 
been expanding since the 1960s, by reaching down into every locality (Dessalegn, 
1999: 8). 
 
4.2.4 Geopolitical Context Within The Horn of Africa 
 
The tradition that Ethiopia’s first emperor, Menelik, was the son of the Queen of 
Sheba and the Israelite King Solomon plays a role in the geopolitics of the Horn of 
Africa and the Middle East, as well as being Ethiopia’s foundation myth. This 
sentimental link with Israel25 accounts, according to Makinda, for Ethiopia’s support 
for United States (US) policies regarding Israel, and in turn the US has used 
Ethiopia as a base from which to monitor activity in the Middle East. In 
consequence, Ethiopia has difficult relationships with its Arabic neighbours which 
drives it closer to Israel. In return, Israel lobbied the US to give aid to Ethiopia 
during the Derg period (1974-1991), hoping that pro-US elements within the regime 
would gain dominance (Makinda, 1987: 61, 39, 98-99). Although active in Ethiopia 




  Presumably greater for Ethiopian Orthodox Christians (which predominate in the 
dominant, highland population) 
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Ethiopia was regarded internationally as an example of modernity within Africa 
when Emperor Haile Selassie applied for Ethiopia to join the League of Nations. 
Lipsky, writing in 1962, was able to say that Ethiopia “has a special role in World 
affairs” as “an ardent champion of collective security” (Lipsky, 1962: 2-3). In 1963, 
the Organisation of African Unity was founded with its headquarters in Addis Ababa. 
Western powers appeared sympathetic to the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 
(Clapham, 1988: 239). Clapham suggests that they took a ‘soft’ line despite 
Ethiopia’s “public commitment to Marxism-Leninism” from 1974, because of the 
political consequences of risking destabilisation of the region (ibid: 236). The 
international community regarded the EPRDF as “better than the military 
dictatorship of Mengistu and, having started from scratch, needed time to develop a 
more democratic society” (Pausewang et al., 2002a: 43). The present regime, the 
“lynchpin state of the Horn” (Vaughan, 2003: 36), has received the support of the 
international community because of its expressed willingness to adopt economic 
and political reform and, more latterly, because of the increased importance of its 
role in the geo-politics of the Horn of Africa; Ethiopia is now regarded as “a ‘frontline 
state’ in the war against terrorism” (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004: 12).  
 
The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an on-going issue in the politics of 
the Horn of Africa. In the 19th and early 20th century Eritrea was subject to the 
Western powers’ ‘scramble for Africa’ then, having been annexed by Ethiopia in 
1952, Eritrea ceded from Ethiopia in 1993 following a referendum (in accordance 
with revolutionary democracy ideology), but war erupted in 1998 after a minor 
border incident (Healy, Chatham House, 2008: 12). Peace was brokered in 2000, 
but a disputed border required UN adjudication which was made in 2003, awarding 
the territory (Badme) to Eritrea, a decision which Ethiopia still rejects. A Chatham 
House analysis suggests that “the impact of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was not 
confined to the two countries, but profoundly altered the alliance structure of the 
entire region” including the Sudanese conflict and the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia 
in 2006, its effects rippling outwards to Uganda, North Africa and the Middle East 
(ibid: 11, 20, 39).  
 
Despite the US and its closest allies having maintained a significant presence in 
Ethiopia, this has not resulted in greater depth of understanding about the political 
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and cultural processes in Ethiopia (Makinda, 1987: 218; Dessalegn and Meheret, 
2004: 103). Rather, the West’s conception of Ethiopia is as a negative/positive 
dyad: as a result of its famines, Ethiopia is typically ‘African’ in the sense of 
“creating their own problems” and it is regarded as ‘a special case’ because of its 
Christian heritage and its ability to avoid being colonised (Sorenson, 1993: 2). Even 
at the height of Ethiopian dependence on Western aid during the 1984 famine, 
Ethiopia managed to dictate the terms of the engagement with the international 
community (Clapham, 1988: 238). 
 
Healy argues that “outsiders need to understand the limitations of their own role” in 
the Horn, but they are hampered by their lack of understanding of its militaristic 
history, misunderstanding local conceptions of power in their analysis of 
strong/fragile states, failing to notice that  “local actors generally operate on a much 
longer time frame than their own” (Healy: 41, 43). International interest in the 
politics of the Horn has increased since the 9/11 2001 attacks but Healy warns that 
“Outside actors need to respond judiciously to the allegations of terrorism levelled 
against various parties to conflict in the Horn. The underlying conflicts in the region 
are older than the contemporary war on terrorism and will probably outlast it.” (ibid: 
45). 
 
Donors’ hesitation in responding to the post-electoral violence in 2005, and the 
speed with which they replaced budget support with a new modality using block 
grants (see 4.3.6), is ascribed, in part, to Ethiopia’s role in the ‘war on terror’, which 
political scientists expected, correctly, to continue despite the anticipated change in 
US administration (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2008: 119); under Obama’s Democratic 
administration, “Today, Ethiopia is a strategic partner of the United States in the 




26  US State Department June 2009 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm [accessed 
09.06.09] 
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4.3 AID RELATIONS 
 
4.3.1 History and Pattern of Foreign Aid 
 
The history and pattern of overseas development aid (ODA) to Ethiopia reflects the 
geo-politics of the Horn of Africa, the polities of the three different regimes in 
Ethiopia in the past 50 years, and the political economies of its bilateral donors. 
Despite its geopolitical importance, Ethiopia has received lower per capita levels of 
aid than most low-income countries. In FY 2004/2005, “Ethiopia received US$15 
per capita in development assistance, compared to US$49 per capita for sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole” (Furtado and Smith, 2007: 1). It was, however, “one of 
the earliest developing countries to receive aid in the modern sense, starting in the 
late 1940s” (ibid:3). 
 
Changes in the pattern of aid are clearly linked to national and geo-politics (ibid: 
22). ODA was given on an even trajectory from 1960, during the reign of Emperor 
Haile Selassie and through his overthrow by the Derg in 1974. Geo-politically, this 
period coincided with the Cold War, but the pattern of ODA changed dramatically 
before it ended, the catalyst being the famine of 1984, which drew worldwide 
concern. A second sharp rise in ODA occurred following the 9/11 attacks on the US 
in 2001. US military support was already being provided (and US bases 
accommodated), but the US Centre for Defense Information reported in 2007 that, 
during the five years after 2001, US military assistance to Ethiopia increased by 
approximately 250% and arms sales had roughly doubled, compared with the 
previous five years.27 
 
During the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000), a number of bilateral donors withdrew 
aid, but later had difficulty re-establishing relations with the Ethiopian government. A 
few donors, the Netherlands and Norway, for example, have limited their aid since 
2003 because of Ethiopia’s failure to recognise the UN’s decision on the Eritrean 
border issue. Figure 4.1 overleaf provides a timeline for total ODA to Ethiopia from 
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. 
Figure 4.1. ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005 
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Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements 
Figure 4.2. ODA to Ethiopia from DAC Countries, 1960-2005, disaggregated by donor 
. 
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Figure 4.1 indicates that major increases in aid occurred in response to the 1984 famine, 
and the sharp rise in 2001 and subsequent years suggests that the rise in aid was linked 
to a political event, the ‘war on terrorism’. 
 
Figure 4.2 disaggregates the data in Figure 4.1 to identify the ODA trajectories of the 
three donors studied (Canada, Ireland and Sweden) against other leading donors. 
Read in conjunction with Figure 4.1, it shows that the overall volatility of aid to Ethiopia, 
with very different trajectories between, for example, the US and Europe. Aid given by 








Canada’s ODA to Ethiopia dates from 1967.  Figure 4.3 shows that its trajectory has 
largely followed the general pattern of aid across DAC donors (shown in Figure 4.1). 




















































































Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements 
 
Figure 4.3. Canadian ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 
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Organisational Structure and Development Objectives  
 
CIDA is one of four ministries within the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade which 
has responsibility to ensure coherence across Canada’s international activities across 
four departments: CIDA, Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Finance (OECD, 2003a: 44). CIDA 
disburses 80 per cent of total Canadian aid funding (ibid: 21). It successfully 
decentralised its offices prior to the 1980s, its local knowledge contributing to CIDA’s 
“ability to take quick, informed and relevant decisions” (CIDA, 2002a: 18). Despite this, it 
recentralised to headquarters in the early 1990s on the grounds of cost but, with the shift 
to programme approaches, CIDA again decentralised because it required deeper in-
country knowledge (OECD, 2003a: 69). CIDA expected its field offices to cover policy 
and programming, as well as administrative functions; and to employ local staff who 
“have the advantage of in-depth country and experience which Canadians often do not 
have” but “at lower cost” (CIDA, 2002a: 18).  
 
Although Pratt suggests that CIDA’s organisational relationship to Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for policy incoherence (Pratt, 1999), two issues feature persistently and 
transparently in international policy, suggesting a strong degree of coherence. Firstly, 
Canada’s multicultural population is a significant driver of policy. The DAC noted that 
Canada “has always been a country of immigrants, with currently one in six citizens born 
abroad” (OECD, 2003a: 47), suggesting this was a potential source of strength for 
Canada’s international influence: “The interaction between developing countries and 
their diaspora in advanced countries can be a new dynamic for development.” ( ibid: 47). 
The second major issue is security, with an increased emphasis after 1989 (Pratt, 1999: 
91) and, after September 2001, Canada sought to strengthen its partnership with the 
USA (GoC, 2005b: 7). This emphasis meant that CIDA’s role was guided not just by 
Foreign Affairs, but also the ministries of Defence, Justice, the mounted police and by 
civil society organisations, subordinating poverty reduction to CIDA’s trade and security 
interests (Pratt, 1999: 94, 99). The OECD-DAC also suggested that “poverty reduction is 
not necessarily treated as an overarching goal.” (OECD, 2003a: 33).  
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The 2003 Peer Review found that CIDA’s analytical capacity was weak (ibid: 56), and 
Noel et al. argued that policy coherence was weak, with assumptions about Canada’s 
internationalism and its role in world politics used to formulate a national consensus, 
masking “the political divisions that underpin public opinion on foreign policy” (Noel et al., 
2004: 30, 39). However, Clark et al. argue that Canadian aid is highly structured: (Clark 
et al., 1997: 155). Implementation occurs at the bottom of a whole series of nested 
policies which can be traced up a hierarchy back to Canadian foreign policy but, 
because of this top-down nature, delivery is often unresponsive to local conditions or 
recipients’ priorities (ibid: 155, 162).  
 
Canadian development cooperation did appear to be relatively bureaucratic. It employed 
comparatively more people than other donor agencies (OECD, 2003a: 54), and CIDA’s 
administrative costs were nearly twice as high as the DAC average (ibid: 17). The Peer 
Review noted that “CIDA is fully aware that too much of operational staff’s time is spent 
on processes and procedures and has launched a process of work simplification. One of 
the first achievements has been to rationalise project cycle management from 32 to 
three different systems across the agency.” (ibid: 57). Public management reform is a 
key plank of CIDA’s development policy, but the Peer Review warned CIDA that 
“capacity development of institutions should not become an end in itself and fail to 




In 2003, an estimated 70% of ODA was being disbursed through Canadian NGOs, 
consultants and academic institutions (ibid: 27). By 2005, 61% of CIDA aid was either 
budget support or programme modality (OECD, 2006b). The move to programme aid 
was to be conditional on countries having “a reasonably sound policy and management 
environment” (OECD, 2003a: 68), and on careful risk analysis before commitment to 
funding. The risks would be managed by continuous monitoring, prompt remedial action 
and by invoking a pre-establish[ed] exit strategy which had been communicated clearly 
“to all parties involved”. (ibid: 68).   
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Canada’s foreign policy statement (1995) set out six development priorities: basic 
human needs; gender equality; infrastructure services; human rights, democracy and 
good governance (CIDA, 2002a: 13). In 2003, the DAC peer review noted that, 
“Although not part of the six programme priorities, the areas of security and conflict 
prevention are categorised under human rights, democracy and governance, and have 
become one of the major features in Canadian aid.” (OECD, 2003a: 38).  
 
Ethiopia Country Programme to 2005 
 
Canada’s aid funding was previously more widely dispersed than any other DAC country 
(OECD, 2003a: 28). This was attributed to the absence of its own colonial history, its 
links with both Anglophone and Francophone countries, and the dispersed origins of its 
immigrants (OECD, 2003a: 21). Canadian aid is now more focused on Africa (OECD, 
2003a: 28). Its investment in Ethiopia rose significantly in the financial year 2003-2004 
(from Can$ 8.4 million to Can$ 30.2 million) (CIDA, 2005: 1). It used a variety of 
modalities: DBS (approaching 50% in 2005); multilateral initiatives such as the Safety 
Net programme; and supporting NGOs working in the field of governance.  
 
CIDA’s emphasis on the importance of capacity building was evident in its Country 
Development Programming Framework (2004-2009) (CIDA, 2004). In accord with its 
strategy of preferring to work with multilaterals, CIDA worked jointly with other donors 
and with the World Bank on initiatives such as the Safety Net programme. The 
Framework talks little about its relationship with the Ethiopian government as 
‘partnership’; this term is reserved for its support for Canadian NGOs (ibid: 18). 
Improved coordination with other donors did not extend to delegated cooperation, an 
arrangement by which one donor acts on behalf of another, but Canada preferred to act 
in concert with other agencies, so that a greater proportion of its missions to Ethiopia 
were carried out jointly, compared to other donors (OECD, 2005b: 60). 
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Ireland’s ODA to Ethiopia is influenced by its own history of poverty and religion. Irish 
catholic missionaries were working in Ethiopia during the Imperial regime, but Ireland’s 
formal aid programme is relatively recent. Figure 4.4 shows that Irish ODA has a 
smoother trajectory than Canada’s, with a significant increase in aid occurring in 2000, 
and therefore preceding the geopolitical effect of the 9/11 attacks, though increasing in 























































































Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements 
 
Figure 4.4. Irish ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 
 
Organisational Structure and Development Objectives  
 
At the time of the research, Ireland’s overseas development agency had been recently 
renamed Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI) 28. DCI was run as a directorate within 
Ireland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). MFA’s primary goals included making “a 
substantial and effective contribution to lasting poverty reduction and sustainable growth 
in developing countries through the policy and programmes of Ireland Aid, and by 
___________________________ 
28
  DCI was previously called Ireland Aid; since 2007, it has been called Irish Aid. 
Chapter 4:  Ethiopia: History, Geopolitics and Aid Relations 
 134 
working for a just and stable international economic system” (DCI, 2004b); “Our aid 
philosophy is rooted in our foreign policy, in particular its objectives of peace and justice. 
Our development cooperation policy and programme reflect our longstanding 
commitment to human rights and fairness in international relations and are inseparable 
from Irish foreign policy as a whole” (ibid). 
 
The OECD-DAC criticised MFA’s policy of rotating diplomatic staff temporarily into 
development cooperation posts without providing any specialist training (OECD, 2003b: 
60), and resulting in loss of institutional memory (Ireland Aid, 2003: 86). Other 
weaknesses identified included shortage of staff, lack of incentives or career structure 
for specialist staff, many of whom were on short-term contracts (ibid: 82; OECD, 2003b: 
59). A new Technical Section had been given an “ambitious range of responsibilities 
including technical support, policy formulation, developing guidelines on good practice” 
but, as a result, DCI had “no full-time dedicated in-house expertise in some key priority 
areas, including health, gender, governance, environment and water” (ibid: 60).  
 
An Advisory Board, comprising a politician, four NGO representatives, a priest, a 
management academic and a representative of the business community, was 
established in 2002 (DCI, 2004e). Its mission was to “oversee the expanding 
programme; advise on strategic direction; support development research; work closely 
with Development Cooperation Ireland to maximise quality, effectiveness and 
accountability” (DCI, 2004b). DCI’s funding of NGOs was above-average for the DAC 
(OECD, 2003b: 62) and Irish missionaries also received DCI funding. There was a ready 




In 2003, Ireland’s preferred modalities were area-based programmes (ABP), sector wide 
approaches (SWAps) and DBS. It saw them as “complementary and mutually 
reinforcing”, but the choice of modality “ultimately depends on specific conditions in each 
country” (OECD, 2003b: 70). The Committee on Aid Effectiveness noted ABPs enabled 
Ireland to feed knowledge gained from experience at local and community levels into 
national level policy dialogue (ibid: 18). It was also felt that ABPs supported 
decentralisation processes and built local capacity (Ireland Aid, 2003: 34). SWAps 
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respond to DCI’s key objectives of education and health, and “can provide … an avenue 
for donors to respond more effectively to fiduciary risks through their regular monitoring 
and reviewing of sectoral programmes as a complement to their on-going support for 
strengthening partners’ financial systems” (OECD, 2003b: 73).  
 
DCI framed its discussion of budget support in terms of risk management rather than the 
partnership agenda. To counteract perceived fiduciary risks, DCI intended to rely on 
improvements in financial accountability and governance (ibid: 74) plus “a rigorous 
collective system of accountability and oversight is implemented by the donors, with the 
World Bank frequently playing a coordinating role” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 58). For Ireland, it 
was important that donors “impose strict limits in relation to any area of expenditure 
which falls outside this [poverty reduction] (e.g. military spending)” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 
58). Even then, it was felt that “arrangements should be sought which would ‘ring-fence’ 
the Irish contribution in some way and ensure that this funding is linked to specific reform 
objectives in, say, the health and education sectors which are of importance to Ireland 
Aid.” (ibid: 58). 
 
Ethiopia Country Programme to 2005 
 
Ireland focuses its ODA programme on Sub-Saharan Africa, “the poorest region of the 
world”, with which the Committee on Aid Effectiveness saw “a continued demonstration 
of Irish solidarity with Africa.” (ibid: 8, 43). The main objective of the Country Strategy 
Paper (2002-2004) was poverty reduction, with support to social sectors; partnership 
was the second most important strategy.29  DCI had SWAps in health and education, 
gave indirect support via Irish NGOs and made a major commitment to food security 
programmes, such as the Productive Safety Net Programme30. Ireland’s decision about 
budget support was based on qualitative judgement on the APR on the PRSP, and 
seven indicators from the PRSP policy matrix; it monitored these ‘with interest’ but did 




 The 2005-2007 CSP was being drafted during the period of fieldwork. It included greater 
emphasis on political engagement around democratisation, though this was still framed in terms 
of humanitarian concern, and greater emphasis on harmonisation with other donors. 
30
  The PSNP has been funded by the World Bank, CIDA, DCI, DFID, EU, USAID and WFP 
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Tigray Regional Support Programme 
 
Ireland had funded ABPs in Tigray from 1994 but decentralisation effectively fragmented 
them by eliminating the supra-district zones. DCI credited their change in modality to 
block grant support, based on “mutually agreed targets” from the PRSP, to their “long 
and trusted” relationship with Tigray. Anticipated benefits from budget support were skills 
transfer, capacity building, enhanced policy dialogue and harmonisation with 
government systems and plans, thus strengthening local ownership. The anticipated 
benefits for Tigray included reduction in transaction costs and improvement in Regional 
government systems, driven by demand for accountability from the people. DCI was in 
the process of developing a joint M&E framework with the Tigray Regional Government, 
to monitor four sentinel woredas intensively (DCI, 2005, DCI, undated). 
 




Figure 4.5 overleaf indicates that Sweden has been relatively consistent in providing aid 
to Ethiopia. Its engagement with Ethiopia grew out of missionary work since before the 
Second World War. Public support for aid to Ethiopia continued despite disquiet about 
Emperor Haile Selassie’s domestic policies, because “political interference [was] 
prescribed by Swedish aid legislation”. Ethiopia was one of Sweden’s six main aid 
recipients from the mid-1960s to the 1990s (Hook, 1995: 98-100). Between 1998-2001, 
however, Swedish assistance was curtailed because of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. The 
Country Strategy for 2003-2007 warned that, “If Ethiopia is drawn into armed conflict, the 
entire development cooperation must be reviewed” (Sida, 2003b: 11, 17). 
 
Organisational Structure and Development Objectives  
 
Sida has been a central government agency operating via an annual mandate from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). A parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs lays down the overall political goals and the budget for international cooperation 
and international development cooperation (Sida, 2005b: 29). The MFA is responsible 
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for policy formulation and for multilateral funding; bilateral funding, which Sida disburses, 
accounted for 55.8% of the aid budget in 2005.  
 
Sweden’s aid programme originally had four objectives: economic growth, economic and 
social equality, economic and political independence, and democratic development 
(Hook, 1995: 101). During the 1990s, explicit objectives about aid effectiveness and the 
development of a market economy were added. These changes came under fire from 
both the political left and right; liberals were concerned that the changes “would 
undermine the normative values that had been a source of Swedish pride and prestige in 
previous years” and the right criticised aid effectiveness (ibid: 113-114). Swedish aid 
policy had previously been determined, in large part, by Swedish values: “being a small 
power with no ambitions to control any other country or region of the world, Sweden had 
often acted quite altruistically in the global arena” with ideas of solidarity with people 
from less developed countries emanating from Sweden’s “social welfare legacy” 





















































































Source: OECDStats: ODA total, net disbursements 
 
Figure 4.5. Sweden’s ODA to Ethiopia, 1960-2005 
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Increased levels of migration, particularly from Eastern Europe and later from the Middle 
East, and alignment with the growing ‘international consensus’ around aid, influenced a 
major shift in Sweden’s development policy. In 2003, new legislation Shared 
Responsibility: Sweden's Policy for Global Development introduced a government-wide 
policy, “an overarching goal of equitable and sustainable global development, which is to 
be achieved via a more coherent policy and increased collaboration and co-ordination 
with other countries and actors” (OECD, 2005a: 20).  
 
Prior to the Policy, “Swedish aid objectives [were] on a high level of abstraction” and did 
not place stringent limitations on Sida’s ‘substantial’ freedom of action (Elgstrom, 1999: 
119). Sweden's Policy for Global Development identified terrorism, the proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and other concerns relating to security as “key challenges 
of our time” (GoS, 2002: 11, 34-36) and emphasised the importance of multilateral 
cooperation in protecting ‘global public goods’ (GoS, 2002: 61-62).  
 
The DAC peer review (2005) concurred with the findings of the internal performance 
management report that, despite the number and depth of Sida’s internal and 
commissioned evaluations and studies, this resource was not adequately used for 
analysis, either to inform or to interrogate government policy (Sida, 2005b, 34). Ostrom 
notes that: “Sida, both as an organization and as a collection of talented individuals, can 
boast of a deep reservoir of knowledge and expertise in development cooperation. Even 
so, Sida’s institutions have not employed this knowledge to its best effect.”  (Sida, 
2002b: 44). 
 
The Policy for Global Development proposed three changes to Sida’s practice. It 
established Sida’s Policy & Methods Unit, which describes itself as “a guarantor for 
coherence”, “linking together analysis, methods development, human resource 
development and guidance. We combine steering, coordination, dialogue, support, 
follow-up and feedback.” (Sida, 2005c). However, an internal study noted staff’s concern 
that, rather than promoting coherence, “the policy and methods documents contain too 
many unclear requirements that are presented as being equally important.” (Sida, 
2005b, 38). The second change proposed the establishment of an independent 
institution to evaluate the policy’s effectiveness. The DAC suggested this would 
duplicate the work of the existing, well-respected evaluation and audit unit within Sida, 
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and, as of 2005, the locus and form of evaluation remained resolved. The third change 
was greater decentralisation to improve aid quality. Labelled ‘Vision from the Field’, it 
involved recruiting local programme officers, as well as moving staff from Stockholm to 
the embassies (Sida (undated-b): 1). Sida headquarters were to provide support to the 
field offices “through guidance, policies, advice and methodological and subject matter 
expertise” (ibid: 1) and Sida’s field staff were expected to “take on an active role in 
highlighting conflicting objectives within Swedish policy.” (Sida, 2005f, 12-13).  
 
Sida at Work: a guide to principles, procedures and working methods (2005) 
emphasises the role of analysis in an environment characterised by “complexity, 
interdependence and dynamism” (SIDA, 2005d: 36). The DAC Peer Review commented 
on the complexity in Sida’s conceptual framework for development cooperation. The 
apex of Sida’s framework, poverty reduction, is followed by two ‘perspectives’: a rights 
perspective and the perspectives of the poor, then eight ‘central component elements 
and three cross-cutting themes. Sida’s website included a “remarkable array” of policy 
statements:” two ‘over-arching policies’; 17 thematic and specific “sector policies”; 19 
“position papers” and many more “guidelines”; research documents and other papers 
(OECD, 2005a: 21, 51). The Review warned against confusion of responsibilities 
between MFA and Sida and against the effect of Sida’s policy complexity 
(organisationally and conceptually) on the workloads of staff in Sida’s field offices (ibid: 
51, 65). The precedence of ‘urgent’ documentation from Sida headquarters over local 
material and the high turnover of expatriate staff meant that Sida was dependent on the 
national programme officers at the embassies for its institutional memory (King and 




In 2003, Sweden devoted marginally more funding to social sectors (education, health, 
sexual and reproductive health and rights, water, sanitation, and culture and media) than 
to human rights and governance. Only 11% was devoted to agriculture and natural 
resources (OECD, 2005a: 33). In 2003, 90% of Sweden’s aid to low income countries 
was untied, but, as the 2003 Bill pointed out, “unilateral untying by individual countries is 
liable to distort competition, which is not the purpose of untying aid” (GoS, 2002: 71).  
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The values associated with Swedish aid, international solidarity, autonomous role for the 
recipient government, long-term commitment and weak levels of donor self-interest 
(Hook, 1995: 102, 103) appeared to be synergistic with budget support. However, an 
internal review of the budget support literature expressed concern about fungibility if 
local officials “misperceive[d] the intentions of the policy makers” (Sida, 2004c: 15). The 
2003 ‘global’ policy allowed Sida indicated a shift from solidarity to conditionality, so that 
“The parties’ respective obligations and the possibility of continuing, changing, 
terminating or suspending cooperation must also be clearly specified”.(GoS, 2002: 63). 
 
Sweden has used ABP modality for many years. Evaluation in 2002 noted that Sida 
failed to use the opportunity to use ABP data to improve programme performance, to 
learn as an organisation or to build local capacity (Farrington et al., 2002: x). Arguing for 
evidence-based modality decisions, the evaluation suggested that ABPs had an 
important role in providing contextual information to assess PRSP effectiveness (ibid: 
72-73). 
 
Ethiopia Country Programme to 2005 
 
With a policy of focussing its aid on countries with low per capita incomes, Sweden 
allocates 50% of its ODA to Africa (Sida, 2005a: 26). Sweden’s approach to 
development cooperation in Africa is based on its political and social structures, hence 
public support for Nyerere’s Ujamaa programme in Tanzania during the 1970s, which 
regarded Sweden as “a friendly, benevolent donor” (Elgstrom, 1999: 117).  
 
Characteristically, Sida has produced studies on Ethiopia’s political and cultural 
structures. The Country Strategy Paper (2003-2007) contained a detailed analysis of 
Ethiopian politics, both current and historical. Its Country Analysis (2003) surmised that 
the EPRDF would continue “to use repressive mechanisms to clamp down on 
opposition” and that “wide-scale human rights violations will occur”. At the same time, it 
noted that, in the “international fight against terrorism”,  the country played a “crucial role 
in the stability of the Horn of Africa”. As regards capacity, the Country Analysis noted 
that, on the one hand, “Ethiopia has demonstrated a high capacity for regular 
accounting, expenditure control and reporting”, but, on the other, decentralisation “is at 
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present causing chaos”, because the government was implementing it at an ‘unrealistic’ 
pace (Sida, 2003a: 11-13, 28). 
 
Sida’s ABP, the Sida-Amhara Rural Development Programme (SARDP), started in 1997. 
Its objectives were increased agricultural productivity and economic diversification 
(Phase I) and good governance and equitable development (Phase II) (Farrington et al., 
2002: 12). The programme is managed by a Programme Coordination Unit under a 
National Director; the PCU contracts technical assistance from a Swedish consulting 
company. At the time of fieldwork, the Programme was negotiating funding for Phase III. 
 




In 2002, a Consultative Group meeting in Ethiopia “led to a striking level of agreement 
with the government and donors about the need for enhanced dialogue structures” 
(DAG, 2005a: 10). At the High Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (2003), the 
Ethiopian State Minister of Economic Cooperation, MOFED31, requested that donors 
harmonised with Ethiopian systems for “procurement, disbursement, monitoring and 
evaluation and reporting. More aid as budget support, multi-year funding and aligning 
policy dialogue with government cycles were also highlighted.” (DAG, 2004a: 5). In 
2004, the Government reiterated that alignment was necessary “If Ethiopia is to conduct 
effective planning, aid coordination and management” (OECD, 2005b: 58). 
 
The OECD-DAC’s 2004 review of harmonisation in Ethiopia found that “many donors 
(especially non-budget-support donors) have done little in practice to harmonise their 
own country programmes”, despite the fact that “95% of donors support the government 
of Ethiopia’s agenda” (OECD, 2005b: 53)32. The international donor community were not 
prepared to align their systems precipitately: “The development of appropriate systems 
in Ethiopia will take time. In recognition of this, the OECD-DAC Guidelines 
recommended that donors simplify and harmonize their systems until they can rely on 
___________________________ 
31
  Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
32
  The donors providing DBS in 2005 were limited to the AfDB, Canada, EU, Germany, Ireland, 
Sweden, UK, and WB.     
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the government systems.” (DAG, 2004a: 8), although “the government openly 
challenges donors to abide by its policies” (OECD, 2005b: 54). In 2006, the OECD-DAC 
noted that donors were still not providing the government with information about planned 
disbursements and that this affected setting the budget (OECD, 2006b: 13-3). The 
government was also limited in its openness with donors; it insisted that “only those 
agencies providing [general budget support] should participate in these discussions” , 
thus excluding other donors which had significant sectoral programmes and experience 
from policy discussions (Furtado and Smith, 2007: 18). 
 
Ownership required that “the developing country should be the co-ordinator of 
development co-operation wherever possible” (OECD,1996: 17, my italics). This caveat 
meant that “where local interest or capability is weak, it remains for donors to encourage 
regular fora for co-ordination, and to assure that their own local representatives 
participate” (ibid: 17). In Ethiopia, fora established by the donor community included a 
High Level Forum and the Development Assistance Group. The High Level Forum, a 
subset of the Ambassadors’ Group, was established in 2002 as “the key structure for 
enabling mutual accountability and better policy dialogue” and “to act as one link 
between in-country actors” and donors’ headquarters. It was co-chaired by the Minister, 
MOFED, and the DAG, and its quarterly meetings focused on SDPRP (PRSP) 
implementation, harmonisation and policy dialogue (DAG, 2003). 
 
Donors Assistance Group (DAG) 
 
The DAG, originally established in 2001 to engage in weekly dialogue with the Ethiopian 
government, was restructured in 2004 to strengthen dialogue with the government over 
the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (SDPRP, the first full 
PRSP); to build links with civil society organisations; and to feed information to the High 
Level Forum and the Ambassadors’ Group. It also set up technical working groups 
(thematic: sectoral and ‘process’) and a pooled fund for DAG action on harmonisation 
and the PRSP. Jointly chaired by the World Bank and UNDP, meetings were held 
monthly, participants being the heads of development cooperation from the donor 
embassies. 
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During 2004, the monitoring and evaluation thematic working group and the government 
tried to establish a joint government-donor monitoring and evaluation framework (see 
below) and jointly agreed a Harmonization Action Plan for the period 2004-2006; this 
had ambitious targets, some to be implemented before the end of 2004 (DAG, 2004a). 
The same DAG paper noted that monitoring and evaluation systems had increased “the 
transaction costs for Government and reduce[d] the speed, efficiency and effectiveness 
of externally funded projects and programs.” (DAG, 2004a: 8). By May 2005, the 
monitoring and evaluation framework appeared to have stalled, possibly because the 
UNDP representative who had led the initiative had moved to another post.  
 
Donors’ Engagement with Civil Society 
 
Donors had at their disposal several analyses of the structure of civil society in Ethiopia. 
These included research commissioned by Sida (Culture and Power in Ethiopia, 
Vaughan and Tronvoll) and by DfID (the Marena studies, IDS), and there is large body of 
knowledge about power relations within civil society in academic analyses of Imperial, 
Derg and post-Derg regimes. More recently, the British Council/European Community 
had commissioned a survey of Non-State Actors (2004); this included commentaries by 
historians and political scientists which qualified the apparent breadth and independence 
of civil society which the survey suggested (EU/MCB, 2004).  
 
One of the actions which the DAG took during 2004 was to support the establishment of 
an umbrella group of NGOs that had participated as a ‘task force’ in SDPRP 
discussions. Renamed the Poverty Action Network/Ethiopia (PAN/E), this group was 
supported by DAG pooled funds, part of which were being used to contract an expatriate 
advisor. As the government had allowed little space for civil society, PAN/E lacked 
experience in making its voice heard, and its involvement in the SDPRP process was 
driven by the DAG. The DAG also funded PAN/E to undertake a monitoring exercise, 
Citizen Report Card (CRC), to gauge public satisfaction with public services.  
 
Key informants among civil society practitioners and academics thought that lack of 
skills, not lack of funding, accounted for NGOs’ difficulties in monitoring and evaluation 
of the PRSP (R1, R2).  They expressed reservation about donors’ categorisation of civil 
society. Terms such as ‘civil society’, ‘actors’ and ‘participation’ were considered too 
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imprecise to be useful, and donors’ rhetoric about partnership with civil society failed to 
acknowledge the greater power, knowledge and resources which donors held. Some 
donors (the US in particular) were perceived to be closer to the government than others; 
there was concern that budget support strengthened the hand of government and that 
donors failed to apply conditionalities. One view was that donors did not use the 
leverage available to them because they feared the consequences of exerting pressure 
on the government, particularly as “the fight against terror has changed the agenda; now 
donors say ‘give the government time’” (R3). It was thought that lack of agreement 
among donors might be the reason for this, although it was noted that donors had taken 
concerted action during the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998). 
 
There was some scepticism among these key informants about donors’ commitment to 
the participation of ‘poor farmers’ in monitoring and evaluating the provision of pro-poor 
services. It was thought this would require donors to undertake “a paradigm shift”. 
Donors set the timetable, but it was too rushed and there were too many ‘initiatives’ on 
Africa, with insufficient critique and analysis; the Commission for Africa was an example 
of this. The agenda was set by donors’ priorities, not by the needs of poor people (R4). 
 
Joint DAG-GoE Monitoring and Evaluation Framework 
 
Government statistical work had institutionalised in the 1960s, establishing the Central 
Statistical Agency (CSA), with the Welfare Monitoring Unit and the Household Income, 
Consumption and Expenditure Surveys established in the mid-1990s (GoE, 2004b). 
DAG noted that the Government M&E system “functions well”, although it needed 
strengthening (GoE, 2004a: 8).33 
 
In 2004, DAG began establishing a joint M&E framework with the government. The 
Action Plan focused on capacity building and institutional strengthening aimed at 
supporting the PRSP policy matrix; tracking progress towards the MDGs and towards 
harmonisation and direct budget support; and monitoring the nature and distribution of 
poverty (DAG, 2004b). With 200 indicators, the PRSP policy matrix risked becoming 
unwieldy (OECD, 2005b: 56), and the DAG recorded that there were “numerous gaps in 
___________________________ 
33
  “A culture of discipline and performance pervades government and the civil service” (Furtado 
and Smith, 2007: 2). 
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reporting of indicators against the SDPRP policy matrix” in the APR 2003/04 (DAG, 
2005b). The number of indicators was subsequently reduced.  
 
The World Bank attempted to involve other donors in its ‘diagnostic reviews’ such as 
CFFA, PER, CPAR and HIPC34, but the number of donor representatives resulted in 
“extremely large and unwieldy teams”; membership was then reduced, but the non-
participating donors felt excluded from access to information (OECD, 2003c: 38). 
Despite this, the reviews were supported by donors because few had the resources to 
undertake similar studies themselves (OECD, 2005b: 61, 54).  
 
4.3.6 The 2005 General Election and Aid Relations 
 
Donors had been encouraged by what they interpreted as the government’s acceptance 
of multiparty democracy in the lead-up to the May 2005 general election. Although 
European election observers35 reported cases of harassment and intimidation, the 
international community took no overt action as a result of the suppression (by force) of 
demonstrations in June following the government’s announcement of delayed release of 
the results while at the same time claiming victory. When the National Elections Board of 
Ethiopia released the results in July, they were disputed by the opposition coalition led 
by the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). As expected, the main urban centres 
had been won by the CUD, including all seats in Addis Ababa, and all seats in Tigray 
were won by the TPLF/EPRDF. The CUD made significant inroads in Amhara 
constituencies. The contentious results were primarily in rural areas, particularly in the 
southern regions. Under pressure from the international community which, led by the 
European Union (EU), attempted to mediate between the government and the opposition 
coalition, the government re-ran elections in 39 constituencies. The second round 
results, published in September, returned to power some senior government ministers 
who had lost their seats in the first round.  
 
In response to the second round results, the CUD leadership advised its elected 
members not to take up their seats in parliament and the EPRDF reacted on 1st 
___________________________ 
34
  CFAA (Country Financial Accountability Assessment), Public Expenditure Review (PER), 
Country Procurement Assessment (CPAR), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). 
35
  Ethiopia had also invited the Carter Foundation to send observers. Ex-President Carter was 
less critical than the EU of the government’s handling of the elections. 
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November by arresting approximately 100 CUD leaders, charging them with treason, 
and, over the ensuing week, rounding up approximately 40,000 people, imprisoning the 
majority in detention camps. In urban areas, predominantly in Addis Ababa and the 
capital of Amhara region, 193 people were killed by EPRDF forces. The violence against 
protesters in November was carried out by the mainly Tigrean army (Abbink, 2006). 
 
In 2005, the donors providing DBS to the federal government were the African 
Development Bank, Canada, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, the UK and the World 
Bank. In December 2005, the EU and World Bank withheld a total of $374 million in 
budget support to Ethiopia; in January 2006, the UK cut its $88 million aid programme 
(ibid: 189-190). Other donors followed or reduced their other programmes. Canada, for 
example, concerned to ensure that aid continued to get to the poor, told the government 
that it intended to stop DBS but, if the government cooperated, it would introduce, in 
concert with other donors, a new mechanism of block grants to sub-regional districts 
(woredas), ‘Protection of Basic Services’ (PBS). Donors, led by World Bank, designed 
PBS because of the risk that “unconstrained budget support could be vulnerable to 
political capture” (World Bank, PBS PID). By bypassing Ministry of Finance ‘control’, 
PBS aid was to be channelled through pro-poor sector ministries for earmarked 
spending at woreda level, backed up by more stringent financial monitoring.  
 
4.2.7 Key Issues for Aid Relations 
 
Ethiopia’s historic and religious past has provided the West and its own people with the 
image of an ‘imagined’ Christian kingdom “in a sea if Islam”. This image continues to 
play a role in the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. The country’s Christian heritage, its 
avoidance of colonisation and the strength and longevity of its institutions, particularly 
the EOC and militaristic leadership, form the bedrock of Ethiopia’s habesha identity. 
Potentially fragmentary structures have been absorbed by this identity, so that religious 
difference is turned into largely syncretistic practice and ethnic diversity is managed in 
dynamic tension by federalism.  
 
As the aid trajectory in Figure 4.1 indicates, the story of aid relations is affected by both 
humanitarian concerns and geopolitical priorities. Despite the famines of 1973 and 1984, 
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the dramatic shift in aid in 2001 suggests that the latter priority is the stronger impulse, 
even though Ethiopia had the second lowest per capita GDP in the world. 
 
Donors which had imposed retrospective conditionality by withdrawing aid during the 
Ethio-Eritrean war found that this sharpened rather than dented the Ethiopian 
government’s resolve, and they had difficulty re-establishing relations with the 
government subsequently. When the OECD-DAC selected Ethiopia as a pilot country for 
harmonisation, the agreement in 2003 was in response to ‘demands’ for alignment by 
the government, which subsequently criticised donors for failing to align sufficiently. The 
history of aid relations, therefore, suggested that Ethiopia was relatively resistant to 
donor pressure and was prepared to act independently when it perceived that it was in 
its own interests to do so. The current regime, which has been in power for 18 years, 
follows a Marxist-Leninist inspired ideology, Revolutionary Democracy, which includes 
the tenet of “communal collective participation and representation based on consensus” 
(Vaughan, 2003: 171). This vocabulary clearly indicates a research opportunity to 
juxtapose Revolutinary Democracy and Liberal Democracy concepts of participation and 
representation. 
 
The NAA assumes attitudinal change on the part of recipient governments, who are 
expected to accept policy reform (and influence, via the PRSPs), and adopt the 
principles of liberal democracy, by allowing ‘civil society’ to hold it to account through 
critique, dialogue and multiparty elections. Chapter 7 explores the values which donors 
ascribe to ‘participation’, and individual staff’s perceptions and practice of participat ion, 
particularly in evaluation, which will be analysed in relation to NAA and Revolutionary 
Democracy rhetoric and practice. The next two chapters continue to describe the 
Ethiopian context. Chapter 5 describes local associational institutions, their forms of 
participation and regulation. 
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CHAPTER 5 





This chapter forms the second part of the literature review on the Ethiopian 
context. Having set out the historical and political context in Chapter 4, this 
literature explores the culture and institutions of rural Ethiopia, focusing on the 
highland regions of Amhara and Tigray. The intention is to review commentary 
on aspects of rural, highland culture and institutions apparent in communal life in 
order gain a discursive understanding of how participation and evaluation are 
conceived and practiced in rural communities. Particular attention has been paid 
to aspects of participation identified in analysis of the WIDE data (Annex A).1 
These are various modes of verbal expression, individualism-collectivism, 
entitlement and accountability, the characteristics of leadership and its 
legitimacy. 
 
It is important to note that this chapter focuses on ‘highland culture’.2 Much of 
the literature argues that highland culture pervades the rest of the country 
through a process of ‘Amharisation’ (see 4.2.1). Other ethnically-based 
customary governance mechanisms, which are more horizontal in nature, have 
attracted considerable attention from Western donors and researchers. The 
Gurage, for example, have a “collective consciousness” rather than a governing 
central authority, which results in a strong sense of connection with other 
Gurage. They are also more engaged in the commercial economy, developing 
rural-urban linkages with cooperative institutions of social and economic support 
(Baker, 1992; Henry, 2004). The traditional rotating, age-related ‘gada’ system 
of government among the Oromo, which was based on a revolving system of 
leadership, has also been contrasted favourably with the hierarchical systems 
found in the northern highland regions of Amhara and Tigray. Tirfe Mammo 
suggests that the emphasis placed on diversity in the southern regions 
suggests, incorrectly, that the northern regions of Amhara and Tigray live in 
                                               
1
  The cross-cultural literature in subsection 3.5.2 was also selected from the same 
analysis. 
2
  The WIDE data indicated that there was greater variety of institutions of, for example, 
labour sharing and consequent mechanisms governing inclusion and exclusion, in 
communities living in other regions such as Oromia or SNNP. However, the PPA (2005) 
commented on the homogeneity of institutions. 
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“harmony and prosperity”. Not only is poverty greater in the north, but there is 
constant political tension in those regions also (Tirfe, 1999: 86). 
 
Section 5.2 draws on a wide literature, from international and national sources, 
and from older and contemporary analyses. Section 5.3 comments on local 
religious practice (expanding 4.2.2). Concepts of leadership, legitimacy and 
opposition are surveyed in 5.4 and specific forms of communication are set out 
in 5.5. Throughout the chapter, it is apparent that government and community 
institutions are intertwined. Formal examples of government-community 
structures are provided in 5.6, and non-state associational structures, described 
locally as ‘private’, are described in 5.7. Section 5.8 discusses some mores of 
participation, and 5.9 explores types of informal and formal evaluation which are 
practised locally. The chapter concludes with a review of local perception and 
practice of participation and evaluation, for comparison with how donors have 
conceived and structured participation and evaluation under the NAA (5.10). 
 
 
5.2 KEY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL DISCOURSE  
 
5.2.1 Synthesising National and International Literatures 
 
Much of the international anthropological and historical literature on Ethiopia 
was written in the 1960s3, and contemporary literatures continues to draw on 
this. Given the influence of the anthropological literature from the 1960s-70s, 
there was potentially a risk of over-dependence on such sources as Donald 
Levine’s Wax and Gold (1965a), Greater Ethiopia (first published in 1974) and 
Korten and Korten’s Planned Change in a Traditional Society: Psychological 
Problems of Modernization in Ethiopia (1972). Levine’s description of the 
pervasiveness of Amhara culture has been described as “anachronistic in many 
ways [but] also prescient” in view of current debates over nationalism and 
ethnicity (Barnes, 2003: 509).  
 
                                               
3
  There is an earlier literature stretching back to the 1930s. Alula Hidaru and Dessalegn 
Rahmato (1976), A Short Guide to the Study of Ethiopia, provides a useful bibliography. 
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In Greater Ethiopia4, Levine rejects the emphasis in much of the literature on 
Ethiopian ethnic diversity; rather, he observes “what these peoples have in 
common, how they interact, and the nature of Ethiopian society as a whole” 
(Levine, 1974: 21). Critics cite the tension of ethnic ‘nationalities’ built into the 
ethnic-federalist Constitution and the government’s crackdown on liberation 
movements in the west and south east of the country as reasons for rejecting 
Levine’s argument (cf. Vaughan, 2003). Despite regarding Levine’s work as 
“influenced by the more discredited aspects of modernization theory”, Harrison 
acknowledges that his analysis is accepted by Ethiopian authors studying the 
Amhara and Tigray dominated government (Harrison, 2002: 598). Clapham 
ascribes the pervasiveness of ‘Amhara culture’ in other regions to its ‘plasticity’, 
meaning that it was easily assimilated (Clapham, 1988). Amhara culture is 
“much more a matter of how one behaves than of who one’s parents are” 
(Clapham, quoted in Messay Kebede, 1999: 107). Poluha prefers to call it 
‘Ethiopian culture’ because other areas have been dominated by this culture for 
so long that it has been adopted nation-wide (Poluha, 2004: 166).  
 
I deliberately sought out different interpretations by more contemporary 
Ethiopian authors as a form of ‘triangulation’ of perspectives. I suspected that 
there could also be an ontological tension between the work of Ethiopian social 
scientists based overseas, working within a different political and cultural milieu, 
and those who have remained in Ethiopia. I was also interested to find out the 
extent to which ‘African’ discourses were considered useful in the Ethiopian 
context. Although there are strongly diverging international views on the 
particularity of Ethiopian culture, Messay suggests that national discourse is 
limited, because “Ethiopians have little taste for philosophy, even for 
psychological analysis” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 179). In contrast, there is 
considerable literature about the application of mainstream discourses to 
discussion of the Ethiopian ‘case’, so that Messay states previous studies have 
relied on “alien” Eurocentric concepts such as feudalism and class struggle 
(Messay Kebede, 1999: xvii). Markakis, for example, believed that Ethiopia was 
showing “a path towards class formation which is quite definite and more 
advanced … than in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa” (Markakis, 1973: 380). 
This (1973) interpretation puts Markakis at odds with other international 
observers, such as Clapham, who identify a synchronicity of vision in which 
                                               
4
 Originally published in 1974, a second edition was produced in 2000. 
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Ethiopian national identity supersedes such divisions. Indeed, Markakis 
recognises that traditional norms ‘diminish … social distance and inhibit the 
growth of class consciousness” (Markakis, 1973: 377). 
 
In order to include a number of different perspectives from the Ethiopian 
literature, I reviewed work from a range of academic disciplines. Two authors 
who write about Ethiopian ‘values’ are Messay Kebede, a philosopher from the 
diaspora, and Habtamu Wandemu, a psychologist working in Ethiopia. By 
comparing values held by different Ethiopian socio-economic groups, work by 
these authors can be balanced against the anthropological work of 1960s-
1970s. Similar issues were addressed by the multidisciplinary team of Ethiopian 
researchers reviewing the role of culture in Finnish development cooperation 
(Vasko et al., 1998: 3). Other scholars whose work I have used include Bahru 
Zewde, an historian, Dessalegn Rahmato, a sociologist, Teferi Abate Adem, an 
anthropologist, and Kassahun Berhanu, a political scientist. 
 




The previous chapter outlined Ethiopian history and its role in political and 
national consciousness. Reference to ‘traditional’ is made here not merely 
because of the apparent sustainability of cultural patterns and institutions 
explained below, but because “Ethiopians have a tendency to trace back to 
ancient times and history” (ibid, 1998: 94). Levine’s comment that “received 
habit is tenaciously kept because of its association with the authority ‘of our 
fathers’ ” (Levine, 1965b: 261) is confirmed by responses within the WIDE data, 
where the start of institutions was often dated by respondents to “time 
immemorial” or associated with Biblical events; and their legitimacy to 
continuation of their forefathers’ practices. Hoben noted a “core narrative” of 
“long ago”, in a ‘past’ which is seldom defined more precisely than ‘before the 
present century’ (Hoben, 1995: 1013). The theme of ‘continuity’ in both the 
international and the national literature takes various forms: patterns of 
leadership, longevity of institutions and patterns of association, and lack of 
religious disputation. Although Poluha warns against associating this continuity 
with immutability, as “even continuity is actively created” (Poluha and 
Rosendahl, 2002: 32), Tirfe Mammo argues that traditional associational life in 
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Ethiopia has been unaffected by foreign intervention (Tirfe, 1999: 4), and the 
embeddedness of the narrative may account for the institutions’ resilience. 
 
Markakis and Asmehash argued that the legitimacy of leadership accounted for 
the slow pace of change in Imperial Ethiopia (Markakis and Asmehash Beyene, 
1967: 194), citing Weber’s description as “resting on established belief in the 
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those 
exercising authority under them” (ibid: 194). Just as the Italian occupation of 
1936 strengthened the role of traditional authority as ‘national’ (ibid: 197), so the 
abrupt changes which the Derg subsequently tried to enforce, unsuccessfully, 
had the effect of reinforcing traditional values and institutions (Messay Kebede, 
1999; Bahru, 2003: 5). Ten years after the revolution, Helen Pankhurst had 
assumed “radical transformation was taking place where in fact there was none.” 




The literature suggests a number of dyads in Ethiopian culture and institutions. 
Ethiopians are both the recipients of God’s divine assignment and unworthy of it 
(Messay Kebede, 1999: 112). Ethiopia is presented as African/non-African, as 
modernising and traditional, as a land of plenty and of famine. Its ethnic diversity 
is seen as both a threat and a source of harmony; peasants are regarded as 
‘backward’ and as the source of knowledge; relationships are both hierarchical 
and a matter of chance. This propensity to dualistic thinking may not be solely 
religious in origin, although doctrine may reinforce it. Writing about ethnic 
marginalisation in southern Ethiopia, Freeman and Pankhurst suggest that 
“deeply entrenched cultural values” concerning food taboos are pre-Christian 
and can be linked with “general symbolic interrelated frameworks” along the 
following dyads: wild/domesticated, nature/culture, chaos/order (Freeman and 




There is an enduring ‘Malthusian’ narrative of environmental degradation, in 
both the national and international literature, which precludes other explanations 
(Hoben, 1995: 1015). Hoben argues that this narrative results in local 
government officials’ holding negative views of peasant agriculture which 
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discredit indigenous resource management practices (ibid: 1018). This brings to 
the fore another dyad: the EPRDF’s assertion that the peasantry are the driving 
force behind Revolutionary Democracy (“it is not a question of magnanimity … 
the peasants … can choose based on an understanding of the facts” (Cha irman 
of the EPRDF, quoted in Vaughan, 2003: 185) and its conception of the 
peasantry as “illiterate, uneducated”, needing to be ‘taught’ (Abbink, 1991, 




Historically, there was also synchronicity, or at least a lack of differentiation, 
between the ‘nobility’ and the peasants. Culture, religious practice and land 
management were essentially the same (Hoben, 1970: 192); what differentiated 
them was their status achieved through military prowess (Messay Kebede, 
1999: 133). For Messay, syncretism is a defining characteristic of Ethiopia 
institutions. This extends beyond the religious syncretism described in 5.3.2 
below, to a “synchronization of the religious vision with the social order and 
individual aspirations”. Their foundation myth gave Ethiopians the identity of 
God’s ‘chosen people’, so that it was “small wonder the divisive forces of 






5.3.1 Orthodox Religious Practice  
 
Tigray and Amhara form the Christian heartlands of Ethiopia. Marcus provides 
this snapshot of Christian highland culture:  “The Tigray and Amhara … are the 
inheritors and avatars of Orthodox Christianity and its political traditions. They 
use ploughs to cultivate grains, and they also herd cattle, sheep and goats. 
Their primary affiliation is to the Orthodox church, and they are loosely 
organized into parishes. Priests and itinerant holy men keep the banner of 
Christianity high and drill their audiences to believe in their moral and religious 
sanctity.” (Marcus, 1986). Although there is a system of religious schools and 
training for young deacons, priests themselves are often badly educated and 
repeat the services in Ge’ez, the EOC’s ancient religious language, by rote; 
Chapter 5:  Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions 
 154 
there is no tradition of preaching and “only minimal importance is attached to 
intellectualization” (Aspen, 2001: 78). Changes in religious practice have been 
introduced as the result of government pressure, rather than changes in 
doctrine. Religious proscription of working on saints days and other holy days 
has been reduced in order to increase agricultural productivity. 
 
Ascetism is a central plank of EOC belief and practice. Orthodox Christians 
expiate their unworthiness through prayer and fasting (Messay Kebede, 1999: 
112). “Hardship, fasting and even torture are used as a means of training the 
body and releasing the soul for higher spiritual activities” (Bridges et al., 2004: 
535). There are 186 fasting days in the year for ordinary people; for monks and 
nuns the number rises to 250 days. Some monks and hermits live lives of 
extreme asceticism. In the Eastern Church, disciplines such as fasting and 
almsgiving are not intended as penance or to incur merit, but “as a means of 
spiritual discipline to help reduce sin in the future, to exercise self control, and to 
avoid being enslaved to one’s passions and desires”.5  
 
The EOC conception of God is as all-powerful, but unknowable; “above all as 
mystery” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 183). Alongside this (or as part of the 
‘mystery’) is the concept of idil (chance6), which gives any Ethiopian, regardless 
of status or wealth, equal chance to improve his or her life. Levine describes idil 
as “the working of divine will” (Levine, 1965b: 261), but not in terms of reward for 
religious behaviour.  Teshale is critical of Messay Kebede’s “romantic” view of 
idil, which he equates to suggesting that Ethiopia is “a land of equal opportunity”, 
and thus “a level playing field” (Teshale, 2008: 362). However, the availability of 
idil as a concept and the absence of a tradition of doctrinal disputation could 
perhaps be placed in juxtaposition to Western concepts of ‘agency’ arising from 
religious non-conformism which are dominant within aid discourse. 
 
5.3.2 Religious Syncretism  
 
Throughout Ethiopia there is a significant degree of religious syncretism, 
allowing shared practices between Orthodox Christian, Muslim and traditional 
practice (what Aspen calls “the knowledge buffet” (Aspen, 2001: 17)). Ethiopia’s 
                                               
5
  Wikipedia, Grave_in-Eastern_Christianity; and Original_sin_in_Eastern_Orthodoxy 
6
   The word ‘chance’ does not really convey the random nature of idil: its meaning 
includes destiny, fate, opportunity. 
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Christian heritage dates from 4th century BC, but Orthodox practice also links it 
to a Judaic heritage and, via synchronicity, to Islamic practice. It retains some 
similarities with Judaism such dietary rules and restrictions on women’s religious 
practice.7 Like the Orthodox Christians, Muslims incorporate the veneration of 
saints and pre-Islamic beliefs and practices into religious and social expression 
(Braukampner, 2003: 121-122). Islam shares with Orthodox Christianity and 
Jewish Falasha belief in “the oneness of God, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, the 
spiritual value of pilgrimage”, and shared practice such as dietary taboos and 
circumcision (Lipsky, 1962: 116, 119). Bliese describes examples of syncretism 
of EOC with traditional beliefs in Wollo, Amhara, as “continual awareness of 
divine activity - a world view foreign to many Westerners. In these and many 
other ways religion is an expression of reality beyond common sense as seen by 
the adherent - a reality which in many ways determines his life and gives it 
external meaning” (Bliese, 1972: 18). 
 
 
5.4 CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP AND COMPETITION 
 
5.4.1 Traditional Conceptions of Leadership 
 
Levine’s earlier work, Wax and Gold (1965) was “violently criticised” for his 
description of Amhara culture as hierarchical and authoritarian, characteristics 
which he argued were transmitted in childhood through the style of upbringing, 
but his argument has recently been endorsed by Poluha8, whose empirical 
evidence “makes the children’s reproduction of authoritarian values and 
behaviour visible and understandable” (Pausewang, 2006). Referring to 
problems in assessing the degree to which political arrangements can be 
explained by cultural factors, Clapham claims that, in the case of highland 
Ethiopia “some such reference is inescapable” (Clapham, 1988: 21). He sees 
the Ethiopian concept of the state as “firmly rooted in the structure of indigenous 
society, both through its economic base and through a distinctive set of values, 
myths and attitudes” (ibid: 21). As a result, the historical “tendency towards 
authoritarianism, hierarchy, centralised rule and lack of transparency” has 
                                               
7
  Some of the dietary rules and the concept of fasting as spiritual discipline are also 
common to Islam. 
8
  Poluha, E. (2004). The Power of Continuity: Ethiopia through the eyes of its children. 
Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
Chapter 5:  Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions 
 156 
shaped policy formation and militated against real decentralisation of power 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 94).  
 
Although the imperial highland land tenure system culture has been labelled 
‘feudal’ by some because “it constituted a hierarchy of relationships ultimately 
resting on the control of arable land and peasant labour - it did not produce any 
hereditary ruling class or caste” (ibid: 22). Instead, respect and deference was 
‘earned’ by leaders provided that, and as long as, they were able to ensure the 
welfare of their supporters. “The leader was required to be both omnipresent 
and omnicompetent, capable of intervening at will in the smallest details of any 
aspect of administration, and his personal involvement was essential where any 
innovation was involved” (ibid: 22-23). When the leader was weakened or died, 
“the absence of such a relationship evokes feelings of incompleteness and 
malaise” (Levine, quoted in Clapham, 1988: 21).  
 
Messay describes the Ethiopian system of leadership as a constant struggle for 
power support coalesced around ‘able’, that is strong, leaders; support is quickly 
transferred to others if leaders display any form of weakness (Messay Kebede, 
1999: 167). With nobody wanting to be seen to be ‘backing the wrong horse’, the 
focus of support tended to be consensual: as long as leadership was deserved, 
it was accepted and its authority obeyed (Messay Kebede, 1999: 213; Clapham, 
1988: 22). 
 
Leadership traditionally has two contractual aspects: a leader must “be an 
effective advocate for his clients with his own superiors, and must guard his own 
interests” in order to fulfil his role as advocate. He becomes powerless “if the 
community is allowed to unite against him”; part of his strategy is therefore to 
“divide and conquer” (Korten and Korten, 1972: 83). As power was exercised 
downwards through arbitrary promotion and demotion, the competition 
generated through clientalism served to weaken any pockets of opposition 
(Korten and Korten, 1972: 71).9  Mengistu’s rise to power mirrored that of Haile 
Selassie; it conformed to traditional concepts of leadership change10 and also 
reaffirmed the notion that leadership “was, in principle, open to anyone” if they 
                                               
9
 Similar mechanisms were observable with Meles Zenawi’s handling of a challenge to 
his leadership from within the TPLF in 2001. 
10
  Mengistu “emerged as undisputed leader of the Derg after eliminating all other 
contenders to central power, re-enacting more vivdly and brutally all the power struggles 
of previous centuries” (Poluha, 2004: 179) 
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demonstrated a capacity for leadership in (usually military) competition 
(Clapham, 1988: 21-22).  
 
5.4.2 Continuity of Governance Patterns 
 
Reviewing Ethiopia’s political economy at the end of the Derg, Ottaway identified 
continuity between imperial and Marxist-Leninist concepts of power and 
organisation (Ottaway, 1990: 4). The Derg not only retained the old traditions of 
power patterns but strengthened them, increasing central control and expanding 
into “many new spheres of life, and people kept silent” (Poluha, 2004: 182). The 
use of violent oppression during the Derg was used to instil “obedience and 
accountability to those above you in the hierarchy”; new leaders were selected 
by political cadres to ensure loyalty (ibid: 182).  
 
In his critique of the revolution and subsequent Derg, Clapham notes a 
continuity between the way power was exerted at local level by kebele officials, 
for example through the demand for contributions of labour and resources and 
the issuing of punishments for failure to attend meetings, and the power exerted 
by headmen under the Imperial regime (Clapham, 1988: 161). Poluha also 
remarks on similarities between the three regimes:  “During the three different 
governments in Ethiopia, those of Haile Selassie, the Derg and the EPRDF, 
retaliation against those who criticise the powerholders has been swift” (Poluha, 
2002: 129). 
 




A general belief in hierarchy and specific relationships between superiors and 
inferiors is manifest in a form of government in which “strict super- and 
subordination with officials showing haughtiness and arrogance while the poor 
bow and scrape” has been apparent in the imperial, Derg and present regimes 
(Poluha, 2004: 166). Muir found “a submissive respect for hierarchical authority, 
which considers challenging public figures to be inappropriate” (Muir, 2004: 7), 
but does not identify the reason.  
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There are two streams in the literature concerning to opportunity for opposing 
power. Kassahun presents these in relation to the present regime. In the first 
argument, because the EPRDF’s administrative structure extends down to the 
smallest settlements so that the party is indistinguishable from the executive, 
little space is left in which opposition parties can develop (Kassahun, 2003: 
144). In the second argument, rather than purely constrained by the ruling 
party’s monolithic structure, opposition groups have historically been weakened 
by fissuring of coalitions, attributed to traditional traits of inability to compromise, 
intolerance of diverging views, mistrust and hostility (ibid: 122, 141). Traditional 
Ethiopian political culture is hampered by the habouring of “personal grudges 
against constructive criticism (internal and external), discouraging a culture that 
espouses divergent views in open debate and exchange, downplaying the active 
participation of the membership in deciding on important matters which affect 
the organisation, and so on.” (ibid: 145). Discussing the prospects for 
democracy in Ethiopia, a senior figure from civil society argued that its history of 
authoritarianism meant political dialogue and toleration of different points of view 





Teferi suggests that all highland people in rural Ethiopia tend to regard the state 
favourably, because “they also recognise the legitimacy of local officials who 
bridge the gap between state and people, albeit in the way they also recognise 
the roles of a hierarchy of supernatural beings in mediating relations with God” 
(Teferi, 2004: 626-627). At the same time, the people understand that local 
government structures are intended to provide them with a measure of self-
government and they expect a degree of autonomy from government 
interference (ibid: 626-627). The EPRDF understood local government to be part 
of a monolithic state structure, whereas farmers understood local government 
officials to be subject to a range of different interests and loyalties but became 
aware of those officials’ increasing power through ‘managed’ elections and 
control of resources (ibid: 628). 
 
Because the institutions and communication structures of highland and political 
culture are so widespread, they are well-understood: “everybody knew how to 
behave and could read and interpret each other’s acts. Since the rules were so 
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clear within the collective where patrons and clients found themselves, it also 
gave members a certain sense of security. At the same time everyone was 
convinced that the hierarchy was flexible and that anyone, or at least any man, 
could reach the top of it.”11 However, knowledge that people reached the top by 
being devious induced a sense of insecurity, because no-one could be certain 




Throughout the background provided about Ethiopia, leadership is framed as 
being achieved through competition and maintained through a combination of 
patronage, divide-and-rule and authoritarian control. The traits of suspicion, and 
giving and taking offence mentioned above in relation to the fissuring of 
opposition, are - the WIDE data demonstrates - also evident in intra-community 
relations at village level. Yet, conforming to African modes of inclusion within the 
group, at village level there are mechanisms to ensure that exclusion is avoided 
where possible. ‘Shimageles’ (councils of elders) are chosen for their wisdom 
and patience, but also for their discretion (in keeping ‘secrets’) and their ability to 
persuade. The forms of ‘dispute’ requiring shimeleges’ arbitration range from 
personal slight to murder12 (Giday, 2000). These traditional conflict management 
mechanisms are used to keep all the parties within the in-group of the 
community, as in the Amharic saying “a shimagele goes as far as telling lies to 
befriend two persons who quarrelled” (Vasko et al., 1998: 118). Once 








A further manifestation of dualism is the Ethiopian mode of oratory known as 
‘wax and gold’ (sam-ennā warq): “The poetic form is “built on two semantic 
layers. The apparent, figurative meaning of the words is called ‘wax’; their more 
                                               
11
  This suggests the concept of idil. 
12
  In murder cases, for example, they will negotiate ‘blood money’ with the bereaved 
family. 
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or less hidden actual significance is the ‘gold’.” (Levine, 1965a, quoted in 
Messay Kebede, 1999: 180). Levine describes it as comparable to rhetoric or 
paradox, but diametrically opposed to Western culture which “rests on a 
commitment to unambiguous communication” (Levine, 1965a: 10). In contrast, 
“[d]irectness of speech is considered to lack finesse” (Lipsky, 1962: 142). 
‘Abyssinian’ culture “sees openness as akin to innocence and simplicity” 
(Young, 1997a: 211). Messay suggests that ‘wax and gold’ originates from “a 
method of approaching religious texts and mysteries” and “corresponds with the 
Ethiopian conception of the divine”, as all-knowing but unknowable (Messay 
Kebede, 1999: 181-182). Qene, the chants sung by cantors (dabteras)13 in the 
churches, also synthesise two meanings by using ‘wax and gold’: “People think 
that qene is a way of hiding, but in fact it is a way of clarifying two things in one 
concept” (theologian quoted in Chaillot, 2002: 88-89). 
 
A concomitant of ‘wax and gold’ is that people “suspect that behind every 
protestation of admiration … lurks some quest for personal advantage”; this 
ambivalence results in “stylised politeness among equals” (Levine, 1965a: 253), 
and in a mixture of cynicism and deference to social superiors, summed up in 
the expression “bow in front, and fart behind” (ibid: 93; Clapham, 1988: 153-4). 
Messay suggests that, rather than conceptualising ‘wax and gold’ as a tool of 
ambiguity for the purposes of duplicity, it should be perceived more 
constructively. With the idea of the wax covering, and therefore obscuring, the 
gold, comes the idea of brushing the wax away to reveal the gold underneath: 
“Far from being the cult of duplicity, wax and gold is then the art of discovering 
and reinstating the truth. .. The ontology affirms the dualism of reality, better still 
the existence of reality behind the visible appearance.” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 
182). Messay suggests that Western ‘scientific’ knowledge is antithetical to 
Ethiopian (traditional) conception of knowledge: “The experimental att itude, 
which is intent on discovering phenomena concealed deliberately by God, will 
only result in punishment.” (ibid: 186, 191). 
 
In everyday life, ‘wax and gold’ is manifest in the widespread and powerful use 
of proverbs, and in political debate among all sections of the community. 
Ethiopian conception of power includes the ability to influence, and this is done 
by charismatic speech, including repetition and exaggeration (Korten and 
                                               
13
  Dabteras are also associated with faith healing and other ‘magical’ powers. 
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Korten, 1972: 251). There are risks, however, from inappropriate speech which 
must surely be exacerbated by the demands of ‘wax and gold’ oratory. While 
using a quiet, low voice is seen as suitably deferential and ‘knowing one’s 
place’, “[a]n aggressive, clever tongue, capable of a wide repertoire of insults 
that will shatter the adversary’s composure” is indicative of strength and, those 
who can, “apply skill and subtlety in the use of insult” (ibid: 58). While “both 
Amharic and Tigrinya speakers love flowery oratory” (Vasko et al., 1998: 111), 
external observers found differences between them. Lipsky describes 
“distinctive qualities” in speech attributed to each group: “the Amharas feel the 
Tigrai are shrewd, fast in thought and action, light in tongue, impatient”, while 
they themselves are “noble, slow of speech, subtle, patient and slow to anger” 
(Lipsky, 1962: 39). When Amhara say that Tigreans “just say what they feel and 





Ethiopian children are taught to self-censor, to listen and not to speak. 
Unmarried adult children are expected to defer to their father, and will become 
‘adult’ when they get married and establish their own households. Alongside this 
definition of adulthood, there is also a conception of legitimacy related to age: in 
Amhara, someone may not be regarded as ‘adult’ until they are 40 years old 
(Giday, 2000: 38). Although the elderly are generally afforded respect due to 
their age and experience, those who are frail or of low status may be too shy or 
embarrassed to speak at meetings (Vasko et al., 1998: 104). 
 
Reticence can indicate “carefulness, thoughtfulness, and, above all, as a 
mechanism for avoiding and escaping trouble”. It is a method of avoiding conflict 
and minimising the risks of appearing foolish, self-seeking or boastful (ibid: 103, 
104). Messay notes that “[a] consequence of the ethics of legitimate place is the 
Ethiopian appalling fear of derision” (Messay Kebede, 1999: 215). According to 
Messay, the Ethiopian concept of yilungta “the excessive concern for public 
opinion” is related to the shame “when one does not behave according to one’s 
status” (ibid: 215). However, the Ethiopian team reviewing the role of culture in 
Finnish aid define yilungta as “a kind of politeness, or super-imposed modesty 
mixed with fear of societal values in which one goes to the extent of sacrificing 
one’s will, interest, belief, opinion, or even an outright advantage, for the sake of 
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others” (Vasko et al., 1998: 98). Yilungta is thus also considered a virtue, so that 
worry about what people say is described as “community mindedness” (Bridges 
et al., 2004: 540). 
 
However, silence in ordinary social situations is considered negatively. Silence 
may indicate the existence of a grudge or disagreement which is more likely to 
be ‘handled’ by the use of negative gossip (‘back-biting’) (Vasko et al., 1998: 
103).  
 
5.5.3 Discussion in Decision-Making 
 
Discussion in meetings follows a particular pattern: when an individual who is 
“respected” on the grounds of age, heroism, religiosity or some other status, 
presents their “ideas”, the community tends to agree. If an individual presents a 
different opinion, “most people try to assimilate the new speaker with that of the 
previous speaker even if it is basically very different” (ibid: 84). In formal 
settings, such as government meetings or in the workplace, the opinions or 
decisions of superiors should not be challenged; this can only be done by 
somebody of a higher status (ibid: 88). Fear of others’ opinion and being seen 
as ‘against’ the group, results in considerable peer pressure, so that in meetings 
an idea will be supported rather than dissent expressed, resulting in “artificial 
group consensus”. Speaking up in support of the current idea brings recognition 
and self-confidence (Korten and Korten, 1972: 246). Korten’s Ethiopian students 
thought that artificial consensus was necessary as individualistic behaviour 
would preclude deliberative consensus, leading to their comment “democracy 
will not work here” (ibid: 248). 
 
In 4.2.3, reference was made to the incorporation of traditional conception of 
leadership within the ruling party’s ideological base, Revolutionary Democracy. 
Within the TPLF, members have “the right and the duty to discuss all topics 
presented by the party. Once the discussions are finished, consensus 
proclaimed and decisions made, these have to be followed by all its members” 
(Poluha, 2004: 185). The party therefore “emphasises all of the factors thought 
desirable by most liberal democrats (decentralisation, participation, 
inclusiveness of discussion, etc)” though it uses the language of “participation” 
with quite different meanings (ibid: 187). In their rise to power, the TPLF worked 
with traditional norms around religion and oral culture to gain peasants’ loyalty, 
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synthesising these with more ‘modern’ techniques such as meetings, majority 
voting, public debates, elections at local levels and public evaluations (Young, 
1997a: 173-192). Young’s view (in 1997) was that the form of rural 
administration which the TPLF established in Tigray through a combination of 
two apparently contradictory initiatives (mobilisation and allowing peasants’ 
participation in decision-making) “may well prove to be the movement’s most 
enduring accomplishment” (Young, 1997b: 195), although he doubted it could be 
implemented in other regions (Young, 1998: 196). 
 
In practice. Tigrean officials’ understanding of the participatory approach “does 
not take a liberal, populist form; there are greater resonances with the early 
Maoist ‘mass line’ approach, a connection which dates back to the ideological 
beginnings of the TPLF in the 1970s. … Informants describe such a participatory 
model as a process whereby the government listens through the baito14 system, 
‘takes a consensus’, makes a decision and then conscientises and mobilises the 
people around the issue.” (Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 115).  
 
 
5.6 GOVERNMENT-COMMUNITY STRUCTURES 
 
5.6.1 State-Civil Society Relations: National NGOs 
 
Nascent CSOs, such as trade unions, had emerged during the imperial regime, 
but these were crushed by the Derg (EU/MCB, 2004: 24, 27). During the 1984 
famine, “aristocrats charities” from the 1960s re-emerged as NGOs to deliver 
international humanitarian relief.15 By the mid 1990s, they were mainly providing 
welfare programmes (72%), to a lesser extent development activities (22%), and 
relief programmes (6%); human rights, advocacy and democracy programmes 
were negligible (Kassahun, 2000: 13). 
 
The ERPDF’s Revolutionary Democracy included a commitment to ethnic 
pluralism and the party introduced an ostensibly free press and permitted the 
establishment of CSOs “that are both autonomous and committed to public 
values such as human rights and the rule of law” (EU/MCB, 2004: 29). 
                                               
14
  The baito was an administrative level, now replaced by kebele or tabia (see 4.2.5). 
15
  Interview with civil society leader. 
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Government rhetoric on participation permits civil society to challenge 
government performance in the interests of good governance, but this is not 
articulated in the same way at some sub-regional levels, where NGO 
involvement is limited to service delivery (ibid: 60).  
 
National NGOs in Ethiopia have a number of structural weaknesses. There is a 
weak tradition of giving funds to NGOs, so they are largely dependent on 
external donor funding and thus owe their existence to external voices, rather 
than evolving from grassroots demands (Clark, 2000: 13-14; also Pratten, 
1997: 14). Ethiopian organisations working with international NGOs describe 
mistrust, misunderstandings; and lack of cultural awareness on both sides 
(Mebrahtu, 2002); Ethiopians could not understand the INGO’s concern for 
confidentiality, or for consulting grassroots staff (Tegegne, 2000). National 
NGOs tend to be organised by educated professionals, based in the capital, and 
therefore not deeply rooted in rural communities because they tend not to 
operate in more remote areas, whereas there are no areas to which government 
does not have outreach (Dessalegn, 1999: 8-13). Commentators have noted 
NGOs’ apparent inability to accept divergent views, particularly within their own 
organisations and their fear of antagonising those in power and consequent 
reluctance to promote democratic values (Kassahun, 2000: 16-17). Clark notes 
that “traditional divisions and suspicions reflective of the larger society initially 
hampered the emergence of [NGO] networks” (Clark, 2000: 10); the rivalry of 
NGOs and their reluctance to communicate with each other has limited their 
ability to speak with the ‘collective voice’ that advocacy work requires (EU/MCB, 
2004: 66).  
 
National NGOs are required to register with the government, thereby allowing 
government some control of civil society organisations by, for example, requiring 
annual re-registration (Asnake and Dejene, 2000: 16, 17). A survey of the sector 
found that the criteria for CSOs were generally understood to be independence 
from the government, to be non-profit making, and to promote their members’ 
interests (which might include advocacy). In contrast, the government regarded 
the role of CSOs to be the provision of development activities (EU/MCB, 2004: 
58-59), yet Watson found that local people thought that NGOs were operating as 
part of the state (Watson, 2003: 306). 
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Two NGOs established by the TPLF in Tigray, the Relief Society of Tigray 
(REST) and the Tigray Development Association, retain close links with the 
party (Young, 1997b: 86;  Hyden and Haile Mariam: 11) and are not regarded as 
independent by other Ethiopian CSOs although presented as such by the 
government (EU/MCB, 2004: 57). REST was started as the ‘humanitarian’ wing 
of the TPLF and now claims to be independent, although it is still clearly linked 
to the TPLF through political affiliation and through funding (Clark, 2000: 8-9). 
 
5.6.2 State-Civil Society Relations: Community-Level Mechanisms 
 
The government structure reaches down to rural communities via three routes: 





The EPRDF has continued the structure of mass organisations created under 
the Derg: farmers associations, women’s associations and youth associations 
are closely linked with government. Sometimes referred to as GONGOs 
(government-organised non-government organisations), these associations 
“have been established as fronts for government activities or the manufacture of 
an appearance of popular support” (EU/MCB, 2004: 30)16. They are described 
as membership organisations “whose origin stem from the government’s wish to 
mobilise various community group members, and which exist in every woreda 
(district) and kebele (village) (ibid: 90-91). The role of Women’s Associations, for 
example, is ambiguous; as described by one representative, the government 
told them that they should be a CSO, so they were acting as an NGO while still 
a partner of the regional government but not part of the government institution” 
(ibid: 57). 
 
Village-Level Government-Community Meetings 
 
Government-community relations are also structured through community 
meetings. Poluha describes the process thus: “The meetings take place at the 
                                               
16
  Such structures were adopted elsewhere in Africa. Mamdani describes them as part 
of “the local state resurfaced as the true locus of on-the-ground coercion” (Mamdani, 
1996: 176). 
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Service Cooperative or at the church after the Sunday service, when women will 
also be present. What is most conspicuous about these meetings is that the 
officials talk and the peasants listen. There is almost no exchange of ideas or 
even words” (Poluha, 2002: 105). Although community members said nothing, 
the government representative recognised that “nobody will go against what 
comes from above, but inside themselves they are against many things” (ibid: 
124, 125). However, Aalen believes that people do participate in local 
government meetings for a variety of reasons: to get information, to receive 
propaganda, to be ‘mobilised’, to receive benefits (or avoid being denied 
benefits), to be involved in communal work. Because the party/government 
structure reaches down into the community, party rhetoric is equally well 
dispersed, so that “peasants in the countryside who do not read newspapers or 
listen to the radio are well versed in the political vocabulary of the national 
political leadership”, and party influence is thus “a naturalised part of everyday 




All government’s agricultural policies, ADLI, PADETES and other policies, 
“ultimately rely on the motivation, willingness and ability of the DAs” (Harrison 
2002: 604). For the past fifty years, national agricultural policy has consisted of 
“promoting uniform packages throughout the country and for all groups of 
farmers” (Kassa Belay and Degnet Abebaw, 2004: 143). DAs have quotas for 
the number of farmers who are to accept the extension packages. Other 
responsibilities include tax collection, mobilisation, and collecting loan 
repayments (ibid: 154, 159). “Local officials were (and still are) uniquely placed 
at the interface between salaried officials at the district, zonal and regional levels 
of government from above and different categories of fellow farmers from 
below.” (Teferi Abate Adem, 2004: 625).  
 
DAs therefore had two ‘principals’, their superiors at the woreda (district) 
administration and local farmers. The woreda expected them to act “with a 
certain disengagement from the social expectations of fellow farmers. Yet 
farmers expected them to be zealous advocates of local concerns and interests 
as their relatives, friends, neighbours and clients.” (ibid: 625). The DAs resolved 
this by “wielding the power vested in them in translating stated programme 
objectives to meaningful local concepts for accommodating irreconcilable 
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interests”, distributing land to their supporters (friends, relatives and clients) and 
denying it to their adversaries” (ibid: 625). On the basis of this quotation from 
Teferi, DAs appear to act as both street level bureaucrats and as broker-
entrepreneurs, but not as broker-translators. 
 
5.6.3 Mobilisation for ‘Partipation’ 
 
Farmers, organised via mengistawi buden or ‘development groups’, ‘contribute’ 
up to 20 days free labour per annum as “community participation” (Marena 
Briefing ET07). This is a further example of continuity across the three regimes, 
as under the Imperial regime, farmers had to provide corvée labour, and were 
organised into work groups by the Derg.  
 
The literature suggests that methods to induce ‘participation’ takes a variety of 
forms, and often involved DAs who, because they were members of 
communities, representatives of government, potential distributors of benefits, 
could “play a controlling or even coercive role” (Marena Briefing ET07). In 
Tigray, farmers joined extension programmes because they feared being 
excluded from “food-for-work programs and other benefits from the government’. 
DAs could also apply moral punishment by describing non-participants in 
meetings as ‘backward, weak and unable to distinguish good from bad’” 
(Mamusha Lemma and Hoffman, 2005: 2). 
 
Harrison notes that the Ethiopian government can claim that the emphasis that it 
places on ‘participation’ is independent of any influence or ideas claimed by the 
donor community. In the government’s conception of participation, which 
incorporates elements of tesatfo (mass mobilisation) and limat (development), 
participation is interpreted by local government officials as “people ‘working 
together to help their community’”, which has a greater a priority than satisfying 
individual needs (Harrison, 2002: 600). 
 
 
5.7 COMMUNITY STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
Farmers and their families differentiate between government associations, such 
as Women’s and Farmers’ Associations (yemengist) and their local associational 
institutions, which they describe as ‘private’ (yegil) (Poluha, 2002: 107), and are 
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wary of government interference and thus incorporation (Muir, 2004: 29). Just as 
NGOs have to register with the government, local burial associations (iddir) are 
required to register with the kebele. Dessalegn suggests that traditional 
associations are resilient to state influence (Dessalegn, 1999: 8) but in Tigray, 
during the revolution, the TPLF were able to gain support even in the most rural 
areas by working with traditional associations (Dia, 1996: 247). In the early 
years after the overthrow of the Derg, the EPRDF approved of the informal 
associations because their practices conformed to the party’s ideals of self-
governance and participatory democracy. More recently, Harrison reported 
government officials’ comments that the associations were undemocratic 
because they “have no properly elected officials, they operate without rules, and 
they are embedded in ‘traditional’ (‘backward’) belief systems.” (Harrison, 2002: 
604). However, traditional associations are formalised by having elected officials 
and strict, written rules of conduct; the descriptions below confirm that these are 
widespread and considered legitimate.  
 
The following three sub-sections describe different types of local association. 
 
5.7.1 Reciprocal Labour-Sharing 
 
There are two main types of labour sharing in northern Ethiopia, labour for food 
(debo) and reciprocal labour (wonfel).17 These include a number of ‘performance 
control’ mechanisms. In debo, the farmer requesting assistance provides food to 
the best of his resources, and may be subject to criticism if it is not of an 
acceptable standard; if it is not, physical or social retribution may be sought (the 
latter may take the form of derision, or even ostracism). In wonfel, the quality of 
labour is the main criterion. There are sanctions on those who arrive late or who 
do not work effectively. Someone with a reputation for hard work and impartiality 
may be appointed as organiser, but his role is limited to encouragement and 
arbitration (Korten and Korten, 1972: 90-92). 
 
5.7.2 Religious Associations 
 
The two main religious associations are maheber and senbete. Maheber, 
formed in honour of a patron saint, involves monthly feasts held on the saint’s 
                                               
17
 Respondents suggested that these were now less common. 
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holy day, at each member’s house in turn. Membership is usually restricted to 
close relationships based on trust; prestige is gained through the quality of the 
feast and there are strict rules of behaviour about avoiding conflict, such as 
forbidding gossip (ibid: 94-95). The nature of membership offers a private forum 
for discussion and problem-solving (Tirfe, 1999: 184).  
 
Because maheber is the smallest group, usually a maximum of twelve, entry to 
membership is the most stringent (not least because of the cost, and therefore 
the level of individual’s investment). Even so, “If the patron saint fails to grant the 
expected support, a member can leave the society to join another one” (Teferi, 
2004: 618). This reaction, despite the importance supposedly attached to the 
religious affiliation, is reminiscent of the action of a follower whose leader fails to 
provide for them (cf. 5.4.1). 
 
Senbete is also based around food, but is held weekly on Sundays outside the 
church. Food may be provided for the destitute, so senbete is not based on 
reciprocity but includes a strong element of alms-giving (Aspen, 2001: 101). 
 
5.7.3 Non-Religious Associations 
 
Two important forms of non-religious association are iddir, the primarily vehicle 
for mutual assistance, and equb, a rotating credit scheme. There is an extensive 
literature about both these mechanisms, probably generated because of their 




Most commonly, the purpose of iddir is to provide mutual assistance at burials, 
the replacement of lost resources such as a house following fire, or death of an 
animal (Korten and Korten, 1972: 95), although they may be formed for other 
religious, kinship or development purposes. Pankhurst describes iddirs as “a 
vital forum for expression of belonging” (Pankhurst, A. 2003: 74). Membership 
may be religious, or based on proximity and therefore may include both 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims. An iddir is “strictly governed”, with a written 
constitution and appointed officials, who, when necessary, will apply a range of 
sanctions (Korten and Korten, 1972: 97). The ultimate sanction is expulsion 
(Henry, 2004: 150; Pratten, 1997: 145). Someone who does not belong to an 
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iddir “is completely cut off from social contact with the other members of the 
community” (Korten and Korten, 1972: 98). Poluha’s respondents told her that 
“To be without an Idir is to be without a family”, that is totally isolated (Poluha, 
2002: 108). Pratten found that other members of the iddir are themselves fined if 
they associated with those expelled. In practice, either fear of expulsion 
prevents the rules being broken or the shimageles intervenes and bring about 




Equb, a rotating savings scheme, is a recent institution, more common in urban 
than rural areas. It takes the form of a local lottery into which carefully-vetted 
members contribute a fixed sum each week or fortnight. Strict rules relating to 
consistency and timeliness of payment are enforced by elected officials, and 
guarantors are required to ensure that those who receive their ‘lot’ early 
continue paying throughout the cycle of the equb. Sanctions include fines and 
exclusion through expulsion or self-censorship. Membership is based on “strong 
ties” such as kinship or friendship, to increase trust. It is appreciated as a 
method of regulating (lack of) self-control (Tirfe, 2000: 186-7). 
 
5.7.4 External Perceptions of Ethiopian Associational Structures  
 
External observers of Ethiopian local associations have been interested in their 
longevity, particularly whether or not they pre-date the Derg or emerged from it. 
Pratten states that “Associative life in Ethiopia before the revolution in 1974 is 
poorly documented” (Pratten 1997: 140). Iddir, for instance, are often assumed 
to have been formed at the time of the Italian invasion in 1936. However, 
maheber are much older; they were described by the Portuguese mission to 
Ethiopia in the 16th century (Alvarez, 1540: 85-86). One of the current NGO 
umbrella organisations describe iddir and maheber as being present since “time 
immemorial” (CRDA, 2006: 6) 
 
Harrison observed that donors found it difficult to interpret the role of traditional 
associations. They saw associations both as a route to development (Watson, 
2003: 288), and as “self-help groups [which] should be left basically alone” 
(Pratten, 1997: 7). Dejene describes iddir as a form of social capital, because 
they included reciprocity, flexibility and adaptability (Dejene, 2003: 44, 49, 51). 
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Description of the traditional associations suggested that membership did largely 
depend on trust, but that regulation was used to ensure that expected levels of 
performance were achieved and that trust was not abused. Membership of 
associations such as iddir and equb provide experience of “democratic working 
methods through elections of [officers], voting on issues and abiding by the rule 
of the majority, teaching techniques of running meetings, introduce the use of 
bookkeeping, time discipline, etc. In short, they may [be a] way to integrate 
modernity into traditional sectors” (Tirfe, 2000: 192; also Pankhurst, 2003b: 21). 
 
 
5.8 MORES OF PARTICIPATION 
 
This sections draws out some aspects of social interaction in associational life 
which were originally identified in the WIDE data as significant for understanding 
local forms of participation. These aspects also prompted the focus in the 
conceptual framework on transactions (motivation and trust) and cultural 






Levine suggests that the self-interest inherent in Amhara patron-client system 
results in ‘hierarchical individualism’ (Levine, 1974: 146). Aspen also 
emphasises the importance of individualism in Amhara culture, in which 
“individuality, self-assertion and personal strength are constantly challenged by 
equally strong tendencies of domination, authoritarian control, and patron-client 
relationships” (Aspen, 2001: 21). 
 
The range of forms which individualistic behaviour include, inter alia: an 
individualistic person is someone who does not conform, who cannot be relied 
upon because they are “unstable and impermanent”, or someone who invades 
other people’s privacy and cannot keep secrets (Korten and Korten, 1972: 
53 54). This highlights the dilemma: on the one hand, the consequence of 
individualistic behaviour is detrimental to the welfare of the community (personal 
individualism is associated with common-pool resource problems); on the other, 
lack of trust requires one to think individualistically. Because of the severity of 
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the consequences, particularly ostracism, disputes are settled by arbitration and 
misdemeanours rarely occur, thus “enhance[ing] social cohesion” rather than 




Rather than “hierarchical individuals”, in Messay’s view “vertical relationships 
have undoubtedly the upper hand as [regards] the possibility of social mobility 
and to increasing one’s possessions, [but] horizontal, communal connections 
are activated where matters of common interests are at stake… These factors 
must not be neglected, for a society based on clientship cannot wholly adhere to 
an unbridled individualism” (Messay, 1999: 154). This supports Korten’s view 
that lateral relationships are instrumental rather than affective, with social and 
cultural norms being formalised through the ‘cooperative institutions’ (Korten and 
Korten, 1972: 87) described in 4.3.3.  
 
Hoben suggests that farmers’ commitment to lateral institutions is weak because 
of the number of different associations to which they belong (Hoben, 1970: 201-
202), but this implies that the brittleness of the relationships indicates lack of 
personal investment. The rules and regulations of the associations which tie 
members into strict forms of behaviour indicate that there are social as well as 
financial investments in belonging. Ethiopian researchers describe attendance of 
associations as “a social commitment” amounting to an obligation (Vasko et al., 
1998: 24). They describe collective thinking as being highly significant in daily 
life; it occurs in communities “rigidly tied together with socio-economic and 
cultural cohesion”. “To preserve this oneness and togetherness … people do not 
like to voice differing opinions”. As a result, there is no tradition of assimilating or 
tolerating different ideas: “Everything is ‘either black or white with no grey 
zones’. Collective thinking usually results in either accepting or rejecting, loving 
or hating, helping or not helping and so on” (ibid: 84-85).  
 
Discussion in 3.5.2 noted the use of shame as a self-regulatory mechanism in 
collectivist cultures. Levine records that, in order to avoid shame, Amhara 
culture means that obligations to people outside one’s immediate circle are kept 
to a minimum, so that the ideal neighbour does not “touch another’s land, wife, 
money, or personal feelings”; but, within the circle, there is unstinting support in 
times of sickness or death and sharing in happy events (Levine, 1965a: 82). 
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A final explanatory twist to this pattern, is the admiration given to those who 
become shifta (bandits). When people (usually younger) break local conventions 
and refuse to conform (behaving ‘individualistically’), they are ostracized, denied 
access to resources and leave the community to become shiftas (Giday, 2000: 
46-7). Although the term is used as a negative political label by government 
supporters to describe opponents, shiftas are respected (Erlich, 1994: 181). 
 
5.8.2 Mutuality, Reciprocity and Trust 
 
There appears to be a pivot around inclusion/exclusion of local associations, a 
constant tension between the individual and the collectivity. Attendance offers 
membership of an in-group, validation of cultural norms, a means of support and 
a forum for discussion outside state structures. Non-attendance incurs 
“punishment” in the form of degrees of social exclusion ranging from “social 
black-listing”, through ostracism to “outright alienation from social life” (Vasco et 
al., 1998: 24). A further term used to express this level of exclusion is ‘ex-
communication’ (cf. Tirfe, 2000: 184; Giday, 2000: 47). An excluded individual 
would be cut off from the supporting mechanisms which govern religious, 
economic and social practice, hence exclusion has to be avoided. 
 
Associations such as iddir and equb and labour-sharing mechanisms were 
described by Ethiopian ‘cultural’ researchers as “based on mutual commitment” 
(Vasko et al., 1998: 84). The commitment, being based on strict reciprocity and 
trust, rather than affectivity, appears to be transactional, in the form of an 
investment in a ‘multi-period game’ designed to ensure future support (see 
Wood, 2003). The tension generated by competition, rivalry and the threat of 
sanctions implies that the game is being continuously replayed. The 
oratory/reticence dyad is a further source of tension and a further game ‘ploy’. In 
meetings, the risk-averse individual would opt for the ambiguous reticence of 
yilungta, in which silence could also indicate wisdom.  
 
Muir suggests that the reciprocity of associational life is actually ‘mutuality’, 
based on trust, shared identity, and high levels of participation, the result of 
“internally driven peer pressure, social, moral and emotional support, and the 
presence of penalties and leadership with the authority to apply them” (Muir, 
2004: 6). However, other researchers offer a different perspective, that 
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associational life with its strict reciprocity is based on individualism rather than 
cooperative behaviour (Korten and Korten, 1972: 11). Rather than uniting 
around common interests within their community, “individuals seem to think of 
each other as members of different and largely autonomous household units 
and interpersonal relations assume a patron-client nature.” (Teferei, 2004: 618). 
Because of this, Levine describes labour-sharing mechanisms such as wonfel, 
as “a temporary coincidence of individual interests” (Levine, 1965a: 247), more 
likely to be shown in times of crisis, for example, death or a house fire (Levine, 
1965a: 248; also Teferi, 2004: 616). This may explain the success of iddir, not 
just in terms of popularity but also their extension into other forms of 
cooperation.  
 
Further towards the contractual end of the transactions spectrum, the literature 
suggests that there is a lack of trust within the in-group, let alone out-group 
ascriptions associated with collectivist societies.  “We are sceptical and 
suspicious of each other, leave alone outsiders”, Ethiopian cultural researchers 
remarked (Vasko et al., 1998: 35). Clapham notes “a pronounced lack of inter-
personal trust. Ethiopian suspicion is proverbial, and brings with it a 
secretiveness, a reserve and a tendency to intrigue” (Clapham, 1988: 22). 
Outsiders are considered ‘fair game’ and those who are too trusting or who fail 
to take advantage of outsiders are considered foolish (Korten and Korten, 1972: 
62; Young, 1998: 202).  
 
 
5.9 EVALUATIVE MECHANISMS 
 
This chapter has already noted that traditional associational structures strictly 
regulate the ‘performance’ of their members, and that psycho-social 
mechanisms regulate patterns of speech, and maintain consensus. Dissensus is 
politically and socially risky. This sub-section provides examples from the 
literature of more specific evaluative mechanisms. 
 
5.9.1 Informal Evaluatory Mechanisms 
 
Pratten describes iddir leaders (called ‘judges’) being elected on the basis of 
their popularity and being respected by the community, but still being 
accountable to the membership who are “entitled to replace any judge who 
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behaves improperly” (Pratten, 1997: 145). Leaders have to face iddir members 
on a daily basis, since they are neighbours (Poluha, 2002: 109). Members’ 
contributions are monitored and careful records kept, to ensure reciprocity is 
strictly observed (Korten and Korten, 1972: 100). Although ‘traditional’, the 
associations’ regulatory mechanisms have been described as evidence of 
‘modernity’ (Tirfe Mammo, 1999: 192)18, and Pratten regards it as a system 
which engenders trust so that the poor “can talk openly”  (Pratten 1997: 145).  
 
The practice of accountability is not ‘modern’. Even during the imperial regime, 
local people were able to dismiss the local headman (chĭqă shum) from office in 
cases of “flagrant misbehavior” (Levine, 1965a: 57-58), and peasants could 
appeal direct to Haile Selassie (Zewde,1991: 200). Although the literature 
suggests that customary practice offers only three options for dealing with 
authoritarian relationships: complete deference; covert criticism or rebellion 
(Korten and Korten, 1972: 81; Levine, 1965b: 280), discussion of leadership in 
5.4.1 suggests there were limits to deference. The combination of idil and 
mistrust may explain the apparent anomaly of publicly challenging the 
performance of authority figures.  
 
5.9.2 Formal Evaluatory Mechanisms 
 
The form of public examination was expanded during the Derg period, 
incorporating Maoist practice. The Derg itself organised Working People’s 
Control Committees to investigate economic malpractice and maladministration, 
publishing their reports in the press (Clapham, 1988: 113). Those among the 
Derg who disagreed with the leadership were “identified as ‘misguided’ [and] 
were required to confess their activities in public” (Mulatu and Yohannis, 1988: 
200). Public examination was further developed by the TPLF in Tigray and is 
continued under the EPRDF. The term used for this evaluative mechanism, 
‘gemgamma’19, translates as ‘evaluation’. After Tigray was liberated from the 
Derg, even judges’ decisions could be reviewed by the people and, if the judges 
were found negligent, they could be dismissed (Young, 1997a: 189-190). Young 
describes gemgamma as “potentially a powerful means of accountability” 
derived from various sources “including Maoism and the traditional means of 
                                               
18
  Muir refers to the penalties imposed by peers for non-compliance as “disciplinary 
support” (Muir, 2004: 21). 
19
  Spelling varies, but usually gemgamma in Amharic, gemgam in Tigrigna. 
Chapter 5:  Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions 
 176 
evaluation employed by Tigrayan elders”20,21 (Young, 1997b: 95). Ambivalence 
towards the practice is found elsewhere: “Advocates of the system argue that it 
encourages openness, reduces corruption and increases people’s motivation 
and performance. Critics point to the political control of the system and the way 
hearings are far from transparent, and often involve serious intimidation.” 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2000: 113-114). Pausewang describes gemgamma as “a 
regular ‘evaluation’ or critique/self-critique exercise, of office holders by those 
over whom they had administrative powers, [which] is again in theory a powerful 
tool of democratic accountability.” but more generally a tool of control used by 
party cadres (Pausewang et al., 2002b: 232). According to Gilkes, gemgamma 
“provides accountability and, in theory, offers democratic decision making, but 
often succumbs to the obvious danger of political control and manipulation and 
frequently becomes an abuse of human rights as in China under Mao.” (Gilkes, 
1999: 39).  
 
 
5.10 LOCAL v. INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS OF PARTICIPATION AND 
EVALUATION 
 
Under the NAA, donors expect that citizens of poor countries will want (and be 
able) to hold their governments to account by using CSOs as proxies to 
influence government policies and to monitor governments’ performance, and by 
voting in general elections. The literature presented here highlights the gap 
between this conception of the nature and role of participation and the reality of 
participation and evaluation in government-community, and inter-community, 
relations as described in the literature. Ethiopian institutions appear more 
stringent and demanding than those that donors advocate (and assume to be 
superior).  
 
The literature suggests that formal civil society organisations (CSOs or NGOs) in 
Ethiopia are not widely regarded as legitimate representatives by rural 
                                               
20
  Ethiopian researchers described gemgamma as culturally alien, because the subject 
“proclaimed his guilt voluntarily and in a ‘self-flagellatory manner’” (Vasko et al. (1998: 
35). 
21
 According to Gilkes, gemgamma: “provides accountability and, in theory, offers 
democratic decision making, but often succumbs to the obvious danger of political 
control and manipulation and frequently becomes an abuse of human rights as in China 
under Mao.” (Gilkes, 1999: 39). 
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communities. Rather, they regard the mass organisations and regional 
development associations as part of the government structure (and the 
organisations may regard themselves as attached to the government, either by 
structure, funding or allegiance). These CSOs have an outreach which extends 
down to the kebele level (village/sub-district). The other type, NGOs providing 
mainly welfare and rural development services, lack legitimacy because their 
outreach is low and they are unfamiliar to many rural communities. Key 
informant interviewees from civil society umbrella groups22 recognised both the 
weaknesses in Ethiopian civil society and the gap between donor rhetoric and 
likely outcomes. In-depth analyses by anthropologists and political scientists, 
which describe how government power is structured down to each kebele, were 
available to donors. These make clear the extent and embeddedness of 
government-community power relations but, without applying those analyses, 
donors risk overlooking the conceptual differences in the meaning and structure 
of civil society and rendering CSO participation as tokenistic. 
 
Donors’ assumptions of ‘agency’, taken for granted in advocacy of liberal 
democracy, appear in stark contrast to conceptions of leadership set out in this 
chapter. Strong, even authoritarian, leadership is regarded as valid but can be 
justifiably challenged if it fails to provide what it claims. However, the risk of 
failure of a challenge include humiliation, exclusion and sometimes retribution. 
These mechanisms are described in the literatures about each of the three 
regimes (Imperial, Derg and the EPRDF), and the political science and 
anthropological literatures describe the same mechanisms in local government-
community and inter-community relations. These mechanisms control individual 
agency, performance, behaviour and speech. Agency can be asserted through 
the use of, inter alia, reticence, excessive deference and veiled insult.  
 
Membership of a range of village-level associational structures is described in 
the literature as a ‘social obligation’ rather than a purely practical necessity to 
meet the religious and socio-economic demands of daily life. Membership 
cannot therefore be regarded as voluntaristic, in contrast to Western concepts of 
agency in civil society and voluntary organisations. Whereas in the West the 
level of participation in membership associations is assumed to be optional, 
participation is closely regulated by fellow members with the intention of keeping 
                                               
22
  See 4.3.5. 
Chapter 5:  Ethiopia: Culture and Institutions 
 178 
the individual included within the collectivity. This is done through the clear 
setting-out of rules and regulations and the sanctions imposed if they are not 
kept. Participation levels are thus maintained by both self-regulation and peer 
pressure. 
 
Farmers and their families are therefore subject to constant informal and semi-
formal  monitoring by their peers via ‘obligatory’ associational membership. The 
gemgamma process also subjects local government officials to public 
examination, ostensibly by farmers as well as their superiors, on a regular basis. 
While there are some superficial similarities between the critiques of both 
gemgamma and donor evaluation methods, for example that they are both tools 
of control, that participation by local people is tokenistic, and that there is an 
over-reliance on quantitative measures of performance, there are some stark 
differences which highlight the nature of governance in Ethiopia and the fluidity 
of the concept of evaluation in aid discourse.  
 
One marked difference is that Ethiopian forms of evaluation are very regular, 
whereas donor evaluation is sporadic. Formerly linked to (usually) two 
milestones in a project’s lifecycle, evaluation of programme modality is likely to 
be episodic and thematic, if it is done at all. Under the NAA, donor assessment 
of government performance is based on PRSP targets. In Ethiopia, evaluation of 
government officials is linked to quotas fulfilled, rather than targets, and is 
therefore based on individual performance. This concept of accountability holds 
the individual responsible, whereas accountability in donor evaluation is linked to 
the effectiveness of a policy or process. A further significant difference in the two 
forms of evaluation are that the Ethiopian form is carried out in public, in front of 
peers as well as supervisors. The results are announced immediately and 
publicly This confirms the cross-cultural literature which suggests that public 
shame is used as a regulatory mechanism in collectivist societies. Evaluation of 
performance in aid, and more generally in the West, individual responsibility is 
rarely ascribed, and certainly not publically. The results of aid evaluations, 
though largely available via the internet, are not disseminated widely and rarely 
to the targeted population.  
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CHAPTER 6 
PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION IN GOVERNMENT-COMMUNITY 





Following the description of Ethiopian history, identity and political systems in 
Chapter 4, and an exploration of cooperative activity and regulation in 
association life in Chapter 5, this chapter presents the findings from semi-
structured interviews1 with respondents in Tigray and Amhara, held to elicit their 
perceptions and practice of participation, particularly in evaluation. My 
respondents included farmers, local leaders, professional government 
employees and government officials working within the regional structure. I 
made no attempt to ‘sample’ respondents formally, nor to select rigorously on 
specific criteria but, in each got/kushet visited, I aimed to interview five people, 
hoping to include a female household-head, a leader and at least two farmers 
categorised as ‘poor’ by the DAs. In practice, the differentiation between the 
categories of ‘leader’ and ‘poor farmer’ was often unclear, as farmers can fall 
into both categories. I also interviewed the DAs, other young professionals and 
more senior government officials.  
 
Access to community respondents was gained via DAs and therefore the 
majority of the responses relate to government-community participation and 
evaluation in the rural development sector which, in Ethiopia, covers agriculture 
and natural resource management.2 Respondents’ anonymity is preserved by 
not identifying specific locations, names or job titles. From the Methodology 
chapter, it is transparent that the woredas selected in Tigray were three (of four) 
designated for detailed monitoring and evaluation under DCI’s regional 
programme. Border tension with Eritrea later restricted community fieldwork to 
two woredas. Sida’s programme in Amhara covered two zones, and the 
research was undertaken in East Gojjam; the three woredas visited are not 
identified here. CIDA did not have regional programmes but findings from their 
technical assistance projects are included in Chapter 7. The semi-structured 
                                               
1
  See Annex B. 
2
  Chapter 3 (Methodology) explained how regions, woredas, kebeles and sub-kebele 
units were selected, how access was negotiated and how individual respondents were 
identified. 
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interview questions around which the interviews were constructed are provided 
in Annex B. Maps of the regions can be found in Annex C. 
 
The data is organised in three sections. In 6.2, I explain the administrative 
micro-structure which organises households into small groups, and then present 
brief ‘portraits’ of my respondents, which provide some contextual background 
both to 6.3 and 6.4, which summarise respondents’ comments about 
participation and evaluation respectively. Reference is also made to two 
qualitative surveys completed in 2005: the Ethiopian Government’s Participatory 
Poverty Assessment and the CRC survey carried out on behalf of the NGO 
umbrella group, Poverty Action Network, Ethiopia (PAN/E).  
 
For comparative purposes, 6.5 offers a very brief overview of some of the 
similarities noted between political and social institutions in Ethiopia, Tanzania 
and Vietnam; these other two multi-ethnic countries have a political history of 
socialist, one-party government, in which donors are applying the NAA. I pursue 
the analysis to locate recurring themes which are identified later, in Chapter 7, 






6.2.1 The Government/Community Nexus 
 
It was not possible to draw a clear contrast between government and community 
structures, because of the overlap and integration between them. Donor 
documentation tends to describe the formal administrative structure down to the 
level of kebele, but, under the EPRDF, government extends beyond the formal 
structure: below the kebele and its sub-division, the got, there is an extensive 
network organising households into small groups. The extent of this structure 
only became apparent to me during community interviews. The lowest level (a 
‘cell’, consisting of five households) is a recent administrative introduction, 
although the EPRDF has always had an extensive network of political cadres. 
One householder is selected from each cell, as its leader. Six cells are grouped 
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together as a ‘development group’ (or mengistawi buden, in Amhara)3, each with 
a total of 30 households. One of the six cell leaders is selected as leader of the 
development group. I was told that the leaders were chosen by election but that 
the selection had to be approved by the DA.4 The structure is set out 
diagrammatically in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Formal and Informal Administrative Structure 
 
In parallel with the administrative and party structures, mass organisations are a 
further layer of influence operating at the government-community nexus. 
Attitudes towards, and membership of, the Farmers’ and Women’s Associations 
varied within and across the two regions. In Tigray, membership of the Farmers’ 
Association was widespread: one farmer said that he could not even consider 
not belonging (T25), another said ‘everyone does’. While individuals would not 
experience any problems if they did not belong (T24), there were reports that 
non-membership of the Farmers’ Association could prevent access to Food for 
                                               
3
  The PPA uses the terms gare for 30 household groups, and dado for five household 
groups (PPA, 2005: 45). 
4
  The introduction of the ‘cell’ structure was not consistent. In Tigray, model farmers 
were effectively cell leaders. One development group in Tigray was structured more like 
an association, with a head, vice-head, a secretary and three model farmers. 
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Work5. Membership could also be a conduit to resources: a landless farmer 
belonged because he hoped that it would mean that his application would be 
considered more favourably when the woreda next distributed land (T5). Most of 
the local leaders belonged to the Farmers Association, though this was less 
consistent in Amhara, and the Association did not have branches in all kebeles.  
 
6.2.2 Female Heads of Household 
 
I interviewed seven women in Tigray6 and six in Amhara7. Although the 
‘category’ was supposed to be ‘female heads of households’, in practice it 
included four married women as well as two divorcees, six widows and one 
woman who had never married but had three children. There was no 
straightforward ‘gendered’ or status-linked explication of women’s ability to make 
their opinions known. Two of the women from Amhara told me that they have 
been ordered to come and speak to me; one was escorted by a local official and 
a member of the militia (A3, A20). The two professional women interviewed felt 
their opinions were not listened to in community meetings, despite being well-
educated (to diploma level). They thought this was either because their 
audience were male farmers (T16), or because community norms meant the 
opinions of educated women were not valued (A9).  
 
Other women did feel empowered to speak up. Age and lack of education did 
not deter any of the Tigrean women from discussing with me their views about 
participation in public meetings and evaluations, but some Amhara respondents 
expressed reluctance to answer questions saying: “I don’t know what it 
[participation] is, because I’m just an illiterate farmer” (A11); “I know nothing, 
there’s no point in asking me any questions” (A3, elderly woman). She preferred 
not to participate in anything, did not belong to any community associations but 
only went to the church to pray. She suffered stigma as a result of having been 
an official under the Derg, but this was not applied to her daughter, who had a 
responsible role demonstrating water point management (A3). 
 
                                               
5
  The WIDE data provided an example of a female household head who said she was 
denied Food For Work because she was not a member of the Association. 
6
  T3, T8, T9, T13, T18, T20, T23. 
7
  A3, A11, A15, A20, A24, A30 
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There was very little variation in the ranking of the ‘factors of influence’ among 
female respondents8. The most important influence in their lives was God. Only 
one woman thought she herself had more control over her life than the 
government hierarchy and she also thought that community life was more 
influential in her life than the government. The response of a young professional 
suggested she had a weaker sense of agency than the other respondents. She 
ranked community as more influential in her life than her self. As a single person 
and not part of a household, she was unable to join any community 
associations9. Among the community respondents, Tigrean women were more 
likely to belong to one or more mahebers, whereas Amhara women were more 




Although I did not seek out to interview priests as a category, fortuitously I was 
introduced to two priests, one in Tigray (T4) and one in Amhara (A7). Their 
responses were remarkably similar. Because the villages had been selected by 
the DAs, the priests’ responses cannot be assumed to be representative of 
priests in either region but may be indicative of priest-community-government 
relations in villages which are geographically and strategically close to local 
government centres. 
 
Both priests were party members, but the one in Tigray was more actively 
involved in government activities than his Amhara counterpart. The Tigrean 
priest belonged to the Farmers Association, was a member of the militia, a 
model farmer responsible for 15 others, and was currently recruiting soldiers to 
meet the ‘political crisis’ in Addis (the post-election violence) and the concurrent 
border crisis with Eritrea. The only community association he belonged to was a 
maheber. The Amhara priest belonged to a maheber and a senebete and took 
his turn preparing feasts for both. He was also a member of the shimageles10. 
He had previously been a member of the kebele but was now more involved in 
the church administrative hierarchy, representing the kebele at the woreda 
church committee. As a member of the kebele church committee, he could be 
                                               
8
   See Methodology, 3.4.5, for a description of ‘factors of influence’ ranking exercise. 
9
  Unlike her male single colleagues, she could not travel into town to eat in restaurants 
so she cooked and ate alone. 
10
  Council of Elders. 
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asked to deal with issues at got level on behalf of the woreda. He was also 
engaged in training against harmful traditional practices and HIV/AIDS; he had 
been trained in irrigation and was now training model farmers himself. 
 
In these (and other) locations, government meetings were held outside the 
church on Sundays and the local form of evaluation (gemgamma) were held on 
holy days - Selassie on 7th of the month, Marriam (St. Mary) on the 21st, or Bäal 
Egziabher (Holy Day of God) on the 29th of the month, Ethiopian calendar11. 
Both priests gave the same reason for the reduction in the number of non-
working holy days: “under pressure from the government” (A7), government 
meetings take precedence over religious commitments because “you can’t live 
without the government here” (T4). Both gave poverty as the justification for this 
but, whereas the Tigrean priest said that government was teaching them that 
they could not rely on aid and should produce their own food (T4), the Amharan 
rationalised the reduction by saying that “gemgamma is not considered work” 
and that, in any case, “all the days in the year are holy days in the EOC”. He 
also qualified it by saying that, if gemgamma were not held on holy days, 




It became clear during the interviews that local leaders were not a separate 
category from poor farmers; nearly all of them were categorised as ‘poor’, 
whether leaders or not. Wealth classification was a matter of perception: a 
farmer classified as ‘poor’ by the DA described himself as a ‘middle’ and another 
farmer, classified as ‘rich’, described himself as ‘middle’. Most farmers had one 
ox and had a reciprocal arrangement with another to get a pair of oxen for 
ploughing. In Tigray the majority of farmers interviewed held 0.5 ha of land, and 
in Amhara the range was greater, from 0.75 ha to 2 ha. Not all farmers 
interviewed had land; some who had worked for the Derg had had land taken 
away when the EPRDF came to power.  
 
In contrast to the female respondents who could withdraw by claiming lack of 
education, marriage or religious commitments, the male farmers had fewer 
opportunities not to ‘participate’. In Tigray in particular, their forums were directly 
                                               
11
  Ethiopia follows a 13 month Julian calendar.  
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or indirectly political. The community-level fieldwork coincided with the second 
period when opposition in the main urban centres was suppressed by 
government forces after the election. There was more overt tension in Amhara, 
and a reported recent increase in beatings and harassment was linked by 
respondents to peri-electoral conflict (A27). My questions were intended to elicit 
usual practice, rather than recent political events, and farmers’ responses in 
both Tigray and Amhara (see 6.3 and 6.4) revealed an apparently structural 
tension related to the political hierarchy. 
 
When asked to rank a range of factors affecting their lives, for better or worse, in 
terms of influence, most - but not all - farmers in both Tigray and Amhara said 
that God was the most influential factor for their future success. Marginally more 
ranked government (second) above their own agency. Community was ranked 
fourth, although a minority ranked idil (chance) as more influential than the 
community. The PPA also included a ranking exercise of the importance of 
“institutions”, which appear to be a list of physical or technical resources 
theoretically available to citizens (EPPA, 2005: 40). While there was some 
overlap between the list of institutions and the list of factors ranked by my 
respondents12, there was little correlation: non-religious associations and sub-
kebele structures were ranked highly in the PPA exercise, but were not rated 
highly in terms of influence by my respondents.  
 
In Tigray, iddir were discouraged by the government as the cause of 
unnecessary expense. Perhaps because of this, Tigrean farmers tended to 
belong to several mahebers; some respondents ‘had’ three. Mourning 
arrangements there were now more informal and no longer standardised. The 
pattern in Amhara was for farmers to belong to an iddir and a maheber, and 
often a senbete. Some farmers in both Tigray and Amhara also had a ‘lot’ in an 
equb. 
 
6.2.5 Local Leaders 
 
As a result of the overlap in status and identity between ‘farmer’ and ‘local 
leader’, I interviewed more local leaders that I had planned: one cell leader, six 
                                               
12
  The exercise which I carried out asked respondents to rank factors according to their 
importance in affecting respondents’ ability to make a success of their lives, however 
they defined ‘success’. The list is included in Annex B.   
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mengistawi buden (development group) leaders and three cell leaders in 
Amhara; in Tigray, three model farmers were interviewed and two development 
group leaders. In Tigray, model farmers have the ‘full’ extension package, which 
might include tree seedlings, fertiliser, ponds, bees, poultry and vegetables. In 
Amhara, a demonstration farmer might grow vegetables and have bees, but 
leaders were not necessarily demonstration farmers. Some of the Tigrean 
leaders described themselves as ‘ex-fighters’ from the overthrow of the Derg. 
 
Apart from administrative duties such as collecting statistics and taxes, local 
leaders in Amhara appeared to have a parental and authoritarian role. Their 
responsibilities included: listening to and solving problems, settling quarrels, 
making announcements, controlling security (A1), including ordering the arrest 
of miscreants (A29, A8). In Tigray, development group leaders were described 
by one respondent as the lowest level of government (T15), but they did not 
appear to have the same importance in the community structure as mengistawi 
buden leaders in Amhara. One senior official interviewed later said that 
development group leaders’ role had been downplayed in the Safety Net 
programme because they tended to influence the distribution of the household 
packages by misrepresenting the needs of the group members.  
 
The criterion for selection of model farmers in Tigray was their adoption of ‘the 
full package’ of innovations recommended by the DA (T10, T17, T22). 
Influential, or ‘big’, model farmers, were distinguished as those who could 
express their ideas and who were enthusiastic about the Government (T10). In 
Amhara, selection of local leaders was more explicitly to do with personal 
qualities and interpersonal skills. Cell leaders were expected to be reliable, have 
a good relationship with the kebele, be willing to work for the community, 
physically able, and have a good rapport with his five fellow farmers (A14, A22); 
to be honest, hardworking and have some education (A22). Leaders were not 
necessarily political (A14), and in Amhara there had been considerable support 
for the opposition CUD in the election. One mengistawi buden leader said that 
political affiliation was not important, and it was better not to be affiliated to a 
party (A13)13. Personal qualities required included being recognised as being 
peaceable and knowledgeable by other householders; being a good organiser, 
                                               
13
  It should be remembered that the fieldwork was carried out in the summer and 
autumn of 2005, when there was post-election violence in urban areas.  
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being of good behaviour (A23), being willing to work with the people, to lead by 
doing (A25). Gaining people’s cooperation, however, was linked to the 
organisation of communal work. What appeared to be paternal interest was 
linked to firm control. One of the mengistawi buden leaders said: “I am also strict 
to control people and I know who attends and who doesn’t” (A4). If they are 
going to be absent without good reason, he expects them to make up their 
contribution by undertaking additional development activities (A4). 
 
Some leaders also belonged to the Party, and most, but not all, said that they 
supported it. Membership of several traditional associations was commonplace, 
with mahebers being the most popular. In the ‘factors of influence’ exercise, all 
those who took part ranked God as their greatest influence. The majority ranked 
government second, themselves third, idil fourth and the community fifth.  
 
6.2.6 Young Professionals  
 
Ethiopia’s development strategies include a rapid increase in the training and 
installation of young professionals in civil service posts across the country. In 
Amhara and Tigray, government policy was to install at least two DAs and two 
teachers in each kebele/tabia. Fourteen young professionals were interviewed: 
five DAs and two junior government officials in Tigray, and six DAs and a 
teacher in Amhara. Minimum educational standards are being upgraded for new 
appointments to government posts, in accordance with civil service reform 
programmes, so that most are diploma holders and some appointees to 
government posts are young graduates. In contrast to woreda officials already in 
post, many of whom were appointed for their political skills (though who may 
now be offered formal qualifications through distance learning), most of the 
young professionals I interviewed had either received training in urban centres 
away from their rural placements, thus being exposed to urban lifestyles, or had 
been born and educated in urban centres and appointed to work in rural 
woredas.  
 
Remoteness made their postings difficult. The road network is more extensive in 
Amhara than in Tigray, but not all woreda towns are linked to metalled roads, 
and few kebele/tabia can be accessed by road14. One day I met two teachers 
                                               
14
  Equally, some woreda towns had no telephone or electricity. 
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who had walked for 12 and 15 hours to reach the woreda town, hoping to hitch a 
lift (there being no regular transport) to the nearest town which had electricity, 
for a night out. They joked that, for them, this trip was ‘like going to Paris’. One 
young government official (T38), raised and educated to diploma level in the 
regional capital, could not afford to go to such a town very often. His 
entertainment was limited to listening to the radio or paying three birr15 an hour 
to watch television in a house where there was a generator. As a single man, he 
was unable to join any of the community associations such as a maheber or an 
iddir16. He feared getting so lonely that he would resort to marrying a local girl 
and then have to remain in the woreda indefinitely. Social restrictions on young 
professionals seconded to rural woredas, from homes and colleges in the main 
urban centres, meant that there were few people to whom they could express 
their personal opinions. The existence of road links, and hence the opportunity 
to visit one’s family on a regular basis, made life tolerable (A8, T36). 
 
Many of the young professionals interviewed said that they wanted to leave their 
jobs but were unable to do so. Firstly, without access to telephone, electricity 
and a road network, it was very difficult to find out what vacancies existed. One 
young graduate (T45) intended to spend his annual holiday trying to find out 
which woredas had good infrastructure before applying for a new job. If they left 
their jobs without consent, young professionals would be barred from 
employment elsewhere within the woreda and, without a letter of 
recommendation from their sectoral head, there would be no opportunities for 
employment in other woredas. Two DAs told me that, if they had refused to take 
up posts they had been assigned by the woreda, then they would have been 
liable for a heavy fine which would have been deducted from any salary they 
subsequently obtained (A18).  
 
One way of changing jobs is via training, but there were few opportunities. 
Though each DA is trained in a different specialism, it is government policy for 
them to work as generalists and they have little access to post-qualification 
training (A10). Funding for distance learning was formerly allocated to political 
appointees, but it is now open to competition by applicants who are less than 33 
years old (T45). However, competition was tough (only 4% of DAs are funded 
                                               
15
  His monthly salary was 600 birr (US$1 = ETB 8.6) 
16
  In contrast, married officials had greater social status as head of their own 
households and therefore able to join community associations. 
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for degrees by distance learning), and training is expensive (the cost of degrees 
was the equivalent of approximately three and a half year’s salary (A18).  
 
Several respondents were critical of donors, believing they concentrated on their 
own priorities, not on the problems experienced by Ethiopian society (T36). 
Young professionals also thought donors took too much at face-value, relying 
uncritically on information provided by the woreda officials. There were 
comments about the use of ‘showcase’ kebeles, accessible by four-wheel drive 
vehicles. A senior woreda official, questioning his juniors in front of me about 
which kebele I should visit, several times included the English phrase “creating 
the right impression”.  
 
The literature on Ethiopia and decentralisation provides examples of the use of 
DAs to carry out political tasks at the expense of their extension work. Because 
local administration is so intertwined with political (party) structures, it is difficult 
to disentangle professional from political duties. Political duties appeared to be 
more contentious in Amhara. I heard that two DAs had been ‘punished’ for 
having supported the opposition coalition during the recent elections by being 
transferred from a semi-urban location to a remote rural kebele. Elsewhere in 
Amhara I was told that ‘political’ duties were a matter of personal conviction; the 
DAs said they could choose to get involved in political work or they could confine 
themselves to their professional work. In one kebele, the DAs said that they had 
successfully convinced the local community that the mengistawi buden and cell 
leaders were not political appointees. Whether they were active supporters of 
the government or not, the young professionals remained dependent on party 
support for the advancement of their careers; the more senior the job, the 
greater the political influence. Being critical of the government did not 
necessarily mean that young professionals were critical of its institutions and 
structures; one DA, the son of a mengistawi buden leader, was confident of his 
own role and his ability to control the leaders for which he was responsible 
(A10). 
 
In the ‘factors of influence’ ranking, there was no consistent pattern in the young 
professionals’ responses. Of those who completed the ranking, there were 
marginally more who said God had greater influence on their lives than 
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themselves17. They ranked the government as less or least influential. Despite 
their unhappiness with their career trajectory, DAs’ ‘factors of influence’ ranking 
and their comments in discussion suggest they attach far greater value to 
autonomy than that suggested by the farmers’ ranking exercise. 
 
6.2.7 Older Government Officials 
 
Senior government staff, particularly those working at regional level, had 
different layers of understanding ‘participation’ and ‘evaluation’ depending on the 
mode of discussion. This would depend on degree of formality or 
discursiveness, whether they were speaking as a politician, a government 
officer, as an individual or as a donor partner. Sometimes the layers were 
enmeshed by internal contradictions or were peeled away by deepening 
discussion. The discussions showed that these government officials were clearly 
aware that participation was interpreted differently by the community, and 
understood the reasons for this. Despite this, senior officials’ descriptions of the 
current practice of participation and evaluation were broadly similar to those of 
junior government staff and farmers. 
 
The respondents18 who answered questions more confidently tended to be 
those who had been in post for many years, had witnessed changes of 
administrative approach and had a degree of professional specialisation. These 
respondents talked more openly with me about the political and cultural 
influences which affected participation. A few described their positions as 
political appointees; others were described as ‘ex-fighters’ by junior colleagues, 
and any appointment was assumed by junior colleagues to be restricted to those 
who supported the EPRDF. Among the senior officials, those who worked in the 
health and education sectors gave far more discursive answers in the discussion 
of different forms of participation, describing the catalysts and barriers to 
communication among different sections of the community.  
 
Despite recent emphasis on educational qualifications as criteria for 
appointment, most older government officials were ‘qualified’ in more 
traditionally acceptable ways, in formal and informal political skills. One recently 
                                               
17
  Two had been street children and described the NGO which had rescued them as the 
most influential factor in their lives. 
18
  Twenty-two government officials were interviewed. 
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appointed man felt unable to answer any questions, despite being a graduate, 
and deferred to his (retired) predecessor who had been an experienced fighter 
in the overthrow of the Derg and had been rewarded for his oratorical 
(mobilising) skills. Another, despite being better qualified than his colleagues 
and his seniors, spoke very quietly and deferentially. Political status appeared 
contentious in the current process of civil service reform. On the one hand, lack 
of educational qualifications meant senior officials could be required to go back 
to the classroom in order to continue their careers (as was the case with a 
number of the respondents in this category). On the other, political appointees 
could have no security of tenure if there was a change of government (A37)19.  
 
Among the more senior staff I interviewed, two additional, related issues came 
out in discussion. High turnover, with loss of staff to the private and NGO 
sectors20, was a great concern; loss of trained staff and lack of stability meant 
that it was difficult to introduce systems such as [Western-style] M&E. High 
turnover was ascribed to the inadequate infrastructure and to organisational 
change through decentralisation (A34, A35, T41). Poor infrastructure meant that 
government officials were unwilling to work in woredas without regular transport 
links, electricity or telephones, let alone to visit remote kebeles, likely to entail 
walking or travelling by donkey for many hours and then to stay overnight in one 
of the village houses. Decentralisation had increased the problem of 
understaffing; instead of technical experts being based at the zonal 
administrative level, decentralisation required replication of technical expertise in 
every woreda. Frequent restructuring also contributed to high turnover through 
promotion. 
 
For several very senior staff, all of whom I was told had been ‘fighters’ in the 
overthrow of the Derg, the problem of high turnover was associated with lack of 
dedication. They thought that a good nationalist was prepared to make 
sacrifices, rather than regard a government job as a stepping stone to getting a 
Masters degree. A senior government official saw the government’s role in 
development as promoting the idea of “save your country”, a role in which “some 
                                               
19
  This statement made by a regional official which took place soon after the election, 
when his responses were discursive and reflective. He declined to meet me again during 
my second visit five months later, the week after the government reasserted its control 
by force. 
20
  Higher education also played a role in high turnover; after three years’ employment, 
government staff became eligible for funded university degrees. 
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of us have to lead” (T41). This required self-denial and setting an example to 
government colleagues (T41, T44).21  
 
The small number with whom I had the opportunity22 to do the exercise ranking 
‘factors of influence’, affecting their lives for better or worse, indicated that the 
government was relatively less influential in their lives: the average ranking was 
God, themselves, idil, community and then government. The older government 
officials seem to experience a sense of autonomy from the government, despite 
their apparent dependence on it for their career. 
 
Senior government staff were the one category of respondents to have contact 
with donor staff. The experience had shown them that different nationalities 
within the donor community had varying approaches to work, and this affected 
the way that donors and government worked together. The World Bank was 
considered more legalistic in its approach than others (A34). The Germans are 
“aggressive” but thorough (A37): GTZ would ‘look into every detail’ (A34). SIDA 
was admired because it allowed the government to ‘own the programme’, 
although it was ‘not owned by the people’ (A34). Some government officials 
thought donors had a responsibility to intervene to “identify bottlenecks” in the 
government’s system (A35).  
 
 




The semi-structured interview questions were designed to elicit what 
respondents understood by ‘participation’, and also to explore the opportunities 
for participation as conceptualised in development discourse, particularly 
empowerment through the exercise of ‘voice’ and ‘agency’. The analysis 
identifies themes of congruence and disjuncture which are followed through in 
Chapter 7, the responses from donor interviews. 
 
                                               
21
 Messay writes that Leninism, like Calvinism, emphasises strict discipline, so that in 
Leninism “the members of the vanguard party … form an elite with a high moral calibre” 
(Messay, 1994: 205). 
22
  This technique was only used where circumstances (suitable location, sufficient time) 
allowed. 
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Respondents described two types of participation: participating through the 
‘contribution’ of labour, and participating in meetings directly or indirect ly 
organised by the government, and this section follows that pattern. Sub-section 
6.3.2 sets out respondents’ comments about contribution of labour, the risks 
associated with non-participation and the sanctions used to ensure participation, 
and discusses these in terms of individual and collective activity; participation as 
common-pool resource and the role of voluntarism. Turning to participation in 
meetings, 6.3.3 focuses on the social and political ascriptions given to this form 
of participation, on patterns of communication, methods of resistance and 
sanctions for non-participation.  
 
6.3.2 Participation as “Contribution of Labour” 
 
For all respondents, the primary meaning of participation was the provision or 
‘contribution’ of unpaid labour (and sometimes materials). They viewed the 
contribution of labour as compulsory (although the well-off could contribute 
money instead). The amount of contribution required was precisely defined: in 
Tigray it was 21 or 22 days a year, and a similar amount was required in 
Amhara, although expressed differently as one day in fifteen, or two days per 
month. Contribution of labour for ‘development activities’ was most likely to be 
announced to the community at meetings after church services on Sundays, by 
the DA or someone from woreda headquarters, and then put into practice by the 
DA giving instructions to the leaders of 30 households, who then gave 
instructions to the leaders of five households to mobilise the able-bodied in their 
cell or group23. Labour would be used for soil and water conservation, building 
bunds and planting trees, but might also be used rural road construction, 
building water points or constructing buildings such as a health clinic or school. 
The contributions would be ‘managed’ through (i) implementation via this 
hierarchical structure, (ii) the use or threat of sanctions, and (iii) evaluation.  
 
The descriptions, both of participation and the sanctions for non-participation, 
were remarkably consistent. Participation means doing what they are told by 
local leaders (A15, A4, A6, T22). In some interviews, doing exactly what was 
ordered by local leaders was proclaimed with pride, as evidence of the 
individual’s support for the government (A15). Farmers said that everyone 
                                               
23
 The division of the groups was less structured in Tigray than in Amhara. 
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participates otherwise they would be fined, or, expressed differently, because 
people know sanctions would be forthcoming, everyone participates. The 
possibility of non-participation was clearly real, however, because of the 
explicitness of the sanctions. 
 
At the time of the fieldwork, punishments for non-participation in development 
activities in Amhara appeared to be suffused with political tension: “If they refuse 
[to participate] repeatedly, we assume they have other missions, for example 
against the government24, so we follow them to see what they do and who they 
talk to. If they continue we take them to the social court and they may get three 
months’ imprisonment” (A16). This statement was made by a farmer classified 
by the DA as ‘poor’, not a local leader, although he may have been part of the 
party cadre.  
 
Even though a Party supporter who had been an ‘election observer’ said “It is 
bad if people are unwilling to take orders” (A16), a broad range of farmers, 
including those who supported the opposition coalition, were also critical of 
those who did not participate. Although a few farmers said that non-participation 
was due to engagement in other activities such as ‘thieving or killing people’ 
(A27), or engaging in anti-government activities (A31), the majority of 
respondents attributed non-participation to lack of knowledge, labels ranging 
from ‘being uneducated’ (A26), ‘being against new ideas’ (A33), to failing to 
respond to ‘persuasion’ (T24). Persuasion seemed to be the more common tool 
to effect participation in Tigray than in Amhara, where more of the respondents 
talked about fines and imprisonment.25 Reports of a two-tier system of 
punishments for failure to participate were common: first a fine, then, for 
repeated offences, imprisonment (A16, A26, A27, A31, A32). 
 
Local leaders’ interventions also appeared to differ, with withdrawal of resources 
more common in Tigray:  
 
                                               
24
 The PPA also notes that respondents feared that being critical of the administration 
would result in being labelled a supporter of the Opposition (PPA, 2005: 44). 
25
 The range of sanctions described by ordinary farmers included fines of between three 
and five birr, additional labour, and imprisonment. 
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“Someone who does not participate is assumed ‘not to be ours’ and is 
denied Food for Work and other development activities by the 
government” (model farmer, T10)26. 
 
In Amhara, the intervention appears to be more personal:  
 
“The cell leaders give me the names of people who do not participate. I 
go and ask their neighbours whether the person has a good reason not 
to attend.” He described himself as “strict to control people and I know 
who attends and who doesn’t.”  He had never known anyone miss more 
than one day. (mengistawi buden, A4). 
 
Some local leaders were anxious to emphasise that no force or punishment was 
applied to those who did not participate in contribution of labour. Examples of 
comments they made include: 
 
“We have nothing to do with them, only teach them until they do respond. 
If they still do not participate, now there’s no punishment; before they 
were fined.” (A1). 
 
“No force is used to make them participate but we teach them repeatedly 
and after that we leave them alone. These days we are emphasising on 
people’s rights and don’t force them.” (A6). 
 
“We always try to raise their awareness, we don’t pressure them or fine 
them or order other people to erase them, we just teach them.” (A8). 
 
Although these comments are clearly framed by those respondents as evidence 
of a ‘modern’ approach, these texts reveal the continuation of traditional forms of 
influence - persuasion, the threat of social exclusion, or even violence. The 
comments below demonstrate how government-organised activities can overlap 
with, and impinge on, informal associational structures, with failure to participate 
ultimately being enforced via the individual’s exclusion from their burial 
association (iddir) or religious association (maheber): 
                                               
26
  The WIDE data also provided an example of a female household head who said she 
was denied Food For Work because she was not a member of the Women’s 
Association. 
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“Non-participation is rare; they may be punished by a fine of three birr by 
the iddir; if they repeatedly do not participate they may be excluded from 
the iddir for a period.” (A13). 
 
“The leaders will repeatedly try to convince them, and if they still don’t 
participate they will be sent to the social court for advice, or eventually 
excommunicated from the iddir and the maheber.” (A14). 
 
A further form of ‘punishment’ was the withdrawal of support from the DAs, the 
the conveyors of new agricultural technologies to ‘progressive’ farmers who 
teach others by example.27 DAs considered participation crucial: “if they won’t 
participate, there won’t be any development” (T12). Most model farmers accept 
his advice, a DA told me; a few do not, and “cause trouble” (T21). Other DAs 
described participation is ‘voluntary’ but the other farmers will try and influence 
non-participants; if they still refuse, “there is no punishment, but visits by the DA 
would cease” (A18).  
 
While government officials thought participation could take a number of forms, 
they acknowledged that the community level understanding of ‘participation’ was 
the contribution of labour, though some said labour and ‘ideas’. The officials 
knew that penalties were imposed: someone who does not participate will “lose 
his economic and social rights” (T31), but another said that the sanctions (a fine, 
and additional labour for repeat non-attendance) were rarely applied, unlike the 
iddirs where punishment is “absolute” (A38)28. The officials tended to have a 
more cynical view of participation than the local leaders. One explained that 
people knew the recent pond campaign29 was impractical but were coerced into 
participating (T32), but with development activities which were considered 
useful, such as water points and roads, farmers were more likely to participate 
willingly (A38). Government officials were now also being asked to make 
contributions, but a senior official could contribute money in lieu of labour (A37). 
Another laughed incredulously at the idea of his making a contribution; he 
agreed with the rural community, that ‘participation’ meant labour, money and 
                                               
27 “Extension agents pay little attention to farmers who do not participate in PADETES” 
(Kassa and Degnet, 2004: 155) 
28
  The social implications of exclusion from iddir are described in 5.7.3. 
29
  This was a central government campaign to build 70,000 ponds across the country, 
regardless of the suitability of location or design. 
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contribution of ideas, but his own contribution was to do budget planning with 
colleagues (T43).  
 
Participation is built into the formal administrative structure through the Bureaux 
of Popular Participation. When I asked a government official whether this was 
used for mobilisation for development and for political purposes, he initially said 
that the community could distinguish them apart, but then said there was no 
clear demarcation between the two (A36).  
 
The Tigrean Regional Government’s Manual for Community Participation 
provides an insight into how participation is presented under Revolutionary 
Democratic ideology, as a voluntary synthesis between state and citizens. The 
manual is primarily a list of exhortatory statements from members of rural 
communities extolling the benefits of participating in government-directed 
development and extension activities. These small ‘stories of success’ describe 
how tabia leaders go to the kushets to convince the communities of the benefits 
of participation: “The peasants from individual up to group have decided 
together and are implementing that are made on development [digging wells] 
with full ownership spirit of the peasants, to eradicate poverty” (Box 7), but 
“those who transgress the collective decisions” are sent to the social court to 
ensure that they abide by the community rules (Box 8); “The leadership bodies 
are beneficiaries of the irrigation like the community so what they express in the 
community’s ideas and interests. The community has self-confidence so they 
express their ideas to their leaders freely and openly. They do not irrigate with 
leadership bodies pressure rather they explain that it is within their own good 
will” (Box 8). 
 
The Ethiopian government was able to present development to farmers as a 
‘national project’, “so that we no longer have to be dependent on foreigners”30, a 
coherent message which resonates with the concept of habesha as the in-
group, and foreigners as the out-group. There also appeared, in the way that 
non-participation was discussed, to be a sense that failure of one person to 
participate impacted negatively on the rest of the community. This was not 
expressed as annoyance that one person was able to avoid contributing any 
labour, as might be the Western reaction, rather that the community suffered 
                                               
30
  Quotation from an interview with a farmer. 
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from the lack of that person’s contribution. “Working together for development, 
everybody participates” (T24). This positions labour contribution as a group 
activity contributing to development as a common-pool resource. In the recurring 
theme of suppressing individualistic behaviour for the ‘greater good’ of the 
community, this concurs with the argument that, in collectivist societies, joint 
effort is regarded as “the only feasible way to bring about change” (Sagie and 
Aycan, 2003: 457).  
 
Evidence of scepticism among (some) government officers about the role of 
coercion, placed alongside the apparent acceptance of labour contribution by 
poor farmers as well as local leaders, suggests that a simplistic interpretation 
that poses a coercive state in opposition to a suppressed rural population would 
be incorrect. Firstly, the ‘contribution’ of labour is accepted legally: Prohibition 
against Inhuman Treatment, Article 18 of the Ethiopian Constitution 1995, 
precludes forced or compulsory labour except “any economic and social 
development activity voluntarily performed by a community within its locality”. 
Secondly, given that corvée labour was required under the Imperial regime, and 
forced labour was a characteristic of the Derg, the reinterpretation of labour 
contribution as public spiritedness or community or - pace Putnam - social 
capital under the EPRDF regime demonstrates both continuity with the previous 
regimes and change in rhetoric. 
 
The use of forced labour is alien to Western values, although development 
strategies other than the NAA encourage ‘voluntary’ labour contribution31 to 
community development and thus enabled customary coercion to continue 
under a different, Westernised vocabulary of ‘self-help’. A World Bank roads 
project in Ethiopia  seeks “to make rural communities the lead program 
implementers of the community initiated components”32. Reading this without 
knowing the existing context of development activities, one would assume that 
the World Bank project offers communities a previously-denied opportunity to 
take responsibility for their own development. This rhetorical stance is 
ideologically consistent with that of Revolutionary Democracy which seeks “to 
exploit the performative power of the unified and mobilised participation and will 
                                               
31
 The modern English meaning of ‘contribution’ implies voluntarism, although there is an 
archaic meaning of contribution as ‘levy’. 
32
 www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/.../rttp_countryReport02_ethiopia.pdf  
[accessed 05.08.09] 
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of the community” (Vaughan, 2003: 182). More broadly, understanding the 
Ethiopian context questions the role of ‘community’ as service providers 
proposed by donors. 
 
6.3.3 Participation as “Involvement in Community Meetings” 
 
The secondary use of participation, as ‘contribution of ideas’ through 
involvement in meetings, is structured around themes which emerged from the 
literature, from the fieldwork responses and from the WIDE data, and uses 
analytical concepts set out in Chapter 3. 
 
The role of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church 
 
The interviews demonstrated that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church also structures 
secular ‘participation’ via the religious calendar. Its obligations and timetables 
were co-opted by the administration as the schedule by which community 
participation was organised, with development activities being announced at 
meetings in the church compound on Sundays and evaluations being held on 
holy days.33 The priests and some other respondents said that the number of 
non-working days prescribed by the church had been significantly reduced as a 
result of government influence. However, the PPA sites in Tigray and Amhara 
“reported strict adherence to traditional prohibitions on farm work on fasting and 
saints days, although the number of prohibited days per month varied between 
10 and 20 in different places” (PPA: xvi, 16). In one PPA site in Tigray, the 
respondent described the penalties for non-observance as incurring God’s wrath 
in the form of “snowfall or other form of calamity”, being “outcast by the 
community”; or having to give a quantity of cereal crop to the church. The cost 
was so high that it acted as a deterrent (EPPA, 2005: 16-17).34  
 
My respondents described how the time and venue of community administrative, 
even political, meetings was structured round the church. Meetings between the 
community and local officials (from the got or kebele and sometimes from 
woreda) are held on Sundays or Holy Days, outside the church. Meetings inside 
                                               
33
  Priests could also theoretically proscribe ploughing as a penance. 
34
  Although the church structured community life to a great extent, through obligations 
often enforced through local informal associations, one’s idil also proffered the hope of 
improved fortune. 
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the church were exclusively religious but, after the services, meetings were held 
by DAs or by the local administration to convey information, to arrange 
development activities, and to discuss security (A1, A4, A6, A14, A29).  
 
The meaning of ‘participation’ in meetings 
 
Many farmers (more in Tigray than in Amhara) understood participation to mean 
involvement in meetings, in addition to the provision of labour. Meetings were for 
“getting the support of all the people to do what activities are ordered by the 
government” (A16). Involvement meant speaking up in meetings and “saying 
what you feel” (T5), “giving your ideas” (T8, T9, T18); and “bringing farmers and 
officials together to solve problems” (A26). Younger government professionals 
talked about the importance of the meetings for farmers to contribute ideas and 
to agree objectives (T27, A28, T38), although the inclusiveness of such 
meetings varied considerably in different locations. In some of the sites, the 
community were rarely involved; only elderly churchgoers attended the meetings 
(A9), and only the woreda, not the kebele, invited the whole community, and 
then rarely (A2). Attendance was more widespread in Tigray: “Nothing [happens 
to someone who doesn’t participate] but he will be criticised in gemgams in 
order to make him attend in future.” (T15). 
 
Government officials seemed generally uncritical of community meetings; the 
advantage of the whole community attending was that it gave those who wanted 
to complain an opportunity to do so. Asked about monitoring male and female 
attendance at meetings, one senior Tigrean government official said that good 
governance was not just about attendance figures, it was about solving 
differences in order to reach a consensus (T44). However, a Tigrean official 
lower in the government hierarchy said that development group leaders do 
monitor attendance at monthly community/tabia gemgam, and will 
persuade/convince people to attend (T19). In a remark which repeats a pattern 
previously noticed in monitoring provision of labour in Amhara, a senior official 
said that, if farmers do not attend meetings, the cadres will ask them/pressure 
them to attend; if they still refuse, it may become a court case and be sent to the 
shimageles (A38).  
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Speaking up in meetings 
 
The descriptions of who spoke at meetings, who did not speak and why, were 
broadly the same, whether provided by male or female farmers, or by Tigrean or 
Amhara respondents: speakers were DAs, tabia/kebele leaders and Agricultural 
Bureau staff (A1, A27, A33) and local leaders, model farmers and ex-fighters 
(T3, T8, T9, T13). Although some said that “anyone can say whatever they 
want” (A27, A15) and “no-one is afraid nowadays” (T2, T3, T9, A3), ordinary 
farmers said that leaders did not listen to them, only to party affiliates (A32). The 
elderly and sick said that they were ignored (T14, T23, A5). Whereas the elderly 
had dominated meetings in the past, now ‘educated’ people dominated meetings 
(A21, A26, A25, T3.T8, T9, T13). Being ‘educated’ was not necessarily linked to 
education, rather it meant accepting advice from DAs, being a ‘risk taker’, or 
being a leader. ‘Risk takers’ spoke to persuade others (A1). The extent of 
voluntary participation is demonstrated by the explanation: “All the leaders first 
inform participants to express their views and so everyone participates” (T24). 
Local leaders said “The majority don’t speak because they don’t follow what’s 
being said, let alone have something to say” (A13) and that “The kebele and the 
megistawi buden leaders will show the people the direction so that all people 
can participate; some knowledgeable people who speak will eventually convince 
the people” (A14). 
 
Government officials thought ‘conservative’ culture meant elders and ‘outspoken 
rich people’, whom they described as highly influential in the community, tended 
to dominate meetings (A34, A36, T11) but young professionals were clear that 
less knowledgeable people who talked a lot through habit no longer dominated 
meetings; rather, those farmers who “are advanced in their ideas”, “are 
innovative” and “risk takers” were the ones who spoke up; that the majority did 
not speak up because they were shy, and afraid of criticism (T27, A2, A10, A19, 
T36).  
 
Age, marital status and ‘education’ affected participation in meetings, even in 
Tigray with its participatory rhetoric. Although older people were respected, 
particularly if they were a member of the shimageles, declining faculties, such as 
poor sight, terminated participation (A5). One older woman had stopped 
attending gemgams because she was no longer “an ideas-maker”, although she 
still attended other meetings (T8), another had stopped attending all meetings 
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because of her age, even though she was working in the fields when I 
interviewed her (T18). Officially, the age range for membership of the Youth 
Association is 18-35 years, but one woman thought her 19 year old daughter 
was ‘too little to speak’ in meetings, and her son would not be old enough until 
he was 25 years old (T18). A 35-year-old, single man said he could not speak to 
us without his father’s permission. On the one hand, it was said that the elderly 
talked a lot in meetings through habit and experience (A21, T11) and, on the 
other, the trend was moving away from dominance by the elderly to those who 
were “educated”, “knowledgeable” and “who understood new things” (A21, A26). 
Women were encouraged to speak up under gender equality policies, with 
younger, educated women being regarded as far more vocal and knowledgeable 
by their mothers (T3, T8, T9, T13). In Amhara, married women were not invited 
to meetings organised by the kebele or by the PTA and did not expect to be, 
because their husbands represented the household (A20). There was some 
scepticism about the value of formal education for girls; one woman thought her 
granddaughter was too young to go to school at 7 years old, and another, with 
school age children, thought that learning in school was ‘meaningless’ (A30).  
 
Membership of the Women’s Association in Amhara was small, even though the 
kebele put pressure on women to join (A24). One Tigrean woman’s daughters, 
who were active in the Women’s Association, now called out ‘here I am to 
speak’ in public meetings (T8), but another woman attended its meetings 
because she would otherwise be “called and criticised for not attending and told 
to participate next time” (T9). A younger woman was given an official position in 
the Association because “she works peacefully, is sociable and is better 
educated” (A24), corroborating other responses which indicate that ‘good 
behaviour’ and education are important criteria for selection in Amhara. Even in 
Tigray, some Tigrean women did not belong because they understood there to 
be an informal criterion that “you had to have better awareness and knowledge” 
(T18) of government policy.  
 
Several government respondents said that the Derg had been influential in 
changing the pattern of participation in meetings, by teaching people to ‘speak 
up’ (T31), and one elderly farmer said there was less discrimination and 
corruption under the Derg (T11). More negatively, a Regional government officer 
said that the Derg meetings were purely political and people were told what to 
do (T42). Respondents who had been officials under the Derg complained that 
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they continued to be pejoratively labelled as ‘bureaucrats’ and were not invited 
to attend meetings (A5, A31, A32). A successful farmer, classified locally as 
‘rich’, felt doubly politically stigmatised, as a former Derg official and as a 
supporter of the opposition coalition. However, this did not affect his social 
relationships, either in friendship or in traditional associations (A3135).  
 
Some EPRDF supporters among male and female farmers claimed there had 
been an increase in democracy under the current government (T1, A15), and 
people could now “talk freely” (T.32, A15). Several farmers had won prizes for 
their oratory and their ability to persuade others (A16, T22, T0)36, and to 
mobilise others for development work. Skill in public speaking is one of the 
criteria of selection as a leader (T1, T2). Good communication skills included 
“being able to read the audience” (A36); in turn, farmers will “read” the response 
that is wanted from them (A34).  
 
Not speaking up in meetings 
 
The emphasis placed in oral skills clearly caused considerable tension. The risk 
of not saying the right thing or saying it clumsily are considerable. A government 
official’s comment that people might want to avoid speaking publicly for lack of 
ability to speak ‘effectively’ or if they had been ignored on a previous occasion 
(T32) was confirmed by an Ethiopian colleague’s comment, “one mistake and 
you (and maybe your family) could be ignored thereafter”. Objecting to the 
majority view could result in “being outcast from the community” (A34). There 
was therefore a practical reason to avoid speaking up, in addition to the cultural 
reticence induced by yilungta37. Health officials, whose monitoring repertoire 
included surveys and interviews, thought that in public meetings people felt 
yilungta even when men and women were consulted separately or in small focus 
groups. Some topics, such as family planning, were culturally difficult to discuss 
even within women-only groups (T32, A40). A different facet of yilungta was 
expressed by one government official: it was not just the fear of looking foolish, 
but also the fear of appearing ‘greedy’ (A36). 
 
                                               
35
  This farmer rented additional land and was said to be wealthier than his neighbours.  
36
  Prizes included a spade for one farmer, and a clock for a government official. 
37
 This form of reticence is discussed in 5.5.2. 
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The cultural ambivalence between the reticence of yilungta and the respect for 
the powers of oratory was reinforced by the ideological demand for ‘participation’ 
in meetings. An alternative description of not speaking up in meetings was 
‘failure to participate’. If farmers did not speak, they were described by the 
leaders as ‘deaf’ (T25). Yilungta is regarded by progressive farmers as old-
fashioned, as “now everyone has to express their views” (T24)38. One 
development group leader described failure to speak as a personal weakness 
which one had to overcome through practice (T15). While the majority do not 
speak because of fear of expressing their opinions (A12, A21, A25, A26, A33, 
T5, T25, T36), other farmers thought that not speaking up was suspicious: 
maybe the non-speakers had bad intentions. There are therefore a number of 
other reasons why the majority avoid speaking up: lack of experience, fear their 
ideas will conflict with the kebele’s, or because their comments are ignored 
(A29). The PPA noted that some respondents feared that being critical of the 
administration would result in “revenge” (EPPA, 2005: 44). 
 
While oratory and reticence might be assumed to be expressions of 
powerfulness or powerlessness respectively, the literature on Ethiopia offers a 
third option, reticence as wisdom (Vasko et al., 1998: 108). Moderating speech, 
by using a quiet, low voice or certain linguistic constructions, is also a sign of 
deference (Levine, 1965b: 251). There is little in development discourse to draw 
on, in terms of analysis of expression, but African cross-cultural literature notes 
the importance of adhering to communication rules, which will include “specific 
nonverbal codes (i.e. eye behavior, body movements, signs, silence), and 
through the use of idioms, proverbs, and wise sayings. This high-context 
communication environment … produces situations in which very little is said to 
imply much." (Moemeka, 1998: 124-125). The reticence which Moemeka 
describes, that "If what a person has to say is not in the best interest of the 
community, he or she is bound by custom to ‘swallow his or her words’" (ibid: 




Respondents emphasised the importance of consensus. Despite the political 
tension which coincided with the fieldwork, which may account for the links 
                                               
38
  Pejorative public labelling of farmers is used as ‘moral punishment’ (Mamumsha and 
Hoffman, 2005: 2). 
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drawn between (not) speaking in meetings and security, the following account 
from a poor farmer, emphasising the route to consensus, reflects the traditional 
pattern of village meetings: 
 
“If I raise an idea against the majority, I’m allowed to express my ideas 
and I try to convince them. If I’m unable to, everybody else will try and 
convince me to adopt their ideas until we reach a consensus. … If there’s 
no consensus, it won’t work well.” (T25). 
 
This process was confirmed by others. DAs said that discussions were aimed at 
convincing others that government policy is right: “agreement is the result of 
influence, not decision” (T36), so if there is no agreement, officials intervene to 
bring consensus about (T37). More senior government officials, however, had a 
different view, saying that majority voting was becoming the norm, and that 
consensus was no longer considered feasible. At one location I was told that a 
record was kept of who had supported a decision and who had not; at another I 
was told that only the totals of those for and against were recorded, not names. 
One government official said that consensus will be reached before work starts, 
developed from a majority decision, that this was the procedure the government 
wanted; individual non-participants impede development (T42). 
 
Revolutionary Democracy involves, according to TPLF ideology, “the right and 
the duty to discuss all topics presented by the party. Once the discussions are 
finished, consensus proclaimed and decisions made, these have to be followed 
by all its members.” (Poluha, 2004: 185). Describing this process as “democratic 
centralism in the vein of Lenin”, Poluha notes that, “in a hierarchical society it is 
difficult to say whether consensus has really been reached, because it is usually 
the opinions of those high up in the hierarchy that are interpreted as the 




Responses to enquiries about the meaning of ‘individualistic’ confirmed the 
tension surrounding non-participation found in the historical and anthropological 
literature. In line with farmers’ comments on the contribution of labour, 
participation was described by ordinary farmers as “working for a common goal, 
not as an individual” (A33); individualistic behaviour was described as not taking 
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part in community works (A26), not participating in communal life, and “during 
the night getting up to bad activities, such as stealing” (A16).  
 
Examples provided of individualistic behaviour were centred more strongly on 
social life than on development activities. Individualistic people were: 
 
 “very poor people who are out of social contact” (A12) 
 “outcast from social gatherings or other activities” (A22) 
 “not willing to accept good advice and doing the opposite” (A24) 
 “those who don’t take part in local associations, or in labour exchange, 
and don’t drink coffee” (A13) 
 “a bad person because they are greedy, not supporting other people” 
(T10).  
 “not paying for drinks for others; having personal belief”  (T15). 
 people who do not participate in maheber or funeral ceremonies, or who 
work alone: “not good people” (T17).  
 “someone who is greedy, and has problems with his ideas, thinking 
negatively” (T26). 
 
One young farmer, who had little schooling and whose other responses had not 
appeared particularly independent, said that ‘individualistic’ meant trying to be 
self-sufficient, rather than being supported by the family (A27). When this was 
being translated for me, I was surprised at what I interpreted as a ‘positive’ 
meaning. However, my research assistant told me that the meaning of ‘self-
sufficiency’ here was negative. He said that most respondents had used the 
word gileneguet, meaning not joining in activities for a common good, which 
could be regarded as ‘greedy’, that is denying others the benefit of your 
participation, whereas in this case the farmer had used the word gileltenaguet, 
that is outcast from social networks, having social stigma. Despite the apparent 
uniform negativity about individualism, there were suggestions that it could have 
merits as well as threats. One local leader said that individualistic behaviour had 
two meanings: it has a positive meaning (working hard for yourself) and a 
negative meaning (spreading bad ideas about participation) (T19).  
 
Tensions around the perpetual threat of individualistic behaviour was evident in 
discussions with senior government officials. In Amhara, the comment was 
made that Ethiopians, particularly the Amhara, are individualistic; they like to 
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work alone, not cooperatively: “Participation is still not the free-will of the 
community, because they are illiterate, they don’t understand ‘development’”; 
communal life was deteriorating, debo and wonfel39 were dying out because 
people are behaving less communally (A37). A government official whose job 
involved liaison with international donors contrasted participation during the 
Derg, which had been compulsory, with the current regime: “now there is 
orientation at kebele towards the community, not the individual”; he stressed the 
need to shift from individualistic behaviour towards ‘the good of the community’ 
(A39). Communal effort for development (a ‘national’ project) and reciprocal 
labour mechanisms were conjoined in these answers. Another senior official 
with many years’ experience of working with different international agencies, 
comparing Western individualism with Ethiopian values: humans are social 
animals; social rules are mandatory and breaking them was considered 
individualistic. He illustrated this with a story about an acquaintance who had 
used his money for education rather than for memorial feasts, in line with 
religious and social practice, had been labelled individualistic and as a result 
was “outcasted, people wouldn’t collaborate with him” (A34). 
 
6.3.4 Bridging Conceptions of Participation 
 
Some officials thought that the government policy of teaching the community to 
contribute their ideas via the administrative hierarchy had resulted in the 
“emerging phenomenon” of “ideas coming via the tabia and the DA in every 
kushet” (T35). Others were more cynical: one said that the only reason people 
wanted to participate in woreda meetings was to get the per diem.  
 
Another senior official had a more differentiated opinion: For him, participation 
meant people being involved directly in their own development. The government 
had a responsibility to change from top-down to bottom-up planning. For the 
community, participation meant the contribution of labour and money. Asked 
about the difference between participation and mobilisation, he said that 
mobilisation also meant involving people in development activities, and it could 
be political. If people believe in it, it was no problem - Ethiopia has a military 
history with a culture of mobilisation as the motivating factor. However, if people 
were forced to comply, there would be problems (T42). 
                                               
39
 Labour-sharing mechanisms (see 5.7.1). 
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Statements such as these which contain ‘Third way’ elements recognisable as 
‘citizen responsibility’ and ‘social capital’ alongside expressions of control and 
coercion, demonstrate the importance of deconstructing the concepts of ‘social 
liberalism’ contained in the NAA (cf. Craig and Porter, 2004). Elements of 
Western democracy, such as majority voting, were also being absorbed, 
apparently gradually replacing traditional methods of consensus.  
 
Government rhetoric about empowerment through ‘speaking up’ and 
‘contributing ideas’ places local practice on a continuum between participation 
as conceptualised under Habermasian ‘deliberative democracy’, customary 
mechanisms of discussion and consensus, designed to be inclusive, and some 
of the tenets, including the role of leadership, of revolutionary democracy. The 
gap between the rhetoric of participation as conceptualised by donors, and the 
reality of its local perception and practice was discussed by some senior 
officials. For reporting purposes, participation defined as community-based 
planning “has taken place but in reality it hasn’t” (A34). Differential descriptions 
of voice and agency were also blurred. Some officials realised that donors also 
conceived participation as contribution of labour and money towards 
development activities in order to engender a sense of ownership (A34, A37). 
Two other views expressed were that donors believed participation meant 
cooperation with donors (T33), and that donors thought participation meant 
attending meetings, contributing ideas, building consensus (as did he) (T35). 
 
The pattern of discussion in meetings described in the Ethiopian literature and in 
the fieldwork can be situated in a wider, African, historical context. “In most 
societies, Africans could attend the meetings of the Council of Elders if they so 
wished. They could raise objections to proposals or offer alternative ideas. The 
councillors would then debate and assess their merits” for as long as it took to 
reach consensus: “Unanimity was not the objective.” (Ayittey, 2006: 76, 139)40. It 
is also possible to link the EPRDF’s requirement to ‘contribute ideas’ as a 
(potentially risky) form of participation, to Ayittey’s comment that, in the African 
context, “If a dissident made an intelligent argument, he was praised for having 
                                               
40
  The same point has been made in relation to traditional Ethiopian politics 
(Pausewang, 1994: 528). 
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offered an idea that could help the community. If he made a silly remark, he set 
himself up for ridicule.” (Ayittey, 2006: 139).  
 
Farmers therefore have to gauge their participation in meetings in terms of self-
expression (via oratory or reticence), with their peers as a critical audience and 
DAs and officials as sources of patronage. Triandis’ presents identity as being 
tri-partite: self-identity, immediate social identity and public identity. An Ethiopian 
farmer could simultaneously hold multiple, largely concentric roles: as well as 
being a leader of his household, he could be a cell leader, a model farmer and a 
development group or mengistawi buden leader; or he could be a local 
administrative official. He (and particularly she) would also have a separate, 
religious identity, his/her social and administrative life being structured by the 
Orthodox Christianity calendar and its rituals41. Beyond their local identity, 
farmers were either Tigrean or Amhara, but above all they were habesha42, and 
the state was able to capitalise on farmers’ sense of national identity by 
presenting development as a national project. The marginalising identity43 found 
in this research was political: previous membership of the Derg, or current 
support for the opposition coalition, resulted in discrimination. 
 
The projection by government of development as a national project may be a 
stronger message than the projection of development in donor rhetoric as an 
individual, rational choice, particularly in contexts such as Ethiopia where 
individualism has such negative connotations.  
 
A social actor approach allows us to begin to understand the ways in which 
participation in the Ethiopian context has considerable overlap with donor 
rhetoric about participation. When Long’s argument of heterogeneity and 
disjuncture is brought into the analysis, along with concepts of Western 
individualism and deliberative democracy, it is necessary – particularly in the 
light of Ethiopian historical memory, identity and culture - to critique some of the 
claims made for ‘voice and agency’ within the development project. 
Heterogeneity and disjuncture, assumed in the West to be constructive for a 
                                               
41
  Even Muslim respondents absorbed Orthodox Christianity into their self-identity. One 
of the reasons a senior official who was Muslim felt proud to be Ethiopian was that it was 
where the ‘true cross’ had been found (this is celebrated at the main annual festival, 
Meskel). 
42
 Skilled oratory/reticence was regarded as a habesha skill. 
43
  The fieldwork sites were ethnically homogenous. 
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‘healthy’ polity, as well as for knowledge formation, may also be destructive of 
community structures and customary norms, as well as posing a deliberate 
challenge to existing political power relations. In Ethiopia, “the strength of the 
system was emphasized by the fact that everybody knew how to behave and 
could read and interpret each other’s acts. Since the rules were so clear within 
the collective where patrons and clients found themselves, it also gave members 
a certain sense of security.” (Poluha, 2004: 189).  
 
In parallel with the projection by donors of Western concepts of participation, via 
the NAA, the contribution of ideas was also being promoted by the government 
via Revolutionary Democracy ideology. Developed by the TPLF from Marxist-
Leninist ideology, it incorporated customary mechanisms of oratory and 
consensus in public meetings. One of the main planks of donors’ strategy for 
increased participation along NAA lines was the World Bank’s PSCAP project, 
which intended to institutionalise ‘participation’ throughout the government 
structure from ministry to kebeles through a programme of capacity building. 
Given the strength of habesha identity and culture, it is likely that the 
government’s approach will be more successful in influencing people to ‘speak 
out’ than the donors’. 
 
 
6.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 




Donor-driven changes in reporting formats were described as problematic by 
government officials, not only because it made time comparisons difficult but 
because the socio-economic categorisation of respondents changed, divided 
into subgroups which did not accord with local structures (A36). Under the NAA, 
donors and the government both rely on quantitative data for the management 
of their development programmes in Ethiopia. For donors, this is largely done 
via the policy matrix attached to the PRSP. Although the ‘civil society’ PAN/E 
CRC report stated that there was little evidence “that hard data is monitored on 
a routine basis for decision-making” (PAN/E, 2005: 20), the Ethiopian 
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government already had a reputation for advanced statistical work, led by the 
CSA since the 1960s (GoE, 2004b)44.  
 
Despite donor/government congruence over the importance of quantitative data, 
the methods used differed in two significant ways: between the use of sampling 
in Western data collection in contrast to the comprehensiveness of data 
collection in Ethiopia, and the use of anonymity in Western methods contrasts 
with the lack of privacy in Ethiopian data collection. Indeed, the comments in 6.3 
indicate that attempts at maintaining privacy were regarded with mistrust by 
local leaders and fellow farmers. The PPA recognised that the administrative 
microstructure meant that “everyone knows everyone else’s business”, with the 
likelihood that householders were impelled to conform to “normal” behaviour 
(EPPA, 2005: 45). 
 
Descriptions of quantitative data collection were similar in the Amhara and 
Tigray woredas. Cell leaders and model farmers collected data on the 
households under their supervision45. They argued that, because they know the 
households very well, the data was reliable. The leaders of 30 households 
passed the data to the DA, who tabulated it, giving one copy to the tabia/kebele 
and, either directly or after approval by the tabia/kebele, another copy to the 
woreda Bureau of Agriculture. The statistics were then passed up the 
administrative and the sectoral hierarchies, to be reviewed by the woreda 
cabinet. Health and HIV/AIDS data were collected via a different route to rural 
development data, because many kebele/tabia lacked health workers (although 
the community may have built a health post). Peripatetic health workers took the 
information direct to the health bureaux.  
 
Understanding the reasons for monitoring 
 
Respondents provided varied reasons for the use of monitoring, shifting - as with 
the meaning of participation - with the respondents’ status in the administrative 
hierarchy. One government official had learnt from an INGO (World Vision) that 
the role of data collection was to increase a local sense of ownership (T33). 
                                               
44
  See 4.3.5. 
45
  In some kebele, DAs collected data on farmers receiving the full extension package, 
leaving the remainder for collection by local leaders. Distance was also a factor; some 
DAs collected information from the kebele/tabia village, leaving local leaders to collect 
information from households in outlying areas. 
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Another said it was useful to identify problems such as animals trampling crops, 
or the need to fence ponds (A39). A more widespread common understanding of 
the reason for collecting statistics was to assist the government to organise 
development activities, through the collection of data relating to the number of 
able-bodied people available to contribute labour and their ‘capacity’, and 
confirmation that development activities have been done according to plan. 
 
Types of statistical data collected 
 
The types of statistics46 collected were linked to the form of development activity 
and the type of extension package. Agricultural data included: crop yield, 
livestock (breeding, vaccination requirements and animal health), use of 
fertilisers, adoption of new technologies such as irrigation, vegetable production 
and composting. Land use statistics were collected for calculation of production 
targets, and the requirement for new technologies. Wealth monitoring included 
household assets (furniture, construction, household innovations) as well as 
livestock numbers. Population statistics related to gender (number of 
male/female headed households) and to the number of able-bodied per 
household for calculation of labour contribution and thereby the targets for each 
development group. Development activities included: terracing, construction of 
dams, water points and sanitation, road building and afforestation.  
 
In addition to data collection, local leaders were responsible for tax collection 
and for monitoring births, deaths and temporary and long-term migration. 
Several local leaders said that they had also been responsible for monitoring the 
number of voters in the recent elections.  
 
Qualitative data collection 
 
Government health officials interviewed used a broader range of data collection 
methods than their rural development counterparts, talked more openly about 
the part that fear, shame and the need for privacy play in data collection and had 
a more nuanced understanding of the problems of analysis and interpretation. 
This effect was observed to a lesser extent among education officials. Generally, 
the directors of schools provide attendance statistics direct to the kebele/tabia 
                                               
46
  I use the word ‘statistics’ here to imply quantitative data. 
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leader; Parent/Teacher Associations played a major role in monitoring and 
evaluating school activities. 
 
Health sector heads put much greater emphasis on the involvement of the 
community in public fora than other government colleagues, conceptualising 
participation as training, sharing ideas, getting feedback (T32, T34) but they 
acknowledged that cultural and religious beliefs made this extremely difficult. 
They had found that, even in same-sex focus groups, participants were reluctant 
to discuss health topics in public. In data collection, there was mixed success 
with surveys: one-to-one interviews had proved successful in Tigray (T32), but 
not in Amhara (A40). 
 
Quality of data collection 
 
The responses from senior government officials reveal the effect of donors’ and 
government’s differing styles of data collection and management. It is clear that 
at regional level, at least, government MIS and M&E systems are influenced by 
a range of donors, either directly by provision of systems or more indirectly 
through the provision of different models and training courses from which the 
government can draw. Since donors’ concepts of M&E vary, and their strategies 
and systems change over quite a short time span, government officials working 
directly with donors experienced frequent change (almost a state of flux) so that 
M&E manuals were perpetually in draft form. It was difficult to link the fluctuating 
M&E system back to the programme logframe. ‘Partnership’ and ‘ownership’ 
brought a wider number of people into the M&E process which is now “the 
responsibility of all people involved in implementation” whereas previously 
programme reporting had been direct “from the grassroots to the top” (A35). 
 
Although the government data collection system was constantly changing, the 
changes were to targets rather than in the structure and methods of data 
collection. Targets were “improved” rather than updated (T43). A tabia leader 
said all the data was carefully collected and he never needed to make 
corrections (T26). DAs said annual work plans were divided into monthly targets; 
if implementation fell below the target, the DA and/or the local leaders would be 
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‘evaluated’47. Apart from the health officials, who wanted to use a wider range of 
methods and analysis, senior government officers expressed satisfaction with 
the system of data collection, although in Tigray there was some concern about 
the level of education of tabia/kebele leaders. There also appeared to be tension 
around the accuracy of data relating to the target for labour contribution set by 
the woreda: a tabia leader complained this was not based on the figure for able-
bodied he had provided (T19).  
 
Most respondents said that they had no way of providing information or giving 
their opinion about development, other than via the local administration. In a few 
sites, respondents had been regularly ‘sampled’ by donors and were familiar 
with donor data collection techniques. In one sites which was part of a 
longitudinal study, I was asked whether my research would be any different, 
because they kept answering questions but “nothing changed”. In another site, a 
model farmer from a village at the end of a rural road close to a town with an 
airport, said that he was used to answering questions from ferenjis - they arrived 
in white four-wheeled drive vehicles and held ‘surgeries’. An ordinary farmer 
said that the authorities always picked the best model farmers for donors to 
interview. An Ethiopian team researching intercultural practice noted that project 
‘beneficiaries’ learn “selective speaking”, in other words they learn what donors 
want them to say (Vasko et al., 1998: 57). Similarly, the PPA noted that their 
respondents tended to say what they thought the Ethiopian researchers wanted 
to hear, particularly if there were kebele officials present (EPPA, 2005: 39). 
 




The practice of evaluation in Ethiopia, gemgamma in Amharic, gemgam in 
Tigrignia, involves a process of public self-evaluation of individual performance, 
followed by group assessment (see 5.9.2). It has its roots in “traditional Tigrean 
culture as well as Maoism” (Gilkes, 1999: 39). Introduced by the TPLF during its 
struggle against the Derg, the EPRDF has extended its use throughout the 
                                               
47
  Data was recorded in exercise books or on sheets of paper issued by the Bureau of 
Agriculture. On several occasions I was shown completed sheets, with monthly quotas 
(an annual figure divided by 12) and identical figures for performance rates. 
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government structure. It nominally involves the examination of performance 
against work plan but the workplan or design and methods are rarely called into 
question, it being assumed that individuals are responsible for success or failure 
of implementation. Implementation is usually limited to completion of targets, 
and targets are often inputs (primarily based on labour). The subject of the 
gemgamma, or his/her superior, will present a report; this will be followed by 
public examination of the subject. The vocabulary used by senior government 
officials to describe gemgamma’s purpose (planning, implementation and 
evaluation (A39)48 was common to Western development concepts. Discussion 
elicited a more critical assessment of the gemgamma process for some officials, 
but not all.  
 
Tigrean farmers said that gemgam are dominated by officials and by those who 
are ‘knowledgeable’ about government policy, such as local leaders and 
demonstration farmers. Some respondents attending the woreda for a gemgam 
said “everyone participates, persuaded by the group leader” (T1); if people did 
not participate, they would “lose out” in decision-making (T2). The extent to 
which ordinary members of the community are involved varies by kebele/tabia. 
In Tigray, ordinary farmers are involved in gemgam of their local administration 
on a monthly basis (T19, T22). In Amhara, ordinary farmers were less likely to 
be involved in gemgamma (A1, A12, A23, A26, A27, A33), but there might be 
occasional community gemgamma in the event of security problems (A22) or 
one could be called by the woreda (A31). Most farmers in Amhara said that 
attendance at gemgamma was restricted to kebele officials “and other party 
members”, militia and mengistawi buden leaders (A12, A16, A33); they were not 
invited to attend and had no forum for expressing their opinion (A5, A12, A16, 
A26, A27, A33). One female farmer in Amhara said that, as with the community 
meetings, the Farmers Association briefed its members in advance of 
gemgamma, telling the farmers what questions to ask (A15). 
 
Gemgamma for development activities were separate from the party cadres’ 
gemgamma, but were still infused by political issues.49 A gemgamma of the 
wider community occurs if there are ‘security problems’ (A22), and the current 
                                               
48
  Only rural development/agriculture gengamma were discussed; gengamma could 
also be political. 
49
 “Some people from the woreda who serve the kebele as policemen have a 
gemgamma every six months” (A8). 
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political crisis had disrupted the usual schedule, making them more frequent in 
Tigray (T10, T18) and less so in Amhara (A31).  A mengistawi buden leader in 
Amhara was not invited to agricultural gemgamma because he was not a party 
member (A13). 
 
The logistics of evaluation 
 
Orthodox Christian religious days are chosen for gemgamma because farmers 
will not be working in the fields on holy days and will be gathered around the 
church on Sundays. The exact pattern of gemgamma varied from kebele/tabia, 
but they could be as often as weekly at the lower levels, for example got leaders 
and mengistawi buden leaders evaluating each other every week (A8). In some 
kebele/tabia, gemgamma were held “every 15 days”, for example “mutual 
evaluation of DAs/mengistawi buden leaders every two weeks” (A18). More 
commonly, gemgamma were held monthly. However, there are gemgamma at 
every level, so that a DA could report that: 
 
“the DAs evaluate each other, the DAs are evaluated by the kebele, DAs 
are evaluated by the mengistawi buden leaders and ordinary people at 
any meeting. The DAs are formally evaluated once a week. We evaluate 
the kebele when the woreda calls a gemgamma and evaluate the 
mengistawi buden leaders every 15 days” (A2). 
 
Both the PPA and the PAN/E CRC report devote considerable attention to the 
role of DAs, the PPA noting that DAs are “widely respected in most 
communities” (EPPA, 2005: xiv). The CRC records that, while DAs were rated 
highly in terms of availability (approximately half the respondents in Tigray were 
visited by a DA once a week, and 82% were visited at least once a month), 
dissatisfaction was registered across the regions surveyed about “weak 
monitoring and supervision by the extension agent” (PAN/E 2005: 82, 88). 
Although this implies that farmers want DAs to keep closer watch on their 
activities, farmers also expect to evaluate DAs, who should be prepared to be 
“criticised and corrected” by farmers (Mamumsha and Hoffman, 2005: 4).  
 
A common pattern was for mengistawi buden leaders to evaluate each other. 
They evaluate their cell leaders and are in turn evaluated by the kebele (A25). A 
tabia leader said that the tabia officials hold a gemgam weekly, and the kushet 
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officials evaluate each other weekly; the tabia/kushet evaluate each other every 
two weeks and there is a community gemgam monthly to evaluate the tabia, and 
the tabia to evaluate the community. He expects the majority to attend (T19). 
Other types of evaluation reported include teachers evaluating each other and 
teachers being evaluated by their students (A9, T37), and by the Parent Teacher 
Association whose “membership includes people known for their ability to 
mobilise, who are trustworthy and knowledgeable about the school” (T26).  
 
Figure 6.2 below illustrates the frequency of gemgemma within the nested 
administrative hierarchy from woreda to household. 
 
The use of gemgamma extends throughout the government and reaches down 
into the community to level of cell leader, who is judged on his ability to mobilise 
his neighbours’ contribution of labour. Poor quality of work is the result of 
insufficient mobilisation, but the ‘mobilised’ theoretically can take part in the 
evaluation. The ‘ideal’ in gemgamma, however, is for the subject to accept 
criticism and “learn from their mistakes” (A10), and to improve his or her 
performance as a result, thus demonstrating the benefits of self-correction. A 
young DA said “There is nothing risky in gemgamma for those who are willing to 
accept suggestions; they have to accept or they lose their positions” (A2). 
 
 
Figure 6.2 - Local Evaluation Framework 
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While the persuasive powers of ‘knowledgeable’ farmers are a risk to the subject 
of the gemgamma, the subject’s own powers of persuasion can be used to 
his/her own advantage and a negative performance report may be rejected. 
Oratorical skills were thus also useful as protection: an articulate person could 
get round any accusation in a gemgam (T34). If a government official’s 
persuasive powers fail to achieve this or they refuse to accept the criticism (or, if 
given a warning, they subsequently fail to improve performance), they may be 
sent to the Discipline Committee and/or dismissed. A local leader who failed to 
respond to criticism could be sent to the social court for advice” (A14). 
 
There were – in theory - other, formal avenues for ordinary farmers to express 
an opinion about the performance of local officials. At the Peasants’ Conference, 
held annually or quarterly, official reports are read out, prepared by the DA (A13) 
or the kebele (A23), but a local leader described these as “top down, there’s no 
possibility of getting the community’s ideas and opinions” (A23). The other 
avenue is the House of 100 Representatives, which was considered by one local 
leader to be a substitute for community participation in gemgamma (A18), 
because dealing with 100 people was more practical than “calling all 1,000 
people in the kebele repeatedly for meetings” (A6). In places, the 100 
Representatives evaluate the kebele every month (A4, A8). Their governing 
regulations included the evaluation of the Representatives by the community but 
this has never been put into practice (A6). One farmer, who had been an official 
under the Derg, understood the 100 Representatives all to be party supporters 
(A32).  
 
Perceived purpose, benefits and disadvantages of gemgamma 
 
The purpose and benefits of gemgamma were described by some village-level 
respondents thus: The purpose of gemgamma is “to correct a person’s mistakes 
about getting government work done on time, and to ensure the person is 
treating the community honestly” (A14); the purpose is “to know the status of 
work, it helps implementation, identifies whether the community is working, and 
to find out whether the kushet is pressurising the community unfairly” (T19). 
Female household heads also saw gemgamma as having benefits: their 
purpose is “to criticise those who work badly, and encourage those who work 
well” (T18); “the people who are not working properly are given warnings” (A15). 
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One DA said that being criticised for failing to meet targets made one work 
harder (T21); another said gemgamma was an opportunity to make sure that 
local leaders did not ‘cheat’ the kebele administration (A10). 
 
Ethiopian farmers understood the purpose and the practice of evaluation to be 
the checking of implementation of development activities against quotas. Failure 
to meet these meant the work had to be repeated. The official purposes of 
monitoring and evaluation were understood to be threefold: (i) to ensure that 
work was done according to plan and on time; (ii) to use the information for 
future planning; and (iii) to make sure that local leaders and officials were not 
treating the people unfairly. 
 
Young professionals tended to be wary of the gemgamma process, perhaps 
because they had more to lose. The group which expressed the most negative 
view of gemgamma were farmers. “Gemgams are about conflict with others, 
that’s why I’m not interested. Poor farmers know it’s better to keep quiet.” (T11). 
A few government officials also thought that ordinary farmers might not want to 
participate because “they are afraid of quarrels” but at the same time would want 
to participate as they would be afraid of criticism for not doing so (A33). 
Although gemgamma is open to abuse, through victimisation both of and by 
government officials and local leaders (some government officials suggested, by 
‘ill-informed’ local people), few of the local leaders and ordinary farmers 
interviewed were particularly hostile to its use, despite farmers having described 
lack of agency and voice. Rather, it was presented as a process of 
accountability embedded into the administrative structure, mediated by cultural 
practice.  
 
Some government officials framed gemgamma in ‘management’ language: it 
was an opportunity to identify the root causes of problems, discuss possible 
solutions and to provide follow-up. One young government official described 
gemgamma being used as a form of performance management, instead of 
supervision and discussion. Anecdotal accounts from those working in federal 
government departments describe regular50 self-assessment in front of 
colleagues suggesting that it is practised throughout the government system. A 
report produced by the Ethiopian Management Institute compares the Civil 
                                               
50
  As frequently as weekly. 
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations  
 220 
Service’s performance management systems favourably to those of public 
enterprises and private organisations because of its continuous monitoring of 
employees’ performance51. A senior official noted that, unlike ‘project 
evaluation’, gemgamma “concentrates on the person, the government is telling 
us to do it” (A35).  
 
6.4.3 Reflection on Ethiopian and Donor Concepts of Evaluation 
 
These responses support the literature in 5.9.2 describing formal and informal 
evaluatory mechanisms. Although a few government officials thought 
gemgamma were an opportunity for learning, the literature suggests that it is 
either an act of coercion or it is a management tool, depending on the writer’s 
perspective. The sense of purpose, clarity and regularity of gemgamma 
contrasts sharply with evaluation in Western development discourse as a fragile 
concept, contested in its purpose, practice and interpretation. One of the more 
frequent criticisms is that evaluators do not include intended beneficiaries in the 
evaluation process. Under gemgamma, those being evaluated meet their 
evaluators face-to-face. While they may risk unfair or implied criticism, 
gemgamma offers a degree of transparency which is not available within current 
donor evaluation practice because it takes place in public.52 The use of public 
shame as a method of inducing ‘improved performance’, and the evaluatee’s 
acceptance of the need to improve, in an act of penitence and absolution 
towards the evaluators/beneficiaries, contrasts sharply with Western evaluation 
methods which evaluate the project or programme, nor the performance of the 
individuals responsible, who are usually anonymised in the evaluation report, 
itself rarely available to the beneficiaries, either in format or in language.  
 
Under the NAA, and particularly when budget support rather than SWAp 
modality is used, evaluation is not a systematic part of assessing efficiency and 
performance of donor intervention or of government performance. Although joint 
                                               
51
  The Institute’s handbook, Performance Management for Ethiopian Civil Service 
Institutions, refers to international literature about accepting criticism and the danger of 
loss of ‘face’, about the role of high context (implicit) communication and about the 
necessity of a shared vision and of transformational leadership which “inspires followers 
to transcend their own self” (EMI (2003):16-20). 
52
 Performance targets or standards are set in Western NPM practice but, in the UK at 
least, individual performance appraisal is a confidential process between employees and 
their line managers. While there was interest in ‘360
0
 appraisal’ when NPM was first 
introduced, its adoption has been limited because its anonymity was found to encourage 
unwarranted negative comment. 
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donor evaluations are encouraged, few had been done in Ethiopia. Under NAA 
logic, donors rely on the government’s own M&E systems to monitor 
performance without, as the next chapter will show, understanding how these 
systems function or, in fact, having trust in those systems whether they 
understand them or not.  
 
 





Within Amhara and Tigrean respondents’ descriptions of their perceptions and 
experience of participation, monitoring and evaluation and local processes of 
accountability, the themes of strong leadership, individualism-collectivism and 
communicative skill which emerge resonate with the historical, anthropological 
and political science literatures reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. This section 
explores the extent to which these themes are ‘peculiar’ to the Ethiopian case, 
or whether comparative analysis with other country contexts indicates areas of 
congruence, disjuncture or ambiguity. The secondary purpose of this section is 
to set up themes of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity arising from the data 
which will be compared with responses from the donor interviews presented in 
Chapter 7. 
 
6.5.2 Comparative Analysis: Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam 
 
Assumptions of its universal applicability contained within the NAA suggest that, 
despite initiatives such as Drivers of Change, the ‘international community’ 
largely disregard local history, culture and political systems. Part of my initial 
motivation to explore such a wide background literature on Ethiopia was that I 
found little in my experience from East and South East Asia which prepared me 
for the social, communicative and political patterns which were apparent on my 
first visit to Ethiopia. Comments from Ethiopian colleagues and respondents 
indicated that they resented cross-country comparisons which I tried to draw 
rhetorically, but comparison is a useful aid to sharpening our contextual 
knowledge (de Vries, 1992).  
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Table 6.1 below presents a very abbreviated comparison of Ethiopia, Tanzania 
and Vietnam. It is designed to identify whether there are any similarities or 
contrasts between these three multi-ethnic countries, each of which has a 
history of Marxist-Leninist inspired government, each still effectively a one-party 
state. The table is effectively a checklist of factors considered in the Ethiopian 
fieldwork, to see whether those factors are present in the cases of Tanzania and 
Vietnam. 
 
Table 6.1. Comparative Overview: Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam 
 
Characteristic Ethiopia Tanzania Vietnam 
Multi-ethnic Yes Yes Yes 
Multi-language Yes No No 
‘Historic’ past is important Yes No Yes 
Underlying belief system EOC - Confucianism 
Strong national identity Yes No Yes 
North-south cultural “divide” Yes No Yes 
One party state (effective) Yes (EPRDF) Semi (CCM) Yes (VCP) 
Opposition Weak Weak - 
Political renewal by ‘purge’ Yes Yes Yes 
Leadership - authoritarian Yes No Yes 
Leadership - patronage ? political Yes ? political 
Colonial past No Yes (brief) 
Past ‘Sovietisation’ Yes Yes Yes 
Marxist-Leninist ideology Yes (residual) Yes (+ market) 
Government microstructure 
Yes (5 hh, 30 
hh) 
Yes (10hh, 100 
hh) 
Yes (25-30 hh) 
Participation as contribution 
of labour (+ sanctions) 
Yes, allocated 
by hh groups 
Yes, but not 
enforced 
Yes, allocated 
by hh groups 
Participation as contribution 
of ideas 
Yes No  Yes 
Use of oratory for 
exhortation and ridicule 
Yes No Yes 
Peasant-based rhetoric Yes (Ujamaa, former) Yes 













Yes Yes Yes 
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Public self-criticism and 
evaluation 
Yes  No Yes 
Culture of ‘critique’ of 
authority 
Yes Weak Yes 










Value to individualism No Yes No 
Value to collectivism Yes No Yes 
Value to self-help Weak Weak Strong 
Kinship-based structure No (south only) Yes No 
 
 
Although Tanzania is sometimes used by donors as a comparator with Ethiopia, 
it appears that the Ethiopian context has more parallels with Vietnam than with 
Tanzania. One marked contrast with Tanzania was the nature of leadership: 
leadership in Tanzania is patronage-based rather than authoritarian. As in 
Ethiopia, disgruntled clients could change their allegiance if a better patron was 
available (Kelsall, 2008: 632-634), although there was little opportunity for local 
people to hold leaders to account (Lange, 2008: 1139-40). Civil society in 
Tanzania also appears markedly different, with wide ranging (often leisure 
based) associational life, with open membership and little regulation (Tadasu, 
2006; de Weerdt et al., 2007: 24-25). Mass organisations are far more powerful 
in Vietnam, where the Vietnam Fatherland Front is “the overarching political 
alliance of all the mass organizations” (UNDP, 2006: 7). Many Vietnamese 
CSOs are former government agencies. What Ethiopia, Tanzania and Vietnam 
all share is a government micro-structure organising households into small 
groups. Even though in Tanzania, cell leaders (of ten households) have no 
development, data or tax collection responsibilities, this level of organisation 
challenges donor assumptions of government-community relations.  
 
I found fewer differences between Vietnamese and Ethiopian practice of 
participation and evaluation. One was the value placed in Vietnam on 
technological innovation and on self-help through hard work (Duikers, 1995: 
192). Unlike the Ethiopian concept of the individual as intrinsically evil, battling 
with self-control, the Vietnamese individual tries to master their “inner selves” as 
a root to self-improvement and harmony (McCloud, 1995: 789). However, as in 
Ethiopia, individualistic behaviour is regarded as selfish, short-sighted and risks 
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jeopardising the good of the community; individualism is a pejorative term linked 
to self-indulgence (Marr, 2000: 769, 789, 794). Another difference was the 
importance attributed to (non-reciprocal) social obligation (Malarney, 1997: 912). 
Far more marked were the similarities, including Marxist-Leninist conceptions of 
leadership of a peasantry which was both knowledgeable/ignorant. I was 
surprised to read a description of Vietnamese oratory, which sounded similar to 
Ethiopian style: “The rhetoric is nearly poetry, that lovely, lilting oral culture thing, 
seeing it this way and then that, space for inflection, nuance …” (Craig and 
Porter, 2006: 138). The Vietnamese form of public self-criticism, kiem thao, has 
many similarities with gemgemma. 
 
Participatory monitoring is a key part of the 1998 Vietnamese legislation, 
Grassroots Democracy Decree, but the concept is well-entrenched. One of Ho 
Chi Minh’s slogans was “The people know, the people discuss, the people do, 
the people evaluate and check up” (Craig and Porter, 2006: 134), a rhetoric 
found in the EPRDF’s Revolutionary Democracy. However, there appear to be 
greater opportunities for expressing resistance to local government 
performance, particularly when contribution of labour was unequally enforced 
(Malarney, 1997: 402-403). Widespread “everyday forms of resistance” to 
unpopular policies were acknowledged, and responded to, by the “Party-state” 
(Conway, 2004: vii). 
 
Craig and Porter argue that it is difficult for Vietnamese to see the benefits of 
“liberal openness” over their traditional structures and institutions (Craig and 
Porter, 2006: 126). Cultural and polity patterns were sufficiently embedded to 
withstand, indeed to reject, the Western model of representative democracy 
(Duiker, 1995: 80). In South East Asia, Western democracy is sometimes 
referred to as “50%+1” indicating that one vote can alter an election. They prefer 
a consensus model, “communal democracy which relies on discussion and 
consensus building and in which the vote  - often unanimous - is not taken until 
after a consensus has been established.” While Western social scientists have 
‘romanticised’ this in the village context and been highly critical at state level, the 
pressure to conform is regarded locally as an expression of “community will, 
bringing errant individuals into line for the greater community good” (McCloud, 
1995: 273). 
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The logic of the NAA suggests developing countries are susceptible to 
persuasion to adopt Western democratic and administrative patterns. Their own 
experience has shown, however, that countries such as Ethiopia and Vietnam, 
and to a lesser extent highly-colonialised Tanzania, accept donor “influence” at 
their own pace. In both Ethiopia and Vietnam, Marxist-Leninist ideology appears 
to have been synthesised with customary practices, and the strength of their 
cultural and belief systems provide a counterweight to donors’ influence. 
 
6.5.3 Information-Sharing: Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity 
 
Joints sources of information 
 
Under the NAA, donors who use ‘up-stream’ modalities no longer have access 
to contextualised information against which to analyse indicators contained 
within the PRSP policy matrix. PPAs offer an alternative source. While the first 
generation of PPAs was designed to elicit contextual information on the “realities 
of the poor” to inform donors’ programmes, the second generation are designed 
to “create new relationships within the policy process” and to influence recipient 
government’s policy-making processes (Norton, ODI, 2001: 11). Although the 
PPA process is supposed to be ‘owned’ by the government, it is clear from 
review of 1st and 2nd generation PPAs in Vietnam and Tanzania that both 
donors and government had difficulty identifying local partners with sufficient 
capacity to conduct and analyse the PPA and resorted to using INGOs (World 
Bank Hanoi, undated: 5).  
 
In 2005, two participatory assessments were conducted in Ethiopia, to which 
donors had access: a PPA and a Citizens Report Card survey. The authors of 
the Ethiopian PPA were international economists (one British, one Ethiopian) 
with extensive experience in Ethiopia, and the survey was conducted by the 
government’s MWU, with support from the CSA. Although its authors are critical 
of labour contribution, the PPA does not capture the ubiquity and extent of 
labour contribution, presenting it as voluntaristic rather than obligatory. They 
describe the sub-kebele administrative structure as ‘social’, when it clearly 
carries out administrative functions such as tax collection and mobilisation for 
public works; the descriptive ‘social’ masks the power relations between the 
Chapter 6: Participation and Evaluation in Government-Community Relations  
 226 
kebele, local leaders and ordinary citizens. The PAN/E (CRC)53 was funded by 
the DAG donor group and contracted to the Public Affairs Foundation of India. 
The analysis appears weakly contextualised, with statements being made which 
seem at odds with the regional or country context. Its statements that “there is 
little evidence in the meetings that hard data is monitored on a routine basis for 
decision-making” and that there is no participation in local “assessments of 
performance” (PAN/E, 2005: 20) appears to ignore local practice. 
 
Both surveys employed focus group discussion (FDG) methods. When the 
Ethiopian PPA used “a representative community discussion group” to elicit 
perceptions about aspects of rural life (EPPA, 2005: 12), it would be useful to 
know what proportion were leaders of five-household cells or 30-household 
development groups. The same clarification would be useful in relation to “key 
informants” within the community (ibid: 14). Describing a “diagnostic” FDG as 
“quite untried in the Ethiopian context”, the CRC expressed surprise to find that 
“communities are open to giving objective and honest feedback” (PAN/E, 2005: 
19).  
 
Without contextual analysis, it is difficult to estimate how powerful such surveys 
as the CRC can be in donors’ discussion with the government. The CSA 
described the CRC somewhat dismissively as an “independent small survey”, 
but it was also equivocal about the qualitative methods used in the government-
commissioned PPA: “The PPA survey was anchored to the WMS to be able to 
link qualitative outcomes with quantitative ones and at the same time enable 
analysts gauge whether the outcomes from the qualitative surveys are reliable 
or not with in a reasonable margin of error. This helped reasonably avoid 
common pitfalls of qualitative surveys.” (MOFaED, APR 2006/07: 122). It is also 
not clear  how much value donors attributed to them. The CRC’s importance 
seemed largely rhetorical, as few donors claimed to have read it.  
 
Elements of congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity 
 
My respondents’ explanations of their conception of development, participation, 
evaluation and accountability showed a broad degree of internal congruence, 
                                               
53
  Amhara Region refused to take part in the CRC; the Afar region data was dropped 
from the report because it was considered unreliable. 
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except at higher levels in the administrative structures where conceptions of 
participation from Western discourse were discursively included. In the 
interviews, I found a broader range of views expressed among respondents 
living in villages near the main roads than in the more remote villages visited54. 
In Amhara and Tigray, only some of the (few) main roads were metalled, there 
were very few rural roads, and many woredas had no electricity or telephone. 
This meant that there were many villages which were rarely visited by woreda 
officials, only by young DAs and junior agricultural experts able to walk to 
them55. The meetings held by local leaders outside the church on Sundays 
would be the only source of ‘official’ information in remote villages, and 
government information delivered in a manner consistent with existing 
knowledge and cultural patterns would be easily assimilated.56  
 
The sources of information available to rural communities (limited largely to the 
EOC and Party/Government sources) are consistent with Denzau and North’s 
concept of mental models being formed by culture and belief systems. Initiatives 
such as Drivers of Change suggest that, despite individuals’ in-country 
knowledge, experience and value-framework, the international ‘community’ 
largely disregard local history, culture and political systems. The data presented 
here suggests that, particularly under NAA orthodoxy with its assumptions of 
attitudinal change, these factors should to be taken into account in order to 
understand the trajectory of change.  
 
The social actor approach presupposes heterogeneity at the interface. I had 
deliberately chosen to carry out the fieldwork in a variety of sites across both 
regions in order to get a range of responses, but the responses themselves 
showed a greater degree of consistency than I anticipated.57 This does not 
mean that disjunctures were not present, nor that there was no evidence of 
                                               
54
   In the 2005 election, opposition support was strongest in the urban areas and, 
discounting Tigray as the TPLF/EPRDF stronghold, support for the government was 
strongest in remote villages. 
55
  More than half the population lives more than 10 kms from the nearest road (World 
Bank report No. 29468-ET) 
56
  A federal government official told me that he thought donors had no understanding of 
the psychological world view of most Ethiopians. 
57
  As a result of cross-regional similarities identified during the PPA, its authors noted 
that “it is possible to treat all rural PPA sites as variations on particular themes that have 
wide application across the whole of rural Ethiopia” (PPA, 2005: 10). They further 
concluded that “Ethiopia presents itself as relatively equal, manifested by the narrow 
ranges of farm size and livestock ownership” (ibid: xviii). 
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change. There was evidence of conflict and exclusion, and concepts of 
participation were, to a limited extent, adjusted across the administrative 
hierarchy so that customary and newer meanings could both be incorporated. 
Despite this accommodation, there were recurring themes (Table 6.2) in the 
Ethiopian interviews. What had become clear following analysis was that 
discussion of participation and evaluation necessarily included discussion about 
the nature of development itself, within the context of rural development 
administration. 
 
Table 6.2. List of Emerging Themes from the Ethiopian data 
 



















Evaluation linked to 
individual performance 
Uncertainty about the 




The following chapter (Chapter 7) analyses the responses of donor staff when 
asked about their understanding of participation and evaluation, as individuals 
and as donor representatives, and their understanding of how participation in 
evaluation is perceived and practiced in Ethiopia. Analysis identified a number of 
synchronicities with the themes in Table 6.2. The interviews also deflected, 
undirected by me, into discussion about the nature of development, where 
individual donor staff juggled their own development values against those of 
their donor agency and those with whom they interacted ‘in the field’.  
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CHAPTER 7 






This chapter explores how three bilateral agencies, CIDA, DCI1 and Sida, 
conceptualised participation and evaluation, and how their staff perceived it to 
be practised in Ethiopia. It is the counterpart to Chapter 6 which analysed the 
findings from similar semi-structured interviews with Ethiopian respondents 
affected by the donors’ aid programmes (described in 4.3). The chapter 
structures the findings under the three broad headings used in Chapter 6: 
national concepts of the ‘development project’, participation and evaluation. 
Long’s social actor approach argues for a recognition of heterogeneity amongst 
actors, here those working at the development interface of ‘harmonisation’ in 
Ethiopia. The underlying approach is to consider individual donor staff as social 
actors, noting how they respond to the development narratives and policies 
adopted by their own employing agency and those of the international 
community. The analysis explores how concepts, experience and values 
discussed by individual staff accord or differ within and across donor agencies, 
and how anomalies are handled. In doing so, it identifies areas of congruence, 
disjuncture and ambiguity which allow sharing information, learning and 
influencing through shared mental models.  
 
As 3.6.6 explains, the ‘selection’ of donors occurred fortuitously through their 
willingness to take part in their research.2 The textual analysis of donors’ 
(publicly available) documentation, section 7.2, was undertaken after the 
fieldwork was complete. In what I see retrospectively to be a form of othering, I 
looked for the antecedents of each donors’ values of participation and evaluation 
after the interviews were completed (having read academic discourse on 
participation, evaluation and development management before the fieldwork). 
The significance of ‘national’ values and patterns of association and 
communication, which I had gleaned from the literature on Ethiopia prior to 
fieldwork, only became apparent following analysis of the donor interviews. The 
                                               
1
  The acronym being used by Ireland’s aid programme in 2004-2005. 
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documentary analysis located each donor agency’s value framework within the 
documents they presented for consumption by their domestic audiences. The 
analysis draws on DAC peer reviews, with commentaries from the literature on 
donors’ programmes and their country’s social capital. A caveat here is the 
disparity in the quantity of literature available about each donor’s practice. There 
is comparatively little analysis of Irish aid practice in the public domain; there is 
rather more literature on the Canadian aid programme; and there is a very large 
literature about Swedish overseas assistance, from internal and external 
sources. Despite this disparity, there is a demonstrable consistency within the 
documentation for each donor.  
 
Section 7.3 analyses the findings from interviews with donor staff. It uses the 
sub-themes identified in the Ethiopian data (Table 6.2) to explore the values, 
underlying belief systems and practice expressed by respondents during 
discussion centring around the three main themes: the nature of development, 
participation and evaluation. 
 
 
7.2 DEVELOPMENT VALUES, PARTICIPATION AND EVALUATION: 
DOCUMENTARY REVIEW 
 




Canadian aid promotes Canadian values, specified as global citizenship, equity 
and environmental sustainability (GoC, 2005a: 2). Of these, global citizenship 
seems to be given greatest priority. Canada positions itself as a leading member 
of the international donor community, committed to multilateralism, and thus to 
the MDGs and to harmonisation. It describes multilateral organisations as “a 
forum to promote values important to Canada, including democracy, human 
development and social justice” (ibid: 27). Berger describes Canada as “a multi-
cultural country where diversity is celebrated and immigration is a constant 
reality”; and “because of diversity in culturally based traditions, religions, and 
histories, different cultures hold culturally distinct sets of values and beliefs” 
                                                                                                                               
2
  A criticism of my research ‘mental model’ could well be that I did not include interviews 
with staff from DFID, my own country’s agency, but DFID declined to take part. 
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(Berger, 2006: 116, 117). The challenges associated with such cultural diversity 
causes Canadians continually to “examine the accessibility, inclusiveness, and 
equity of their institutions and processes” (Berger, 2006: 117).  
 
This need to promote domestic cohesion (Noel et al., 2004: 31) is reflected in 
three foreign policy objectives: “jobs and prosperity; common security; and 
Canadian values and culture. It is categorical that Canadian development 
assistance is an integral component of foreign policy and an instrument serving 
these three integrating national interests.” (Pratt, 1999: 89). As a multicultural 
society, “Canada has learned how to make effective and principled 
compromises, bringing disparate groups and interests together in the service of 
a common purpose” (GoC, 2005b: 4). Noting that “Canadian aid is an instrument 
serving foreign policy objectives”, the DAC Peer Review of Canadian aid (2003), 
warns that Canada risks placing “socio-economic interests ahead of responding 




The key principles which drive Ireland’s development programme are 
effectiveness, value for money, transparency and accountability, “a holistic 
approach to the struggle against poverty”, “policy coherence with other aspects 
of Irish foreign policy”; together with rigorous monitoring and evaluation (Ireland 
Aid, 2003: 5). “These guiding principles … place Ireland at the cutting edge of 
international development policy. Ireland consequently continues to set the high 
standards for its official development co-operation programme” (OECD, 2003b: 
24). 
 
Ireland sees its aid programme as rooted in its historical past and its Roman 
Catholicism, with the missionary work effectively providing a “template” for Irish 
aid (Ireland Aid, 2003: 68). “Ireland’s own experience of colonisation, poverty, 
famine and mass emigration has provided a basis for a long tradition of solidarity 
with the poor and dispossessed.” (OECD, 2003b: 11). This is evident in the 
language in its Aid Effectiveness report: “Never has there been a more exciting 
opportunity for Ireland to express its solidarity with the struggle of developing 
countries against poverty and inequality and its determination that these evils 
will be overcome.” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 92). There is considerable public support 
for NGOs working in developing countries, because “The Irish take pride in 
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these direct and personal efforts to reduce suffering in the world” (OECD, 
2003b: 19). NGOs “have shown exemplary compassion and commitment in the 
help which they have provided over many years for the poorest people of the 
world”, and “have helped to shape a clear sense of … the moral leadership 
which Ireland can exercise in this area” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 62). The DAC review 
agreed that “Ireland aims to implement a high-quality official development 
cooperation programme in line with international good practice and, increasingly, 
to set an example for other donors” (OECD, 2003b: 19). 
 
Edmondson’s description of community life in the West of Ireland suggest 
parallels with Ethiopian mores: “neighbourliness is counted a phenomenon 
which is more important than individuals, not a contractual relationship between 
them.” Strict rules about social actions, such as attendance at funerals, “are 
followed, without exception”; the opinions or wishes of the individual are not 
important, “It was the impersonal nature of the action which was felt to be 
admirable” (Edmondson, 2001: 62). Failure to comply with interactional ‘rules’ 
invoked a “judicious silence” of disapproval or the use of gossip and ridicule. 
The importance of consensus was apparent: “In joint political activities, voting on 
committees, which underlines the possible existence of different opinions, is 
considered divisive; attempts are made to bring round dissenters to the general 




Swedish aid is an expression of Swedish social values, in which “solidarity with 
the underprivileged is regarded as a moral responsibility” (Hook, 1995: 104). 
Discussion of values permeates Sida’s documentation, whether in relation to 
participation, to partnership, to management style or to evaluation and this sub-





Traditionally, Swedish society has been marked by “high levels of trust, both 
vertically (between citizens and the elite) and horizontally (between individuals). 
Concepts such as consensus, collaboration, and cooperation were important 
ideological markers of Swedish society” (Rothstein, 2002: 292). The tenets of 
Chapter 7:  Donors’ Perceptions and Practice 
 233 
jantelagen,  the ‘law’ of humility, include: “thou shalt not believe thou art as good 
as we”; “thou shalt not believe thou knowest more than we”; “thou shalt not 
believe thou canst teach us anything”3. This appears in Sida policy: “no party 
can claim superior knowledge that should be superimposed on other parties” 
(Sida, 2005d: 49; King and McGrath, 2004: 29). The adjunct of jantelagen is 
lagom: appropriateness, moderation; “not too much, not too little” (Arora-
Jonsson and Cornwall, 2006: 84). These concepts have connotations of 
fairness, gender equality, and subsidiary values include patience, avoidance of 
both praise and competitiveness.  
 
Commentary on social capital suggests that Sweden and the other 
Scandinavian countries continue to be “high-trust societies”, but trust is 
horizontal in nature and linked to high levels of voluntary activity (Rothstein, 
2002: 324), with “92 per cent of all Swedish adult citizens belong to at least one 
voluntary organization” (Rothstein, 2002: 299). While strong associational life 
explains the adoption of Third Way social inclusion, parts of Swedish society 
consider that “neo-liberalism simply is un-Swedish” (Eliaeson and Jedrzejewska, 
2004: 2, 9).  
 
Expression of values within Sida 
 
Swedish values permit a greater degree of openness and transparency within 
Sida than the other two donors and its self-reflexivity provides a spotlight on its 
values as an organisation and as a collection of individuals. Sida recognised that 
its staff had “normative driving forces” with individual staff setting up unrealistic 
personal goals (Sida, 2005b: 24). Staff “considered it was not possible to speak 
of orientation of results, openness, insight and transparency in decision-making 
processes in programmes of development cooperation and then not do these 
things at home” (ibid: 24). King and McGrath note the self-critical nature of 
documents written by Sida’s own staff (King and McGrath, 2004: 153), who 
together with Swedish politicians and development workers talk about the 
“historic inadequacies of Swedish development professionals” (King and 
McGrath, 2004: 150), even though Sida is widely considered an exemplar of 
good aid practice. A recurring complaint among staff was that Sida as an 
organisation failed to learn from its experience; that insufficient time and effort 
                                               
3
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jante_Law [accessed 09.04.08]. 
Chapter 7:  Donors’ Perceptions and Practice 
 234 
was devoted to monitoring and evaluation, with lack of coherence in reporting 
structures and lack of analysis (Sida, 2005b: 22, 34, 36). On the management 
side, Sida expressed concern about attitudinal ‘problems’. Its approach was to 
allow “elements of sub-cultures” to exist within Sida, giving individual staff a 
degree of freedom (Sida, 2005b, 24).  
 
7.2.2 Concepts of Participation and Agency 
 
As all three donors were advocates of the NAA, this sub-section reviews donors’ 
documentation for statements about different facets of participation: 





CIDA played a major role within the OECD-DAC in promoting harmonisation 
(CIDA, 2002a: 8), and has used Shaping the 21st Century as a basis for its 
current policies (R6). In accord with its global security agenda, CIDA prefers to 
work with the multilateral agencies and its contributions to the IFIs are above 
DAC average. The DAC peer review noted that “CIDA is currently modifying the 
role played by field staff in order to increase their involvement with multilateral 
organisations” (OECD, 2003a: 52). 
 
“Partnerships with civil society4 and the private sector in Canada and overseas 
have been distinctive elements of Canada’s approach” (GoC, 2005a: 29). As a 
result, much of CIDA’s support has taken the form of tied aid, thought to provide 
greater domestic support and a “positive image” of Canadian values and 
interests conveyed internationally by Canadian organisations (CIDA, 2002a: 20). 
Clark et al. suggest that Canadian businesses, academics and NGOs have 
more influence with CIDA than recipients “because they are more strategic 
political allies and supporters of CIDA than actual aid recipients” (Clark et al., 
1997: 156). In aid relationships, CIDA has adopted the policy, backed up by the 
Office of the Auditor General, of ‘enhanced partnership’ with selected developing 
countries which “have demonstrated they can use aid effectively.” (GoC, 2005a: 
                                               
4
  CIDA’s Partnership Branch is responsible for programme delivery by NGOs (CIDA, 
2002a: 22-23) 
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22), based on governance issues, including supporting for human rights, gender 
equality, democratic development, and the rule of law” (CIDA, 2002a: 7). 
Canada’s geo-political concerns are acknowledged in the eligibility criteria for 
partnership: “Special consideration may also be given to countries with the 
potential to exercise regional leadership.” (ibid: 12). 
 
Although “CIDA considers that fostering local civil society organisations is an 
important element in building a democratic society.” (OECD, 2003a: 38), 
discussion of civil society in its documentation is dominated by the multicultural 
nature of Canadian society. ODA policy focuses on building security through 
good governance; “Our future is intertwined with that of people around the globe 
struggling to secure democracy and human rights”, because “[s]ecurity and 
development are inextricably linked” (GoC, 2005a: 1). Human rights abuse was 
a key concern (reflecting perhaps its immigrant population), but Canada would 
not take corrective action unilaterally, only in concert with other donors and 
multilateral institutions (CIDA, 1996: 16). 
 
CIDA defines democratic participation as “strengthening popular participation in 
the exercise of power, building democratic institutions and practices, and 
deepening democratic values in society”. In addition to elections, democratic 
participation “also takes place” through civil society which serves “to articulate 
and channel people’s concern”. CIDA’s definition of a strong democratic society 
includes the rights of freedom of opinion, expression and association; tolerance 
for dissent and opposition and “a high level of public understanding of and 
participation in the political process” (CIDA, 1996: 21). 
 
Empowerment is only discussed in CIDA’s policy documents in terms of gender 
empowerment (Scrutton and Luttrell, 2007: 1, 3). Although it supports civil 
society organisations which provide advocacy for democratic participation, the 
concept of empowerment as ‘voice’ or ‘agency’ is only discussed within its 




Ireland expressed interest in harmonisation “due to the expected benefits in 
terms of improving aid effectiveness and reducing transaction costs” (OECD, 
2003b: 69). The DAC thought Ireland would be ready to adopt flexible 
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approaches and adjust its procedures in order to harmonise” (OECD, 2003b: 
69). However, Ireland showed ambivalence about working with multilateral 
agencies, expressing concern about the effectiveness of some UN agencies and 
disquiet about the power of the World Bank (Ireland Aid, 2003: 72, 75). While 
acknowledging donors’ dependence on the World Bank for producing the 
statistical and economic data used to monitor progress in developing countries, 
the Committee on Aid Effectiveness wanted the Bank to recognise Ireland’s 
comparative advantage in local knowledge (Ireland Aid, 2003: 74-75). 
 
Partnership is one of DCI’s key aid principles and should be “built on mutual 
respect and parity of esteem” (DCI, 2004d). Partnership is achieved through 
mutual understanding, because “Ireland’s objective in preparing country 
strategies is to reach a shared definition of the partner’s needs and an agreed 
programme of action by Ireland for addressing these which complements the 
partner’s own [PRSP]” (OECD, 2003b: 67). Its concept of partnership is based 
on defined responsibilities and transparent dialogue, setting out “a clearly in a 
structured framework for cooperation”, but this was conditional on “frank 
dialogue…. but if more serious difficulties arise, such as a manifest lack of 
political will on the part of the recipient country to take action required for its 
development, there will be a need for reassessment.” (Ireland Aid, 2003: 19). 
Dialogue plays a key role: programme approaches facilitate “regular, open 
dialogue and encourages the partner to take the lead in the formulation of 
development strategies, thereby contributing to the strengthening of capacity in 
programme countries” (OECD, 2003b: 67).   
 
DCI had a distinct view of civil society based on its domestic policy. Aid “should 
be mirrored in a strong sense of partnership domestically” with social partners, 
defined as trade unions and employers, and the voluntary sector (Ireland Aid, 
2003: 14). Ireland was one of the first European countries to develop 
‘partnership governance’ with its own civil society and voluntary organisations 
(Geoghegan and Powell, 2005: 846).  
 
While it provides support to Irish NGOs, who focus primarily on health and 
livelihoods issues, relatively little focus is given to citizen advocacy work or to 
the role of CSOs, possibly reflecting the primary role of social welfare in DCI’s 
development strategy. The DAC review advised DCI to increase its support for 
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advocacy and the private sector (OECD, 2003b: 13); this accords with the DAC 
agenda, but is at variance with DCI’s key priorities. 
 
Democratic participation is defined in terms of values: “Central to our value 
system is a belief in the equal rights and dignity of all human beings” (OECD, 
2003b: 18), but it is seen in terms of individual agency, “an integral element in 
human development” (OECD, 2003b: 18). Review (by Scandinavian 
consultants) of DCI’s Human Rights and Democratisation scheme noted the 
importance it gave to grassroots community empowerment (CMI, 2002: 1) but 
concluded that the scheme lacked focus may be due to an indigenous desire ‘to 
help’. In Ireland’s domestic experience, volunteers have been ‘mobilised’ by 
“notions of ‘care’; a response to an experience of poverty; religion” and class-




The DAC Peer Review states that “Sweden is at the forefront of the international 
agenda on harmonisation and alignment”, and that Sweden was influential in the 
formulation of the DAC’s Strategy for the 21st Century (Sida, 2005a: 19). An 
internal review concluded that Sida had the requisite “flexibility and mandate” to 
harmonise its programmes, based on Sida’s long-standing partnership approach 
to development cooperation (OECD, 2005a: 88), and harmonisation offered the 
opportunity to “exert an influence on the partner countries and other donors” 
(Sida, 2005b: 510). 
 
Sida has been one of the more effective countries at implementing delegated 
partnerships with like-minded donors, particularly with Norway and the 
Netherlands (OECD, 2005a: 15). Sweden has a series of concentric circles of 
common interest; the original ‘Nordic’ group of Scandinavian countries is 
expanded under the principle of ‘good neighbourhood’ to include the Baltic 
States; its immediate Nordic donor partners may  be expanded as the Nordic 
Plus group to include, depending on the circumstances, the Netherlands, 
Germany, the UK and Canada. Sweden has a European identity (“Sweden in 
Europe”) and a global identity (“Sweden in the World”), the latter based on a 
vision of joint security through multilateral and bilateral partnerships (OECD, 
2005a: 19).  
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Dahl suggests that the ‘relative neutrality’ of the term ‘partnership’ in Swedish 
allows it to be used ambiguously in Swedish aid discourse (Dahl, 2001: 15). As 
well as retaining its links with solidarity, partnership is presented as ‘modern’ 
because, unlike “the ‘old-fashioned’ policies where recipients were not held 
accountable because of naïve, leftist idealism”, partners now have 
responsibilities (Dahl, 2001: 24). During the 1970s and early 1980s “Sida was 
mesmerized by the idea that aid must be given on the terms set by the recipient, 
and that Swedish aid was an act of solidarity” (Elgstrom, 1999: 153). By the late 
1990s, there was much greater emphasis on partners’ responsibilities, linked to 
prudent stewardship (Molund, 2000: 3, 23). King and McGrath found a tension in 
Sida thinking: on the one hand its partners “already have the requisite 
knowledge and that Sida can simply facilitate”; at the same time Sida 
increasingly felt that its partners should understand Sida’s philosophy (King and 
McGrath, 2004: 142).  
 
Participation in Democratic Governance (2002) demonstrates that Sida was 
experiencing difficulty synthesising its previous ‘knowledge’ about participation 
as empowerment, which drew on the language of power and social exclusion, 
with the newer global agenda around good governance. In discussing 
representative democracy, decentralisation and civil society organisations as 
vehicles of improved participation, the description of each is followed by a list of 
risks or impediments which are often rooted in the local political and cultural 
context. Sida ‘makes a bi-causal link between democracy and poverty reduction, 
but frames representative democracy as ‘indirect participation’, offering “very 
few opportunities for direct participation in decision-making”. Although 
decentralisation offered an alternative opportunity for citizens to hold 
government to account, it would not necessarily lead to increased democracy, 
participation or poverty reduction (Sida, 2002c: 4-7, 16, 19).  
 
Despite the strength of Swedish civil society structures, Sida describes civil 
society as an amalgam of competing interests and values, influenced by history 
and culture, with varying degrees of dependence on the state, with institutions 
which may perpetuate conflict and authoritarianism (Sida, 2004c: 9-10, 14-15, 
23). Sida advises its staff, including those who expect recipient governments to 
consult civil society about PRSPs, of the necessity to analyse “how the dividing 
lines in civil society run”, and to be conscious that CSOs themselves may be 
undemocratic (Sida, 2004c: 16, 14).  
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The language of social capital links this agenda with Sweden’s own 
associational experience so that, while the possibilities of people exerting “an 
influence on their lives are generally greater if they organise themselves 
together with others than if they are alone” (Sida, 2004c: 11-13), the benefits 
include “networks of trust, norms and informal rules” (ibid: 12). At the same time, 
Sida cautions it staff against making assumptions about CSOs based on 
Sweden’s own context (ibid: 24). 
 
Sweden’s Policy for Global Development emphasises that the need to 
“contribute to an environment supportive of poor people’s own efforts to improve 
their quality of life” (OECD, 2005a: 31), but empowerment other than via 
membership of civil society organisations receives little attention. Participation of 
the poor within traditional forms of association is understood to be restricted by 
shortage of time, lack of skills and resources, ethnic and religious division, and 
may be constrained by hierarchical and ‘unresponsive’ local mechanisms (Sida, 
2002c: 12).  
 




When CIDA undertook extensive public opinion surveys in 2002, it found 
widespread support for development cooperation but scepticism about aid 
effectiveness. CIDA clearly places the Canadian public as principles, defining 
accountability as ‘stewardship’ (CIDA, 1998: para 1.2). It is here that the 
language of personal values, which permeate DCI’s and Sida’s documents, is 
found: “Accountability starts with the commitment of individual staff members to 
CIDA’s values, which include respect for others, integrity, equity and 
transparency; full expression of staff potential; and quality service” (CIDA, 
1998a: para 3). CIDA recognises a challenge between meeting its obligations for 
accountability to Canadian citizens and “its commitment to OECD DAC 
Principles of Donor Harmonization” (OECD, 2006a: 135). Alignment is an 
“exception” to standard hierarchical accountability because the recipient 
government also shares responsibility for development results, although CIDA 
has the greater accountability (CIDA, 1998a).  
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CIDA prides itself in its implementation of RBM; its documentation links 
monitoring more directly to performance, “refining as we go”, resulting in 
“continuous learning” (RBM Handbook on Developing Results Chains, 2000: 5, 
6). In accord with DAC comments about its bureaucratic nature, CIDA has a 
complex series of measurement frameworks. “CIDA’S corporate logic model” is 
based on Key Agency Results which “operate at three levels of outcomes” and 
“form the core of CIDA’s Results-Based Management Accountability 
Framework”: “development results (impact on developing countries”) (OECD, 
2006a: 135); “enabling results (effective programs and strategies)”; 
“management results (the right tools, internal to the agency)” (OECD, 2006a: 
135-136). The DAC Peer Review suggested that, if poverty reduction was an 
overarching objective, it would need a clearer message within CIDA’s mandate 




Unlike CIDA and Sida, DCI has little documentation in the public domain about 
its approach to evaluation, although Ireland’s value-driven development 
programme recognised that it needed to promote an evaluation culture within 
DCI in order to increase institutional learning (OECD, 2003b: 64). Its Evaluation 
and Audit Unit was given the mission to do so (DCI, 2004c: 1).  
 
DCI did, however, have a comprehensive reporting system, but the DAC review 
recommended that the frequency of reporting be reduced (‘streamlined’) (OECD, 
2003b: 64). It also suggested that DCI had failed to embrace the principles of 
alignment, such as joint monitoring and relying on evaluations and audits 





Sida’s characteristically self-critical review of its own performance management 
concluded that there were “no clear linkages between the overall goals of 
development cooperation and the activities for which Sida is responsible” (Sida, 
2005b: 7). Internal reviews criticised delays in evaluation and lack of analysis 
(Sida, 2005b: 12). Sida studies also criticised the quality of reporting. A balance 
had to be struck between performance analysis reports that were too detailed, 
Chapter 7:  Donors’ Perceptions and Practice 
 241 
with the result that they were not read in their entirety, and the use of summaries 
which were too brief to be useful (Sida, 2004b: 9, 22). Overall, monitoring and 
evaluation is considered a difficult process (Sida, 2003a: 5) and is problematised 
in the Evaluation Manual (Sida, 2004a: 11). The Learning and Skills Unit 
described Sida as “a knowledge organisation” in which knowledge development 
is ‘a social process’, involving dialogue, networking and reflection and finding 
“ways to tell other people about your work” (Sida, 2005e: 5-6, 11, 14). It was 
also noted that dialogue taking place as part of harmonisation and as a 
feedback mechanism following evaluations was usually not documented and the 
information gained was lost; institutional memory was also lost with turnover of 
staff (Sida, 2005b: 43, 45). At the same time, there was concern about the 
adoption of the NAA. PRSPs would necessitate additional analyses by Sida to 
ensure they represented the interests of the poor (Sida (undated-a): 1), and 
there was apprehension that emphasis on “processes for creating alliances … 
and creating good relations” would weaken the ‘orientation on results’ (Sida, 
2005b: 22).  
 
The Global Development Policy (2003) also changed the M&E balance within 
Sida and with partner governments. It posed problems of attribution due to ill-
defined borders of responsibility between the different Swedish government 
agencies responsible for its implementation (Sida, 2005f: 12-13). The new Policy 
& Methods Unit would be “responsible for stringent quality assurance of country 
strategies” (ibid: 10), and that “Sida and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs must 
have an active role in requesting performance information, or must at least have 
an idea of how to use it.” (Sida, 2004b: 22).   
 
7.2.4 Indications for Harmonisation and Alignment 
 
Analysing the development values which donors present in the documentation 
written for their domestic voting and tax-paying audiences, indicates that donors’ 
development strategies are strongly influenced by cultural norms and social 
structures, and are tied in with concern for public opinion and therefore domestic 
political and foreign policy. Patterns are discernible between each donor’s 
development values and the country’s domestic values, influencing each 
agency’s development ‘identity’ and the forms of their engagement with others.  
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Harmonisation requires that donors’ values and practices are sufficiently 
congruent that they can coordinate their programmes of aid delivery. As 4.3 
demonstrated, the donors did not share geopolitical objectives and their 
documentation indicates that their values and priorities differ. Each donor 
claimed to have a particular advantage over other donors, in the form and 
degree of ‘empathy’ - CIDA claiming its multicultural immigration, DCI its 
empathy borne of colonial history and religion, and Sida its length of 
engagement and its historical solidarity. Their domestic social structures, the 
status accorded to civil society and communication patterns also differed. 
 
As regards alignment, CIDA placed emphasis on civil service reform, capacity 
building and governance issues and therefore more likely to be interventionist in 
government management systems, rather than receptive to the adoption of the 
recipient’s systems. DCI and Sida, on the other hand, were more likely to invest 
in social sectors and to approach partnership according to the empathy and the 
mixture of solidarity and reservation indicated in their documentation. 
 
 




Respondents included headquarters and embassy expatriate staff, embassy- 
and regionally-based national staff and contract staff. Most embassy and 
regionally-based staff were interviewed two or three times, with four-six month 
gaps between interviews. I have also included comments from key informants 
within Ethiopian universities and civil society. The interviews took place between 
October 2004 - November 2005.  
 
As ‘political development’ featured so strongly in many of their responses, I have 
presented their comments about the political economy of development first 
(7.3.2), followed by an exploration of donors’ access to local knowledge (7.3.3). 
This provides the context in which to consider their views about participation 
(7.3.4) and evaluation (7.3.5). This order corresponds with the Ethiopian 
concepts of development discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, in 7.3.6, the 
interviewees’ own agency is considered in relation to policy and practice.  
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7.3.2 Aid, Politics and Development 
 
Development as a Political Process 
 
Politics featured in donors’ responses in two ways: geopolitics and ‘politics as 
development’. All three agencies were keen advocates of the NAA and the 
influence of the new orthodoxy was evident in discussion of technical monitoring 
with donor interviewees. “Development is no longer technical or specific, it is 
now concerned with global issues” (R7). “The global political process was 
always there but donors have decided - or allowed themselves - to blur the lines” 
between development and politics; “everything now is ‘dialogue’” (R8). The 
responses  below accorded with the characteristics of each of the donors in 
terms of development values and organisational cultures described earlier. 
 
Within Sida, policy had become focussed on partnership/ownership since 1998, 
with ‘methods’5 being driven by the global political situation and the requirement 
for information from M&E was now “overtaken by global issues such as 
harmonisation.” (R9). This “creates tension”, because some within the agency 
say that the new modalities are an “empty shell” (R10). Although there had been 
concern whether global issues were reflected in changes ‘on the ground’, there 
was no debate among policy makers about the effectiveness of the NAA; 
instead, discussion within the agency focused on “how change takes place”, 
through structures or institutions or local agency (R11).  
 
Within CIDA, the new modalities were described as "very political programmes" 
(R12). Because development was understood to be political in CIDA (R13), 
political channels of communication between embassy and headquarters were 
now stronger than technical channels: the Country Director reviews "every piece 
of paper" of politically sensitive material. Staff thought that M&E was less 
important than previously, because “maybe donor attribution doesn't matter 
nowadays, because politicians have signed up to a political agenda”. In 
contradiction to Canadian government rhetoric, in “Results for Canadians”, staff 
doubted whether the Canadian public has much interest in attribution. (R14) 
 
                                               
5
  Sida’s use of the word ‘methods’ is equivalent to ‘approach’ (R15). 
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Responses from DCI staff revealed a range of opinions about the role of politics 
in development: one respondent was adamant that development is political, 
“Because Africa has such fragile states, development can't be technical”. (R16). 
On the other hand, because Ireland did not have a geopolitical 'agenda', Ireland 
had no specific 'rights based' foreign policy, which therefore “fits round 
development cooperation, rather than the other way around” (R17). Both 
headquarters and embassy staff also acknowledged that DBS was controversial 
in Dublin, because of its political nature (R18, R19). Staff at Embassy level also 
thought that DCI’s Advisory Board “don't understand the pressures from foreign 
affairs, the political imperatives” 6 (R20).  
 
The increased political role of development was influencing recruitment. 
Previously, CIDA had been staffed by “lifelong development specialists” but 
"now that development is more political", CIDA staff were expected to have had 
previous experience in other government departments (R21). Sida also 
previously had long-term specialist staff, but was having recruitment difficulties, 
now recruiting NGO employees, postgraduates without previous experience and 
academics who had not necessarily had any field experience (R22). The Irish 
government seconded diplomatic staff (described somewhat dismissively as 
“career civil servants”) to work in development cooperation (R23). The reduced 
role for technical expertise created tension in DCI and particularly so in Sida. 
The shift from technical to political was not recognised as a problem in CIDA, 




Some respondents from each agency thought that NAA modalities were 'more 
efficient' because they reduced transaction costs for donors (R24, R25, R26), 
avoided the problem of fungibility with projects, and avoided fragmentation of 
donor effort (R27). Benefits of DBS included greater influence (“a bigger stick”), 
greater transparency of the national budget and more effective (joint) donor 
missions (R28). Reducing transaction costs for the government, the main 
argument underpinning the new orthodoxy, was mentioned by one respondent: 
“anything which reduced the burden on government staff, leaving them to get on 
                                               
6
  The Advisory Board’s membership was drawn from NGOs, the Catholic church, 
among others. 
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with development, would be of benefit” (R29). Transaction costs were often 
linked to project modality: “the drawback of projects is that the government 
doesn't know what money is sloshing around"; “TA distorts the incentive 
structure within government” (R30). 
 
Sida’s decision to move away from projects followed internal debate in 1998, 
and it was “now moving towards the new modalities very fast” (R31). Within a 
range of opinion among CIDA staff, one respondent who supported arguments 
for 'scaling up' modalities recognised, after the election, that they needed to 
keep a 'balanced portfolio' (R32). Aware of debates with HQ about the 
relationship between DBS and governance, DCI also recognised the need to 
retain a range of modalities and regions, “so that we don't have all our eggs in 




Within the rhetoric of harmonisation, differences of approach were apparent, 
with exclusionary language sometimes used in relation to those who questioned 
the current orthodoxy. Although DAG was described by one respondent as 
‘unanimous’ (R34), there was no unanimity, for example, about DBS. The US for 
example believed it to be ‘illegal’ (R35), the Netherlands did not use DBS 
because of Ethiopia’s failure to comply with the international ruling on the 
Eritrean border issue, and felt it had greater freedom of action by not being a 
DBS donor. GTZ also had doubts that DBS was a worthwhile modality. Asked 
the extent of unanimity within the DAG, given Norway’s different strategy, one 
DAG member was rather dismissive: “Oh Norway, well, they just do their own 
thing - we don’t really take any notice” (R36). Another thought that small groups 
within DAG with different ideas “shouldn't challenge harmonisation” (R37). 
 
Donors also had different objectives and strategies for governance. CIDA’s 
approach was civil service reform, particularly a World Bank initiative, PSCAP7, 
to support the Ministry of Capacity Building. DCI had reservations about PSCAP, 
particularly “its institutional aspects”, and thought other donors had similar 
concerns (R38). The Dutch described PSCAP as “too big, too complex”. The 
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differences of approach was encapsulated by the importance different donors 
ascribed to governance performance indicators. A small group of donors 
(including DCI and Sida, but not CIDA) worked together to compel the World 
Bank and the other donors to accept the need for governance indicators in the 
PASDEP8 policy performance matrix; “we insisted that they were included, even 
if it meant forcing a delay” (R39).9 The split reflected each donor agency’s 
development values (see 7.2.2). In DCI’s case, this resistance confirmed 
Ireland’s equivocal approach to the power of the World Bank; CIDA 
demonstrated its unequivocal support for the multilateral agencies. There were 
different opinions about conditionality, with one donor who thought governance 
indicators were unnecessary describing these donors as “less transparent about 
conditions, especially on governance issues”, suggesting that interest in 
conditionality was more for the donors' benefit than for the Ethiopian people 
(R40). The opposing view was that most donors, except DCI, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, “ignored politics prior to the election” (R41).  
 
Within the DAG, therefore, there were different groupings of donors, depending 
on their interests and objectives. CIDA considered their ‘like-minded donors’ 
were “generally” the Dutch, EU, WB, USAID, DFID, Sida. On PSCAP, their 
current supporter was DCI. On DBS, their like-minded donor was Sweden (R42). 
DCI’s like-minded donors were Nordic+2 (the Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands and DFID). On the Productive Safety Nets programme, DCI 
recognised which donors were 'like-minded' by the language they used; it was 
important to know who had the same viewpoint as them (R43). DCI singled out 
the Netherlands as having particular synergy: neither country had “political 
baggage”, and so could “join together to be voices against those with other 
agendas” (R44). Working out these relationships seemed to be less important to 
Sida staff, but in practice Sweden’s relationship with Norway was important. 
Although Sida had moved from its traditional welfarist approach closer to a 
global security approach, and had surprised its traditional partner Norway by its 
adoption of DBS,  despite both the Eritrean question and Ethiopia’s poor human 
                                                                                                                               
7
  Public Sector Capacity Building Programme ($397m), based in the Ministry of 
Capacity Building and designed to trickle down through government departments and 
woreda bureaux to kebele level. 
8
  The PASDEP was Ethiopia’s second full PRSP. 
9
 As a Tigrean government official discussed with me, sub-national quantitative 
measures of attendance at meetings, or even speaking at meetings, represent at best a 
limited and ethnocentric indicator of empowerment in the Ethiopian context. 
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rights record, the two countries enjoyed continued trust by ‘delegated 
cooperation’ of their health and education programmes. 
 
Donor staff recognised that the NAA altered the nature of their own 
‘participation’. The complexity of interests and relationships within the DAG 
meant that presentation and influencing skills were more useful for working with 
other donors than with government (R45). Each individual agency had to create 
credibility and acceptance of its role by other donors (R46). CIDA thought that 
the government conceived the donor community as a hierarchy, with the World 
Bank at the top, followed by the European Union, DFID and then CIDA (R47). 
The government restricted dialogue with non-DBS donors (R48) so some felt it 
necessary to contribute a small amount to a pool-funded activity, despite 
reservations, in order to have “a seat at the table” (R49, R50).  
 
Donors therefore spent more time interacting with each other in different 
groupings and, with the adoption of the NAA and its modalities, less time with 
government or with their intended beneficiaries. Figure 7.1 sets out the ‘dialogue 
architecture’ between donors, and between donors and different levels of 
government. It shows that choice of modality dictated the opportunities for 
donors to gain feedback from ‘the field’.  
 
 
Figure 7.1.  The ‘Dialogue Architecture’ 
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‘Development as Politics’: Congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity 
 
In congruence with Ethiopian officials and leaders, staff from all three donors 
stated that development was largely ideological. Donors’ individual normative 
frameworks had to be adapted to the prevailing orthodoxy, differences in 
national priorities and values being accommodated and compromises made 
where possible. Although senior government officers were aware of donors’ 
ideological concepts, references to Revolutionary Democracy were ‘filed away’, 
either conceptually or physically, by donors so that the government’s ideology 
was not discussed, merely its openness to pluralism. By not discussing ideology, 
it appeared that the government was prepared to accept liberal democracy by 
allowing multiparty elections. 
 
Both donors and government exhibited the ability to label Ethiopian citizens as 
both ‘knowledgeable’ (their participation being regarded as valuable for 
effectiveness) and, at the same time, ‘not knowledgeable’ (needing to be 
educated or led)10. There was an element of this in the relationship between 
donor headquarters and the field offices: HQ provided policy and assumed that 
the field offices would implement it; the field offices provided data but HQ did not 
have the ‘capacity’ to use it. The NAA rhetoric requires recipient governments to 
work with donors both as equal partners (partnership) progressing to senior 
partners (ownership), but donors lacked confidence in the government’s 
technical capacity and, where it was important for donors, such as in 
‘humanitarian’ circumstances or in reaction to political violence, donors 
reasserted a degree of control.  
 
7.3.3 Understanding the Local Context 
 
Acquiring Local Knowledge 
 
As all three donors’ documentation had emphasised the importance of local 
knowledge (CIDA through decentralisation to country offices, Sida via its ‘Field 
                                               
10
 This ‘capacity’ labelling was particularly apparent in government officials’ descriptions 
of farmers. Revolutionary Democracy assigns peasants a role as the engine of change. 
Officials would say “farmers know all there is to know” but a few minutes later would 
describe them as backward and illiterate, requiring instruction and firm leadership. 
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Vision’ which was designed to inform policy formulation, and DCI as a source of 
‘reality checks’), it was useful to find out how this local knowledge was gained.  
 
Staff from all three agencies said that they relied on information from Ethiopian 
staff working for their embassies; some also relied on other donors whom they 
met at meetings or socially, on the press and some undertook field visits. CIDA 
expressly did not seek or use information from their regional projects; DCI 
gained information from the TRSP and from its activities in SNNP; Sida’s local 
information was built up over a long period of engagement in Ethiopia and 
therefore was not dependent on its SARDP programme alone. All three donors 
could access information from INGOs, particularly those from their own 
countries. Only one member of staff, on a short-term contract, mentioned 
academic research as a source of information. Despite the harmonisation 
rhetoric around sharing reports, there was mixed evidence of this. It seemed to 
be important to be on the circulation list: recent reports were frequently referred 
to in passing but most respondents had not had time to read them.11 
 
Within CIDA, there were highly contrasting views about the relevance of 
acquiring information about the local context. These ranged from confidence in 
the data provided by the government so that acquiring additional information 
from alternative sources was unnecessary, to concern about the agency’s lack 
of local knowledge: “Why does CIDA know so little?” (R51) There was openness 
about discussing local issues between international and national staff at the 
Swedish embassy but, although Sida staff claimed to be reasonably confident in 
their level of local knowledge, they expressed frustration at not being able to use 
it at the local level. DCI’s staff felt that the TRSP gave them a better 
understanding of local institutions and cultures than was available to most other 
donors, and that they had a responsibility to share this ‘reality check’ with their 
colleagues in the DAG. Sometimes these colleagues rejected this assistance on 
the grounds that DCI’s Tigray knowledge could not be generalised across the 
country (R52). DCI was aware from its other activities, for example in the SNNP 
Region, that “It’s a country of such diversity that [we] are not sure insights are 
transferable” (R53) Staff from all three donors cited high staff turnover as a 
                                               
11
  Despite donors’ claims for the value of monitoring by civil society, they claimed not to 
have read the PAN/E Citizens Report Card report. 
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waste of institutional knowledge, leaving national staff employed in the 
embassies as holders of institutional memory.   
 
International staff who had worked elsewhere in Africa found the contrast in 
working relationships most clearly apparent in the ‘determination’ of Ethiopians 
to pursue their own objectives. For some, the consequence of this was a 
tendency for the Ethiopian partners to be ‘less compliant’ (R54), to exhibit an 
“inability to accept compromise” (R55), and reluctance to consider lessons 
learned from other African countries (R56)12. Opacity in Ethiopian 
communication patterns meant that it was difficult to gather genuine opinion 
(R57). Other respondents admired “the way that the Government states what it 
wants and how it wants to do it, and will stick to its guns” (R59); “they ‘drive the 
train’, but it means that they do have opinions” and have a strong sense of group 
identity (R59). This lack of deference to the international community reflected a 
“sense of equality”; “maybe [the donors] are arrogant, thinking that they are 
being ‘useful’”(R60).  
 
Donors noted evidence of honesty and self-criticism among government staff, 
but, at the same time, the government was “too ambitious” and “monolithic” in its 
planning; its refusal to undertake pilot projects resulted in roll-out of 
inappropriate technologies and lost opportunities for capacity-building (R61, 
R62, R63, R64). It was thought that the Government’s development strategy 
over-estimated the possibility of behavioural change: “think how difficult it is for 
Westerners, let alone those with restricted choice” (R65).  
 
Concepts of Local Power 
 
Within CIDA, understanding of local structures and institutions of 
government/community relations ranged from lack of concern about the absence 
of information, based on the assumption that CSOs were an adequate 
counterweight to the government, through to some perceptive inferences based 
on broader political knowledge - despite a lack of knowledge of local structures. 
CIDA had chosen not to use their projects as sources of information about the 
local context, although long-term international TA staff could have provided a 
useful understanding of local structures and local patterns of communication, 
                                               
12
   There was interest in learning from Chinese experience (R73). 
Chapter 7:  Donors’ Perceptions and Practice 
 251 
such as the role of persuasion and of gengamma. (Newly-arrived international 
TA had to find their own way through cultural and political complexities and it 
was evident from their responses that each expatriate relied on a conceptual 
lens from their own culture and experience.) One expatriate noticed that 
disagreements in internal project meetings often resulted in heated discussion 
but then eventually everyone “caves in” (R66). He thought this was probably 
cultural but he was worried that there may be “tension further down the line”. On 
the other hand, meetings went on for a long time so that everyone could “have 
their say”, even if “it's the same as the previous person said”. (R67).  
 
In both DCI and Sida, there was a degree of tension between staffs’ comments 
on the structures of power around which their programmes were constructed, 
what they actually understood to be happening in reality and concern about the 
perceived gaps in their knowledge. For DCI, the ‘process’ was of greater 
significance than the current status of power relations, with ‘process’ appearing 
to be more or less a substitute for ‘goal’, an end in itself13. Although they had 
identified working in the ruling party’s home region (Tigray) as ‘high risk’ for 
DCI’s credibility, international staff were content with information received via the 
joint steering committee meetings with Tigray government staff, even though (or 
perhaps because) they themselves had sketchy knowledge of local organisation 
below kebele level. They had noticed in recent evaluations that the views of the 
community had been represented by kebele leaders and intended to insist on 
community access for a forthcoming study (R68). More probing questioning 
subsequently revealed a greater degree of understanding of local structures and 
processes than originally apparent, but it was qualified by comments about it 
being ‘anecdotal evidence’. It seemed as though labelling it in that way 
distanced the respondent from the unpalatable possibility that their Tigrean 
partners could be packaging public opinion for donor consumption. 
 
‘Process’ also seemed important in the Sida programme: decentralisation, as a 
‘process of change’ at woreda level “allowed Sida to compromise” (R69). Sida 
had a dilemma: it had information from its own staff, from evaluations, 
monitoring visits and from formal reports, that government structures controlled 
their SARDP programme to the exclusion of Swedish concepts of community 
                                               
13
 Process approaches require active management with regular monitoring and 
evaluation to facilitate iterative learning and thus modification (Bond and Hulme, 1999). 
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participation, and yet their commitment to ownership prevented them from 
intervening (R70, R71). Although the SARDP programme was thought to 
empower local farmers through provision of information at local workshops, 
some international staff were unable to discuss participation with farmers 
themselves, both because they were not allowed unmonitored access but also 
because they were anxious not to put farmers at risk. Others thought that 
farmers feared to show their increased empowerment because of political 
reprisal. An expatriate thought the didactical nature of professional inputs from 
DAs and local experts was cultural in origin (R72). It appeared to another that 
local political influence was extensive; it explained why there was a lack of 




National staff were able to contrast local concepts and practice with donors’ 
concepts, saying that participation was understood uniformly through the levels 
of government to the community as the contribution of labour and materials. For 
the government, giving people the right to decide was “incomprehensible”, ‘true 
participation’ was “threatening”, though a few officials were more “enlightened”. 
For presentation purposes, contribution was described as 'participation' but 
“everyone knows it's coercion”. At the same time, contribution “is seen as a 
good thing by farmers, as well as by government”. (R74). One respondent 
separated 'political participation' conceptually into ‘civil society’ and 'grassroots' 
(R75), but another said that EPRDF influence, reaching down into the 
community via the Women's, Farmers' and Youth Associations, linked the two 
(R76). There were people who represented the Party down to "the groups of 
seven households" so that no-one was unaware of Party influence. For people 
who disagreed with the Party line, the possibilities were either to ‘agree’ with the 
Party, or to be ignored or “be threatened”. (R77). National staff were adamant 
that yilungta was political in nature, not cultural, and thus farmers only offered 
positive comments in gengam(ma). It was clear from comments made by 
Embassy staff with experience at field level and by national staff who had 
experience of working in different regions that there were regional variations in 
the nature of local political institutions and the degree of agency these afforded 
both donor staff and local people. In SNNP, for example, “society is more open, 
but less controlled by the Party” (R78). In Tigray, despite Party dominance, local 
people were given more opportunity to debate and challenge government 
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interventions. In Amhara, there was comparatively less opportunity for local 
people to express their opinions.  
 
National staff were concerned at the gap between donor rhetoric on ‘good 
governance’, and the actual nature of ‘participation’ and the depth of 
government influence down to household level. The government had learnt to 
use donors’ participatory jargon in order to “bless” their own activities as 
‘community participation’ while in practice setting and enforcing quotas for 
compulsory labour (R79). Another comment was that “donors are soft on 
government, they’ll only react strongly if there's an extreme issue” (R80).  
 
My suggestion that they had a challenging role ‘interpreting’ the local context for 
their international colleagues was rejected, each of them claiming that they were 
able to discuss issues openly with their international colleagues. Interviews with 
embassy national staff and some of their regional colleagues were sometimes 
quite tense, with respondents showing reluctance to answer questions. It was 
easier for them to discuss tensions that existed with regional counterparts, 
because the new modalities had damaged their ‘legitimacy’ beyond the 
embassy. The extent to which they could be considered as a form of broker (see 
2.5.4) was unclear. As technical specialists, there was less demand for their 
expertise under the NAA modalities. Their contextual knowledge would have 
made them sceptical about the likely impact of the liberal democratic narrative, 
and its value outside the embassy. Embassy employment did offer the possibility 
of training outside the country, including postgraduate study, and access to the 
‘international’ job market, including work with multilateral agencies. Rather than 
using the gap in rhetoric and understanding between donors and government 
opportunistically, these respondents seemed to me to regard the gap as a 
source of contention and frustration, particularly with the high turnover of 
international colleagues. 
 
Local Knowledge: congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity 
 
How international staff handled that information accorded closely with the 
development values expressed in their agency’s documentation and with 
independent commentaries reviewed in 7.2. Staff within CIDA did not collect 
local information, but recognised retrospectively that it had political value as 
regards their own strategy was concerned. Both DCI and Sida collected local 
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information but were restricted by their own values in the ways that they could 
apply it. Their values of ‘empathy’ and ‘non-interference’ respectively appeared 
to restrict them from delving more deeply into local power structures.14 The local 
knowledge provided by national and programme level staff accorded with the 
responses provided during community-level fieldwork in Amhara and Tigray, 
even though the description of power structures and their effects were 
interpreted differently according to the respondents’ political perspective. 
International TA was another source of information untapped by CIDA and Sida, 
ostensibly because of different reporting structures. Newly arrived consultants 
had difficulty interpreting the local context accurately, and filled the gap by 
drawing on their own mental models. The gap in local knowledge between 
international and national staff at the embassies, rhetorically small, was either 
unapparent to international staff or experienced as unexplored tension by 
national staff.  
 
Donor staffs’ own understanding of ‘participation’ and their knowledge of local 




Concepts of Participation 
 
Donor staff interpreted the term ‘participation’ in three different ways: as a 
vehicle for aid effectiveness, as political space and as embodied by civil society. 
Synthesising their views has been difficult because the term was used in an 
undifferentiated way, allowing different donors to conceive it differently, staff 
within the same agency to understand it differently and for individuals to use the 
term to express conflicting meanings, depending on the context.  
 
At Sida HQ, participation was understood both as part of ‘good governance’, as 
a right, and instrumentally, as a tool for aid effectiveness. In-country staff shared 
this understanding of what role participation should play in SARDP activities 
(“community participation is the basis of Sida’s interaction with the Region”), but 
                                               
14
 When this research data was presented to each of the three donors, DCI’s reaction 
was shocked surprise, CIDA’s reaction was focused on political issues (a desire for 
political, rather than a development management, analysis; and confirmation of the 
existence of opposition to the TPLF in Tigray), and Sida’s reaction was lack of surprise. 
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their equivocal explanation of local power structures belied this role for 
community participation. Having said that communities understood participation 
to be the compulsory provision of labour, Sida “doesn’t demand contributions [of 
labour], it is included by the government who demand that the community 
contribute, but Sida is neutral on this” (R81). Sida national staff suspected that 
contributions are not voluntary as the government claims, but found it difficult to 
prove otherwise: “There probably are enforcement methods but Sida doesn’t 
know about them” (R82). For some national staff and regional colleagues, 
discussing questions of voluntarism or punishment for non-participation was 
difficult to tolerate, and cut short their interviews. 
 
DCI’s international staff had difficulty reconciling their own ideas about what 
participation meant, how the Government viewed participation and finally how 
donors practiced participation. One normative view incorporated both 
participation as political space and as a tool in aid effectiveness: participation 
should be an inclusive process, consulting the community, allowing it to have a 
say. Participation leads to a sense of ownership and greater outputs, everyone 
has a part to play in shaping the agenda, ensuring its relevance; participation 
should be included in processes, by consultation. The Government lacks belief 
in the utility/relevance of the community's involvement. The Ethiopian 
government says "We will participate the people", i.e. they are told what to do. 
The government is unconvinced by participation in the Western sense, they're 
still talking about political mobilisation. It views real participation with distrust, as 
potentially threatening. On the other hand, from their previous experience, staff 
thought that participation at woreda level was less ‘top-down’; the community 
may not participate in the western sense because they are not asked in the first 
place - the process is only extractive, there's no incentive for people to 
participate. (R83). A question about the possibility of risks being attached to 
participation resulted in a reflection on the nature of local participation: a surmise 
that “fear of punishment is not truly participatory. Can the community be 
objective if they have ownership? Whose voices are heard? Local government 
might dominate in meetings, so it can't be objective.” (R84).  
 
This hesitation about the nature of local participation conflicted with that given by 
DCI’s regional employees, who were confident that in local meetings the 
community spoke out voluntarily; “if people don't want to give information, they 
can say no”, but people have “nothing to hide” (R85); and if some people spoke 
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too much, and what they were saying was wrong, they were shouted down by 
others (R86). Despite this, the government only involved people in 
implementation. It depended on the woreda and on the “mobiliser” whether 
participation was compulsory, but the tabia (kebele) could turn down woreda 
requests if they did not agree with the priorities set. Feedback from the 
community had suggested that 20 days’ labour per annum was ‘welcome 
contribution’.15 Any reluctance to participate meant “they do not really 
understand the concepts of commitment and ownership” (R87). Local donor staff 
believed that community involvement leads to sustainability, that communities 
are responsible for development so they need to 'invest' (through their effort). 
The communities might see failures in implementation but would not understand 
the link between ‘participation’ and change (R88). Local donor staff thus partially 
synthesised international donor concepts of voluntary participation and 
empowerment with government strategy of development and empowerment 
through ‘contribution’. Their expression of surprise when the community 
challenged government officials during a joint monitoring viisit was unexpected, 
given that they were Tigrean and would be fully familiar with TPLF rhetoric and 
culture of public criticism. However, it was said with a sense of pride and 
perhaps illuminates the overlap between the Western concept of ‘voice and 
agency’ and local concepts of participation via the contribution of ideas.  
 
Within CIDA, very different ideas about the meaning of participation were 
expressed. For one individual, participation was understood as solely the 
engagement of civil society in policy dialogue (R89), but several others 
described it as ‘political space’. Not using information from its projects or NGOs 
to inform its thinking about participation, CIDA staff had no contextual 
experience to draw on when questioned about the meaning of participation at 
community level, so said that they would have to ask a colleague for that 
information (R90, R91). They did not know how community representatives were 
chosen; they thought that there were citizen representatives at woreda level but 
did not know the mechanisms (R92).  
 
Observing one of CIDA’s ‘old-fashioned’ projects would have provided them with 
some understanding of local mechanisms. The views of the project co-directors, 
                                               
15
  Embassy staff also said that, in circumstances such as border tension with Eritrea, 
people would contribute labour voluntarily because it was ‘in the national interest’. 
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collectedly separately, illustrate the difference in interpretation when local 
knowledge is accessed. National consultants, together with local government 
officials and leaders, had selected farmers to take part in the project at a 
meeting of 200 farmers fortuitously called by the kebele, before selection criteria 
had been defined by the project. The newly-arrived international TA described 
this method of selection as “efficient” but unscientific (R93). In his interview, his 
national counterpart explained that the government’s practice was to discuss an 
issue with church or community leaders a minimum of three times before they 
started planning an activity. Communities sometimes said ‘no’, and the project 
had to accept that but, at the least, community contributions of labour and 
materials were necessary (R94). He thought that “100% participation results in 
empowerment”. Food aid had led to dependency, "So we tell farmers, either use 
your land productively or you'll lose food aid. If they say that their land is 




Those donor staff who included a third meaning for participation, embodied as 
‘civil society’, talked about it more in terms of instrumental use, than as a 
political right. Civil society was described as an counterbalance to the 
Government, and as an alternative source of information (R96). Asked to define 
civil society, one response was "all those affected but, as it's too hard to get to 
the villages, we need to use CSOs”. (R97). Other definitions included 
professional associations, the media and the private sector but generally ‘civil 
society’ was used interchangeably with ‘NGOs’ as claimants to political space. 
Advocacy was therefore one instrumental use; another was as an adjunct to 
local government, whereby Regional government should involve civil society in 
governance; in this view, CSOs were not expected to be the voice of local 
people, it was thought the responsibility of woredas to ensure that “community 
voices were heard” (R98).  
 
Among civil society leaders, the nature of CSOs at community level was 
problematic: while in theory the concept of civil society should include traditional 
associations, in practice local CSOs were drawn from Women’s, Farmers’ and 
                                               
16
  Land tenure is largely hereditary, but can be reassigned by the woreda. Resettlement 
is rarely voluntary. 
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Youth Associations and from cooperatives. These were thought by some donors 
to be ‘too politicised’, and lacking independence from the Party, so that donors 
preferred to work with national NGOs which had a ‘specific focus’ indirectly, via 
international NGOs. Other donor staff did not know whether there were any 
organisations which represented the community apart from NGOs and, possibly, 
cooperatives; they were unaware of Women’s, Farmers’ or Youth Associations 
(R99).   
 
There was general (though not unanimous) concern about the capacity of 
Ethiopian CSOs. Within a single agency, one respondent thought that CSOs 
lacked capacity and “political nouse” (R100), another thought that existing civil 
society mechanisms were adequate (R101). A third thought that, unlike the 
Government, the NGO umbrella group, PAN/E, “can accept compromise” 
(R102). Comments from national staff included CSOs’ lack of local knowledge 
because they rarely travelled from their Addis base; and that donors “protected” 
NGOs too much, and “should give them a different kind of support. African and 
Asian rights-based NGOs will confront the government, at some cost to 
themselves” (R103).  
 
Donors regarded their support to PAN/E as a capacity building exercise; civil 
society was getting stronger because “PAN/E spoke up well against the 
Government at a recent meeting” (R104). Asking whether the CSOs were 
representative of rural Ethiopian interests provoked some reflection: “I’m not 
sure whether NGOs think of themselves as representative. Umbrella groups 
may see themselves as representative, but they are already selective, 
aggregated” (R105). Given the rhetoric about the importance of civil society, one 
donor thought it surprising that donors did not invite CSOs to sit on their M&E 
groups (R106). The DAG had considerable interaction with PAN/E during 2004 
but, in early 2005, this virtually ceased. When asked in December 2005 about 
PAN/E’s involvement in PASDEP (the new PRSP) consultation, one of the 
donors directly involved did not know whether the DAG had contacted civil 
society groups but assumed that “they must have contacted PAN/E” (R107). 
 




Effective verbal skills were important for donors as well as for Ethiopians. Good 
communication skills were vital for negotiating with and influencing other donors 
and establishing their agency’s role and status within the DAG, for those acting 
as representatives of DAG thematic working groups in meetings with Ethiopian 
government staff and for development cooperation staff who had diplomatic 
duties. Poor communicators were thought to hinder progress. ‘Influencing’ had 
become a recognised modality, and an OECD-DAC paper suggested that 
donors should recruit staff on the basis of their communication and influencing 
skills, rather than their technical experience (OECD, 2005c). Just as Ethiopian 
communities were encouraged to participate through the use of persuasion and 
exhortation, persuasive skill was also important for ‘influencing’ and for 
promoting each donor agency’s comparative advantage, whether in 
development values, experience or evaluation methods. Each country had 
distinctive communication patterns. The social capital and cross-cultural 
literature suggests that Swedish conversational style is ‘economical’ and Sida 
had established a learning centre to teach staff communicative skills to enable 
‘learning’. The communication patterns of Canadians and Irish were described in 
the social capital literature in terms of social cohesion, the Canadian style 
influenced by its multicultural population and Irish communication structured 
according to conversational rules designed to maintain consensus.  
 
Consensus and collectivity 
 
The literature on social capital in these three donors’ societies suggests that 
consensus has also been important. It was important to minimise conflict in 
Canada’s multicultural society; in rural Ireland expressing different opinions in 
public meetings was considered divisive; and in Sweden, social mechanisms 
existed to avoid confrontation.  
 
Despite the rhetoric about harmonisation and the DAG as a representation of 
donor convergence, heard more strongly in CIDA than the other two agencies, 
consensus within the donor ‘community’ was problematic because agencies 
held different views, had different strategies, and formed different subgroups 
according to shared priorities and levels of concord. Donors formed different 
patterns of association, depending on the subject-matter and the importance 
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they ascribed to it. Disagreeing with one donor on one topic, did not preclude 
working with them on another. Where consensus was required, for the PRSP 
matrix, for example, compromises had to be made. However, while some 
aspects of the matrix were negotiable, governance indicators - for some donors - 
were not.  
 
Despite being members of ‘the donor community’, staff were aware of the 
differing objectives and organisational cultures. An agency might be a member 
of ‘Nordic+’ group, belong to a ‘common foreign policy’ grouping or switch 
between them, depending on the circumstances. Individual staff’s values were 
largely congruent with their agency’s stated objectives, but their responses 
indicated that individual identities were important: differentiation as a technical or 
a policy expert, or as someone with an NGO background rather than being a 
‘bureaucrat’ or civil servant. An individual could bring different identities to the 
fore depending on the context, presenting themselves as a member of the donor 
community when talking about harmonisation, and as a ‘coalface’ development 
worker when discussing empowerment. Their national staff had several 
identities: as habesha, as ‘donor staff’, as well-educated expert, as metropolitan 
visitor to the regions.  
 
Review of the literature on identity in 3.5.2 suggested that individuals hold 
multiple self-conceptions. Figure 7.2 overleaf sets out, very schematically, the 
different identities which my respondents revealed in interviews. As discussed in 
6.3.5, a local Ethiopian leader could hold multiple identities. In proposing this 
schema, I stress that it relates to ‘social actors’ roles within aid-funded 
development, not to their social lives and relationships. While national and 
international donor staff also held multiple, overlapping identities, unlike the local 
leaders, their identities were not (loosely) concentric. National donor staff were 
‘national experts’ in the embassy, but, when they went to the field, they were 
metropolitan, expert, donor staff but also habesha (and might have a defined 
ethnic identity as well). When I raised the question of these possible identities, 
national staff did not find the question tolerable and dismissed it without 
discussion. In contrast, the different backgrounds of the international donor staff 
affected their sense of identity quite precisely; technical specialists tended to 
make a clear distinction between themselves and staff who had a civil service 
background, who they sometimes labelled ‘bureaucrats’. If they had an NGO 
background, this was often mentioned in discussion as giving them a privileged 
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viewpoint. National identity was a further complication; they had to identify the 
skills and experience which each brought to the donor forum and allied 
themselves with other, like-minded donors. Gender was a further ‘identity’ for 




Figure 7.2.  Conception of congruence/disjuncture in identities 
within the local aid chain 
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Concepts of Participation Congruence, disjuncture and ambiguity  
 
Donors’ conception of participation in meetings clearly had some resonance with 
the government’s expectation that ‘innovative risk-takers’ within the community 
should ‘contribute ideas’. Participation in implementation of development 
activities was also couched in positive terms. There was, however, no overt 
recognition by donors that contribution was compulsory. Compared with the 
clarity about concepts and practice of participation in Ethiopian government-
community relations, donors’ perceptions were confused, malleable and 
susceptible to different interpretations, depending on the respondents’ and their 
agency’s values and political priorities. However, there was significant 
congruence in the importance of some of the skills required to facilitate 
participation: persuasion, exhortation, and communicative facility to enable 




Section 7.2.3 briefly outlined the different approaches to evaluation in donors’ 
literature. This section explores respondents’ views about evaluation and its role 
in aid effectiveness and performance management. The responses covered a 
number of aspects which fell into two main themes: vertical relations (the aid 
chain) and horizontal relations (the NAA). Within the vertical thread, there was 
discussion of evaluation as an aspect of hierarchy and as a manifestation of 
spatial distance. Evaluation was also an area of contestation in horizontal 
relations, as the various ‘partners’ negotiated how to work together, whom to 
trust, and what could legitimately be done or said. 
 
M&E within the aid chain 
 
 Spatial-hierarchical relations 
 
Both Sida and CIDA staff referred to ‘Paris’, to denote the OECD-DAC, when 
discussing aid policy and strategy17 (R108, R109). For CIDA, the agency most 
committed to harmonisation, this relationship was clearly important. When Sida 
                                               
17  “The global development agenda essentially gets fashioned in Paris” (King 
and McGrath, 2004: 14). 
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staff mentioned Paris, it seemed sardonic: “this type of information” (technical 
knowledge) has been “overtaken by global issues such as harmonisation” 
(R110). While CIDA welcomed working with the IFIs, Sida staff felt IFIs tended 
to dominate joint evaluations meaning that Sida’s years of experience in 
evaluation were ignored (R111). 
 
There was general concern about the power which superior capacity in handling 
quantitative data afforded the World Bank (R112, R113), perhaps at the 
expense of the recipient country’s objectives and ownership (R114). Although it 
was recognised that detailed discussion of performance indicators was “too 
difficult” for bilateral donors, particularly those without a technical background 
(R168), the need for consensus meant that donors had “gone for the highest 
level of aggregation - nothing below output", because the Bank used 'policy 
actions' rather than specific performance indicators (R115).  
 
 Donors’ evaluation structures 
 
CIDA staff in Ethiopia spontaneously described evaluation in terms of nested 
hierarchies of procedure. CIDA was developing a ‘Performance Activity 
Structure’, into which a Strategic Results Assessment Framework (SRAF) would 
feed, and the Performance Activity Structure fed back into the Management 
Results structure (R116). Some of CIDA’s staff talked about this structure very 
easily, others appeared to find it unnecessarily complex, but their comments 
confirmed the literature in 7.2.3, that CIDA places great emphasis on its 
bureaucratic systems. 
 
The responses from Sida staff also conformed to analysis and commentary on 
Sida’s approach to evaluation: an emphasis on self-criticism. All staff queried the 
effectiveness of Sida’s ability to analyse and utilise the information it collected. 
The complexity lay in the administrative structure rather than the processes. 
Different facts of monitoring, analysis and evaluation were covered by sectoral 
staff headquarters, by the Evaluation and Audit (UTV) unit or by embassy staff. 
There was also potential confusion between the Policy & Methods Unit, UTV 
and the proposed new, independent, evaluation unit.  
 
DCI headquarters thought that field staff were reluctant to agree to evaluations 
and hoped that, by involving embassies in designing the evaluations, field staff 
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would come to view evaluations more positively (R117). Embassy staff said that 
M&E was vitally important to learn lessons, particularly with the new modalities 
(R118, R119) but local staff had a far clearer concept of evaluation than their 
international colleagues. Staff in Tigray thought that the purpose of evaluations 
was for donors to confirm that “the money is being wisely spent, objectives being 
met”. The only possible explanation for not doing evaluations could be that 
donors trusted the government (R120).  
 
 Performance management 
 
Only CIDA had a system of performance management, though not all its staff 
were clear about it. A new performance measurement tool, the SRAF, would 
replace the APPR which was “too anecdotal” (R121). The SRAF was being 
linked to the PRSP matrix but, as one respondent wryly commented, since the 
matrix for PASDEP had not yet been agreed and as the SRAF is based on 
indicators from the matrix, “It’s a bit difficult!” (R122). Staff at DCI said there was 
no link between programme evaluation and individual performance appraisal 
(R123). Although Sida had commissioned a study on incentives, staff said the 
idea of performance-related pay was “taboo”; rather, Sida staff have “a strong 




Technical reporting in all three embassies was either being reduced or 
refocused on political issues. This accorded with the NAA, but reduced 
opportunities for on-going analysis and iterative learning and contrasted 
markedly with the frequency built into government reporting systems. SARDP 
programme’s quarterly reporting was considered “too frequent” by Sida 
headquarters, even though there was unease about the quality of reporting 
(R125). DCI’s regular reporting system of monthly ‘snapshots’, two monthly 
monitoring reports and an annual report no longer included six monthly sectoral 
reports, in response to Dublin’s request “to reduce their workload” (R126). Staff 
from Sida and DCI were both concerned that most reports went to the political 
rather than technical desk. Political rather than technical reporting was the norm 
at CIDA; notes on every meeting attended by CIDA staff were routinely 
circulated but most paperwork was channelled via CIDA’s Country Director 
because “it’s political” (R127, R128).  
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 Knowledge Management 
 
Because DCI staff regretted the institutional memory lost by the reduction in 
sectoral reporting, they intended to carry on producing the reports for embassy 
use (R129). In Dublin, staff thought knowledge was fragmented because 
different reports went to the country desk, finance and sector specialists, with 
no-one taking an overview; they agreed with embassy staff that coordination of 
information within DCI was poor (R130). Sida staff at HQ and embassy were 
equally concerned at the lack of coherence: there was “no functioning M&E 
system”, no feedback to beneficiaries, no “joined-up thinking” (R131). Sida was 
trying to “systematise collection of data from the field” formally via UTV and 
informally through the Policy & Methods Unit, but there was no link to 
‘knowledge management’ (R132). Both Sida and DCI worried about loss of 
institutional memory through staff turnover. An enquiry whether information from 
the field informed Sida’s policy received the sardonic reply “most of Sida’s 
intellectual platform comes from IDS, ODI, and ISS”18 (R133). In contrast, CIDA 
staff expressed satisfaction with its systems. Asked how project reports 
contributed to improved effectiveness in Canada’s Ethiopian programme, since 
reports went to Ottawa rather than the embassy, one respondent was confident 
the information fed back into the RBM system, but could not explain how. 
Another respondent said all the information was available on the internet19, 
although in practice it does not appear to be publicly available. 
 
There was general agreement among donor staff that communication and 
networking skills were very important for knowledge management. Although 
Sida describes itself as “a knowledge organisation”, learning was defined as the 
acquisition of skills to meet the new modalities: dialogue, negotiation, 
influencing, relevant communication patterns. Sida had established a Division 
for Learning and Competence Development to effect this; asked how knowledge 
from the field was incorporated into Sida’s learning, the Division’s head stated 
                                               
18
 Referring to academic centres in the UK and the Netherlands. 
19
  The only reports I was able to find on CIDA’s website had been written by the World 
Bank and Sida. 
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that there was no formal mechanism, and suggested that it could be distributed 
by word of mouth (R134)20.  
 
 M&E Technical Knowledge 
 
DCI’s conception of M&E as a process was evident in its understanding of 
learning. While “development ideas and praxis change frequently and this forces 
learning” (R135), “learning takes time and should based on lessons learned via 
monitoring and evaluation” (R136). Staff at the embassy explained that they had 
had no training in M&E; they “all had to learn as we go along - it’s a struggle, 
even for us” (R137). They relied on consultants for evaluation skills (R138, 
R139). Regional staff were being encouraged to use qualitative techniques in 
joint evaluations with government staff; one person was due to receive training 
in Tanzania. At the embassy, it was thought that external consultants would 
need to be particularly skilled in qualitative techniques to circumvent local power 
structures and to elicit the community’s view (R140). 
 
CIDA M&E staff wondered whether M&E consultants were value for money 
(R141). Several respondents were dismissive of M&E expertise: “it’s just 
common sense”, “it’s not brain surgery!” If necessary, they could do M&E 
themselves with advice from CIDA HQ (R142, R143). However, CIDA placed 
special emphasis on building Ethiopian statistical capacity, funding TA to the 
CSA. Although staff thought project methodology “old-fashioned”, CIDA was 
funding two major projects, both using Canadian TA and CIDA project 
management systems. One was described as a “model project” by embassy 
staff but, when the Canadian agency pointed out that no mid-term evaluation 
had taken place, they were told that it need not be done because progress 
appeared satisfactory from the paperwork (R144, R145). 
 
Oversight of the reporting and organising evaluation of SARDP was the 
responsibility of Sida’s national staff, who followed the agency’s guidelines on 
M&E and received guidance from Sida’s Evaluation Unit (R146). Reporting 
‘upwards’ was diffused through both the political and the thematic desks at Sida 
HQ. There were Sida ‘resource groups’ elsewhere in Africa which could advise 
                                               
20
   Sida's Learning (SIDA, 2005E) advises staff to "find ways to tell other people about 
your work and create opportunities for dialogue and exchange of experience”. 
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staff in Ethiopia about evaluating multidisciplinary programmes. International 
staff were concerned at the structural complexity of reporting within Sida, and 
lost opportunities for learning, but had no direct responsibility for reporting on 
SARDP activities. 
 
 Embassy knowledge of government monitoring systems 
 
Sida’s policy of non-interference meant that contact between Sida international 
staff and SARDP, their ABP, was limited21. A national programme officer visited 
regularly, but feedback from the programme via reporting was weak (R147); 
contact between the international TA advisers and Sida was restricted to 
attendance at one joint review meeting per year.  
 
SARDP had employed a number of evaluation advisers over the length of the 
programme, but had not implemented the advice given because it was 
considered inappropriate for the local context (R148). Reports from SARDP’s 
woredas lacked analysis (R149), and international TAs found analysis difficult 
because the information was ‘thin’ and there was “no participatory data” (R150). 
TA staff assumed that reluctance to use PRA techniques was due to the 
government’s belief that qualitative methods were inferior (R151) but embassy 
staff thought that, although the government tried to appear open, it had difficulty 
accepting transparent monitoring because it feared criticism and exposure 
(R155).  
 
Although CIDA did not collect information from their regional projects, and they 
had little knowledge about local structures and forms of participation, their 
international staff understood data collection: “DAs are being expected to collect 
data on a weekly or monthly basis, whereas donors only expect data to be 
collected annually” (R152). Donors were more concerned about local analytical 
ability at woreda level. When asked what level of analysis was expected, 
embassy staff said consolidation or compilation (R153, R154); in fact, data was 
compiled at kebele level and consolidated at woreda level. Asked whether there 
could be reasons why monitoring might be easier in Ethiopia, one expatriate 
                                               
21
  Evaluation of SARDP in 2002 noted “a curious disconnect between partnership 
dialogue at technical level and partnership level, suggesting that Sida interpreted 
government ownership as an injunction against intervention at policy level, even when 
policy threatened the success of a major project” (Farrington et al., 2001: 8) 
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could not initially think of any reasons but, on reflection, suggested that 
centralisation of power provided a conduit for information and that there was an 
established discipline of collecting detailed information, though ‘not necessarily 
effective’ (R155). It was through discussion of M&E, therefore, that a connection 
between government ideology and local structures began to be made. 
 
Although DCI international staff expressed surprise at the amount of data 
collected at community level (R156, R157)., they were not concerned that the 
performance matrix for the TRSP joint M&E framework continued to be a ‘work 
in progress’: “the indicators are secondary to the process” (R158). DCI regarded 
targets “pragmatically”, their approach was “not mechanistic, but mediated by an 
understanding of effort and achievement” (R159). In the first year of TRSP there 
had been no attempt at conditionality, but “some degree of conceptual linkage to 
PIs should be possible in the current funding year” (R160). The idea of M&E as 
process as opposed to measurement was also found at DCI in Dublin: 
“’Monitoring’ suggests that development is rational, that it can be quantified, but 
it can’t - it’s a messy business” (R161). Unlike the other two donors, DCI did not 
favour the use of LFA, believing ‘logframes’ to be too rigid and unable to reflect 
real change (R162). 
 
Evaluation, when it did take place, exposed donors to government accusations 
of being ‘overly critical’. Sida found the regional government reluctant to accept 
evaluators selected by Sida because they were expected them to be ‘critical’ 
(R163). During evaluation of a DCI-funded agricultural research programme, 
DCI understood local opinion to be that DCI critique was unwelcome, that DCI 
should “just provide funding” (R164). As a result, DCI thought that local 
processes meant people “weren’t open to criticism”, perhaps because of the 
unfamiliarity of working in partnership, vested interests, or being fearful for one’s 
reputation or even losing one’s job (R165).  
 
 Local evaluation practice 
 
Although international donor staff said they were unaware of any ‘Ethiopian’ 
form of evaluation, national staff were fully aware of gengemma. For them, 
discussion of gengamma was contentious for different reasons. Discussing ‘real’ 
participation with SARDP was sensitive and needed to be done diplomatically, 
and “Sida raises the issue of gengamma all the time” (R166). This information 
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had clearly not reached an M&E specialist who thought that there was “no such 
thing as a separate ‘Ethiopian’ system of evaluation” (R167). DCI national staff 
considered gengamma “a crude political tactic”, one that was widespread across 
government but that should be kept within the Party (R168). My question 
whether gengamma was discussed in donor meetings caused some 
amusement. 
 
Local staff in Tigray considered gemgam(ma) structurally useful, because it 
linked the kushet (got) to the tabia (kebele), to the woreda and then to the 
Region: “having the four levels linked is a strength” (R169); a problem which 
could not be resolved by the tabia could be referred to the woreda. M&E was 
thought “not difficult in Tigray” because “the TPLF make people more aware and 
well-organised” (R170). Local staff said that there were no risks attached to 
‘gengam for development’ because it was not “personalised”; eight to ten years 
previously, personal criticism would have led to demotion but nowadays it was 
“understood better”, although a negative evaluation could result in loss of 
promotion (R171). Strong personalities often won support, so the weak were at 
greater risk (R177). “Participants in evaluation are chosen by the DAs and the 
tabia administration and possibly also by the teachers. Farmers are chosen if 
they have a good record of participation, are innovators and have good personal 
qualities.” (R178). The question ‘why would people want - or not want - to 
participate’ elicited the response that participants might participate through fear 
of losing food aid or through political fear that “emotional” officials would cause 
problems for them (R179). There was no risk to the government in undertaking 
M&E because the people were not aware of their rights (R180). 
 
Monitoring and evaluation in donors’ horizontal relationships 
 
The NAA introduced new horizontal relationships into which evaluation could be 
fitted, if donors wanted to undertake them. Their potential partners were civil 
society, the government and other donors.  
 
 Civil society 
 
None of the donors suggested that joint evaluations might be held with civil 
society representatives. The only performative role they ascribed to civil society 
was as ‘independent’ monitors of PRSP implementation, a role for which they 
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provided technical assistance and funding. As reported earlier, donor staff 
described civil society as ‘weak’, lacking in ‘political nouse’ and evaluatory skills. 
PAN/E assumed, and some donor respondents confirmed, that donors had not 
read the report of the CRC evaluatory exercise which the DAG had chosen and 
funded. The CRC, developed, implemented and analysed by an Indian 
organisation, ‘captured’ citizens’ levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
public services. It was claimed to be a diagnostic and accountability tool which 
would stimulate reform, ‘activating stakeholder responsiveness’ and ‘mobilizing 
state-public partnerships’ (PAN/E, 2005: 10-13). PAN/E received no feedback 
other than from the World Bank and the IMF, and assumed that, at 97 pages, 




The DAG had set up a joint M&E working group with the government in 2004, 
but it appeared to stall early in 2005, probably because its instigator was 
transferred to another posting. Although monitoring the effectiveness of DBS 
was thought to be very important, donors had mixed opinions about the 
possibility of effective monitoring: “with DBS, performance indicators can be 
used to ascribe responsibility” (R181) but, for a number of respondents, 
monitoring the effectiveness of the new modalities was more contentious.. 
PRSPs were considered a ‘top-down’ exercise, and the performance indicators 
were “a crude measure” of effectiveness (R182), even though the DAG group 
had spent “a whole day” working out the indicators (R183).  
 
Having regional modalities afforded DCI and Sida the opportunity to undertake 
field-level evaluations jointly with government. Both donors expressed 
commitment to the principles of ownership, but experienced difficulty negotiating 
access to their programmes. For Sida, this became more urgent after the 2005 
election conflict but, when international staff visited the project the following 
month, government staff were unavailable to meet them (R184). 
 
Although they considered M&E an important component of budget support, DCI 
staff believed that developing the TRSP joint monitoring framework involved a 
“trade-off”; they had to “give up some control” over their reporting systems in 
order to work out a mechanism for M&E (R185). Delays included unavailability 
of government counterparts, difficulty agreeing performance indicators and 
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embassy sector advisers experiencing difficulty negotiating access to make field 
visits to verify the Region’s data. Although DCI was satisfied with the regional 
government’s financial accounting reporting, Embassy staff were disappointed 
that some sector heads did not attend their regular Joint Steering Committee 
meetings with the Regional government (R186). Embassy staff put the delays in 
establishing the joint evaluation structures down to government staff’s lack of 
capacity, rather than lack of political will (R187). 
 
The focus of CIDA’s interest in government M&E was monitoring the PRSP. 
They were concerned that the latest PRSP (PASDEP) was going ahead in 2005 
despite not having had the agreed monitoring reports on SDPRP, the previous 
PRSP (R188). They did, however, volunteer that there were occasions when 
donors failed to supply reports or comments on time, causing the government to 
miss deadlines which the donors had set (R189). Until the post-election crisis, 
one view from within CIDA was that it could rely on the APR and on the 
Government’s data (“there’s no point in reinventing the wheel”) (R190). For this 
respondent, the main problem with M&E was aligning CIDA’s RBM systems with 
the government’s timetable, because they followed a different cycle (R191). 
Others within CIDA regarded the APR as a limited source of information, and 
had doubts about the usefulness of the PRSP policy matrix (R192, R193). After 
the political crisis of 2005, CIDA thought it necessary to improve their local 
knowledge, and were looking for suitable cross-checks, including PAN/E, 
Human Rights Watch, and possibly data from their own projects. (R194); they 
were also considering going back to using NGO data ‘because of the situation’ 
(R194). 
 
 Other donors 
 
Enthusiasm for harmonised procedures was mixed within Sida, both at HQ and 
in the field; technical staff appeared less enthusiastic than policy staff. One view 
at Sida HQ was that joint evaluations risked “watering down” the evaluation 
criteria in order to accommodate different donors’ perspectives; individual 
agencies were thought more likely to do thorough, analytical evaluations (R195). 
However, Sweden was the only donor to achieve the fullest form of 
harmonisation - delegating cooperation in health and education to its long-term 
development partner, Norway.  
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Monitoring and Evaluation: Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity 
 
Throughout this section, respondents’ comments have shown that participation, 
monitoring and evaluation under the harmonisation agenda is in practice 
challenging for donors because of differences in their values, objectives, levels 
of expertise and styles of communication. Success in the donor-donor arena 
rests on political skills rather than on technical expertise. Donors retain a range 
of modalities, although during the fieldwork period these donors placed more 
emphasis on programme modalities than on projects and other forms of 
intervention. 
 
M&E in a pooled-funded initiative, the Productive Safety Nets Programme 
(PSNP), encapsulates some of the difficulties donors experience in 
harmonisation and ownership. Donors had “been trying to harmonise the 
different indicators and outputs but different donors have different M&E 
logframes” (R196, R197). Asked why donors appeared to be investing so 
much effort into M&E of the PSNP and not to other modalities, I was told that 
the PSNP was “humanitarian - the donors can’t sit back and let the 
government do or not do it”. Development was supposed to be ‘government-
led’, but “was it a case of having a blind man in the lead?”. Despite the 
ownership agenda, “donors are now realising that it can’t be left to government 
and consequently donors are funding TA.” (R198). 
 
The PSNP also drew donors into considering how local power structures might 
be affecting access and targeting; and to discussing possible political 
interference from the government at kebele level (R199). Subsequent 
evaluation revealed that not only were there differences of opinion among 
donors but also conceptual differences between donors and government about 
entitlement to cash transfers. Under the PSNP agreement, transfers to 
beneficiaries were supposed to be linked to activity, but “some donors felt that 
this agreement was being diluted and that conditional transfers in return for 
public works were being over emphasised”; donors had “heated 
disagreements” about how to proceed.22 
 
                                               
22
  [http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/ethiopia-insights-psnp.pdf, accessed 14.12.07] 
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7.4 SHARED MENTAL MODELS 
 
7.4.1 Actors’ Agency 
 
The NAA, as previous development orthodoxies have done, presumes that the 
international donor community shares the same development values and will act 
in concert. Although the three donors were sufficiently like-minded to work 
together in various, fluctuating groupings, depending on common interests, the 
differing perceptions and practices described by these donor respondents 
indicate contrasting development values which require them to negotiate, 
compromise or - sometimes - disagree with their donor colleagues, as well as 
with their development partner, the Ethiopian government.  
 
The comments which donor staff made about the politicisation of development 
and the modalities they were using indicated that, while some opinions about 
participation and about M&E were strongly held, others appeared to be not well-
established as an individual’s responses were either contradictory or evolved 
into reflective detours around the topic. Cumulatively, these demonstrated 
different normative stances within and between donor agencies, revealed 
uncertainty about what information was available and what staff were able or 
prepared to use. The following paragraphs explore individual agency within the 
participatory space available to staff within the ‘dialogue architecture’.  
 
Most international respondents expressed concern about their own and their 
agency’s effectiveness, wondering whether donors are listened to, questioning 
whether donors should really be recommending what the electorate should do, 
“maybe Europeans are being arrogant thinking that they’re being ‘useful’”, “not 
sure we have insights” (R200). Tools for expressing this concern included irony, 
cynicism, and emphasising their personal values and technical skills. Doubt 
about their role was expressed in phrases describing the change of relationship: 
“advocate, not impose”, “facilitate only”, “keep comments to a minimum”, “can’t 
interfere” (R201, R2023, R203, R204). Other comments suggested that donors 
felt inhibited by the government’s political skills: the government was “good at 
donor discourse, donors don’t know what to do”; “lack of donor understanding 
gives the government room for manoeuvre” (R205). After the post-election 
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violence, donors were uncertain how to respond: “it shouldn’t be ‘business as 
usual’ but what can donors do?” (R206). 
 
Respondents emphasised that individuals or ‘personalities’ were very important. 
As individuals, they were representatives of their donor agency, in an arena 
which each donor had “to create credibility and acceptance of roles by other 
donors” (R207). Key individuals could act as catalysts, mobilise other donors 
and work effectively with government officers, but someone with poor 
interpersonal or political skills could stall progress.  
 
Individual staff’s values and objectives closely reflected their career trajectories. 
Sida respondents were all senior technical specialists with many years’ 
experience, though one had transferred to a policy post. CIDA respondents 
reflected Canada’s multicultural profile; some were development specialists, but 
others had a background in the civil service. The international respondents from 
DCI were all development specialists from NGO backgrounds, who had joined 
DCI in order to continue working in an operational environment. These findings 
support the work of Kaufman, who found the values and career trajectories of 
DFID staff influenced their concepts of development (Kaufman, 1997). However, 
these could also be linked to the values identified in each donor’s own 
documentation (see 7.2.1). One individual, working on another country’s 
embassy, described values and forms of agency closely aligned to those of her 
compatriots’, and dissimilar to colleagues’ at the embassy where she worked.  
These responses support the earlier analysis that forms of social capital in 
donors’ documentation could be linked to characteristics described in their 
‘national’ social capital literature.  
 
A body of discourse on the agency of individual actors working at the 
development interface was reviewed in 2.5.4. A key thread concerns the 
possibility of considering them as broker-entrepreneurs, broker-translators or 
street level bureaucrats. Olivier de Sardan’s description of DA brokers may be 
applicable: interaction with their clients requires them to negotiate various logics 
and tactics but, while doing so, they have to “defend their own personal 
interests; defend the interests of their institution; [and] mediate between various 
actors’ interests and those of local factions” (Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 172). 
Donor staff may be keen to defend their own interests in terms of peer respect 
and recognition, and their own value framework from the demands from their 
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organisation. The responses of DCI and Sida staff indicate that they did not 
accept agency policy unquestioningly, but manoeuvred around it. Their self-
identity as technical specialists helped them to do this. In contrast, only one 
individual within CIDA staff, who tend to be civil servants, was prepared to 
critique practice, if not policy, discursively. 
 
7.4.2 The Arena for Sharing Mental Models 
 
Denzau and North argue that mental models are formed by culture and belief 
systems and, given their different political, religious and social histories, patterns 
of association and communication, it is unsurprising that donors’ perceptions 
and practice of participation should differ, and that they had chosen different 
modalities and ways of interacting with different levels of government. If day-to-
day donor experiences are regarded as “interface encounters” (Long, 2001: 
190), we expect the emergence of a variety of strategies, reflecting individual 
social actors’ values, experience and interests. However, Long rejects the 
argument that “cognitive maps or cultural understandings provide for the ground 
rules for social life that remain the same for members of the same ‘epistemic 
community’” (ibid: 189). In this research, however, the responses provided by 
donor staff showed that actors’ “goals, perceptions, values, interests and 
relationships” were not malleable at the donor interface (ibid: 191); rather, they 
demonstrated ‘patterns of resistance’ based on their culture and belief systems, 
largely shared by members of their national ‘community’. This was particularly 
evident in the case of DCI and Sida, but was also demonstrable among CIDA 
staff whose heterogeneity reflected the diversity which domestic Canadian policy 
aims to meld via an emphasis on multiculturalism, civic harmony and 
bureaucratic systems - transformed in development policy as support for 
multilateralism, harmonisation and civil service reform. This research has shown 
that the amount of contextual information available to donors was limited by their 
adoption of the NAA, which also reduced face-to-face contact with Ethiopian 
counterparts. Even when opportunities existed to collect local information, they 
were often not taken up: by CIDA because projects were considered 
unfashionable and their reporting systems did not allow it; by DCI, because they 
were empathetic and prepared to wait for ‘process’ to develop the mechanisms; 
and by Sida, because they were solidaristic and did not want to interfere.  
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Rather than representing the “crisis” which, under SMM, would demonstrate to 
the Ethiopian government or electorate that their present system of government 
had ‘failed’ and that liberal democracy provided the answer, the events of 2005 
re-enforced the traditional concept of strong leadership defeating rivals to power. 
Instead, it was donors who “learnt” that they had misread the extent to which the 
EPRDF had accepted democratic pluralism, that there were limits to their trust in 
the Government and that DBS was not the appropriate modality.  
 
7.4.3 Polity, Information and Mental Models 
 
The 2005 Elections 
 
Donors who had thought that Meles Zenawi supported democratic change by 
“struggling to get the Party to agree to elections”, felt wrong-footed by the events 
of 2005, one suggesting that the events were causing a “tectonic shift” in donor 
attitudes (R208). They initially viewed the post-election violence in the summer 
as positive, an indication of society ‘opening up’ (R209); “people thinking for 
themselves” (R210). Many activities were put on hold while waiting for the 
election results to be released, but the violence in November 200523 caused 
donors to reassess their Ethiopia programmes. Led by World Bank, donors 
designed a new modality, Protection of Basic Services, intended to bypass the 
Ministry of Finance and channel aid through individual ministries for earmarked 
spending at woreda level, as “woreda block grants are the only way to get 
money direct to the poor” (R211). It was to be backed up by more stringent 
financial monitoring.  
 
In contrast, the outcome of the elections was logically consistent with citizens’ 
perception and experience of traditional power relations in which the traditional 
components of leadership challenge (see 4.3.4) were played out. Lefort found 
that the concept of democratic parliamentary elections was ‘incomprehensible’ 
to rural communities in Amhara (Lefort, 2007: 254). The rural population 
interpreted holding elections as an expression of weakness by the EPRDF, but 
they were not sure whether the challenged or the challenger was more powerful. 
There were serious risks attached to supporting the wrong party; there was 
                                               
23
   Nearly 200 people were killed and 30,000 - 40,000 people imprisoned (Abbink, 2006: 
192) and opposition CUD party leaders were arrested and accused with treason. 
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coercion before the election and violent retribution afterwards (ibid: 254, 270). 
Conforming to the historical pattern of challenge/defeat, opposition CUD leaders 
were charged with treason following the election and the CUD was subsequently 




In 2005, development orthodoxy was not only considered ‘political’, but political 
events challenged the assumption that the ideology of the NAA, liberal 
democracy, was being adopted by the Ethiopian government. Waterman and 
Meier’s polity framework (see 3.4.3, summarised in Figure 7.3 overleaf) offers 
an explanation of why donors may not consider it necessary to use ‘information’ 
as evidence in policy formulation. Designed to address different types of 
transactional relationship between politicians and civil servants, the framework 
can also be used to consider the relationship between donors (aid principals) or 
citizens (political principals) and the Ethiopian government (agent for aid delivery 
and development management).  
 
Waterman and Meier’s matrix structures ‘little’ and ‘much’ information into the 
principal-agent relationship of polity. With the government’s monitoring structure 
reaching down to groups of five households, there is very little information which 
the government could not collect, should it choose to do so; in the matrix, the 
government possessed ‘much’ information. The three donors had ‘little’ 
information in comparison, because their access to primary data was eroded by 
moving to up-stream modalities or because their value system precluded them 
from actively retrieving information.24 Differences in foreign policy and aid 
objectives indicated that goal consensus among donors was not particularly 
strong and there was no substantive, as opposed to rhetorical, goal consensus 
between donors, or donors and government, despite a PRSP. 
                                               
24
 None of the donor respondents mentioned financial cost as a deterrent. 




Figure 7.3. Principal-Agent expansion to consider polity 
(Waterman and Meier, 1998: 188) 
 
When Ethiopian citizens are also considered as principals, shared culture and 
belief systems could indicate internal goal consensus and Revolutionary 
Democracy rhetoric suggests their relationship is one of ‘stewardship’. As there 
was information asymmetry between the government and its citizens, the matrix 
offers two options: patronage systems, where there is goal conflict, or Plato’s 
Republic, where there is goal consensus. The literature on the nature of 
leadership in Ethiopia suggests that power has been the currency of patronage 
whichever regime has been in place: “Government in Ethiopia … is a matter for 
experts who know what to do; the ignorant peasant, by contrast, is there to be … 
governed” (Clapham, 1990: 227) through “a pattern of patron-client relations 
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where state officials act as patrons and peasants or poor townspeople as 
clients” (Poluha, 2004: 116). Whether there was goal conflict, for example over 
the extractive nature of participation, or goal consensus, as over the Eritrean 
question or in identification as habesha, it would make little difference to the 
rural population whether the polity was ‘patronage systems’ or ‘Plato’s 
Republic’.25  
 
Where government has much information and donors have little information, 
Waterman and Meier provide two options: ‘principal-agent’ and ‘bottom-line’. 
Donors explained that the ‘moral’ risks of conditionality-induced exit from their 
aid programmes included potentially increased poverty and the difficulty of 
regaining access (as happened after the Ethiopian-Eritrean war). Donor staff 
believed that the government assumed donors avoided imposing conditionalities 
because of these risks (R212). On the other hand, the NAA, with its assumption 
of shared objectives, emphasis on country ownership and reduced access to 
contextualised and localised information, has more parallels with ‘bottom line’ 
polity. Under ‘bottom line’ polity, “principals require regular reports, and if 
nothing is out of line they do nothing. Only if some major problem occurs do the 
principals intervene and try to take corrective action” (Waterman and Meier, 
1998: 191). This appears to reflect most accurately donor-government relations 
in 2005. When principals’ trust is broken by the steward, “the principal is likely to 
feel betrayed and angry and may increase controls” (Davis et al., 1997: 33, 40, 
41). The shift in modality from DBS to PBS, with its increased monitoring, 
suggests that betrayal of trust occurred in 2005.  
 
7.4.3 Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity 
 
It is a central argument in this thesis that development management research 
should engage constructively with practice. As Long argues that the social actor 
does not lack agency, but has the power to strategise (even if that strategy is 
resistance or withdrawal), the final section of this chapter focuses on issues of 
congruence and disjuncture in order to identify opportunities for improved 
knowledge and dialogue. 
 
                                               
25
  The markedly different levels of electoral support for the government in Amhara and 
Tigray might reflect the two different polities. 
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Rather than sharply divergent perceptions and practices between donors and 
the state, recurring themes selected from the findings suggested that there was 
a considerable overlap in modes of communication, in approach and in sources 
of confusion. As Denzau and North state, “where mental models are shared, 
tacit understanding and the use of cultural ‘shorthand’ reduce the need for 
explicit exchange of information.” (Denzau and North, 1994: 20). This held true 
in government-community relations, but mental models between donors and 
government were not shared. The ubiquity of buzzwords (cf. Cornwall, 2005) 
such as participation, partnership and ownership suggests that they are used as 
development ‘shorthand’, and their meanings shared. Differential meanings 
emerged during discussion but, even so, ambiguity offers room for manoeuvre.  
Table 7.1 lists the themes identified in Chapters 6 and 7 by congruence, 
disjuncture and ambiguity. 
 
Table 7.1. List of themes by degree of congruence 
 
Congruence Disjuncture Ambiguity 
Participation: 




weak capacity dyad 

















In proposing these themes of congruence, I do not suggest that there was 
synchronicity of understanding, but that both donors and government used the 
same mechanisms, and could recognise this in each other’s strategies. 
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 Participation: speech skills, exhortation and consensus 
 
Effective verbal skills were important both for donors and for Ethiopians. For 
donor respondents, good communication skills were vital for negotiating with 
and influencing other donors and establishing their agency’s role and status 
within the DAG. All four countries had distinctive patterns of communication and 
social institutions but oratory was culturally embedded and highly valued in 
Ethiopia, whereas in contrast to donor countries, communication skills 
sometimes had to be taught. Donors thought that poor communicators could 
hinder progress; in Ethiopia it could mean being out-of-step with the rest of the 
group, and prejudicing one’s future ability to influence decision-making. At the 
same time, reticence is valued in Ethiopia, because it can imply modesty and 
wisdom. Swedish culture also values reticence in the sense of economic speech 
and humility.  
 
Donors’ influencing, of each other and government, and the government’s use of 
persuasion are both forms of exhortation. Donors’ claims that reports go unread, 
reducing their local knowledge, is an indication that influencing was seen as a 
more useful strategy. Exhortation not only plays a specific role in the Ethiopian 
Government’s ADLI programme and the organisation of rural development, but 
is a cultural tool, applied throughout government-community relations.  
 
Another form of exhortation used by both donors and government was through 
the use of exemplars. The Tigray Government’s community participation manual 
(6.3.2) uses examples of change arising from both individual and community 
effort as a form of exhortation to ‘participate’. The format of these stories is very 
similar to that employed in the qualitative evaluation method, Stories of Change, 
which has a specifically transformative agenda because it seeks to identify 
significant changes in people’s lives. Local evaluations by SARDP and 
Tigray/DCI both called the methodology ‘stories of success’. CIDA staff, too, 
said there was need for analysis “that will enable stories to be told” (R180).26  
 
                                               
26
 Donor headquarters also look for positive stories of change to display, often via their 
websites, their effectiveness to their domestic populations. 
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According to Ayittey, public meetings in Africa are traditionally geared towards 
consensus, in order to ‘keep the person in the community’ (Ayittey, 1992). The 
findings support this pattern in Ethiopia, the underlying institution being the 
maintenance of the community as a unit. The literature on social capital 
suggests that consensus has also been important in these donors’ societies. It 
was important to minimise conflict in Canada’s multicultural society; in rural 
Ireland expressing different opinions in public meetings was considered divisive; 
and in Sweden, social mechanisms existed to avoid confrontation. Despite the 
rhetoric of harmonisation, consensus within the donor ‘community’ was more 
problematic, because agencies held different views, had different strategies, and 
formed different subgroups according to shared priorities and levels of concord. 
Where consensus was required, for the PRSP matrix, for example, 
compromises had to be made.  
 
 A ‘knowledgeable’ - ‘weak capacity’ dyad 
 
Donors and government both exhibited the ability to label groups as 
simultaneously both ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘not knowledgeable’ (needing to be 
educated). Officials would, on the one hand, say that “farmers know all there is 
to know” but a few minutes later would describe farmers as backward and 
illiterate, requiring instruction and firm leadership. Donors were unsure of their 
own effectiveness while at the same time claiming superior expertise. The NAA 
rhetoric requires recipient governments to work with donors both as equal 
partners (partnership) progressing to senior partners (ownership), but donors 
lacked confidence in the government’s technical capacity and, where it was 
important for donors, such as in ‘humanitarian’ circumstances or in reaction to 
political violence, donors reasserted a degree of control.  
 
 Reliance on quantitative data  
 
The NAA meant donors were theoretically dependent on government 
quantitative data for monitoring their aid effectiveness (with as yet weak 
monitoring capacity within civil society, the use of alternative sources of data 
was a matter of donor choice). Donors expressed surprise at the volume, 
frequency and (federal) management of local statistical collection. Both 
government and donor staff identified the lack of local analytical capacity as a 
problem (some donor staff as well as government officials interpreting ‘analytical 
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capacity’ as ‘consolidating data’). Donors were critical of the Ethiopian 
government’s tendency to roll out development strategies across the country 
without piloting or establishing baseline data. However, in humanitarian 
situations such as the Safety Net Programme where M&E ‘mattered’, donor staff 
turned a critical eye on their own practice, regretting their own failure to establish 




The clearest disjunctures between donor and local conceptions of participation 
in evaluation related to (i) the purpose of evaluation, and consequently its 




Donors’ uncertainty about the form and purpose of evaluation contrasted sharply 
with the certainty and regularity of evaluation, at every level in the government-
community structure. Although the literature describes two purposes attached to 
donor evaluation, ‘accounting for’ and ‘effectiveness’, it is generally critical about 
the evidence for the use of evaluation in aid effectiveness, organisational 
learning or policy formulation. Instead, it is sometimes considered a political 
device, to present a display of consensus and effectiveness to the general 
public. DCI and Sida both displayed this uncertainty; only CIDA expressed 
confidence in its concepts and practice. The only form of performance 
management structure was CIDA’s SRAF, but this was linked to the PRSP 
policy matrix, thus measuring government performance rather than 
demonstrating causality between donor intervention and service provision. 
However, it fitted with OECD-DAC procedures which require monitoring the 
extent of harmonisation, not its effectiveness.  
 
The purposes of monitoring and evaluation were understood by Ethiopian 
respondents to be: (i) to ensure that work was done according to plan and on 
time; (ii) to use the information for future planning; and (iii) to prevent local 
leaders and officials treating the people unfairly. This clarity of purpose is 
grounded in culture and belief systems (see 3.5.2), just as Western concepts of 
evaluation are grounded in Protestantism and the Enlightenment. Gemgamma 
was clearly used as an accountability and performance management tool. Its 
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immediacy meant that it measured quantity and quality of work rather than 
impact or effectiveness. Kebede writes that Leninism, like Calvinism, 
emphasises strict discipline, so that in Leninism “the members of the vanguard 
party … form an elite with a high moral calibre” (Kebede, 1994: 205). Senior 
officials complained that their juniors were unwilling to make sufficient sacrifices 




The second major area where there was unequivocal disjuncture between 
government and donor strategies was in the concept of ‘process’. Despite 
claiming that M&E was important as a regulatory mechanism where DBS was 
used, some donor staff felt that ensuring the internal logic of performance 
indicators within a policy matrix was ‘mechanistic’; for them, the process was 
more important (R213). Of the five elements of process approaches identified by 
Bond and Hulme, the first - that implementation should be flexible and phased - 
accords most directly with this perspective. The other four elements are more 
challenging in the NAA context: systematic, iterative learning; understanding 
“the complex social realities of local situations”; institution building, including 
political support; and well-qualified and motivated leadership (Johnson and 
Wilson, 2000: 1341-1342).  
 
NPM has some congruence with Ethiopian concepts of accountability systems, 
with its use of targets and assumption of moral hazard. Targets are alien to 
process approaches, which require intensive management (Bond and Hulme, 
1999: 1354), including continuous M&E so that mistakes are uncovered and 
corrected quickly (Rondinelli, 1993: 183). Current development orthodoxy does 
not allow for such double-loop learning. Crucially, process approaches, or 
adaptive administration, necessitate the freedom to experiment using culturally 
acceptable practice and behaviour: this requires contextual knowledge (ibid: 
172-176). The assumption of universality within the NAA orthodoxy therefore 
conflicts with the ‘process’ approach these harmonising donors claimed to be 
using. Equally importantly, donors were unable to provide the active 
management, flexibility and iterative learning that process approaches require. 
The reworking of the concept of process as ‘work in progress’, as opposed to 
‘mechanistic’ active management, allowed an optimistic assessment of  
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progress, for example towards democratic pluralism, until this optimism was 
dashed by the post-election violence27.  
 
Process approaches also challenge donors’ uncertainty about the nature of 
leadership, and preference for ‘facilitation’. The ‘process’ literature argues that 
adaptive administration requires people who “view themselves as leaders rather 
than as bureaucrats” (ibid: 187). Independently, several embassy staff had 
remarked on the importance of individuals among the international community 
whose levels of commitment and leadership skills made them effective change 
agents. The contestation surrounding the role of leadership in Western polity 
and in development discourse contrasts with Ethiopia, where strong leadership 
has been historically important, and leadership skills are admired at village level. 
The Tigray Region’s participation manual says that the leaders ‘know’ what 
beneficiaries want or at least what they should want. Donors also claim to know 
what beneficiaries want. Following the 2005 elections, the former British 
Ambassador, then Secretary of the Commission for Africa, was quoted as 
saying that “the international community in some ways acts as a lever, as a 
proxy for the wishes of the people within countries.” (interview published in The 
Reporter, 04.06.05, Addis Ababa).  
 
Mixed Messages and Ambiguity of Approach 
 
 The project of ‘development’ 
 
Both donors and government respondents described development as a ‘political’ 
project, relating this to the NAA and to geopolitics. Both the donor community’s 
development strategy, as set out in Shaping the 21st Century (OECD DAC 
1996), and the Ethiopian government’s development strategy are positioned 
within specific ideologies, both of which are born from particular cultural, 
historical and intellectual roots. It may be that, if development strategy is 
ideologically-based, tests of adoption (monitoring) may be considered useful; but 
tests of effectiveness (evaluation) are thought to be unnecessary. Although 
poverty reduction is described as an ‘overarching’ objective in most donors 
programmes (here, DCI and Sida, but not CIDA), the methods used in current 
                                               
27
  The ‘work in progress’ interpretation may also fit well with the qualitative technique, 
‘stories of change’, discussed earlier in relation to ‘exhortation’. 
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orthodoxy - democratic pluralism, private sector development, a strong civil 
society and civil service reform - are drawn from a Western political trajectory. 
 
The Ethiopian government was able to present development to farmers as a 
national project, “so that we no longer have to be dependent on foreigners”28, a 
coherent message which resonated with the concept of habesha as the in-
group, foreigners as the out-group. Shaping the 21st Century also presents 
development to donors as “enlightened self-interest”, offering geopolitical 
stability, increased markets and reduced migration and terrorism (OECD, 1996: 
6); donors, their national staff and advisers identified this agenda in relation to 
aid to Ethiopia. Global security was a significant component of both CIDA’s and 
Sida’s aid programmes. In 2005, donors had to calculate the risks of enforcing 
their good governance agenda at the risk of jeopardising their future 
engagement with the Ethiopian government, a risk which many believed they 
had miscalculated by withdrawing aid in 1998, during the Ethio-Eritrean war. 
Juxtaposing donors’ (eventually) firm reaction to the post-election violence of 
2005, on the one hand, with US support for Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia 12 
months later, on the other, demonstrates the normative challenge presented by 
donors’ geopolitical interests.  
 
 Participation: Social capital 
 
The social capital literature, discussed in 2.4, argues that civic ethics are 
enhanced by associational membership. Under the communitarian politics, this 
approach is manifest in evolving policies for CSO engagement in local planning, 
service delivery and monitoring local government performance in the countries 
with ‘Third Way’ governments such as the UK. In Ethiopia, government assigned 
the latter two roles to rural communities via contribution of labour and 
gemgamma. 
 
Traditional forms of association, which include informal cooperative activities 
and faith-based membership, are more closely aligned with evolving Western 
conceptions of social capital, although explicit or implicit sanctions for non-
                                               
28
  Quotation from an interview with a farmer, see 5.4.3. 
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participation conflict with Western assumptions of voluntary participation.29 Even 
so, descriptions of regulatory social mechanisms within Irish and Swedish 
associational life suggest that greater reflexivity in the assessment of social 
capital in developing countries, at least when framed politically30, would allow a 
more grounded critique of development orthodoxy and its practices.  
 
 Participation: Agency and Voice 
 
Both liberal democracy and revolutionary democracy encompass the idea of 
popular participation by means of public expressions of opinion. A form of local 
participation (secondary to labour contribution) in Ethiopia is ‘sharing ideas’, 
framed as being more ‘modern’ in the rhetoric of participation transmitted by 
both government officials and local leaders who link it to the current regime: 
“now everyone can speak”. Government rhetoric about empowerment through 
‘speaking up’ and ‘contributing ideas’ places local practice on a continuum 
between participation as conceptualised under Habermasian ‘deliberative 
democracy’, traditional Ethiopian cultural mechanisms of discussion and 
consensus and some of the tenets of revolutionary democracy. Lack of precision 
in specifying types and standards of participation allows donors and government 
to interpret the term in very different ways, depending on the arena. Responses 
indicated that donors either appear not to understand local practice, or 
interpreted it through their own mental models, avoiding the necessity of 
questioning the normative assumptions of voluntarism within civil society as 
framed within the NAA.  
 
The descriptions from Ethiopian farmers of the raising and discussion of ideas, 
the opportunity for as many people as wished to, to speak and the aim of 
inclusion within the group by means of consensus offers a public participatory 
space that is not always available in Western public forums. When donors were 
asked to reflect on local concepts and practice of participation in evaluative 
forums in Ethiopia, they had little or no information to draw on and had difficulty 
                                               
29
 In Tony Blair’s statement in 1998 that “rights and opportunity without responsibilities 
are engines of selfishness and greed” (Craig and Porter, 2004: 393), the sentiment and 
even words such as ‘greed’ are congruent with Revolutionary Democracy rhetoric but, in 
rural development administration in Ethiopia, responsibilities mean compulsory, not 
voluntary, labour. 
30
  Religious associations, for example, may offer respite from political pressure. 
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explaining what participation meant in any meaningful way, even in terms of 
Western discourse.  
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CHAPTER 8 
REFLECTION ON THE ROLE OF MENTAL MODELS 





This thesis has explored the perceptions and practice of participation in 
evaluation among social actors in the aid chain of three bilateral donors working 
in Ethiopia. The development orthodoxy in place at the time of the fieldwork, the 
NAA, rhetorically required donors to harmonise their own programmes to reduce 
transaction costs on recipient governments, to align their management systems 
with those of the government and to work in partnership with the government so 
that it would take on ‘ownership’ of the (aid-funded) development process. On 
the government’s part, it was expected to adopt multiparty political pluralism, a 
Western style of public sector management (NPM), and to allow an empowered 
civil society to monitor its progress, and its citizens to hold the government to 
account via the ballot box. The short time-span between the agreement on 
harmonisation (December 2002) and the cancellation of DBS (December 2005) 
afforded an opportunity to study the practice of harmonisation and other 
components of the NAA listed above. 
 
The methods which donors use to effect the attitudinal change required by the 
NAA are dialogue, influencing, cash transfers (DBS) and voluntary secession of 
power. In Ethiopian polity and culture, these ‘components’ translate as follows. 
Oratory and persuasion are skills characteristic of habesha identity. Cash or any 
other resource transfers are couched in notions of entitlement, and controlled by 
reciprocity and sanctions. In traditional Ethiopian concepts of leadership, power, 
once claimed through competition, is maintained against future competition by 
expressions of strength; defeat results in marginalisation.  
 
In 2005, there was a clash between habesha and ferengi political systems, when 
the government failed to adopt multiparty pluralism, contrary to donor 
expectations, and dealt with the challenge to its leadership according to 
customary patterns. It cracked down violently on opposition to disputed election 
results, killing 200 protestors and imprisoning 30-40,000 members of the public, 
including approximately 100 leaders of the opposition coalition who were 
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charged with treason. This accorded with the historical trajectory and with rural 
communities’ expectations (cf. Lefort, 2007, and Abbink, 2006).  
 
The SMM approach suggests that the rate of learning takes two forms. Either 
learning takes place over a long period of time, during which mental models A 
and B move closer together through repeated interaction and exchange of 
information, or it takes place after a crisis which is unexplained by A’s mental 
model, but is explicable by B’s mental model; therefore, logically, A adopts B’s 
model. The NAA assumes that A will adopt B’s mental model if provided with an 
‘enabling environment’. The envisaged enabling environment of multiparty 
elections did not shift the Ethiopian government to accept pluralism. Rather, the 
crisis shocked donors’ mental models and induced them to change aid 
modalities. How much donors’ learned from the experience is not yet clear, as 
the structure of the replacement modality, PBS, suggests that its design was not 
grounded in the knowledge provided by power analyses or the literature on 
Ethiopian political systems. By replacing DBS with local block grants, the PBS 
structure implies that sectoral ministries, regional government and woreda 
administrations operate independently of the EPRDF, and that power structures 
are not hierarchical and authoritarian. 
 
Donor discourse also assumes (presumes) that their concepts and practice of 
participation and evaluation, based on Western values and patterns of 
knowledge, will be adopted by recipient countries because they are recognised 
as superior. The literature reviewed describes NPM as an Anglo-Saxon 
structure, employed under the NAA to support the adoption of the Third Way 
strain of liberal democracy which is also Anglo-Saxon by adoption (Craig and 
Porter, 2006). The findings from the Ethiopian interviews support Ayittey’s 
argument that indigenous African forms of participation, which allow wide-
ranging discussion designed to include all participants via consensus, is more 
inclusive and equitable (Ayittey, 2006). The form of public evaluation practiced in 
Ethiopia - and Vietnam, for comparison - grafted Maoist practices onto 
indigenous forms of informal evaluation, which are far more exacting in terms of 
performance management and accountability than the evaluations (now less 
frequently) carried out by donors. 
 
The underlying guide to this research has been Long’s social actor approach, 
which conceives the knowledge interface as the site of struggle within 
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heterogeneous communities, where ‘knowledge’ is fluid, and used strategically 
and inductively. Employing SMM as an analytical tool, it was apparent that 
‘knowledge’ in this research context took three forms: culture, belief and 
information. Donors tend to be somewhat tentative in their claims to undertake 
‘knowledge management’, what information they can collect and how they 
process it to effect improved policy and delivery. The findings make clear that 
their development values, communication styles and political frameworks dictate 
how, or whether, this happens. It was also clear that, in compiling their 
‘knowledge’ of the local context, and indeed their understanding of participation, 
the donors who took part in this research relied on other donors for information 
and analysis, disregarding academic literature on Ethiopia.1 Because the World 
Bank had the capacity to provide (mainly quantitative) data and analysis, donors 
were largely dependent on the Bank for information. The OECD-DAC provided 
the intellectual platform for donor policies, by configuring the NAA. The 
delineation of specific development ‘orthodoxies’ to which, rhetorically, members 
of the donor community adhere suggests that donor ‘knowledge’ is relatively 
structured. The episodic ‘shifts’ in orthodoxy might, in SMM terms, be described 
as conceptual crises. If Denzau and North’s model of learning is applied, we 
would expect donors to be faced with firm evidence showing that the existing 
orthodoxy lacked “logical consistency” before concluding that a proposed 
orthodoxy provided a more logical explanation. The NAA provides an example; 
its core document, Shaping the 21st Century, dismissed “sceptical analyses” of 
aid effectiveness and cited (only) two unpublished papers, describing them as 
“some new work has pointed to more positive assumptions” of aid’s impact 
(OECD, 1996: 8). 
 
The strength of Ethiopian identity, formed by its specific history and orthodox 
religion (Chapters 4 and 5), together with confirmation of the customary patterns 
of communication, collectivist institutions, religious belief and polity provided by 
the responses from Ethiopian government and community actors (Chapter 6), 
suggest that their ‘knowledge’ is significantly less fluid. Applying SMM analysis 
would suggest donors’ concepts of participation and evaluation offer no 
incentive for Ethiopian rural communities to shift their mental model. Leaving 
aside political mental models, it may be that cultural mental models also offer a 
useful perspective. From conversations and from observation, I understood that 
                                               
1
  Even Sida’s power analyses (e.g. Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2002) were not read by 
some of the donors. 
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ferengi appearance, communicative ‘skill’ and behaviour were widely regarded 
with derision. While this could be regarded as ‘ingroup-outgroup’ behaviour, 
other international influence was regarded more positively. Efficiency in Chinese 
technical assistance in infrastructure and reports of Chinese agricultural 
productivity are widely admired, irrespective of ideological links. Although donors 
complain about cheap Chinese products flooding African markets, from 
observation I suspect these may have greater transformative power than donor 
‘influence’. In the northern highlands where asceticism pervades religious 
practice and cultural norms mean that people dress uniformly2, my eye was 
caught by flashes of colour seeing a woman walking home from market with a 
brightly decorated Chinese platter, rather than a plain metal or earthenware one. 
I may be opening myself up to the criticism of Ethiopian colleagues of making 
unwarranted comparison, but I will argue later for the greater use of 
cross-country comparison and reflexivity. 
 
While I have drawn on work from other disciplines, I place this thesis firmly 
within development management, specifically within a ‘normative’ framework. As 
made clear at the beginning of the thesis, I am interested in approaching 
development management from a purposeful perspective involving constructive 
engagement with ‘management’ within donor policy and practice. For the rest of 
this chapter, I use the research findings and analysis to propose future 
directions for praxis and research.  
 
Section 8.2 explores possible ‘lessons’ to be ‘learnt’ from this research when 
analysed through a social actor lens, employing the SMM approach and 
elements of cross-cultural and polity analysis. Given the uncertainty and mixed 
meanings expressed by donor respondents, section 8.3 assesses the ‘agency’ 
of technical specialists in influencing and informing development policy and 
practice, expanding this to consider the ‘room for manoeuvre’ given to donor 
agencies to set development policy and practice, in relation to wider government 
political objectives. The final section, 8.4, discusses the implications of the 
research for development management discourse and argues for the inclusion 
of culture and ideology in assessing development policy and practice. It 
                                               
2
 It seemed to me that women in East Gojjam could express individual style through 
differently patterned edging on their natala (white stoles), and women in Tigray through 
the way that they plaited their hair. 
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recommends comparative assessment of the development approaches of 
differently-minded, as well as like-minded, donors. 
 
 
8.2 ‘LESSONS LEARNT’ FROM THE RESEARCH 
 
8.2.1 Consensus, Heterogeneity and Confusion 
 
Liberal democracy, promoted by the NAA, values the autonomy of the individual. 
In common with African notions of community3, the Ethiopian interviews showed 
that the unity of the group was valued in terms of joint effort and social cohesion. 
The term ‘social capital’ in development discourse does not place sufficient 
value on Ethiopian notions, which effectively regards ‘the community’ or the 
informal association as a common-pool resource, which could be jeopardised by 
individualistic behaviour, were this not controlled by social and other sanctions. 
The label ‘greedy’ which highland farmers applied to individualistic behaviour 
encapsulates this. The conduct of community meetings and the judgements 
made by the Council of Elders were intended to keep all ‘participants’ within the 
community. For this reason, meetings were customarily structured so that all 
who chose to speak could have their say and those who chose to remain silent 
could do so. Although either strategy could be risky, persuasion was used to 
build consensus.  
 
Two points arise from this. The first is well-known in development discourse, that 
familiarity, even in the face of adverse incorporation, reduces uncertainty and 
affords the social actor greater security than acting independently (cf. Wood, 
2003). Consensus and staying within the community is therefore a legitimate 
strategy and should be respected. Within development discourse, however, the 
nature of ‘community’ and its benefits are ambiguous and contested. On the one 
hand it is presented as the site of struggle and the exercise of power by elites, 
on the other as the source of social capital. Development practice often urges 
the introduction of institutions and structures to ‘build’ communities and 
empower them to ‘participate’ according to the Western model, ignoring existing 
associational mechanisms and institutions for building trust and/or cooperative 
practices which have greater local legitimacy.  
                                               
3
 See Ayittey (1992).  
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My second point is therefore to argue that caution needs to be taken in the value 
attributed to heterogeneity in Western discourse, which itself is influenced by 
democratic traditions which are not necessarily as consensual as Habermas’s 
label ‘deliberative’ implies but which incorporate adversarial techniques which 
underpin Western political systems. Development orthodoxy assumes that the 
citizens of developing countries will grasp opportunities to participate 
democratically, by implication enabled to do so as a result of aid influence. 
Whereas donor discourse focuses on the challenge of encouraging potential 
participants to ‘opt in’, for Ethiopian farmers, the challenge would have been 
‘opting out’ of participation, because the penalties of doing so were social as 
well as political, and severe. Our tendency to apply ethnocentric, Western, 
interpretations of ‘participation as empowerment’ can therefore blind us to the 
idea that inclusion in the in-group, whether being a member of the community or 
being ‘habesha’, is also empowering. The simplistic binary formulation of 
‘lacking agency’ versus ‘empowerment’ contrasts starkly with the complex web 
of transaction costs for members of rural communities of not participating (in 
local terms) and of participating (in Western terms).  
 
Similar points about relative values can be made in relation to evaluation and 
accountability. The narrow gap between implementation, evaluation and holding 
someone to account described by the Ethiopian respondents is far more 
demanding in performance management terms than Western practice, and is 
accepted as legitimate because it is a mechanism which maintains the common-
pool resource and because it employs existing cultural mechanisms. The 
structure whereby local leaders and government employees can be questioned 
by the public in community meetings involves a far wider proportion of the 
community than would participate in ‘evaluation’ in, for example, the UK with its 
increasing democratic deficit. The accountability structures in use in Ethiopian 
community life build on what could be described as a ‘culture of critique’, where 
‘performance’ in associational life is monitored by social and written regulation. 
Even the system whereby local leaders and DAs evaluate each other (see 
Figure 6.3) could be regarded as a form of ‘peer review’. Even though 
gengemma is alien to Western practice, it should be acknowledged that the 
weakly-monitored process approaches, lapsed time-frames and lack of 
attribution in donor approaches to evaluation may well appear alien to Ethiopian 
notions of accountability.  
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The clarity of explanations of participation and evaluation provided by Ethiopian 
respondents contrasted sharply with those of donor international staff (with 
national staff negotiating between the two). The variable conception of 
‘participation’ in development discourse is exemplified by the breadth of ways in 
which participation is discussed in 2.5 (academic discourse) and 7.2 (donor 
discourse). The ‘contribution of ideas’ which these discourses cover, one way or 
another, also forms a key plank of Revolutionary Democracy but government 
policy uses a different structure to effect the contribution, one based on familiar 
fora and customary practices and skills. 
 
The main Ethiopian conception of participation, contribution of labour, is also 
confused in donor discourse. Under instrumental and Third Way agendas, 
donors advocate contributions of labour in community resource management 
assuming that this is a form of social capital - as it is presented in Revolutionary 
Democracy rhetoric - rather than taking into account the transaction costs 
discussed in academic development discourse. Gender empowerment was the 
key focus of CIDA’s policy on participation and, while I was in Ethiopia, they 
were discussing a rural road infrastructure programme; they were planning to 
insist that 50% of the workers were women, making no allowance for the 
transaction/opportunity costs to the female workers, let alone the real possibility 
of coercion to meet the 50% target. In their attempt at empathy with Ethiopian 
women, donors projected a model of empowerment based on their own notions 
and practice, which might well increase women’s workload, possibly keeping 
young girls from school. 
 
Authors writing about Ethiopia describe the authoritarianism of its structures but 
also the level of openness and transparency afforded by the conduct of local 
government in public, through its consensus-making fora and public evaluation. 
This is particularly so with Tigray, the heartland of the TPLF leadership of the 
EPRDF. Researchers have found, as I did, that these public mechanisms, 
combined with the strength and confidence of Tigrean identity, made fieldwork 
logistically easier, because of readier, more independent access to respondents, 
their willingness to discuss participation, evaluation and to critique the 
performance of government officials and other leaders. However, concurrently, 
the army, which is mainly Tigrean, was suppressing popular opposition to the 
election results in other regions with extreme force. Until the crisis, only some 
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donors - and then tentatively - would discuss the government’s authoritarianism. 
The Ethiopian public understood it as customary practice. Discourse suggests 
that donors compromise their standards for human rights and governance 
practices for both external reasons (geopolitical considerations) and internal 
(disbursement pressure, uncertainty about causal effect and conflicting values). 
While ambiguity is employed to gloss over these conceptual conflicts, the 
tension and linkages between ‘strong’, development states, donors’ values and 
local concepts of development need to be researched. 
 
One of the routes by which the government exerted influence was through mass 
organisations (the Farmers’, Women’s and Youth Associations) which they had 
reclassified, for donors’ consumption, as CSOs. The role which NAA specifies 
for civil society is drawn from Third Way politics in (mainly) Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Based in part on Putnam’s work in northern Italy, identifying forms of 
civic engagement which can be traced back to the early Middle Ages (Francis, 
2002: 79), Third Wayism4 is also being applied in the UK which has no similar 
history and where individualism was also evident in the mediaeval period (Grint, 
1995: 169). Methods for restructuring civil society are therefore still being tried 
out in individualistic societies,5 while being imposed via the NAA on collectivist 
societies which already have associational mechanisms to effect cooperative 
practice, ensuring inclusion and accountability.  
 
One particular outcome of the 2005 crisis was the effect of the diaspora on 
donors’ decision-making. While CIDA staff in Ethiopia were urging their 
headquarters not to react precipitously to the post-election violence, the 
Ethiopian diaspora in Canada were exerting influence on the Canadian 
government (R214). This political dynamic structures diaspora into the 
participatory space of development, which enables them to influence not only 
their ‘home’ governments and, in the Ethiopian case, the opposition, but also 
donor development policy. Migration, which donors regard as a threat to 
domestic social stability and therefore a justification for aid,6 had bridged the 
broken feedback loop between taxpayers in one country and the recipients of 
aid in another. 
                                               
4
  See Craig and Porter (2004). 
5
 The new associational life being constructed under Third Way politics includes, as I 
found through experience, the familiar issues of voice, agency, social sanctions, 
transaction costs and incorporation into government structures.  
6
 See Shaping the 21st Century (1996). 




8.3 AGENCY AND INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMULATION 
 
8.3.1 Agency in Development Agencies 
 
Given that the NAA was designed and is monitored by the DAC and the World 
Bank, and that political priorities take precedence over technical expertise within 
bilateral donor practice (at least in these three donors), it is important to look 
critically at how development policy and practice are formulated within individual 
donor agencies. Staff at Sida headquarters and CIDA embassy staff referred 
frequently to ‘Paris’, referring to the OECD-DAC. In a critique of Shaping the 
21st Century, Hulme notes that the DAC’s focus is on “making the case for 
increased foreign aid and demonstrate that aid will be used effectively”, rather 
than on tackling poverty, and that it based its approach on NPM which had 
already been adopted by many of the OECD donor countries (Hulme, 2009: 21). 
 
Development discourse tends to focus on the shortcomings of particular 
agencies or on the power of the World Bank and other multilateral institutions. In 
reflecting on donors as ‘social actors’, I argue that their agency in influencing 
policy - as an individual or as a department with a government mandate - is 
contingent on the degree of politicisation of development at national level. The 
concern expressed by donor technical staff about their own knowledge (and the 
use it is put to) mirrors the frustration articulated by recently retired donor staff, 
wanting to put in writing how development policy and practice ‘should’ be 
(Gould, 2004: 268). 
 
After the 2005 crisis, staff from each of the three donors said they realised that it 
was necessary to have a ‘basket’ of different modalities to select from. This 
claim appears to put the ‘agency’ back into donor agencies’ ability to design and 
select forms of development intervention. In practice, the donors already had a 
range of modalities to employ, even though the dominant narrative of the NAA 
suggested that coherence to its principals was mandatory. In practice, other 
donors, particularly non-“Anglo-Saxon” ones, followed a different path. This 
suggests that development policy is decided at the ‘national’ level, by central 
government, rather than by the donor agency.  
 




At the individual level, technical specialists reported a decline in their own 
agency as a result of the shift to political development. Because development “is 
now political”, technical specialists felt less valued, particularly since receiving 
requests from headquarters to reduce technical reporting. They also noted that 
organisational change had put policy departments in charge of formulating 
practice as well as policy. King notes the trend among donors to reduce sectoral 
departments, centralising resources on policy departments and recruiting staff 
with ‘political’ skills (King, 2004: 28; see also OECD, 2005c).  
 
Eyben recommends that aid agency staff get out into the field to connect or re-
connect with the recipients of aid (Eyben, 2006: 10). Among the international 
staff interviewed, a number had chosen their posting deliberately in order to 
undertake operational work (as opposed to policy work) either in Ethiopia 
specifically, or within Africa. They tended to identify themselves as development 
workers as well as donor staff and regretted that compulsory rotation to other 
postings occurred just as they had acquired sufficient local knowledge to be able 
to work effectively. As well as congruent development values along national 
patterns, linkages were evident between the professional background of the 
individual respondent and their (desire for) knowledge about the local practice of 
participation. Those with a general civil service background were less well-
informed about, and attributed less importance to understanding, local 
conceptions and practice than those with a technical background, who were 
more engaged with the issue and expressed greater normative intent7. Donor 
agencies rotate their staff to different postings to avoid the danger of their “losing 
perspective” by “going native” (Pomerantz, 2004: 37). Most donor respondents 
believed this was counter-productive: as well as causing the loss of institutional 
memory, it implies that contextual knowledge is a threat to policy and practice, 
rather than a valuable resource.8  
 
                                               
7
   Kaufman (1997) found that the rationale and career paths of individuals' entry into the 
professional arena of development affected their aims, objectives and the manner in 
which they worked. 
8 Briefing staff fully on the local cultural and political context before they started their 
posting, would improve their analysis of local events and information. This could be 
achieved cost-effectively through linkages, as Bevan suggests, with academic 
institutions which already have specific country knowledge (Bevan, 2000: 756).  
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Although the SMM approach implies that length of engagement results in 
improved sharing of mental models, this research suggests that time is not a 
sufficient explanation. Sida had the longest engagement in Ethiopia, had 
compiled detailed information about its culture, institutions and power structures, 
and the Regional Government regarded Sida as a good and reliable donor. 
Despite this, Sida felt frustrated by SARDP’s limited progress yet unable to 
intervene (until the 2005 crisis). DCI had twelve years’ engagement in Tigray 
and recognised the political risk of supporting a region dominated by the ruling 
party. Its international staff’s identification with the needs of Tigrean farmers and 
its recognition of local attempts to build capacity led DCI to regard the TRSP as 
an effective model of donor:government relations, but international staff had 
difficulty explaining the nature of local participation, evaluation and political 
economy. Most CIDA staff interviewed rarely travelled outside Addis and had 
little understanding of local forms of participation or evaluation. The greater 
emphasis that CIDA put on political reporting gave them no advantage in 
predicting the post-election violence. 
 
Motivation to ‘help’ 
 
I suggested in Chapter 2 that the choice of career of those working in 
development, and their decision to gain field experience, are likely to be 
normative in origin. How the term ‘normative’ is understood individually will vary 
according to different mental models, so that in arguing for a particular direction 
for development management, the values ascribed to ‘normative’ (and whose 
values they are) need to be made explicit.  
 
Interviews with DCI and Sida staff elicited the same values of ‘empathy’ and 
‘solidarity’ respectively described in their agency’s documentation. The research 
demonstrated, however, that values such as ‘empathy’ and ‘solidarity’ are part of 
mental models which are not necessarily shared. As a result, an interpretation is 
projected onto the ‘other’ context which reflects the empathiser’s mental model 
rather than specific contextual knowledge or familiarity. Evaluation of the TRSP 
in 2006 suggested that, in other countries as well as Ethiopia, DCI fails to 
communicate explicitly to its partners the importance it ascribes to transparency 
and accountability. The evaluation also noted DCI’s “repeated assertion” that its 
local knowledge gave it a comparative advantage but it suggested that 
ambiguity between DCI and the Tigray government resulted in DCI being “taken 
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too much for granted”. (DAI, 2007). Ostrom suggested that Sida (but it may also 
apply to DCI) suffered from the Samaritan’s Dilemma9. To avoid this, she argued 
that donors need to retain a measure of control, even though this conflicts with 
the intention implied in ‘ownership’ (Sida, 2002b:12). 
 
During the interviews, I noticed that a number of respondents found discussion 
of ‘participation’ uncomfortable. For international donor staff, the issue was the 
gap between their normative values and knowledge of the discourse, and their 
relative lack of detailed knowledge of the local context, or with what they knew 
or suspected about local political power structures. For national donor staff, the 
gap between the rhetoric of participation in donor discourse and policy, and the 
reality of participation seemed acute, particularly in Amhara, and for this reason, 
I did not pursue obviously contentious issues, to avoid causing my respondents 
further distress. For the international staff, employment with a donor agency 
meant that they had to rationalise their own identity as technical specialists, and 
the values and skills that went with it, with a ‘political’ form of development about 
which they were ambivalent. For some, the NAA was justifiable as a vehicle for 
empowerment, for others it detracted from more direct measures to aid poverty 
reduction.  
 
For these reasons, I suggest that the process of interpretation they employed to 
turn policy into practice was closest to that of the street-level bureaucrat, or 
perhaps Olivier de Sardan’s ‘broker’ (see 2.5.4). Even so, this label does not 
accurately reflect that they were having to interpret policy to fit in with their own 
mental models, as much as interpreting for their national staff and others with 
whom they were in discussed. Values and the use of knowledge appeared to be 
the motivating factor, rather than any form of entrepreneurial ‘broker’ or client 
‘translator’ bowing to a powerful donor patron. Discussions with senior donor 
staff clarified that policy was driven by organisations outside the agency, by 
central government’s (mostly foreign) policy and by ‘Paris’ (OECD-DAC) or 
‘Washington’ (World Bank). Overall development policy is decided by 
parliaments and, as Sida had experienced, the shift to the right in Swedish 
politics had placed a requirement on them to adopt a more ‘political’ 
development than some of their staff felt comfortable delivering. From this 
                                               
9
   “Samaritans are faced with the puzzling problem that their best strategy is always to 
extend help, but reciprocating with high effort is not the best strategy for the recipient” 
(Sida, 2002b: 5). 
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research, it appears that the policy-makers in donor agencies are more likely to 
be placed in the broker/translator role described by Mosse and Lewis (2006) for 
their government’s political objectives. 
 
8.3.2 Knowledge from ‘The Field’  
 
Discussion with some operational staff showed that they had empathy with the 
target population of their aid programmes, but this was not sufficient in itself. 
Their values made DCI and Sida staff reluctant to interfere and constrained what 
they felt they could, and did, say to government counterparts, and on the depth 
of discursiveness which they were able to achieve. At an individual level, we 
clearly use our own mental models, with more or less knowledge, to interpret 
what we see and read and to ‘fill in’ the gaps in our knowledge, in what Denzau 
and North describe as a ‘process of induction’ and what Long describes as 
‘knowledgeability’. 
 
As Figure 7.1 demonstrates, the ‘partnership architecture’ meant that donors’ 
interaction was largely with each other, and modality restricted their interaction 
with government. This reduced the need to explore ambiguities of terminology 
and thus differing values and objectives; rather, ambiguity could be exploited to 
maintain consensus. Gould describes the process of using the ‘buzzword’ terms 
of harmonisation and partnership as ‘consensualism’, which papers over 
divergences of interest and subverts the meanings of words so that they are 
politically emollient (Gould, 2007: 291).    
 
The literature reflects considerable concern about the potential pitfalls of 
development language; there is anxiety about using judgemental language, 
about getting swept along by current vogues or using outdated terminology.10 
Authors note that it is constantly being renewed, and, with the NAA, at an 
unprecedented speed. The terms used in current aid orthodoxy, such as ‘good 
governance’ and ‘empowerment’ are “seductively positive” (Abrahamsen, 2000: 
64), they are “feel good terms” which evoke “a comforting mutuality” (Cornwall 
and Brock, 2005: 2).  
 
                                               
10
  Crewe, 1987: 75; Chambers, 1997: 1744; Burnell, 1997: 233; Pomerantz, 2004: 45. 
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When donor staff explored the different meanings of the term ‘participation’ in 
some depth, it seemed that their differential meanings were related to particular 
contexts or modes of discussion, so that conflicting meanings sometimes 
appeared within the same interview. Filtering out information or rendering it 
ambiguous may therefore permit greater consistency with donor staff’s individual 
normative values around helping, or incorporating their agency’s political 
objectives. If the meaning of participation had migrated from one meaning to 
another, then the process would be that described by Denzau and North (1998) 
as plasticity; but because donor staff held different conceptions among their 
peers and individually, with conflicting internalised meanings, the process is 
more accurately described as ‘fluidity’. 
 
Congruence, ambiguity and disjuncture 
 
By presenting divergent mental models diagrammatically, Figure 8.1 indicates 
that comparative analysis helps identify areas of ambiguity which offer 
opportunities for clarification of intent or practice. They also offer ‘room for 
manoeuvre’, which may be constructive in that they become a tool for 
negotiation or an opportunity for improved dialogue. Alternatively, they may be 
used ‘passively’, to gloss over areas of disagreement, or negatively, to mislead. 
Set out diagrammatically, the gap between areas of disjuncture looks difficult to 
bridge but, by making disjunctures explicit, it alerts donors to specific areas of 
contestation.  
 
Figure 8.1.  Congruence, Disjuncture and Ambiguity in Mental Models 
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Rather than accepting that “common discursive ground” is not possible because 
meanings are constantly manipulated (Salemink, 2006: 122), employing this 
approach identifies degrees of congruence or disjuncture. Juxtaposing recurring 
elements in both Ethiopian and donor interviews, it was possible to see whether 
synergies exist which could be recognised by others as fitting in with their own 
mental model. Even if they are not synchronous, their relative congruence 
makes identification easier. For example, recognising that they are relatively 
unskilled in the use of speech to ‘influence’ or ‘persuade’ compared with 
Ethiopian oratory could alert donors to look for signals which they might 
otherwise have missed, and thus indicate where alternative sources of feedback 
are required.  
 
SMM and Drivers of Change 
 
Knowledge of the local context offers donors the rhetorical opportunity for more 
effective interventions, but Craig and Porter suggest they may regard it as a 
political threat, because it illuminates sites of struggle and conflict which 
challenge bland notions of ‘community’ and may challenge the logic of current 
aid orthodoxy, built on consensus and pluralism (Craig and Porter, 2007). The 
Drivers of Change (DOC) approach, which recognises that the cultural and 
political context structures aid relationships and institutions (DFID, 2004), has 
considerable resonance with this research. Interestingly for this thesis, the 
catalyst for commissioning a DOC analysis has, on several occasions, been a 
political crisis in the recipient country (OECD-DAC, 2005d: 6). Donors had 
stated that DOC analysis was important to identify “the underlying causes of 
poor governance and lack of ‘political will’ for change” (ibid: 3), but this comment 
was often accompanied by donors’ “scepticism and uncertainty about how far it 
can contribute directly to operational work”, because the analysis offered little in 
the way of “concrete alternatives” (ibid: 13). This suggests that donors would 
avoid discussing areas of ‘disjuncture’ with recipient governments. However, the 
DOC review findings support the SMM approach by noting that these analyses 
can indicate commonalities as well as differences, and suggest that donors’ use 
of DOC analysis to improve their knowledge can assist harmonisation (ibid: 26).  
 
However, interviews in Ethiopia in 2005 showed that most donor staff did not 
use the academic and commissioned analyses of power relations already 
available to inform their strategies. Disappointingly, they admitted that they often 
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did not read reports, even the one which the DAG funded on behalf of ‘civil 
society’11. This may reflect the demands of the ‘dialogue architecture’ which 
meant that they relied on other donors as their source of information, or that it 
was not perceived to be necessary: the process was more important than the 
content. When they failed to use monitoring opportunities, donor staff chose to 
be ‘imperfectly informed’ except, as the case of the Productive Safety Net 
Programme illustrates, when it ‘mattered’. Donors considered it important to 
monitor the PSNP closely, because it was “humanitarian” (R215).12  
 
8.3.3 Shift from Technical to Political Imperatives 
 
A theme that recurred in discussion with both Ethiopian government officials and 
local leaders, and with donor staff, was that development was a ‘national’ 
project, and that it was associated with a particular ideology: Revolutionary 
Democracy in Ethiopia, and Liberal Democracy combined with NPM for donors.  
 
Analysis such as those in Chapters 6 and 7 provides an explanation of how 
power is exercised through forms of leadership consistent with local culture and 
belief systems. These forms of analysis, which “reveal how little is really known 
about how to promote progressive and sustainable change”, challenge the NAA 
with its assumptions of a causal link between multiparty democracy and poverty 
reduction (OECD-DAC, 2005d: 25). What differentiates the NAA from previous 
orthodoxies such as structural adjustment is its specifically political agenda. It 
has closer links with comprehensive planning, because the NAA’s ideological 
role, in regard to the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, replicates that of “aid as 
cold war patronage and ideological tool” under comprehensive planning 
(Copestake, 2005: 70). The MDGs, which developed from the targets set in 
Shaping the 21st Century (1996), contain no reference to good governance, 
either as civil service reform or as the introduction of multiparty democracy.13 
Rather, it has a sectoral focus, primarily on health and education. Because there 
is consensus among governments, and more importantly among their citizens, 
that sectoral inventions have more demonstrable impact on the lives of ordinary 
people, there is a strong argument that sectoral interventions, that is ‘technical 
                                               
11
  This refers to the CRC consultation (see 6.4.5). 
12
 There were differences of opinion later between donors and between donors and 
government relating to notions of entitlement ([http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/ethiopia-
insights-psnp.pdf, accessed 14.12.07]) 
13
 It does, however, identify terrorism as an external threat. 
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development’, have greater legitimacy than policy management focused on 
political reform. (Donors recognised that cooperation in the health and education 
sectors had been more successful, but were not sure why (R216). An SMM 
perspective, that the length of engagement in those sectors (from the days of 
the missionaries), congruence of objectives, clarity of performance indicators 
and continuing engagement between donors and government via SWAps, offers 
a plausible explanation.) 
 
Gould recognises that the development industry “owes its existence to political 
fiat” (Gould, 2007: 274). He argues the necessity for analysis of “how the ‘idea’ 
of development is translated into policy via specific forms of human agency” 
(ibid: 281). Although the topic of ‘development’ is difficult to define because its 
breadth and diversity, the billions of dollars spent on it requires that donor 
practice is made transparent, particularly so, Gould argues, because “its main 
outcome is ‘policy’” (ibid: 277). Understanding how donors conceive 
development and the extent to which development policy is informed by 
contextual knowledge, requires the deconstruction of donors’ spoken and written 
statements (ibid: 290). However, to do this satisfactorily requires more 
differentiated use of the term ‘discourse’; donor discourse and academic 
discourse have different objectives and employ different mechanisms. In 




8.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 
 
8.4.1 Development Management Discourse 
 
In arguing that donor agencies need to be more empathetic in policy, taking the 
local context into account, development management discourse needs to 
broaden its focus - vertically up the aid chain to politicians and wider 
government policy (and electoral support), and horizontally for comparative 
analysis with other donors’ approaches. These issues of policy, practice and 
                                               
14
 Development Studies “generates endless and competing versions of virtuous 
prescriptions for social betterment” and a race to the “normative high ground” (Gould, 
2007: 271) and, sometimes, a “discursive one-upmanship” (ibid: 274). 
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context provide considerable potential for ‘normative’ development management 
research. 
 
The example of Ethiopia in 2005 demonstrates that the precipitate introduction 
of ‘development’ based on external concepts and unshared values is likely to be 
unsustainable. Under pressure from their principals (politicians) to demonstrate 
results, donors’ political priorities require short-term returns on their ‘investment’, 
so development becomes ‘history in a hurry’15. This results in the adoption of 
new development policies and modalities, so that aid effectiveness tends to be 
projected as a presupposed outcome (which is a political technique), rather than 
being analysed retrospectively, allowing for adaptation (process management) 
rather than the jettisoning of existing processes.  
 
There is clearly a role for development management research to investigate the 
trajectory of policy formulation and the use made by donor agencies of 
contextual information, such as analyses of culture and belief systems and the 
power structures maintained by them. However, development management 
faces a number of arguably self-constructed culs-de-sac: its researchers claim 
‘normative intent’, but are unsure how to effect this because of their concern 
about the legitimacy of development intervention, let alone their ability to 
influence policy. The anthropologist and CMS communities are both wary of 
incorporation, and subsequent complicity, as a result of engaging with 
management practice.  
 
However, concurrent with these discourses in development management 
reviewed in 2.2 are moderating voices warning against insistently critical 
perspectives, calling for a more constructive engagement. Development 
management’s ‘uncertainty’ is also an opportunity for reflexivity “in a social and 
political sense, as a participatory, popular reflexivity, which can take the form of 
broad social debates and fora on development goals and methods” (Pieterse, 
1998: 369, italics in the original). Bebbington also calls for a more constructive 
approach to development studies by re-grounding discourse in development 
practice (Bebbington, 2004).  He singles out Cornwall’s “refreshing humanist 
edge” (Bebbington, 2004: 281) which provides a reminder (to donors and to 
‘brokers’) that citizens “shape their own conditions of engagement and find and 
                                               
15
  Copestake, pers. comm. 
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use their own voice” outside the participatory spaces created for them (Cornwall, 
2004: 85). 
 
The review of development management discourse in 2.2 categorised Thomas’s 
concept - of management for development as an orientation rather than a task 
(Thomas, 1999) - as ‘normative’ development management. In later work 
Thomas concludes that values, being deeply-held, cannot be imposed on 
others, and are only one aspect of development management in which 
exchange of ideas, that is “influencing, steering, negotiation, looking for common 
ground, and so on, are of more importance than trying to force agreement for 
the implementation of a rationally defined programme of action” (Thomas, 2007: 
387). This thesis concurs with this view. As noted in 2.2, Cooke and Dar and 
others working in CMS also accept Thomas’s ‘normative’ argument, but they 
recognise that it challenges their rejection of engagement with development 
management practice (Dar and Cooke, 2008). 
 
No such disjuncture is found between Thomas and Brinkerhoff, who both call for 
the analysis of the role of values in development management. Brinkerhoff is 
arguably the lead US author in the public sector management stream of 
development management discourse. The paper written by Craig and Porter 
(2003) which describes the NAA system as ‘technical’ because it is based on 
NPM has been widely cited by other authors, so it is important to emphasise that 
this thesis has used Brinkerhoff’s schema. I follow Brinkerhoff in describing 
‘conventional’ monitoring and evaluation practice as technical, and the NAA’s 
use of monitoring, via the PRSP policy matrix, critique by civil society and 
electoral accountability, as political. In a subsequent paper on ‘Thirdwayism’, 
Craig and Porter later described the enrolment of the citizen in NPM as 
“‘inclusive’ liberalism” (Craig and Porter, 2004), clearly a political - indeed, 
ideological - enterprise. 
 
8.4.2 Development Management and Ideology 
 
The thesis has explored actors’ perceptions and practice during a period when 
one ideology, liberal democracy, was being offered by donors as an alternative 
to another ideology, Revolutionary Democracy. In the event, Ethiopia’s meta-
narrative was stronger than that of donors’. 
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In linking NPM and its inclusion within the NAA with a specific ideological 
framework, describing the Third Way as a Liberal project, Craig and Porter 
identify the antecedents of current development orthodoxy (2004: 390). Third 
Way ideology is associated with the US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada, and is seen as an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, “distinguished from a 
more continental or redistributive mode of social inclusion” (ibid: 404). However, 
Australia and New Zealand’s aid programmes are more independent than those 
of the US, UK and Canada, for which there must be a non-ideological 
explanation. 
 
A similar risk of ‘projection’ can be identified in universalising concepts of 
‘transformatory’ participation. The development literature uses examples from 
Latin America, implying that its political culture is transferable to other countries 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2004a: 162). National donor staff in Addis Ababa, for 
example, hoped that Ethiopian CSOs would take NGOs in South Asia or Africa 
as role models of activism (R217), ignoring the identified reasons for the 
‘weakness’ of civil society in Ethiopia. An acknowledgement of others’ mental 
models would ground that idealism towards a more realistic analysis of the 
potential for civil society and citizen empowerment in other cultural and political 
contexts. 
 
I argued in 8.3 that donor agencies’ room for manoeuvre is restricted by central 
government policy. This includes the choice of public management style which, 
as a government department or agency, donor agencies almost certainly have to 
adopt. NPM is regarded in Europe as an Anglo-American formulation, which 
European countries have adopted selectively and which they interpret and 
implement differently16. The bilateral donors in the forefront of the NAA in 
Ethiopia were the UK and Canada, with Ireland and Sweden in the second 
stream. Germany and The Netherlands were much more guarded towards the 
NAA, and Norway distanced itself even further. At home, these latter three 
countries have also been guarded in their adoption of NPM. A similar pattern 
occurs in relation to choice of modality: Germany and Italy, both of which gave 
more aid to Ethiopia than Canada, Ireland or Sweden, invested via projects 
providing technical assistance. There are clearly differences in development 
management which could usefully be explored. Escobar favourably compares 
                                               
16
   (Christensen and Laegreid, 1999; Noordhoek and Saner, 2004; Barzelay and 
Füchtner, 2003; Politt et al., 2007) 
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discourse about development studies in the UK, The Netherlands and Ireland 
and some Scandinavian countries with the paucity of debate in the United States 
(Escobar, 2008: 202), but closer engagement with other European donors’ 
approaches could usefully expand Anglo-Saxon development management’s 
framework of reference to include comparative political perspectives.  
 
8.4.3 Development Management and Cross-Cultural Discourse 
 
The SMM approach indicates the importance of analysing culture and belief 
systems in order to understand the process of change. Critique of donors’ failure 
to base policy and practice on context, as DOC analyses have demonstrated, 
requires development management to broaden its perspective and draw on 
other the expertise of other disciplines for its analysis of change and orthodoxy. 
This research indicates that applied development management could usefully 
draw on political science, cross-cultural psychology and history, as well as 
anthropology, sociology and institutional economics. Gould argues that 
‘transdisciplinary’ research, rather than providing clarification, may render 
development ‘empirically irreducible’ because of definitional problems (Gould, 
2007: 273). These prevent interdisciplinary dialogue and reinforce boundaries 
between different disciplines (ibid: 274). Review of the development 
management literature suggests that taking a range of different disciplinary 
perspectives into account could be easier for those taking a public sector 
management perspective than CMS or anthropology because they already work 
in a multidisciplinary environment.17  
 
There may also be lessons to be learned from the business sector, not merely 
because successive development orthodoxies have included a role for the 
private sector, but also because much of the cross-cultural research stems from 
the international management sector. Eyben considered what development 
organisations could learn from transnational corporations who achieve efficiency 
in a complex world through being reflexive, absorbing and communicating 
different perspectives, and “embracing uncertainty and explicitly sharing values” 
(Eyben, 2000: 11). Gould identifies the difference between business and social 
science approaches to knowledge as social science’s concern with “the 
contingent nature of knowledge” and of its construction (Gould, 2007: 288). In 
                                               
17
 In my experience in NHS management, contributions from all disciplines were 
expected and their particular expertise respected. 
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international work, business people want to understand the context before they 
start work in a new country, and can access services which inform them about 
local cultural norms and patterns of communication. Not all sections of the 
development community presume superior knowledge on cross-cultural issues: 
Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway and Finland invest in intercultural 
competency research, suggesting an intellectual modesty not readily apparent in 
Anglo-Saxon encounters. I have used the term ‘Western’ to indicate the political, 
cultural and intellectual approaches of donors on a European-North American 
spectrum. With more East Asian countries becoming donors themselves, the 
analytical lens is being turned back on the West, with academic centres 
comparing Asian and Western values to development. 
 
Under the NAA, ‘knowledge management’ is largely handled by the World Bank 
and a small number of bilateral donors making their existing knowledge better 
known to like-minded groups, with the focus on dissemination rather than 
knowledge generation (King, 2004: 27). Not only does this create a knowledge 
bank for ‘the West’, ignoring the South and East, but it means that knowledge 
among NAA donors is self-reverential. 
 
8.4.4 A Schema for Normative Development Management 
 
This thesis has pursued the role that culture and belief systems (religion or 
ideology) play in participation and evaluation. Because they form our mental 
models, culture and belief systems dictate the pace and manner in which 
information is handled and learning occurs (the SMM approach). Responses 
from the donor staff coalesced around the themes of ideology (the NAA), what 
they knew or were prepared to admit to knowing/not knowing, and the degree of 
empathy they expressed for their intended beneficiaries in Ethiopia. What was 
clear from the interviews was a tension around ‘information’: whether or not it 
was available, whether it was accessed, how or if it could be used and even 
whether it was necessary to have. 
 
Normative development management, as described by Thomas, concerns the 
values associated with development, a value-framework based on the desire to 
‘help’. It could thus be classed as ‘empathy’. As the responses from DCI staff 
showed, empathy was not sufficient to provide knowledge of, or accept the 
reality of, political structures of power which suffused government influence 
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down to the lowest community unit. The assumption that Ethiopia would accept 
democratic pluralism indicates the lack of use of (available) evidence. The 
‘missing middle’ appears to be information, hence the decline in value ascribed 
to evaluation. I therefore conceive normative development management as the 
following schema (Figure 8.2).  
 
Without being pegged to information, empathy, ‘knowledge’ and ideology (and 
its political manifestations), though interlinked, are relatively free-floating. 




Figure 8.2.  A Schema for Normative Development Management 
 
Donors’ policy formulation is dictated by the relative emphasis given to these 
values in national development policy. The three agencies’ development values 
(which were supported by staffs’ responses) showed that CIDA gave more 
weight to ideology, indicated by its support for the global security agenda and 
Third Wayism; DCI proclaimed that its aid programme was driven by empathy; 
and Sida’s values were based on empathy (solidarity) and knowledge, although 
their aid policy had recently changed following an ideological shift in the 
Swedish government.  
 
As well as providing a framework for analysing donor policy formulation, the 
schema may also be a useful tool in analysing the relative weight that different 
strains in discourse give to these three components. As social actors in 
research, all three components combine to form our mental models, and are 
reflected in individual ontologies and epistemologies. Reflexivity in the research 
process aids this analysis, hence my inclusion of ‘discourse’ under the 
knowledge heading in the diagram. 
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This thesis offers three contributions. Firstly, it re-emphasises that donor 
countries’ cultural and political context dictates their aid policy and relationships. 
Secondly, it provides a framework for conceptualising the participatory space 
between mental models and the opportunities it affords for exploring 
congruence, ambiguity and disjuncture. This reduces the tendency, despite the 
consensualist rhetoric, to regard the aid relationships as a duality: donor(s) and 
recipient because it reveals congruence/disjuncture between all actors, including 
harmonising donors. Thirdly, it recognises not only that sustainable development 
is a long-term process, but that mental models, whether shared or individual, are 
‘logical’ to their owners because they are based on culture and belief systems. 
Acknowledging the logic and therefore validity of various actors’ mental models 
then allows reflection on the degree to which development models and 
processes proposed by donors appear logical (or illogical) to aid recipients.  
 
Thomas’s description of normative development as an unattainable ideal 
(Thomas, 2000) has to be challenged by Bebbington’s admonition that “you do 
what you can” (Bebbington, 2004: 278). Craig and Porter call on those working 
in development “to be frank and blunt about the limited political and economic 
outcomes of their own institutionalized doctrine and practice” and consequent 
accountabilities (Craig and Porter, 2006: 274). In development management, 
reflexivity has to be extended to the wider political environment so that we can 
be alert to other practices which may be superior to our own.  
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ANNEX A 





The University of Bath had been researching in Ethiopia as part of a network 
with the Centre for the Study of African Economies and with the Department of 
Sociology and Social Anthropology, Addis Ababa University (AAU), since the 
early 1990s. In the summer of 2003, the ESRC-funded research group at Bath, 
Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) and AAU undertook ‘grounding 
research’ in 20 rural sites.  Fifteen of these sites had been studied in some 
depth in 1996 as part of the wider research network, Well-being and Ill-being 
Dynamics in Ethiopia (WIDE). Involvement in data-entry of the 2003 research 
(known as WIDE2) provided an opportunity for me to do two things.  Firstly, it 
provided useful contextual background to supplement my historical and 
anthropological reading. Secondly, it enabled me to do a scoping study of 
cultural practices and institutions which might help or hinder local participation in 
monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The WIDE2 research comprised ‘semi-structured questionnaires’1 which teams 
of male and female researchers completed with male and female respondents 
respectively.  The questionnaire was divided into a series of modules, one of 
which, entitled Social Structures and Dynamics2, explored (i) currently important 
social networks, institutions and organisations and the ways in which different 
people use them; (ii) the mechanisms underlying their operation and (iii) the 
structuration of the networks and organisations. The researchers were asked to 
interview three different people from each network, institution or organisation: a 
leader or an ‘important person’, an ordinary member and someone who had 
either not been a member or who had been adversely affected or excluded. Up 
to four networks and four institutions (one of them to be a labour-sharing activity) 
and three organisations were explored with women and with men at each site. 
 
                                               
1
   WeD Ethiopia website [25.01.06] 
2
   Module 2 
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Survey of responses collected revealed a number of recurring themes which will 
be discussed below: 
 
The role of associations in individual’s lives 
Role of religion 
Trust, mistrust, institutionalised checks on behaviour, on use of resources 
Use of sanctions, including ostracism 
Reciprocity, cooperation, cohesion 
Power distance, leadership 
Interlinkages between associational and government hierarchies  
Communal life v. individualism. 
 
ii. The role of associations in individual’s lives 
 
The responses elicited strong associational life in the 20 sites. Provided that the 
respondent could afford the costs involved, and had not been excluded, he or 
she would be likely to a number of associations, many of them interlinked. In the 
responses, the networks, institutions and organisations were not clearly 
separated, in that one respondent might view a particular type of association or 
activity as a social network, an institution or an organisation. For the purposes of 
my research, it was more helpful the group them according to their primary 
purpose. 
 
The networks, institutions and organisations can be grouped into five main 
categories: 
 
(a) associations dealing with the practicalities of life, for example burial 
associations (iddir being the commonly used word, though shengo, .. were 
used in some locations); or savings/rotating credit groups (equb) 
 
(b) religious associations and events, such as saint’s associations (maheber), 
Sunday or ‘church’ associations (senbete), memorial services (teskar, 
qurban) and some other Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), Muslim or 
traditional religious events. 
 
(c) development activities organised by NGOs or quasi-government agencies 
(relatively few) 
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(d) labour-sharing activities, either labour for food (e.g. debo), labour 
reciprocity (e.g. wonfel), labour for oxen or share-cropping. 
 
(e) social networks, such as kin groups, neighbours, friends. 
 
Apart from friendship, which was described in terms of a very small group of 
people enjoying shared trust, loyalty and reciprocal secrecy, membership of the 
other associations and activities were often mutually dependent. For example, 
an invitation to join an equb might be extended to other members of a maheber, 
but someone falling foul of the regulations of an iddir may be precluded from 
membership of labour-sharing mechanisms.  
 
Membership of an iddir is particularly important: “I joined to live within society” 
(S10). Not joining the iddir “is seen as not living peacefully with the community” 
(S9). 
 
As explored below, the associations may sometimes be linked directly or 
indirectly to government administration, so that membership or exclusion of the 
different associations and institutions may affect an individual’s standing with 
administrative authorities. 
 
If an individual either criticises or is criticised by his or her co-members of one 
association, that individual may be excluded from membership of other 
associations important to their well-being. As a result, it is to their advantage not 
to be critical.  
 
iii. The role of religion 
 
In the previous section, a number of religious-based associations were 
described. The proportion of Ethiopian Orthodox Christians to Muslims, 
Protestants and other denominations is estimated differently by different sources 
but, as mentioned earlier (in the History section) the presence of Muslims in 
Ethiopia predates the Muslim ‘invasion’ by Gragn in the mid-16th century.  
 
Given the regional geo-political situation, it might be anticipated that there would 
be friction between EOC and Muslim followers. However, the responses showed 
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many ways in which EOC and Muslims particularly not only tolerated each 
other’s religious practices but celebrated each other’s festivals.  One woman 
reported “My friend is a Moslem and I am a Christian. On holidays what we used 
to do was to sleep over in the house of the person whose holiday it was.” As a 
result of their friendship, her brother married her friend (S38, R1, O3). In the 
same site, Muslims as well as Christians had a maheber in the name of St. 
Mary. The researcher asked the respondent whether the EOC condemned the 
adbar ceremony (a traditional religious ceremony celebrated under an ‘adbar’ 
tree). The respondent confirmed that “the priests condemn the adbar ceremony. 
But it is a long-standing tradition, a custom that has come down from early 
times.” Both Muslim and Christian respondents from the Highlands thought the 
adbar ceremony kept their children and animals free from disease (S14 and 
S30). Iddir membership maybe open to Christians and Muslims, or maybe 
exclusively for one or the other.  An iddir in one location which is open to both 
Muslims and Christians and saves money throughout the year to buy meat to 
celebrate Meskel (EOC ceremony of the Finding of the True Cross), will split the 
money so that the two religious groups can slaughter the cattle in ways 
appropriate to their respective religions (S37); yet another membership of 
another iddir will be closed to Muslims for the same reason.  
 
There was more likely to be tension between EOC and Muslims and the rising 
number of Protestants and Pentecostalists. They were unlikely to allow 
Pentecostalists or Protestants to join their iddir (S32) and, even if they were 
willing, Pentecostalists were forbidden from belonging to associations that were 
not connected with their church (S1). Yet, in another location, there was a 
maheber of Orthodox and Protestant Christians (S.17). Pentecostalists were not 
allowed to join in the after-work drinking which meant that the post-work 
socialising terminated earlier than before (S9).  Pentecostalists do not celebrate 
Meskel, and they ‘condemn it [the adbar ceremony] as idolatry’ (S38).  
 
In one site, greater religious diversity meant that religion had become a criterion 
on which membership of non-religious associations, in this case an equb, was 
based (S18). On the other hand, “Olla buna [coffee group] never exclude people 
on the basis of religion because coffee is not meat” (S.9). 
 
Re-examining the WIDE2 data after fieldwork in Highland (Tigray and Amhara) 
communities, I found responses which reflected the way in which the church is 
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incorporated into government structures, e.g. a priest who had a role in kebele 
administration, he reported that “he controls the community’s access to inputs, 
credit and local justice.” (S.11). A maheber, rather than celebrating a particular 
saint, “raised money for the TPLF founding memorial ceremony.” (S.19). 
 
The argument here is that religion is not necessarily a source of inter-community 
division. However, my fieldwork showed how much M&E practice is linked to the 
church. In retrospect it would have been interesting to have sought out mixed 
communities in Tigray and Amhara to see how Muslims were effected. 
 
iv. Trust, mistrust, institutionalised checks on behaviour, on use of 
resources 
 
Almost all associations and institutions described by WIDE2 respondents appear 
to be highly bureaucratised. This applied whether the institution was a quasi-
government one, a religious association, or a kin group (S1) or a friendship 
group (S3). Even a coffee group3 had agreed codes of conduct, flaunting of 
which required explanation (S9). A typical structure would be:  Chairman 
(sometimes ‘muse’ meaning judge), secretary, treasurer or cashier - and 
sometimes an auditor and storekeeper. There might also be ‘3 observers’ 
(S.17), or ‘4 people to make peace within members’ (S.10). One iddir official was 
described as the man who takes responsibility for “punishing members when 
they violate the rules” (S40). Decisions might be taken by the membership as a 
group, or might be taken by the leaders without reference to the members (S24).  
 
In addition to recording payment of regular fees, officials record which iddir 
members visit or fail to visit a bereaved household; who supplied or failed to 
supply the required food and drink for funeral, maheber or senbete feasts (S2, 
S3) 
 
In addition to a formal structure, the majority associations described had ‘rules, 
‘regulations’ or ‘by-laws’. These would be “written on the paper under which all 
the members are governed” (S11), and the written rules would be registered 
with the kebele or the Woreda (S.13). In the case of people breaking the rules of 
an equb, for example, this could result in cases being taken to court (S13). 
                                               
3
   Traditionally, a coffee ceremony is held with neighbours and relatives three times a 
day. 
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There was a considerable degree of similarity between the rules as described. 
Foremost was the rule to pay the weekly, monthly or annual contribution, next to 
attend meetings punctually, and to obey the ‘rules’. Sometimes the rules 
included ‘active participation’ (S20). Misdemeanours might be very specific, e.g. 
50 cents for arriving late for an equb meeting, or more general - ‘misconduct’ at 
a credit association meeting incurred a fine of 5 birr, and ‘misbehaving’ at a 
burial association meeting also warranted a 5 birr fine. 
 
Transgressions warranting a fine were only the first of the penalties.  In a 
maheber, “those who are breaking the rule will be given advice, warned, and 
finally dismissed or cancelled from membership of the maheber” (S1).  Such a 
person may lose access to other communal institutions 
 
Rather than resentment at the restrictions imposed by the rules, many 
respondents appeared to welcome the discipline that the rules imposed.  In 
crop-sharing, “breaking the rules usually leads to serious conflict among the 
community” (S11), in another site members of an iddir who broke the rules were 
described as ‘evil’ (S29). The absence of rules might pose a threat: in a youth 
group [those aged 18-35 years are considered as ‘youth’], “since it has no 
specific rules and stronger regulations, there can be many individuals who can 
suffer” (S20).  If people stopped following the rules of marriage, “God will punish 
us for what we did and there will be catastrophe”.4  Failure to keep clan rules 
may result in a fine, in being ‘insulted’ by the rest of the clan and possibly labour 
(S2).  
 
A respondent in a Protestant women’s iddir, who declared that they have “no 
such thing as punishment. .. The only rule we follow is advising the members but 
not by punishing anyone.”  Yet in another answer, “If one member is absent 2-3 
times from participating to help another members, she may be punished 1-3 birr 
to continue being a member of the organisation” (S18).  
 
The original survey of the WIDE2 data was taken before the research sites were 
identified.  The institution of punishment by fines and subsequently by exclusion 
seems entrenched in Tigray and Amhara, and also prevalent in Oromia but was 
                                               
4
   The argument here is not that the rules of marriage are kept ‘religiously’, rather that 
the default stance is that obeying the rules in all aspects of life is good for society. 
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more mixed in SNNP, for instance it might include physical punishment there 
(“the one who is absent [from an equb] will be tied with rope and wood” (S.36).  
 
With most associations requiring a regular contribution of money, there appears 
to be continual concern about the honesty of its officials. “Some committee 
members use the deposited money for themselves” (clan group, S1/2), “some 
equb judges are inclined to their kin group and friends” (S23) 
 
Suspicion is not confined to financial irregularity. Performance is closely 
monitored in labour-sharing arrangements. In failure to comply with the 
requirements of labour-sharing (in this case, dugde), the poor worker may 
nowadays be taken to the Peasants Association leadership (i.e. the kebele 
administration); in the past he might have been beaten (to death, in one case 
cited by the responded) because “you never eat other’s labour”. In another site, 
if a person is “working below what is expected” in the labour-sharing activity 
(debo), he will be fined 5 birr; and if the person fails to take their turn in jointly 
herding cattle a fine of 10 birr is imposed(S.9).  
 
Even suspicion of wrong-doing by association may result in exclusion: one 
respondent whose fugitive brother was suspected of stealing cows from his own 
community, was excluded from his own iddir on the advice of his brother’s iddir 
(S9). This meant that he was also excluded from dabare (joint cattle herding), 
meheber, olla buna “and any other social intercourse”. He stayed ‘outside’ for 
three months before going to the kebele to apologise, and paying a 100 birr fine. 
There are further examples of one association or institution enforcing another’s 
rules. A man’s clan were asked by his equb officials to make him pay the 
remainder of his contributions when he stopped paying after winning his turn in 
the ‘lottery’ (S23). Members of the youth club who failed to pay their contribution 
are encouraged to do so through pressure from the iddir.  
 
One way of ensuring members behave acceptably is by careful selection. For 
associations, e.g. iddir applicants may be scrutinised by the whole membership 
before acceptance (S3). For potential labour-sharing relationships, the 
instigators look for willingness to work hard, better skill (S15).  As one 
responded advised, “If someone is lazy while working for others, they have to be 
open about him. This minimise the problem. Selection is in fact done on the 
basis of capability to work competitively” (S9). Careful selection is considered a 
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sound investment in, for example, an equb otherwise “you start with stupid 
individuals so that he/she cheat you, as you spare your time accusing these at 
court/kebele” (S31). Even membership of an HIV/AIDS club depends on “good 
personality of the applicants” (S33). 
 
Applicants to join an equb require a guarantor (S23), but even when a member 
suspicion of the rest of the group demands that “winners have to bring witness 
from those who haven’t taken their money” (S33). 
 
Even friends are carefully vetted: “Those who can join are persons who will not 
tell your secret to other people (i.e. outsiders) and also individual who is ready to 
share his secrets with the group” (S3).  
 
Food plays a significant part in associational relationships and those that 
prepare it inadequately, e.g. for gige, labour-sharing for food, will be subject to 
‘back-biting’ (S6).  Poor effort in labour-sharing activities may result in that 
person being served last (S.9). 
 
v. Sanctions, including ostracism 
 
Ostracism is frequently used as punishment or as a threat, whichever institution 
is being challenged. If a member of the iddir “does not come to the burial .. no 
one will talk to the person” (S3). Breaking the rules of dala (inheritance of 
brother’s property and wife) “creates isolation”. Failure to comply with the rules 
of a religious association results in being “discharged from the church and his 
membership right.  He is requested by law.” (S17). 
 
In many cases, exclusion results from inability to pay the required contribution 
(S18) 
 
vi. Reciprocity, cooperation and cohesion 
 
It would be wrong to suggest that all respondents displayed the same attitudes 
of mistrust, the importance of institutional hierarchies and rules.  For example, 
one respondent said her maheber had “no need of leader and officials. It is 
based on religious love and willingness” (S24). 
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There were examples of iddir which cross religious divide. Iddir have been 
adopted by Muslims and Christians, Oromos, Amharas, Tigreans, Wolaytas - the 
researcher noted that iddir has replaced kinship as an affective mechanism 
(S.37). 
 
Other expressions of solidarity among the responses included:  
 
 In neighbourhood networks (S15), craftworkers are integrated, “especially 
for coffee relations”. 
 
 Several sites quoted the same proverb: “Instead of a neighbour’s death, 
let a relative who live in a distant area die!” (S15), and more 
compassionately, “A neighbour is better than a relative who lives far” 
(S37). 
 
 “As far as I’m living in this community, it is a must to participate in such 
kinds of social life networks. At the time, when I need help for my work, no 
one will come to help me unless I help others” (S18) 
 
 Friendship seemed a rare source of enjoyment:  with friends “you will have 
fun” (S3) 
 
Conflict seemed to be preset just below the surface. “If two members quarrelled, 
they will be asked to make peace. And if one of them aren’t agree to make 
peace, the person who did not agree will be out of the maheber” (S6). 
 
As in labour-sharing mechanisms, it seemed that reciprocity was very important:  
The good thing about the three networks of friendship, youth clubhouse and 
kinship was that each network provided someone who would assist you when 
you needed help (S3). 
 
WIDE2 researchers reported that they were unable to find candidates who had 
been adversely affected by their kingroup, neighbourhood or kin iddir - 
“everybody has an equal share and everybody is equally responsible for 
everything” (S27). This statement of equality appears to conflict with other 
statements of mistrust listed above. Another possible explanation is that  
acknowledging discord was socially unacceptable. 
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ANNEX B 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
What does ‘participation’ mean to you? To donors? To Government? to 
Communities?  What is for? 
 
Have you ever been asked your opinion about development activities?  What 
were the circumstances? Was your opinion collected, and if so, how?  Were you 
unable to give your opinion, and if so, why? 
 
How are people chosen to speak on behalf of the community?  What are their 
characteristics? 
 
Are there people whose opinions are not collected?  If so, why? 
 
Are there people who are reluctant to participate? What happens if people 
refuse to participate? What would people say about them? What does 
individualistic mean? 
 
What evaluations do you attend? What are they for? 
 
Are there any problems or potential dangers from ‘evaluation’? 
 
How are participants selected, and why? 
 
Why would they want - or not want - to participate? 
 
If you were unable to participate in the evaluation yourself, who would you trust 
to put forward your point of view?  
 
If there was a discussion about a development intervention and someone 
disagreed with the elders/leaders/heads of department/other donors, what would 
happen? How would a decision be made? 
 
Are statistics collected about your community by the kebele or the woreda?  If 
so, why?  What statistics are collected and by whom? 
 
Does the kebele or the woreda collect information from communities because 
they are (a) knowledgeable, or (b) unsure what is the best approach, or (c) 
powerful or (d) some other reason? 
 
If you had the ability to influence what information was collected, what 
information do you think would be most useful?   
 
What sort of information is justified for collection?  Are there any topics which 
you think donors, government or your community are not entitled to ask? 
 
If donor funding was given to your government, how would you know whether it 
was being spent wisely?  How important is it for you to know? 
 
Who is responsible for ‘good’ development, and who should be held 
accountable? 
 
Annex B: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 323 
 
There could be a number of good or bad influences on your ability to “succeed” 
in life. Would you please put these in order of importance to you? 
(use of flash cards) 
 
Has this discussion raised any other issues in your mind that you would like to 
mention? 
 




Additional questions for donor and government staff 
 
What does ‘monitoring’ mean to you? To donors? To Government? to 
Communities?  What is for? 
 
What does ‘evaluation’ mean to you? To donors? To Government? to 
Communities?  What is for? 
 
Why do donors do M&E?  What do they use the information for? Why might 
donors not do participatory M&E? 
 
Why does Government do M&E?  What do they use the information for? Why 
might Government not do participatory M&E? 
 
What is the current PM&E system?  What is the logic behind it? 
 
In Ethiopia, what do you think might make M&E difficult for donors? for 
government? 
 
In Ethiopia, what do you think might make M&E easy to implement? 
 
If communities were involved in the design (method and content) of evaluations, 
what would the benefits be, if any? For donors? for Government? for 
communities? 
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QUESTIONS FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS 
 
 
Have you lived here for a long time? 
 
How much land to you have? 
 
What is your status in the kebele? 
 
[If a local leader]  What criteria does someone have to have to be chosen as a 
development group/cell leader? 
 
Are statistics collected about your community by the kebele or the woreda?  If so, why?  
What statistics are collected and by whom? 
 
Are there people whose opinions are not collected?  If so, why? 
 
Are there people who are reluctant to participate? What happens if people refuse to 
participate? Would they be described as ‘individualistic’? What does individualistic 
mean? 
 
[If not a local leader] Have you ever been asked your opinion about development 
activities?  What were the circumstances? Was your opinion collected, and if so, how?  
Were you unable to give your opinion, and if so, why? 
 
How are people chosen to speak on behalf of the community?  What are their 
characteristics? 
 




Do you have any questions for me? 
 

















Aalen, Lovise (2002). Expressions of Control, Fear and Devotion: The Elections 
in Mekelle and Wukro, Tigray Region. In: Pausewang, S., Tonvoll, K. and Aalen, 
L. eds. Ethiopia Since the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and 
Performance. London: Zed Books  
 
Aalen, L. and Tronvoll, K. (2008). The 2008 Ethiopian Local Elections: The 
Return of Electoral Authoritarianism. African Affairs. 108 (430), 111-120. 
 
Abbink, J. (1998). An historical-anthropological approach to Islam in Ethiopia: 
issues of identity and politics. Journal of African Cultural Studies. 11 (2), 109-
124.  
 
Abbink, J. (2006). Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in 
Ethiopia and its Aftermath. African Affairs. 105/419 173-199.  
 
Abrahamsen, R. (2000). Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and 
Good Governance in Africa. London: Zed Books.   
 
Abrahamsen, R. (2004). The World Bank's Good Governance Agenda: 
Narratives of Democracy and Power. In. Gould, J. and Marcussen, H. S. eds. 
Ethnographies of Aid - Exploring development texts and encounters. Roskilde, 
Denmark: International Development Studies, Roskilde University 
 
Ahmed, H. (2006). Coexistence and/or Confrontation? Towards a Reappraisal of 
Christian-Muslim Encounter in Contemporary Ethiopia. Journal of Religion in 
Africa. 36 (1), 4-22. 
 
Alula Hidaru and Dessalegn Rahmato. eds. (1976). A short guide to the study of 
Ethiopia. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.   
 
Alvarez, Father Francisco. (1540). Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to 
Abyssinia during the years 1520-1527. Translated from the Portuguese and 
edited, with notes and introduction, by Lord Stanley of Alderley for the Hakluyt 
Society, in 1881. 
 
Amare Tekle (1990). Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Politics. In: Ottaway, 
M. (ed.) The Political Economy of Ethiopia. Papers presented at a 2 day 
conference at John Hopkins Sch. Of Adv. Internat. Studies in April 1988. New 
York: Praeger 
 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities. Revised edition. London: Verso.    
 
Aregawi Berhe. (2004). The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front. 
African Affairs. 103/413, 569-592.  
 
Arora-Jonsson, S. and Cornwall, A. (2006). Making Connections: Learning about 
Participation in a Large Aid Bureaucracy. In: Eyben, R. ed. Relationships for Aid. 
London: Earthscan.  
 
Asnake Kefale and Dejene Arado. (2000). Civil Society and Good Governance 
in Ethiopia. (unpublished paper) 
 
 327 
Aspen, H. (2001). Amhara Traditions of Knowledge: Spirit Mediums and their 
Clients. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.   
 
Ayittey, G. B. N. (2006). Indigenous African institutions. 2nd ed. Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc. 
 
Bahru Zewde. (1991). A history of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974.  London: James 
Currey Ltd.   
 
Baker, J. (1992). The Gurage of Ethiopia: Rural-Urban interaction and 
entrepreneurship. In: . J. Baker and P. O. Pedersen. (eds.). The Rural-Urban 
interface in Africa: Expansion and Adaptation. Upsala: The Scandinavian 
Institute of African Studies. 
 
Barnard, A. and Spencer, J. (1996). Encyclopaedia of Social and Cultural 
Anthropology. London: Routledge. 
 
Barnes, C. (2003). Review article: Sovereignty, Identity and Modernity-
Understanding Ethiopia. African Affairs. 102, 507-514.  
 
Barzelay, M. and Fuchtner, N. (2003). Explaining Public Management Policy 
Change: Germany in Comparative Perspective. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis. 5, 7-27. 
 
Bebbington, A. (2004). Theorizing participation and institutional change: 
ethnography and political economy. In: Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. eds. 
Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring new approaches to 
participation in development. London: Zed Books.  
 
Berger, I. E. (2006). The Influence of Religion on Philanthropy in Canada. 
Voluntas. 17, 115-132.  
 
Bevan, P. G. (2000). Who's a Goody? Demythologizing the PRA agenda. 
Journal of International Development. 12, 735-750. 
 
Berhanu Mengistu and Vogel, E. (2006). Bureaucratic Neutrality among 
Competing Bureaucratic Values in an Ethnic Federalism: The Case of Ethiopia. 
Public Administration Review. 66 (2), 205-216.  
 
Blackburn, J., Chambers, R. and Gaventa, J. (1999). Learning to take time and 
go slow: mainstreaming participation in development and the Comprehensive 
Development Framework Prepared for Operations Evaluation Department, 
World Bank. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies  
 
Bliese, L. (1972). External Conversation in Yedju: A description of religious 
mobility in Wollo province, Ethiopia. Texas: University of Texas.  
 
Bond, R. and Hulme, D. (1999). Process Approaches to Development: Theory 
and Sri Lankan Practice. World Development. 27 (8), 1339-1358, 
 
Booth, D, Christiansen, K. and de Renzio, P. (2005). May. Reconciling 
Alignment and Performance in Budget-Support Programmes: What Next? 
Practitioners' Forum on Budget Support, World Bank, Cape Town, South Africa, 
May 5-6 2005.  
 
 328 
Booth, D. (2005). Missing Links in the Politics of Development: Learning from 
the PRSP Experiment ODI Working Paper 256. London: ODI.  
 
Booth, D. and Lucas, H. (2002). Good practice in the Development of PRSP 
Indicators and Monitoring Systems ODI Working Paper 172. London: ODI.  
 
Braukamper, U. (2003).  slamic history and culture in Southern Ethiopia: a 
collection of essays. Munster.    
 
Brett, E. A. (1996). The participatory principle in development projects: the costs 
and benefits of cooperation. Public Administration and Development. 16, 5-19. 
 
Brett, E. A. (2000). Development Theory in a Post-Socialist Era: competing 
capitalisms and emancipatory alternatives. Journal of International 
Development. 12, 798-802. 
 
Brett, E. A. (2003). Participation and Accountability in Development 
Management. Journal of Development. Studies. 40 (2) 1-29.  
 
Bridges, D., Amare Asgedom and Setagew Kenaw. (2004). From 'deep 
knowledge' to 'the light of reason': sources for philosophy of education in 
Ethiopia. Comparative Education. 40 (4), 531-544. 
 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2008). The State and International Development 
Management: shifting Tides, Changing Boundaries, and Future Directions. 
Public Administration Review.  68 (6), 985-1001. 
 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and Coston, J. M. (1999). International Development 
Management in a Globalized World. Public Administration Review. 59 (4), 346-
361.  
 
Brodkin, E. Z. (2008). Accountability in Street-Level Organizations. International 
Journal of Public Administration. 31, 317-336. 
 
Brown, D. (2004). Participation in poverty reduction strategies: democracy 
strengthened or democracy undermined? In. Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. eds. 
Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring new approaches to 
participation in development. London: Zed Books. 
 
Brown, D. (1998). Professionalism, participation and the public. good: issues of 
arbitration in development management and the critique of the neo-populist 
approach. In: Minogue, M., Polidano, C. and Hulme, D. eds. Beyond the New 
Public Management: Changing Ideas and Practices in Governance. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar  
 
Burnell, P. (1997). Foreign Aid in a Changing World. Buckingham: Open 
University Press.  
 
Campbell, J. R. (2008). International Development and Bilateral Aid to Kenya in 
the 1990s. Journal of Anthropological Research. 64, 249-267. 
 
Carlsson, J. (1994). The political economy of evaluation: international aid 
agencies and the effectiveness of aid. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.   
 
 329 
Chabal, P. and Daloz, J-P. (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument. Oxford: James Currey. 
 
Chabal, P. and Daloz, J-P. (2006). Culture Troubles: Politics and the 
Interpretation of Meaning. London: Hurst & Company .  
 
Chaillot, C. (2002).  The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church Tradition: A Brief 
Introduction to its Life and Spirituality. Orthdruk (Poland): Inter-Orthodox 
Dialogue.  
 
Chambers, R. (1997). Editorial: Responsible Well-Being-A Personal Agenda for 
Development. World Development. 25 (11), 1743-1754.  
 
Chambers, R. (1998). Foreword. In. Blackburn, J. and Holland, J. eds. Who 
Changes? Institutionalizing participation in development. London: Intermediate 
Technology Publications. 
 
Chen, C. C., Peng, M. W. and Saparito, P. A. (2002). Individualism, Collectivism 
and Opportunism: A Cultural Perspective on Transaction Cost Economics. 
Journal of Management. 28 (4), 567-583.  
 
Chhotray, V. and Hulme, D. (2009). Contrasting Visions for Aid and Governance 
in the 21st century: The White House Millennium Challenge Account and DFID's 
Drivers of Change. World Development. 37 (1), 36-49. 
 
Chr. Michelsen Institute (2002). A Review of Ireland Aid's Human Rights and 
Democratisation Scheme. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.  
 
Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (1999). New Public Management - Design, 
Resistance or Transformation? A Study of How Modern Reforms Are Received 
in a Civil Service System. Public Productivity & Management Review. 23 (2), 
169-193. 
 
Clark, J. (2000). Civil Society, NGOs, and Development in Ethiopia. World Bank. 
 
CIDA (1996). Government of Canada Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, 
Democratization and Good Governance. Gatineau: CIDA.  
 
CIDA (1998). The Agency Accountability Framework. Gatineau: CIDA.  
 
CIDA (1999). CIDA's Policy on Gender Equality. Gatineau: CIDA.  
 
CIDA (2002a). Canada Making a Difference in the World - A policy statement on 
strengthening aid effectiveness. [www.acdi-cida.gc.ca; 21.04.06]  
 
CIDA (2004). Country Development Programming Framework in Ethiopia (2004-
2009). Addis Ababa: CIDA.  
 
CIDA (2005). Ethiopia and Canada: Working Together for Ethiopia's Sustainable 
Development. Addis Ababa: CIDA. 
 
Clapham, C. (1988). Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 330 
Clapham, C. (1990). Conclusion. In: Ottaway, M. ed. The Political Economy of 
Ethiopia. Papers presented at a 2 day conference at John Hopkins Sch. Of Adv. 
Internat. Studies in April 1988. New York: Praeger.  
 
Clapham, C. (1991). State, Society and Political Institutions in Revolutionary 
Ethiopia. In: Manor, J. ed. Rethinking Third World Politics. London: Longman  
 
Clark, A., Gaye, I. and Sow, M. (1997). Canadian Aid Effectiveness in Senegal: 
a case study of an aid relationship. In: Carlsson, J., Somolekae, G. and Van de 
Walle, N. eds. Foreign Aid in Africa: learning from country experiences. Uppsala: 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
 
Clark, J. (2000). Civil Society, NGOs, and Development in Ethiopia: a snapshot 
view. Washington: World Bank. www.worldbank.org. 
 
Cleaver, F. (2001). Institutions, Agency and the Limitations of Participatory 
Approaches to Development. In. Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. eds. Participation: 
the new Tyranny? London: Zed Books. 
 
Cleaver, F. (2004). The social embeddedness of agency and decision-making. 
In. Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. eds. Participation: From Tyranny to 
Transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development. 
London: Zed Books. 
 
Clegg, S., Kornberger, M., Carter, C. and Rhodes, C. (2006). For Management? 
Management Learning. 37 (1), 7-27.  
 
Cohen, R. and Kennedy, P. (2000). Global Sociology. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Conway, T. (2004). Politics and the PRSP Approach. Vietnamese Case Study. 
Working Paper 241. London: ODI 
 
Conyers, D. and Mellors, R. (2005). Aid Ineffectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
The Problem of Donor Capacity. IDS Bulletin. 36 (3), 83-89.  
 
Cooke, B. (2001). The Social Psychological Limits of Participation. In: Cooke, B. 
and Kothari, U. eds. Participation: the new Tyranny? London: Zed Books  
 
Cooke, B. (2004). The Managing of the (Third) World. Organization. 11 (5), 603-
629.  
 
Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (2001). Participation: the New Tyranny? London: Zed 
Books. 
 
Copestake, G. (2002). Aid management dilemmas, microfinance and the 
political economy of helping. Previously presented at a Development 
Management group of DSA meeting January 2002. 
 
Copestake, J. G. (2005). Flexible Standards for Controlled Empowerment? 
Microfinance as a Case-Study of Aid Management In: Folke, S. and Nielsen, H. 
eds. Aid Impact and Poverty Reduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Cornwall, A. (2002). October. Making spaces, changing places: situating 




Cornwall, A. (2004). Spaces for transformation? reflections on issues of power 
and difference in participation in development. In. Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. eds.  
Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring new approaches to 
participation in development. London: Zed Books. 
 
Cornwall, A. and Brock, K. (2005). Beyond Buzzwords: "Poverty Reduction", 
"Participation" and "Empowerment" in Development Policy. Overarching 
Concerns Programme Paper Number 10 UNRISD Overarching Concerns 
Programme Paper. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.  
 
Cracknell, B. E. (2000). Evaluating Development Aid: issues, problems and 
solutions. London: Sage Publications Ltd.  
 
Craig, D. and Porter, D. (2003). Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New 
Convergence. World Development. 31 (1), 53-69.  
 
Craig, D. and Porter, D. (2004). The third way and the third world: poverty 
reduction and social inclusion in the rise of ‘inclusive’ liberalism. Review of 
International Political Economy. 11 (2), 387-423. 
 
Craig, D. and Porter, D. (2006). Development Beyond Neoliberalism? 
Governance, poverty reduction and political economy. London: Routledge 
 
Crewe, E. (1997). The Silent Traditions of Developing Cooks. In: Grillo, R. D. 
and Stirrat, R. L. eds. Discourses of Development: anthropological approaches. 
Oxford: Berg.  
 
Crewe, E. and Harrison, E. (1998). Whose Development?  An Ethnography of 
Aid. London: Zed Books.   
 
DAG (2003). Mechanisms for Enhanced Government-Donor Dialogue in 
Ethiopia. [www.dagethiopia.org, accessed 31.10.07]  
 
DAG (2004a). Ethiopia Harmonization Action Plan 2004-2006. Addis Ababa: 
DAG.  
 
DAG (2004b). DAG Common Framework of Support for the SDPRP Monitoring 
and Evaluation system: summary note. DAG Core Group for the PRSP, Addis 
Ababa.  
 
DAG (2005a). DAG Pooled Fund Annual Report 2004. Addis Ababa: DAG.  
 
DAG (2005b). Statement of the Development Assistance Group (DAG) on the 
SDPRP Annual Progress Report (2004/05). Addis Ababa.  
 
Dahl, G. (2001). Responsibility and Partnership in Swedish Aid Discourse . 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Paper No. 9 Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet  
 
Dar, S. and Cooke, B. (2008a). Introduction. In: Dar, S. and Cooke, B. eds. The 
New Development Management: Critiquing the Dual Modernization. London: 
Zed Books.  
 
 332 
Davies, R. (2003). Network Perspectives in the Evaluation of Development 
Interventions: more than a metaphor. EDAIS Conference November 24-25 2003. 
New Directions in Impact Assessment for Development: Methods and Practice. 
 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D and Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward A Stewardship 
Theory of Management. Academy of Management Review. 22 (1), 20-47.  
 
DCI (2004a). Volunteer 21: About Volunteer 21. [www.dci.gov.ie; accessed 
18.10.04]  
 
DCI (2004b). Statement by Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
[http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/aboutus/strategy/part1.asp; accessed 18.10.04)  
 
DCI (2004c). Evaluation & Review: Overview. [www.dci.gov.ie; accessed 
18.10.04]  
 
DCI (2004d). Multi Annual Programme  Scheme (MAPS). [www.dci.gov.ie; 
accessed 18.10.04]  
 
DCI (2004e). Advisory Board to Development Cooperation ireland. 
[www.dci.gov.ie; accessed 18.10.04]  
 
DCI (2005). Country Strategic Plan, Ethiopia: Monitoring & Evaluation 
Framework, 2005-2007. Dublin: Development Cooperation Ireland.  
 
DCI (undated). Tigray Regional Support Programme Ethiopia, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Framework, 2003-2006. Addis Ababa: Development Cooperation 
Ireland.  
 
de Herdt, T. and Bastiaensen, J. (2004). Aid as an encounter at the interface: 
the complexity of the global fight against poverty. Third World Quarterly. 25 (5), 
871-885. 
 
Dejene Aredo. (2003). Iddir: A Look at A Form of Social Capital. In: Pankhurst, 
A. (ed.). Iddirs: Participation and Development. Proceedings of the Ethiopian 
National Conference, 20-21 December 2001. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian 
Studies. 
 
Denzau, A. T. and North, D. C. (1994). Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and 
Institutions. Kyklos. 47 (1), 3-31.  
 
Denzau, A. T., North, D. C. and Roy, R. K. (2006). Shared mental models: a 
postscript. In: Roy, R. K, Denzau, A. T. and Willett, T. D. (eds.) Neoliberalism: 
national experiences with global ideas. UK: Routledge.  
 
Desai, B. (2006). (2006). Inside Out: Rationalizing Practices and 
Representations in Agricultural Research Projects. In: Mosse, D. and Lewis, D. 
(2006). (eds.) Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in 
Development Development Brokers and Translators. Bloomfield, CT Kumarian 
Press Inc. 
 
Dessalegn Rahmato and Meheret Ayenew (2004). July. Democracy Assistance 
to Post-Conflict Ethiopia: building local institutions? Clingendael Working Paper 
No. 27. Forum for Social Studies, Addis Ababa, and Clingendael Conflict 
Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.  
 333 
 
Dessalegn Rahmato. (1999). December. The growth of civil society institutions 
in Ethiopia marked as 'first draft'. Addis Ababa: Forum of Social Studies.   
 
de Vries, P. (1992). A research journey - on actors, concepts and the text. In: 
Long, N. and Long, A. eds. Battlefields of knowledge: the interlocking of theory 
and practice in social research and development. London: Routledge.  
 
De Weerdt, J. et al. (2007). ‘Membership Based Indigenous Insurance 
Associations in Ethiopia and Tanzania’. In: Chen, M. et al. (eds.). Membership 
Based Organizations of the Poor. London: Routledge. 
 
DFID. (2004). Drivers of Change.  
 
Dia, Mamadou (1996).  Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: 
Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions. Washington: IBRD/WB.    
 
Doolittle, A. A. (2006). Resources, Ideologies and Nationalism: The Politics of 
Development in Malaysia. In: Mosse, D. and Lewis, D. (2006). (eds.) Theoretical 
Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in Development Development Brokers 
and Translators. Bloomfield, CT Kumarian Press Inc. 
 
Duikers, W. (1995). Sacred War: Nationalism And Revolution In A Divided 
Vietnam. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Earle, L. (2002). Lost in the Matrix: The Logframe and the Local Picture. Intrac, 
5th Evaluation Conference, Holland, 31st March - 4th April 2003. 
 
Easterly, W. (2002). The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problems of 
Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid. Policy Reform. 5 (4), 223-250.  
 
Edmondson, R. (2001). Studying civic culture ethnographically and what it tells 
us about social capital: communities in the West of Ireland. In: Dekker, P. and 
Uslaner, E. M. eds. Social capital and participation in everyday life. London: 
Routledge.  
 
Elgstrom, O. (1999). Giving Aid on the Recipient's Terms: The Swedish 
Experience in Tanzania. In: Hyden G. and Mukandala, R. eds. Agencies in 
Foreign Aid: comparing China, Sweden and the United States in Tanzania. 
Basingstoke: Macmilln Press Ltd.  
 
Eliaeson, S. and Jedrzejewska, S. (2004). Neo-Liberalism and Civil Society, 
Swedish Exceptionalism and Polish Pluralism. European Civil Society Network, 
Conference on Markets and Civil Society in Europe, Madrid, September 23-25, 
2004.   
 
Erlich, Haggai (1994). Ethiopia and the Middle East.   Boulder: Col. Lynne 
Reinner Publishers Inc.  
 
Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the 
third world. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Escobar, A. (2008). Afterword. In: Dar, S. and Cooke, B. eds. The New 




ESRC (2004). ESRC Research Ethics Framework Working Paper No. 3:  Social 
science research ethics in developing countries and contexts. 
 
Estrella, M. and Gaventa, J. (1998). Whose counts reality? Participatory 
monitoring and evaluation: a literature review. IDS Working Paper 70. Brighton: 
IDS.  
 
Ethiopian Participatory Poverty Assessment 2004-2005. Ellis, F. and 
Wolehanna, T. (eds.). Addis Ababa: Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development. 
 
EU/MCB. (2004). Mapping Non-State Actors in Ethiopia. Research study 
commission by the European Union and the Ministry of Capacity Building, 
Ethiopia, and British Council, Addis Ababa.  
 
Eyben, R. (2000). Development and Anthropology: A View from Inside the 
Agency. Critique of Anthropology. 20 (1), 7-14. 
 
Eyben, R. (2005). Donors' Learning Difficulties: Results, Relationships and 
Responsibilities. IDS Bulletin, 36 (3), 98-107.. 
 
Eyben, R. (2006). Relationships for aid. London: Earthscan.   
 
Eyben, R. and Ferguson, C. (2004). How Can Donors Become More 
Accountable to Poor People? In. Groves, L. and Hinton, R. eds. Inclusive aid: 
changing power relationships in international development. London: Earthscan. 
 
Eyben, R. and Ladbury, R. (1995). Popular participation in aid-assisted projects: 
why more in theory than practice? In. Nelson, N. and Wright, S. eds. Power and 
Participatory Development: Theory and Practice. London: ITDG. 
 
Farrington, J. and Lomax, J. (2001). Rural Development and the 'New 
Architecture of Aid': Convergence and Constraints. Development Policy Review. 
19 (4), 533-544.  
 
Farrington, J. et al. (2002). Area Development Projects, Poverty Reduction, and 
the New Architecture of Aid. Volume 1, Synthesis Report Sida Evaluation Report 
02/14.  
 
Fetterman, D. M. (1998). Ethnography.  2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.  
 
Fournier, V. and Grey, C. (2000). At the critical moment: Conditions and 
prospects for critical management studies. Human Relations. 53 (1), 7-32.  
 
Francis, P. (2002). Social Capital, Civil Society and Social Exclusion. In. Kothari, 
U. and Minogue, M. Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Freeman, D. and Pankhurst, A. eds. (2003). Peripheral People: The Excluded 
Minorities of Ethiopia. London: C. Hurst.  
 
Furtardo, X. and Smith, W. J. (2007). Ethiopia: Aid, Ownership and Sovereignty. 
Global Economic Governance Programme, University College Oxford. 
 
 335 
Gasper, D. (2003). Studying aid: some methods. ISS Working Paper No. 382. 
ISS, Netherlands. 
 
Gasper, D. (2004). The Ethics of Development: From Economism to Human 
Development. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
 
Geertz, G. (1966). Religion as a Cultural System. In: Banton, M. (ed.). 
Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. London: Tavistock 
Publications ltd. 
 
Geoghegan, M. and Powell, F. (2005). Community Development, Partnership 
Governance and Dilemmas of Professionalization: Profiling and Assessing the 
Case of Ireland. British Journal of Social Work. 36, 845-861.  
 
Giday Degefu Koraro. (2000). An Introductory Inquiry into the Salient Features 
of Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution in the Gurage, Amhara, Oromo 
and Tigray Societies. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace 
and Development. 
 
Gilkes, P. (1999). Ethiopia - Perspectives of Conflict 1991 - 1999. Switzerland: 
Swiss Peace Foundation. [www.swisspeace.ch] 
 
Goetz, A-M. and Gaventa, J. (2001). Bringing citizen voice and client focus into 
service delivery. IDS Working Paper No. 138. Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies. 
 
Gordillo, G. and Andersson, K. (2004). From Policy Lessons to Policy Actions: 
Motivation to Take Evaluation Seriously. Public Administration and 
Development. 24, 305-320.  
 
Gould, J. (2004). Positionality and scale: Methodological issues in the 
ethnography of aid In: Gould, J. and Marcussen, H. S. eds. Ethnographies of Aid 
- Exploring development texts and encounters. Roskilde, Denmark: International 
Development Studies, Roskilde University  
 
Gould, J. (2006). Aid Modalities and the Arts of Government. In: Folke, S. and 
Nielsen, H. eds. Aid Impact and Poverty reduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan  
 
Gould, J. (2007). [Dis]assembling development. In: Gould, J. and Siitonen, L. 
eds. Anomalies of Aid: A festschrift for Juhani Koponen. Helsinki: Interkont 
Books 15.  
 
Government of Canada (2005a). Canada's International Policy Statement. A 
Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development. Gatineau: Government 
of Canada.  
 
Government of Canada (2005b). Canada's International Policy Statement. A 
Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview. Development. Gatineau: 
Government of Canada.  
 
Government of Ethiopia, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2004a). 
Monitoring and Evaluation System for the Rural Development and Food Security 
part of the SDPRP and MDGs. Slide presentation to the SDPRP M&E 
Workshop, 21 May 2004, Addis Ababa.  
 336 
 
Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Agency (2004b). M&E of the 
Implementation of SDPRP and the MDGs - Survey Data Perspective. Slide 
presentation to SDPRP M&E Workshop, 21 May 2004, Addis Ababa.  
 
Government of Sweden (2002). Government Bill 2002/03:122  Shared 
Responsibility: Sweden's Policy for Global Development. Stockholm.  
 
Grammig, T. (2002). Technical knowledge and development: observing aid 
projects and processes. London: Routledge.   
 
Grint, K. (1995). Management: a sociological introduction.  Cambridge: Polity 
Press.   
 
Harbeson, J. (1998). Is Ethiopia Democratic? A Bureaucratic Authoritarian 
Regime. Journal of Democracy. 9 (4)’ 62-69.  
 
Harrison, E. (2002). 'The Problem with the Locals': Partnership and Participation 
in Ethiopia. Development and Change. 33 (4), 587-610.  
 
Harriss, J., Stokke, K. and Tornquist, O. (2004). Introduction: The New Local 
Politics of Democratisation. In. Harriss, J., Stokke, K. and Tornquist, O. eds. 
Politicising Democracy: the new local politics and democratisation. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Harrow, J. (2001). 'Capacity Building' as a Public Management Goal. Public 
Management Review. 3 (2), 209-230.  
 
Healy, S. (2008). Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts 
Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel. London: Chatham House. 
 
Heginbotham, S. J. (1975). Cultures in Conflict: The Four Faces of Indian 
Bureaucracy.  New York: Columbia University.   
 
Henkel, H. and Stirrat, R. (2001). Participation as Spiritual Duty; Empowerment 
as Secular Subjection. In: Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. eds. Participation: the new 
Tyranny? London: Zed Books  
 
Henry, L. (2004). Morality, Citizenship and Participatory Development in an 
Indigenous Development Association: the case of GPSDO and the Sebat Bet 
Gurage of Ethiopia. In. Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. eds. Participation: From 
Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in 
development. London: Zed Books.  
 
Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. (2004a). Relocating participation within a radical 
politics of development: insights from political action and practice. In: Hickey, S. 
and Mohan, G. eds. Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring 
new approaches to participation in development London: Zed Books.  
 
Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. (2004b). Towards participation as transformation: 
critical themes and challenges. In: Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. eds. Participation: 
From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in 
development London: Zed Books. 
 
 337 
Hirschmann, D. (1999). Development Management versus Third World 
Bureaucracies: A Brief History of Conflicting Interests. Development and 
Change. 30, 287-305.  
 
Hoben, A. (1970). Social Stratification in Traditional Amhara Society. In: Tuden, 
A. and Plotnicov, L. eds. Social Stratification in Africa. New York: The Free 
Press, Macmillan.  
 
Hoben, A. (1995). Paradigms and Politics: The Cultural Construction of 
Environmental Policy in Ethiopia. World Development. 23 (6), 1107-1021.  
 
Hofstede, G. H. (2001). Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, behaviors, 
institutions, and organizations across nations. 2nd ed. London: Sage.      
 
Holvoet, N. and Renard, R. (2007). Monitoring and Evaluation under the PRSP: 
solid rock or quicksand? Evaluation and Program Planning. 30, 66-81.  
 
Hood, C. (1991). A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration. 
69, 3-19.  
 
Hood, C. (2005). Public Management: The Word, the Movement, the Science. 
In: Ferlie, E. et al. eds. The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. Oxford:   
 
Hook, S. W. (1995). National Interest and Foreign Aid.  Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner.   
 
Hubbard, M. (2005). Aid Management: Beyond the New Orthodoxy. Public 
Administration and Development. 25, 365-371.  
 
Hulme, D. (2009). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): A Short History 
of the World’s Biggest Promise. BWPI Working Paper 100. Manchester: Brooks 
World Poverty Institute. 
 
Hupe, P. and Hill, M. (2007). Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public 
Accountability. Public Administration. 85 (2), 279-299. 
 
Hyden, G. and Haile Mariam, Mahlet. (undated). Voluntarism and Civil Society. 
[draft] 
 
Ireland Aid (2002). Attitudes Towards Development Cooperation in Ireland: The 
Report of a National Survey of Irish Adults. Report by MRBI in 2002. Dublin: 
Ireland Aid.  
 
Ireland Aid (2003). Report of the Ireland Aid Review Committee. Dublin: Ireland 
Aid.  
 
Irish Aid. (2006). Evaluation of the Irish Aid/ Tigray Regional Support 
Programme (TRSP). Report by DAI Europe Ltd. Dublin: Irish Aid.  
 
Johnson, H. and Wilson, G. (2000). Biting the Bullet: Civil Society, Social 
Learning and the Transformation of Local Governance. World Development. 28 
(11), 1891-1906.  
 
 338 
Johnston, R. and Soroka, S. N. (2001). eds. Social capital in a multicultural 
society. In: Dekker, P. and Uslaner, E. M. Social capital and participation in 
everyday life. London: Routledge.  
 
Kashima, Y. (2002). Culture and Self: A Cultural Dynamical Analysis. In: 
Kashima, Y., Foddy, M. and Platow, M. J. eds. Self and Identity: Personal, 
Social, and Symbolic. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
 
Kassa Belay and Degnet Abebaw (2004). Challenges Facing Agricultural 
Extension Agents: A Case Study from South-western Ethiopia. Journal of Social 
Development in Africa. 139-168.  
 
Kassahun Berhanu (2003). Party Politics and Political Culture in Ethiopia. In: M. 
A. Mohamed Salih. ed. African political parties: evolution, institutionalism and 
governance. London: Pluto Press.  
 
Kaufmann, G. (1997). Watching the Developers: a Partial Ethnography In: Grillo, 
R. D. and Stirrat, R. L. eds. Discourses of Development: anthropological 
approaches. Oxford: Berg.  
 
Keeley, J. and Scoones, I. (2000). Knowledge, power and politics: the 
environmental policy-making process in Ethiopia. The Journal of Modern African 
Studies. 38 (1), 89-120.  
 
Kelsall, T. (2008). Going with the Grain in African Development? Development 
Policy Review. 26, 627-655. 
 
Killick, T. (1997). Principals, Agents and The Failings of Conditionality. Journal 
of International Development. 9 (4), 483-495. 
 
Killick, T. (2004). Politics, Evidence and the New Aid Agenda. Development 
Policy Review. 22 (1), 5-29.  
 
King, K. (2004). Development Knowledge and the Global Policy Agenda. Whose 
Knowledge? Whose Policy? Occasional Paper, Centre of African Studies, 
University of Copenhagen. 
 
King, K. and McGrath, S. (2004). Knowledge for Development?  Comparing 
British, Japanese, Swedish and World Bank Aid. London: Zed Books.   
 
Korten, D. and Korten, F. (1972). Planned Change in a Traditional Society: 
Psychological Problems of Modernization in Ethiopia. New York: Praeger 
Publishers.   
 
Kulipossa, F. P. (2004). Decentralisation and democracy in developing 
countries: an overview. Development in Practice. 14 (6), 768-779. 
 
Kunz, A. and Pfaff, D. (2002). Agency theory, performance evaluation, and the 
hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society. 27, 275-295.  
 
Landell-Mills, P. (1992). Governance, Cultural Change, and Empowerment. 
Journal of Modern African Studies. 30 (4), 543-567. 
 
 339 
Lange, S. et al. (2000). Civil Society in Tanzania. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen 
Institute. 
 
Lange, S. (2008) The Depoliticisation of Development and the Democratisation 
of Politics in Tanzania: Parallel Structures as Obstacles to Delivering Services to 
the Poor. Journal of Development Studies, 44 (8), 1122 — 1144 
 
Lefort, R. (2007). Powers-mengist-and peasants in rural Ethiopia: the May 2005 
elections. Journal of Modern African Studies. 45 (2), 253-273.  
 
Legro, J. W. (2000). The Transformation of Policy Ideas. American Journal of 
Political Science. 44 (3), 419-431. 
 
Leftwich, A. (1996). On the Primacy of Politics in Development. In. Leftwich, A. 
ed. Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice. London: Polity Press. 
 
Levine, D. N. (1965a). Wax and Gold: tradition and innovation in Ethiopian 
culture. Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
 
Levine, D. N. (1965b). Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism. In: Pye, L. W. 
and Verba, S. ed. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Levine, D. N. (1974). Greater Ethiopia:  The evolution of a multi-ethnic society. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
 
Lewis, D. (2002). Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the 
Usefulness of a Concept. Development and Change. 33 (4), 569-586. 
 
Lewis, D. (2008). Nongovernmentalism and the Reorganization of Public Action. 
In: Dar, S. and Cooke, B. eds. The New Development Management. London: 
Zed Books.  
 
Lewis, D. and Mosse, D. (2006). Encountering Order and Disjuncture: 
Contemporary Anthropological Perspectives on the Organization of 
Development. Oxford Development Studies. 34 (1), 1-13.  
 
Lewis, D., Bebbington, A. J. et al. (2003). Practice, Power and Meaning: 
frameworks for studying organizational culture in multi-agency rural 
development projects. Journal of International Development. 15, 541-557.  
 
Lipsky, G. A. (1962). Ethiopia: its people, its society, its culture.  Haven, Conn.: 
Human Relation Area Files, Inc.  
 
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy dilemmas of the individual in public 
services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Lister, S. and Betley, M. (1999). Approaches to Decentralisation in Developing 
Countries. MEFMI/DFID workshop on Good Practice in Public Expenditure 
Management, Cape Town, June 1999. 
 




Long, N. and Long, A. eds. (1992). Battlefields of Knowledge: the Interlocking of 
Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development. London: Routledge.   
 
Lucas, H., Evans, D. and Pasteur, K. (2004). December. Research on the 
current state of PRS monitoring systems. IDS Discussion Paper 382. Brighton: 
IDS.  
 
Makinda, S. M. (1987). Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. 
Beckenham: Croom Helm.   
 
Malarney, S. K. (1997). Culture, Virtue, and Political Transformation in 
Contemporary Northern Viet Nam. The Journal of Asian Studies, 56 (4), 899-
920. 
 
Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and Subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of 
late colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Mamumsha Lemma and Hoffman, V. (2005). October. The Agricultural 
Knowledge System in Tigray, Ethiopia: Empirical Study about Its Recent History 
and Actual Effectiveness Conference on International Agricultural Research for 
Development, Stuttgart-Hohenheim, October 11-13, 2005.   
 
Marcus (1994). A History of Ethiopia   Berkeley: University of California.      
 
MARENA Research Project: reconstruction of natural resource management 
institutions in post-conflict countries. University of Sussex. 
[http://www.geog.sussex.ac.uk/research/development/marena/] 
 
Markakis, J. (1973). Social Formation and Political Adaptation in Ethiopia. 
Journal of Modern African Studies. 11 (3), 361-381.  
 
Markakis, J. and Asmehash Beyene (1967). Representative Institutions in 
Ethiopia. Journal of Modern African Studies. 5 (2), 193-219.  
 
Marr, D. G. (2000). Concepts of 'Individual' and 'Self' in Twentieth-Century 
Vietnam. Modern Asian Studies, 34 (4), 769-796. 
 
Marsden, D. (1994). Indigenous management and the management of 
indigenous knowledge. In: Scoones, I. and Thompson, J. eds. Beyond Farmer 
First: Rural people's knowledge, agricultural research and extension practice. 
London: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd  
 
Marsland, R. (2006). Community Participation the Tanzanian Way: Conceptual 
Contiguity or Power Struggle? Oxford Development Studies. 34 (1), 65-79. 
 
Martens, B. (2002a). Chapter 1: Introduction. In: Martens, B. et al. eds. The 
institutional economics of foreign aid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Martens, B. (2002b). Chapter 5: The role of evaluation in foreign aid 
programmes. In: Martens, B. et al. eds. The institutional economics of foreign 
aid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Masaki, K. (2004). The 'transformative' unfolding of 'tyrannical' participation. In. 




Maxwell, S. (2005). January The Washington Consensus is dead! Long live the 
meta-narrative! ODI Working Paper No. 243. London: ODI.  
 
McCourt, W. (2001). Moving the public management debate forward: a 
contingency approach. In: McCourt, W. and Minogue, M. (eds.) The 
internationalization of public management: reinventing the Third World state. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
McCourt, W. (2008). Public Management in Developing Countries: from 
downsizing to governance. Public Management Review. 10 (4), 467-479.  
 
Mebrahtu, Esther (2002). Perceptions and practices of monitoring and 
evaluation: international NGO experiences in Ethiopia. Development in Practice. 
12 (3-4), 501-517.  
 
Medhane Tadesse and Young, J. (2003). TPLF: Reform or Decline? Review of 
African Political Economy. 97, 389-403. 
 
Mercer, C., Mohan, G. and Power, M. (2003). Towards a critical political 
geography of African development. Geoforum. 34 (4), 419-436.  
 
Messay Kebede. (1994).  Meaning and Development. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
 
Messay Kebede. (1999).  Survival and Modernization Ethiopia's Enigmatic 
Discourse: A Philosophical Discourse. Laurenceville, New Jersey: The Red Sea 
Press, Inc.  
 
Michaelowa, K. and Borrmann, A. (2006). Evaluation Bias and Incentive 
Structures in Bi- and Multilateral Aid Agencies. Review of Development 
Economics. 10 (2), 313-329.  
 
Moemeka, A. A. (1998). Communalism as a Fundamental Dimension of Culture. 
Journal of Communication. 48 (4), 118-141.  
 
Mohan, G. and Hickey, S. (2004). Relocating participation within a radical 
politics of development: critical modernism and citizenship. In: Hickey, S. and 
Mohan, G. eds. Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring new 
approaches to participation in development London: Zed Books.  
 
Mohan, G. and Stokke, K. (2000). Participatory development and empowerment: 
the dangers of localism. Third World Quarterly. 21 (2), 247-268. 
 
Molund, S. (2000). Ownership in Focus? Discussion paper for a planned 
evaluation Sida Studies in Evaluation 00/5. Sida Studies in Evaluation. 
Stockholm: Sida.   
 
Mosse, D. (2005). Cultivating Development: an ethnography of aid policy and 
practice. London: Pluto Press.   
 
Muir, A. (2004). Building Capacity in Ethiopia to Strengthen the Participation of 
Citizens' Associations in Development: A Study of the Organizational 
Associations of Citizens. (Draft Report). Oxford: Intrac. 
 
 342 
Mosse, D. and Lewis, D. (2006). Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and 
Translation in Development Development Brokers and Translators Lewis, D. and 
Mosse, D. Bloomfield, CT Kumarian Press Inc.   
 
Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate (1988). Ethiopia: Transition and 
Development in the Horn of Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.   
 
Noel, A., Therien, J-P and Dallaire, S. (2004). Divided Over Internationalism: 
The Canadian Public and Development Assistance. Canadian Public Policy. 
XXX, 1 29-46.  
 
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
North, Douglass C. (1995). The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development. In: Harriss, J., Hunter, J. and Lewis, C. M. eds. The new 
intuitional economics and Third World development. London: Routledge.  
 
Norton, A. et al. (2001). A Rough Guide to PPAs. Participatory Poverty 
Assessments: a rough guide to theory and practice.  London: ODI. 
 
Nursey-Bray, P. (1983). Consensus and community: the theory of African one-
party democracy. In. Duncan, G. ed. Democratic theory and practice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
OECD-DAC (1996). Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development 
Co-operation. Paris: OECD.  
 
OECD-DAC (2003a). Development Co-operation Review: Canada. Paris: 
OECD.  
 
OECD-DAC (2003b). DAC Peer Review: Ireland. Paris: OECD.  
 
OECD-DAC (2003c). Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery. 
Paris: OECD-DAC.  
 
OECD-DAC (2005a). Peer Review of Sweden. Paris: OECD.  
 
OECD-DAC (2005b).Survey on Harmonisation and Alignment of Donor 
Practices: Measuring Aid Harmonisation and Alignment in 14 partner counties 
 
OECD-DAC (2005c). Incentives for Harmonisation in Aid Agencies. Study 
prepared by ODI for the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. 
 
OECD-DAC (2005d). Lessons learned on the use of Power and Drivers of 
Change Analyses in development co-operation: Final Report. OECD DAC 
Network on Goverance (GOVNET). Paris: OECD-DAC.  
 
OECD-DAC (2005e). Managing Aid: Practices of DAC Country Members. 
 
OECD-DAC (2005f). Security System Reform and Governance. 
 




OECD-DAC (2006a). Managing for Development Results. Principles in Action: 
Sourcebook on emerging Good Practices. Paris: OECD-DAC.  
 
OECD-DAC (2006b). Survey on Monitoring The Paris Declaration. Country 
Chapter 13. Ethiopia. Paris: OECD-DAC.  
 
Olivier de Sardan, J-P. (2005). Anthropology and Development: Understanding 
Contemporary Social Change. London: Zed Books. 
 
Osterloh, M. (2001). Motivation, knowledge transfer and organizational forms. In: 
Frey, B. ed. Inspiring Economics: human motivation in political economy. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Ottaway, M (1990). Introduction: The crisis of the Ethiopian State and Economy. 
In: Ottaway, M. ed. The Political Economy of Ethiopia. Papers presented at a 2 
day conference at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 
April 1988. New York: Praeger.  
 
PAN/E (2005).  Pro-Poor Services in Ethiopia: a Pilot Citizen Report Card. Addis 
Ababa  
 
Parkhurst, A. (2003). The Role and Space for Iddirs to Participate in the 
Development of Ethiopia. In: Pankhurst, A. (ed.). Iddirs: Participation and 
Development. Proceedings of the Ethiopian National Conference 20-21 
December 2001. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies. 
 
Pankhurst, H. (1992). Gender, Development and Identity: An Ethiopian Study. 
London: Zed Books.   
 
Pankhurst, R. The History of Famine and Epidemics in Ethiopia prior to the 
Twentieth Century. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission. 
 
Pausewang, S. (2006). Book Review of: Poluha, E. (2004). The Power of 
Continuity: Ethiopia through the eyes of its children. Uppsala: Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet. Journal of Modern African Studies. 44 (1), p.168. 
 
Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, K. and Aalen, L. (2002a). A Process of 
Democratisation or Control: The Historical and Political Context. In: Pausewang, 
S., Tronvoll, K. and Aalen, L. eds. Ethiopia Since the Derg: A Decade of 
Democratic Pretension and Performance. London: Zed Books  
 
Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, K. and Aalen, L. (2002b). Conclusion: Democracy 
Unfulfilled? In: Pausewang, S., Tronvoll, K. and Aalen, L. eds. Ethiopia Since the 
Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance. London: Zed 
Books  
 
Perusek, D. (2007). Grounding Cultural Relativism. Anthropological Quarterly. 
80 (3), 821-836.  
 
Picciotto, R. (2003a). New evaluation standards for a new century. Paper 
presented at the UKES Annual Conference, December 1-3, 2003, Cardiff. 
 
Picciotto, R. (2003b). International Trends and Development Evaluation: The 
Need for IDEAS. American Journal of Evaluation. 24 (2), 227-234.  
 344 
 
Pieterse, J. N. (1998). My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-
Development, Reflexive Development. Development and Change. 29, 343-373.  
 
Pollitt, C., van Thiel, S. and Homburg, V. (2007). New Public Management in 
Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Poluha, E. (2002). Learning Political Behaviour: Peasant-State Reations in 
Ethiopia. In: Poluha, E. and Rosendahl, M. eds. Contesting 'Good' Governance: 
crosscultural perspectives on representation, accountability and public space. 
London: Routledge Curzon. 
 
Poluha, E. (2004). The Power of Continuity: Ethiopia through the eyes of its 
children. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
 
Poluha, E. and Rosendahl, M. (2002). Introduction: People, Power and Public 
Spaces. In: Poluha, E. and Rosendahl, M. eds. Contesting 'Good' Governance: 
crosscultural perspectives on representation, accountability and public space. 
London: Routledge Curzon.  
 
Pomerantz, P. R. (2004). Aid Effectiveness in Africa: Developing Trust between 
Donors and Governments. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books.   
 
Pratt, B. ed. (2003). Changing Expectations? The Concept and Practice of Civil 
Society in International Development. Oxford: Intrac.    
 
Pratt, C. (1999). Greater Policy Coherence, a Mixed Blessing: The Case of 
Canada. In: Forster, J. and Stokke, O. eds. Policy Coherence in Development 
Cooperation. London: Frank Cass Publishers  
 
Pratten, D. T. (1997). Local Institutional Development and Relief n Ethiopia: A 
Kire-based Seed Distribution Programme in North Wollo. Disasters. 21 (2), 138-
154.  
 
Quarles van Ufford, P., Giri, A. K. and Mosse, D. (2003). Interventions in 
Development: towards a new moral understanding of our experiences and an 
agenda for the future. In: Quarles van Ufford, P. and Giri, A. K. eds.  A moral 
critique of development: in search of global responsibilities. London: Routledge.  
 
Rao, V. and Walton, M. (2004).  Culture and Public Action: Relationality, 
Equality of Agency, and Development. In: Rao, V. and Walton, M. eds. Culture 
and Public Action. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
 
Rebien, C. (1996). Evaluating development assistance in theory and in practice. 
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.  
 
Roberts, J. (2003). April. Results-oriented public expenditure management: will it 
reduce poverty faster? . ODI ODI Briefing Paper. London: ODI.  
 
Rondinelli, D. A. (1993). Development projects as policy experiments: an 
adaptive approach to development administration. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.   
 
Rose, N. (1999). Powers of Freedom: reframing political thought. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 345 
Rossi, B. (2006). Aid Policies and Recipient Strategies in Niger: Why Donors 
and Recipients Should Not Be Compartmentalized into Separate “Worlds of 
Knowledge.” In: Mosse, D. and Lewis, D. (2006). (eds.) Theoretical Approaches 
to Brokerage and Translation in Development Development Brokers and 
Translators. Bloomfield, CT Kumarian Press Inc. 
 
Rothstein, B. (2000). Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories. Journal 
of Theoretical Politics. 12 (4), 477-501. 
 
Rothstein, B (2002). Sweden: Social Capital in the Social Democratic State. In: 
Putnam, R. D. ed. Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in 
Contemporary Society Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Sagie, A. and Aycan, Z. (2003). A cross-cultural analysis of participative 
decision-making in organizations. Human Relations. 56 (4), 453-473.  
 
Salemink, O. (2006). Translating, Interpreting and Practicing in Civil Society in 
Vietnam: A Tale of Calculated Misunderstandings. In: Mosse, D. and Lewis, D. 
(2006). (eds.) Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in 
Development Development Brokers and Translators. Bloomfield, CT Kumarian 
Press Inc. 
 
Sauer, J. B. (2002). Metaphysics and economy-the problem of interest: a 
comparison of the practice and ethics of interest in Islamic and Christian 
cultures. International Journal of Social Economics. 29 (1/2), 97-118.  
 
Schuurman, F. J. (2000). Paradigms lost, paradigms regained? Development 
studies in the twenty-first century. Third World Quarterly. 21 (1), 7-20. 
 
Scrutton, C. and Luttrell, C. (2007). The definition and operationalisation of 
empowerment in different development agencies. Empowerment Note 2. 
London: ODI.  
 
Seabright, P. (2002). Chapter 2: Conflicts of objectives and task allocation in aid 
agencies. In: Martens, B. et al. eds. The institutional economics of foreign aid. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Sida (2002a). Aid, Incentives and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of 
Development Cooperation. Main Report. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2002b). Aid, Incentives and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of 
Development Cooperation. Summary Report. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2002c). Participation in Democratic Governance. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2003a). Country Analysis: Ethiopia. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2003b). Country strategy for development cooperation with Ethiopia, 
January 2003 - December 2007. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2003c). Donorship, Ownership and Partnership: Issues Arising from Four 
Sida Studies of Donor-Recipient Relations. Sida Studies in Evaluation 03/03. 
Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2004c). Sida's policy for civil society. Stockholm: Sida.  
 346 
 
Sida (2004a). Looking Back, Moving Forward: Sida Evaluation Manual. Sida 
Studies in Evaluation 97/1. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2004b). Sida's Performance Analyses - quality and use. Stida Studies in 
Evaluation 04/02. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2005b). Performance Management at Sida. Internal Audit 05/05. 
Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2005e). Sida's Learning: Sida's approach to learning. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2005a). How does Sida work with LFA? [www.sida.se; accessed 28.03.06]  
 
Sida (2005c). Policy and Methodology (POM) in brief. [www.sida.se; accessed 
03.04.06]  
 
Sida (2005d). Sida at Work - A Guide to Principles, Procedures and Methods. 
Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (2005f). Sida's role in and responsibility for the global development policy. 
Memorandum. Stockholm: Sida.  
 
Sida (undated-b). The Field Vision: the field takes the lead. [www.sida.se; 
accessed 16.05.05]  
 
Sorenson, J. (1993). Imagining Ethiopia: Struggles for History and Identity in the 
Horn of Africa. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.  
 
Stirrat, R. L. (2008). Mercenaries, Missionaries and Misfits. Critique of 
Anthropology, 28 (4) 406-425. 
 
Strathern, M. (2000). New accountabilities: anthropological studies in audit, 
ethics and the academy. In: Strathern, M. (ed.). Audit Cultures. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Tadasu Tsuruta. (2006). African Imaginations of Moral Economy: Notes on 
Indigenous Economic Concepts and Practices in Tanzania. African Studies 
Quarterly. 9 (1 & 2). 
 
Teferi Abate Adem. (2004). 'Decentralised there, centralised here': Local 
governance and paradoxes of household autonomy and control in North-East 
Ethiopia, 1991-2001. Africa. 74 (4), 611-632. 
 
Tegegne Teka. (2000). International Non-Governmental Organisations in Rural 
Development in Ethiopia: Rhetoric and Practice. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
 
Teshale Tibebu. (2008). Modernity, Eurocentrism, and radical politics in 
Ethiopia, 1961-1991. African Identities. 6 (4), 345-371. 
 
Thomas, A. (1999). What makes good development management? 
Development in Practice. 9 (1&2), 9-17.  
 
Thomas, A. (2000). Development as practice in a liberal capitalist world. Journal 
of International Development. 12, 773-787.  
 347 
 
Thomas, A. (2007). Development Management - Values and Partnerships. 
Journal of International Development. 19, 383-388. 
 
Thomas, M. A. (2004). Can the World Bank Enforce its Own Conditions? 
Development and Change. 35 (3), 485-497.  
 
Tinker, T. (2004). The Enlightenment and its discontents: Antinomies of 
Christianity, Islam and the calculative sciences. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal. 17 (3), 442-475.  
 
Tirfe Mammo. (1999). The Paradox of Africa's Poverty: The role of indigenous 
knowledge, traditional practices and local institutions - the case of Ethiopia. 
Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, Inc.   
 
Toggia, P. (2008). History writing as a state ideological project in Ethiopia. 
African Identities. 6 (4), 319-343. 
 
Triandis, H. C. (1989). the Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural 
Contexts. Psychological Review. 96 (3), 506-520.  
 
Triandis, H. C. (1999). Cross-cultural psychology. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology. 2, 127-143.  
 
Trimingham, J. (1952). Islam in Ethiopia. London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Turner, M. and Hulme, D. (1997). Governance, Administration and 
Development: making the state work. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.   
 
UNDP. (2006). Deepening Democracy and Increasing Popular Participation in 
Vietnam. Hanoi: UNDP. 
 
Uphoff, N. (1996). Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory 
Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science. London: Intermediate 
Technology Publications Ltd.  
 
Vasko, V. et al. (1998). Culture in Finnish Development Cooperation . Helsinki: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 
Vaughan, S. (2003). Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia. PhD thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh.  
 
Vaughan, S. (2004). Ethiopia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment. 
Writenet Report, commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Protection Information Section (DIP). UNHCR.   
 
Vaughan, S. and Tronvoll, K. (2002). The Culture of Power in Contemporary 
Ethiopian Political Life. Stockholm: Sida. 
 
Velayutham, S. and Perera, M. H. B. (1996). The influence of underlying 
metaphysical notions on our interpretation of accounting. Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal. 9 (4), 65-85.  
 
Velautham, S. Accountability and the Catholic Church. Are you surprised? 






Waddington, M. and Mohan, G. (2004). Failing forward: going beyond PRA and 
imposed forms of participation. In. Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. eds. Participation: 
From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in 
development. London: Zed Books. 
 
Waterman, R. W. and Meier, K. J. (1998). Principal-Agent Models: An 
Expansion? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 2, 173-202.  
 
Watson, E. E. (2003). Examining the Potential of Indigenous Institutions for 
Development: A Perspective from Borana, Ethiopia. Development and Change. 
34 (2), 287-309..  
 
Watson, E. (2004). 'What a dolt one is': language learning and fieldwork in 
geography. Area. 36 (1), 59-68.  
 
Wedel, J. R. (2004). 'Studying Through' a Globalizing World: Building Method 
through Aidnographies. In: Gould, J. and Marcussen, H. S. eds. Ethnographies 
of Aid - Exploring development texts and encounters. Roskilde, Denmark: 
International Development Studies, Roskilde University  
 
White, S. C. (1996). Depoliticising development: the uses and abuses of 
participation. Development in Practice. 6 (1), 6-15. 
 
Wilson, G. (2006). Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in 
Development Practice. Development and Change. 37 (3), 501-523.  
 
Wood, G. D. (1998). Projects as Communities: consultants, knowledge and 
power. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal. 16 (1), 54-64.  
 
Wood, G. D. (2003). Staying secure, staying poor: the Faustian bargain. World 
Development. 31 (3), 455-471.   
 
Woodward, K. (2002). Understanding Identity. London: Arnold.    
 
Woolcock, M. (2007). Higher Education, Policy Schools, and Development 
Studies: What Should Masters Degree Students be taught? Journal of 
International Development. 19, 55-73. 
 
Wright, S. and Nelson, N. (1995). Participatory research and participant 
observation: two incompatible approaches. In: Power and Participatory 
Development: Theory and Practice. Nelson, N. and Wright, S. London: ITDG.    
 
Young, J. (1997a). Development and Change in Post-Revolutionary Tigray. 
Journal of Modern African Studies. 35 (1), 81-99.  
 
Young, J. (1997b). Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's 
Liberation Front, 1975 -1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Young, J. (1998). Regionalism and democracy in Ethiopia. Third World 
Quarterly. 19 (2), 191-204.  
 
